ML20004D839
| ML20004D839 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A911 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106100199 | |
| Download: ML20004D839 (4) | |
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April 30, 1981 vier Patsiormt Ttterwows: AntA 704 Straw Paooucteow 373-4083 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II
'101 Marietta Street,. Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 i
Re: Oconee Nuclear Station IE-Inspection Report 50-269/81-04 50-270/81-04 50-287/81-04
Dear Sir:
With re' gard to R. C. Lewis' letter of April 6, 1981 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Cbmpany does not consider the infor-mation contained therein to be proprietary.
Please find attached responses to the cited items of noncompliance.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, executed on April 30, 1981.
Ve truly yours,
.G t.n C d.' 4t t
/ William O. Parker, Jr.
FTP/myk Attachment 8106 10 0 \\CO
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DUKE POWER COMPANY' OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
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Response:to IELInspection Report 50-269/81-04, -270/81-04, -287/81-04 Violation'A l'0 CFR 50.72(a)(7) requires events' of this type' to be reported to the NRC
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Operations Center as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour-of the occurrence.
Contrary to the above, on February 2, 1981, at 1455 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.536275e-4 months <br /> Oconee Unit 2 tripped from'85% full power and the event was not reported to the NRC Operations Center.
This is a Severity Leve1 VI. Violation (Supplement I.F.), applicable to Unit 1.
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Response
This iten is correct. The Assistant Sh!/t Supervisor assigned to Unit 1 at the time of the trip judged that the trf p did not meet any of the criteria for reporting to the NRC Operation's Center. Since the reactor trip resulted from a turbine. trip,. in_ his judgement a Reactor Protective or Engineered Safeguards System actuation had not occurred and thus did not meet Criteria 7 of the-reporting requirements..This erroneous. judgement has been discussed with all Shift Supervisors, including the man se fault in this incident.
Violation B Technical Specification 6.4.la requires adherence to procedures for normal operation and shutdown of systems and. components involving nuclear safety.
Contrary to the above, on February 23, 1981, 1-LP-42 was opened without com-pleting the required removal and restoration procedures which resulted in a Ic... of system status that caused an uncontrolled decrease in the pressurizer-level.
This is a' Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.) applicable to Unit 1.
Response
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,This: violation is correct and is the result of personnel error. The Control
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' Operator intended to increase letdown flow by opening 1HP-42 as the unit was i
fcooling down. He inadvertently instructe'd the Nuclear Equipment Operators to i
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open ILP-42, which they did.
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'Thel erroneous valve configuration was corrected after investigation of a rapid j
decrease in pressurizer-level revealed that 1LP-42 was open instead of 1HP-42.
--The' Control Operator involved was counseled on his deficiencies. The importance
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Joffproper performance of plant evolutions, including required documentation,
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was discussed.in a meeting of Shift Supervisors.
This incident and the corr-tive' action noted above will be reviewed by appropriate Operation's personnel l
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i by Mayl20, 1981.-
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- g Violation D' Technical Specification.3.1.2.4 restricts the secondary side of a steam gener-ator to a maximum.of 237 psig whenever the. vessel shell is at or below 110 F.
Contrary to the above, on February 26, 1981, the Unit 3 steam generator was at 550 psig while the vessel temperature was at 70 F.
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.) applicable to Unit 3.
Response
This item is correct. The apparent cause of the overpressurization was leakage through the startup control valve which filled the steam generator and the i
main steam line. The steam generator was in wet layup at the time and, there-fore, no high level alarm was available.
Immediately after discovery, valves 2SD-5 and 3SD-290 were opened to lower steam generator pressure. A technical analysis of the effect of the excess water on the' steam generator and main steam line has been performed by Duke Design Engineering, and the hangers on the affected systems have been inspected.- No damage to any system was found.
The condensate and feedwater operating procedures has been revised to lower
. steam generator level to between 60% and 80% on the operating range prior to initiating feedwater recirculation, so that a high level alarm is available.
A note-was added to the procedure which specifies closing the startup block valve if the control valve leaks. These corrective actions should prevent recurrence of this type event.
Violation E 10 CFR 20.203 requires each radiation area be conspicuously posted and in-formation be available to aid individuals in minimizing exposure.
Contrary to the above, on February 9, 1981, a janitor's sink located in room 357 of the auxiliary building was found to be contaminated although the room nor the sink were posted.
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement IV.E) applicable to Unit 3.
Response
1 This violation is correct; however, it should be noted that Room 357 is within-the station's Radiation Control Area which is posted as a radiation area.
Room 357 was not included in procedures HP/0/B/1000/54 which lists areas to be periodically surveyed for contamination.
After' identification of the contamination sink, the drain was flushed to remove the contamination. Room 357 has been added to procedure HP/0/B/1000/54 as part of.the routine monitoring requirements.
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~ Violation-F-Technical Specification 6.4.le requires adherence to procedures for main-tenance on systems affecting nucleat safety.
Contrary to the above, on January 30, 1981 on two occasions an Emergency Power Switching Logic Test was not followed, resulting in inadiertent load shed and Keowee Emergency actuation.
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement 'I.E.) applicable to Unit 3.
Response
This violation is correct and was the result of personnel error. The Performance Technician responsible for running the test failed to follow the test procedure. This technician was counseled on the importance of adhering to steps as given in an approved procedure.
In addition, all other technicians in the Performance Group have been given training on following procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.4.le.
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