ML20003G495
| ML20003G495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1981 |
| From: | William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8104290672 | |
| Download: ML20003G495 (6) | |
Text
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-y_g Omaha Public Power District 1623 MARNEY a OMANA. N E 8 R A S e( A 68102 e TE L.EPH O N E S36 4000 AREA CODE 402 February 27, 1981 To ADM/DMB:
PDR LPDR NSIC Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director
@TM U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ADM/Kdts Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Seyfrit:
Omaha Public Power District's letter dated June 6, 1980, was submitted in response to IE Bulletin 80-06 regarding Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) reset controls.
In the enclosure to the letter, the District indicated that 43 components were to receive engineering evaluation to determine the need for additional corrective action.
As requested by Mr. Wagner of the Commission, a summary of the results of the engineering evaluations is attached.
Sincerely,
%!D W.C.NonManager Jones Divis Production Operations WCJ/KJM/TLP:jmm Attachment cc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 4
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~1 TABLE 1 Valve /Eauipment Name Analyses PCV-521 Cont.' Valve for Waste Disposal Gas to Stack-Note 1 HCV-480 Inlet Shutdown Heat Exchanger 4A Note 2 HCV-484 Outlet Shutdown Heat Exchanger 4A Note 2 HCV-481 Inlet Shutdown Heat Exchanger 4B Note 2 HCV-485 Outlet Shutdown Heat Exchanger 4B Note 2 HCV-489A Inlet to AC-1 A Note 3 HCV-4898 Outlet to AC-1A Note 3 HCV-490A Inlet to AC-1B Note 3 HCV-490B Outlet to AC-lB Note 3 HCV-491A Inlet to AC-lC Note 3 HCV-491B Outlet to AC-1C Note 3 HCV-492A Inlet to AC-lD Note 3 HCV-492B Outlet to AC-10 Note 3 PCV-2909 Leakage Cooler 4A Pressure Operated Control Valve Note 4 PCV-2929 Leakage Cooler 4B Pressure Operated Control Valve Note 4 PCV-2949 Leakage Cooler 4C Pressure Operated Control Valve Note 4 PCV-2969 Leakage Cooler 40 Pressure Operated Control Valve Note 4 CH-4A Boric Acid Pump Note 5 CH-48 Boric Acid Pump Note 5 FCV-269 Boric Acid Control Valve Downstream 4
of FCV-269Y Note 6 LCV-218-2 Volume Control Tank Outlet and Low Level Isolation Note 7 HCV-2808A Inlet LPSI-1A Note 8 HCV-28088 Outlet LPSI-1 A Note 8 HCV-2809A Inlet LPSI-1B Note 8 HCV-28098 Outlet LPSI-lB Note 8 HCV-2810A Inlet HPSI-2A-Note 8 HCV-281CB Outlet HPSI-2A Note 8 HCV-2811A Inlet HPSI-28 Note 8 HCV-28118 Outlet HPSI-28 Note 8 HCV-2812A Inlet HPSI-2C Note 8
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Valve /Eculoment Name-Analyses HCV-2812B Cutlet HPSI-2C-Note 8 HCV-2813A Inlet Containment Spray SI-3A Note 8 HCV-28133 Outlet Containment Spray SI-3A Note 8 HCV-2814A Inlet Containment Spray SI-3S Note 8 HCV-2814B Outlet Containment Spray 51-3B Note 8 ECV-2815A Inlet Containment Spray SI-3C Note 8 HCV-28153' Outlet Containment Spray. SI-3C Note 8 CW-45A Deaerator Vacuum Pump Note 9 DM-463 Deaerator Vacuum Pumo Note 9 WD-2A Reactor Coolant Orain Tank Pump Note 10 WD-23 Reactor Ccolant Drain Tank Pump Note 10 i
HCV-344 Containment Spray Valve Note 11 HCV-345 Contain:ent Spray Valve Note-11 O
1
1 Note 1:
The function performed by PCV-521 is to exhaust gas from the gas decay tanks to atmosphere.
Valve PCV-521 will go open upon ESF reset.
Although the Stack Radiation Monitor Signal will immediately close the valve upon excessive radiation in the stack, the District is processing EEAR 80-52 to modify the control circuit such that PCV-521 remains closed when the accident signal is reset.
Note 2:
HCV's 480, 481, 484, and 485 are the inlet and outlet valves supplying ccaponent cooling water to the shutdown heat exchangers.
The engineering evaluation recommended that the control circuitry for valves HCV-480, 481, 484, and 485 be modified to ensure that the valves remain open after ESF reset.
The District is processing EEAR 80-53 to modify the control circuits to ensure the valves open on reset of ESF signals.
Note 3:
HCV's 489A, 4893, 490A, 4908, 491A, 4915, 492A, 'and 4925 are the inlet and outlet valves supplying component cooling water to the com-ponent cooling heat excnangers.
The aforementioned valves are ocen con-tinuousiv under normal ccnditions.
Actuation of tne ESF signal ano :ne suosecuent reset of the ESF signal will not affect the operation of these valves The ESF signal would operate the valves to the open position should any valves be closed.
The position of the control switch prevents the operation of these valves to the closed position.
No modification to these valves' control circuit is planned.
Note 4:
PCV's 2909, 2929, 1949, and 2959 are pressure control valves whose main function is to control leakage from the reactor coolant system into the safety injection system.
Valves PCV-2909, 2929, 2949, and 2959 will operate only if there is high pressure between the check valves sepa-rating the Safety Injection System and Reactor Coolant System.
Due to the non-critical function performed by these valves and that Emergency Procedure EP-35 identifies the valves as valves that will change post-tion upon ESF reset, no modifications are planned for PCV's 2909, 2929, 29?9, and 2959.
Note 5:
The function of the boric acid pumps CH-4A and 4B under post-accident conditions is to supply concentrated boric acid to the suction of the charging pumps.
Upon reset of the SIAS lockouts, the boric acid pumps are de-energized.
Charging fluid is not essential to the safe shutdown of the plant.
Alternate supplies to the charging pumps can be taken from the SIRW tank, volume control tank, and the concentrated boric acid gravity feedline.
No modifications are planned for the boric acid pumps.
Note 6:
The function of valve FCV-269 is to supply makeup boric acid solution to the volume control tank.
After reset of the ESF signal, FCV-269 will open.
Boric acid and demineralized water is supplied to FCV-269 by valves FCV-269Y and FCV-269X, respectively.
These valves are controlled by operation action.
FCV-269 is not essential to the safe shutdown of the plant and no modifications are required.
Note 7:
LCV-218-2 supplies borated water from the volume control tank to the suction of the charging pumps.
The opening of valve LCV-218-2 upon ESF reset provides an alternate supply for the charging pumps should charging flow be required.
Note that charging fluid is not necessary to the safe shutdown of the plant.
No modifications for LCV-218 9 are planned.
Note 8:
The function of valves HCV-2808 through 2815A and B is to supply component cooling water to the containment spray and safety injection pump bearing coolers.
Upon reset of the ESF signal, the aforementioned valves will close.
For each containment spray and safety injection pump operating at the time of ESF reset, annunciation panel Al on control boards CB-1, 2, and 3 will alarm in the form of bearing cooler no flow alarms. The loss of cooling water can easily be observed and corrective action can be taken.
No modifications are planned for valves HCV-2808 through 2815A and B.
Note 9:
The function of the deaerator vacuum pumps CW-6A and B is to remove the non-condensable gases in the primary water that is beirg stored for use.
Upon reset of the ESF signal, the pump (s) would start pulling vacuum off of the primary water vacuum deaerator.
The pumps are not essential to the safe shutdown of the plant and no modifications are being planned.
Note 10:
The function of the reactor coolant drain tank pumps WD-2A and 2B is to control the level in the reactor coolant drain tank.
Upon actu-ation of the ESF signal, the pumps are de-energized regardless of tank I
level. Valves HCV-500A and B, located on the discharge side of the pumps, are closed and remain closed after ESF reset.
The closing of valves HCV-500A and B isolates the containment building from the auxi-i l
liary building in post-accident conditions.
Upon reset of the ESF l
signal, the pumps may be energized if the level in the reactor coolant l
drain tank is high.
In post-accident conditions following ESF reset, the reactor coolant drain tank pumps would then be deadheaded against valves HCV-500A and B.
The pumps are not essential to the safe shutdown l
of the plant.
Modifications to control circuitry are being considered i
for the protection of the pump itself and are not safety related what-l soever.
tiote 11:
Containment spray valves are closed in the first step of. Emergency Procedure EP-35 (Reset of Engineered Safeguards) when ESF signals have cleared. The closure is made by operator acticn through the use of a hand controller located in the control room, fio modification is being planned for HCV's 344 and 345.
However, EP-35' will be revised to re-quire the hand controllers to be placed in the full open position prior to ESF reset.
This action would prevent the deadheading of.the contain-ment spray pumps and would keep. the pumps available for service.
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