05000324/LER-1981-048-01, /01T-0:on 810513,while Evaluating RIP Isolation Valve Failure,Eccs Actuation Instrument E41-LSH-NO15B Isolation Was Not Recognized.Caused by Personnel Emphasis on Returning Isolation Valve to Svc.Control Switch Replaced

/01T-0:on 810513,while Evaluating RIP Isolation Valve Failure,Eccs Actuation Instrument E41-LSH-NO15B Isolation Was Not Recognized.Caused by Personnel Emphasis on Returning Isolation Valve to Svc.Control Switch Replaced

ML20004C016
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	05/22/1981
From:	Pastva M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20004C015	List: 05000324/LER-1981-048, Forwards LER 81-048/01T-0 05000324/LER-1981-048-01, /01T-0:on 810513,while Evaluating RIP Isolation Valve Failure,Eccs Actuation Instrument E41-LSH-NO15B Isolation Was Not Recognized.Caused by Personnel Emphasis on Returning Isolation Valve to Svc.Control Switch Replaced
References
LER-81-048-01T, LER-81-48-1T, NUDOCS 8106010423
Download: ML20004C016 (2)

LER-1981-048, /01T-0:on 810513,while Evaluating RIP Isolation Valve Failure,Eccs Actuation Instrument E41-LSH-NO15B Isolation Was Not Recognized.Caused by Personnel Emphasis on Returning Isolation Valve to Svc.Control Switch Replaced

Event date:
Report date:
3241981048R01 - NRC Website

text

N8lIC FORM 364 U.S. NUCLEA7 CEOULATCGY COMMISSION 77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l

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!PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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8 60 61 DOCK ET NUY9E R 64 63 EVENT DATE i4 7b REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h a 2 l While evaluating the failure of RIP isolation valve, X-206D position D to open, it l

o 3 l was discovered that the isolation of the affected ECCS actuation instrument,

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ITT71l E41-LSH-N015B had not been recognized and the appropriate action statement followed. l ITTT1 i This is one of two instruments used to shif t HPCI suction to the torus on a high i

O 6 l torus level. The other switch was operable. This event did not affect the health l

ITITl I or safety of the public.

l l o Ia i i Technical Specification 3.3.3, 6.9.1.8b l

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3J 34 35 36 31 40 el 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h li10ll A failure to recognize the isolation of the instrument due to emphasis placed on l

L' Li j l returning the isolation valve to service caused this event.

The valve control switchI i 2 l was replaced and the valve was rmturned to service within 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, which returned I i 3 l the instrument to service.

The involved person has been counseled concerning the I

d4_) I importance of technical scecification awareness when a piece of equipment is inoperable.

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M. J. Pastva, J r.

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I.ER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-81-48 Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2 Event Date:

5/13/81 This event occurred as a result of a personnel error on the part of the duty Shif t Foreman who failed to recognize the isolation of the affected instrument, and take the appropriate corrective actions specified in the technical specifications.

While performing PT 3.1.11PC, RIP isolation valve, X-206D position D failed in the closed position due to a broken control switch, Master Specialities, Model No.10EF4, on the reactor turbine gauge board.

An examination of the control switch revealed a broken bakelite pivot piece which prevented the switch actuation plunger from resetting the switch contacts after the valve was closed.

The broken control switch was then replaced, satisfactorily tested, and the valve was reopened approximately 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after the switch failure.

While investigating the valve closure failure, it was discovered through e.n examination of plant documentation that the isolation of the affected instrument, 2-E41-I.SH-N015B, had not been identified and that the applicable action statement as specified in the technical specification had not been performed.

The closing of the RIP isolation valve isolated one of two suppression pool level instruments that transfers HPCI suction point from the condensate storage tank to the suppression chamber on receipt of a high level signal from the suppression pool. The other switch which transfers the HPCI suction on a high suppression pool level was operable and both switches which shift the HPCI suction to the suppression pool on a low condensate storage tank level were operable.

' Due to emphasis placed on returning the RIP isolation valve to normal operation, the isolation of the N0153 level switch was overlooked. The involved Shift Foreman has been specifically counseled to be constantly aware of all aspects pertaining to technical specifications when plant equipment or co=ponents are inoperable or out of service. In addition, all shift licensed personnel will review this LER to ensure their awareness of this concern.

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