ML20003E333
| ML20003E333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1981 |
| From: | Callan L, Hunnicutt D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003E330 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-80-24, 50-368-80-24, NUDOCS 8104020910 | |
| Download: ML20003E333 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1980024
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-313/80-24
License No. OPR-51
50-368/80-24
Licensee:
Arkarsas Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
Inspection at:
ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection conducted:
November 22 - December 21, 1980
Inspectors:
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t W. D. Jonnson, Senior Resident Inspector
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v* L. J. Callan, Resident Inspector
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Approved by:
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0. M. Hunnicutt, Chief,
Date
Reactor Projects Section No. 2
Inspection Summary
Inspection conducted during period of November 22 - December 21, 1980
(Report No. 50-313/80-24)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection including Surveillance Observation,
Maintenance, Followup on Licensee Event Reports, Operational Safety Verification,
Followup on_ Previously Identified Items, and Preparation for Refueling.
The inspection involved eighty-six (86) inspector hours on site by two (2) NRC
inspectors.
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Results:
Within the six areas inspected, one violation was identified.
' Inspection conducted during Deriod of November 22 - December 21, 1980
(Report No. 50-368/80-24)
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dreas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection including Operational Safety
Ver1rication, Surveillance Observation, Maintenance, and Followup on Previously
Identified Items.
The inspection involved ninety-one (91) inspector hours on site by two (2) NRC
inspectors.
Results:
In the four (4) areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified in three (3) areas.
One apparent violation was identified in
one area, (Violation, Severity Level IV, failure to control issuance of keys
to a high radiation area door as committed in a letter to the Commission dated
August 27, 1980, paragraph 7).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO General Manager
G. H. Miller, Engineering & Technical Support Manager
B. A. Baker, Operations Manager
T. N. Cogburn, Plant Analysis Superintendant
E. C. Ewing, Plant Engineering Superintenlent
L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager
J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent
J. Albers, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor
D. O. Snellings, Technical Analysis Superintendent
L. Bell, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent
D. Glenn, Health Physics Supervisor
The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,
technicians and administrative personnel.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
(Closed) Open item 368/8003-04:
Margin to saturation system operating
procedure.
Procedure 2105.12, entitled "RCS Saturation Margin Calculator
Operations," was issued on November 18, 1980.
(Closed)
Infraction 313/8010-04:
Physical barriers.
The licensee's corrective action on this item is considered
satisfactory.
(Closed)
Infraction 368/8010-04:
Shutdown margin calculation.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action on this
item, including revised procedure 2103.15, and had no further
questions.
(Closed)
Infraction 368/8011-01:
Pressurizer code safety valve.
The licensee submitted a proposed Technical Specification change
related to this item on August 29, 1980.
(Closed)
Infraction 313/8011-01; 368/8011-04:
Vital area security.
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The licensee's corrective action on this item was satisfactorily
completed.
(Closed)
Infraction 368/8011-02:
Radiation area posting.
The licensee's corrective action on this item was satisfactorily
completed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 368/8011-08: Gagging pressurizer code safety
valve.
The licensee and the inspector have been unable to determine the
exact time of removal of the safety valve gag. The inspector has
determined that if the ten-hour permitted gagging period was ex-
ceeded, it was only exceeded for a short time.
Further investiga-
tion is unwarranted.
(Closed)
Infraction 368/8017-01:
Inoperable containment cooling units.
The licensee's corrective action on this item has been satisfactorily
completed.
-(Closed) Deficiency 368/8017-03:
Failure to submit a Licensee Event Report.
The licensee has submitted LER 80-76 as correct've action on this
item.
-(Closed) Open Item 368/8017-05: Label on breaker 2B63E5.
The label on this breaker has been corrected.
(Closed) Open Item 368/8017-06: Housekeeping in the electrical penetration
area on elevation 386.
This area has received the needed housekeeping attention.
(Closed) Open Item 313/8017-01; 368/8017-07:
Doors on radwaste storage
building.
The roll-up doors on this building have been repaired and closed.
(Closed)
Deviation 313/8018-01; 368/8018-01: Actions on IE Bulletin 80-10:
On October 30, 1980, the licensee submitted a revised response to
IEB 80-10 in response to.this item.
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3.
Preoaration for Refuelino -(Unit 1)
The inspector witnessed the inspection and storage of 'three new fuel
assemblies on December 2,1980, and the shuffling of several burnable
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poison rod assemblies on-December 4,1980. No viclations or deviations
were identified during the observation of these activities.
This inspection
effort,' including review of the licensee's procedures for fuel handling,
core verification, fuel inspection, fuel sipping and core internals handling
will be continued in the next inspection period.
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4.
Licensee Event Reoorts Followuo (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed five event reports (80-09, 16, 25, 37 and 39) con-
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cerning the Unit 1 Hydrogen Purge System that have been issued during the
past seven months.
Due to the large number of event reports in such a
relatively short period of time, the inspector developed a concern for the
reliability of the Hydrogea Purge System and, therefore, reviewed the event
report history of this system over the last two years.
The result of this
review is as follows:
Licensee Event
Date of
Report Number
Descriotion
Occurrence
78-11
Hydrogen Purge fan (VEF 37A)
4/19/78
tripped during surveillance
78-16
Hydrogen Purge fan (VSF 30A)
5/19/78
tripped during surveillance
79-01
Supply filter to Hydrogen Purge
1/12/79
System (VFA 208) failed during
surveillance
79-09
Hydrogen Purge fan (VSF-30A)
6/28/79
tripped during surveillance
80-01
Hydrogen Purge Supply Isolation
1/14/80
valve failed
80-02
Hydrogen Purge Exhaust
1/14/80
Isolation valve failed
80-09
Hydrogen Purge Supply fan
3/28/80
(VSF 30A) tripped during
surveillance
80-16
Hydrogen Purge System
6/11/80
flow rate low
80-25
Hydrogen Purge fan (VEF 378)
7/11/80
tripped during surveillance
80-37
Hydrogen Purge fan (VEF 37A)
9/29/80
tripped during surveillance
80-39
Hydrogen Purge fan (VEF 37A)
10/28/80
tripped during surveillance
The inspector reviewed the above history of failures for the Hydrogen Purge
System with licensee representatives and determined that the licensee-is
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pursuing engineering solutions to the system's problems.
Design change 0625
has been issued by the licensee to modify the seal water supply to the
Hydrogen Purge System fans by providing solenoid isolation valves to the
seal water supply.
These solenoid valves will isolate the seal water from
the fans when the fans are not in operation and will automatically open when
the fans start.
This design change results from the licensee's belies' that the major cause
of system failure has been system fouling and flow degradation caused by
seal water leaking by the seals on idle hydrogen purge fans and thereby
filling the hydrogen purge piping.
Event reports 80-09, 80-16, 80-25, 80-37, and 80-39 will remain open pending
a final engineering solution to the Hydrogen Purge System's Problems.
The
inspector will follow the licensee's efforts in this area to ensure that
corrective action is taken in a timely fashion.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector observed the technical specification required surveillance
testing on the Unit 2 steam driven emergency feedwater pump (2P7A) and
verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures,
that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for
operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components
were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications
and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during
the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate manigement
personnel.
The pump room floor drain was found to be clogged during this
test on December 17, 1980.
This condition was not corrected prior to the
next scheduled run of the pump later the same day, resulting in flooding
the 2P7A pump room floor to the point of overflowing to the 2P78 pump room.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Diesel Fire Pump Monthly Test (1104.32 Supplement II)
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Decay Heat Removal Pump (P34A) Monthly Test (1104.04 Supplement I)
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Unit 2 Diesel Generator Monthly Test (2104.36 Supplement II)
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Unit 2 Tendon Surveillance (2304.91)
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Unit 2 ' A' High Pressure Injection Pump Monthly Test (2104.39 Supplement I)
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
During the observation of the monthly test of No. 2 Diesel Generator for
Unit 2, the inspector noted a potentially significant problem with the
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physical arrangement of the diesel exhaust outlet and the control room
ventilation suction.
Specifically, during this test a large amount of
diesel exhaust was sucked into the control room through the ventilation
supply.
In less than one minute, until an operator was able to isolate the
control room ventilation supply from the outside (by going into "recirc"),
enough diesel fumes entered the control room to slightly affect visibility
and to discomfort the operators.
It appears that such a result during coera-
tion of the diesel generators occurs only if the wind conditions blow the
diesel exhaust towards the control room ventilation suction which is located
close by the diesel exhaust outlets.
This matter has been discussed with
licensee representatives and the licensee has indicated that an engineering
evaluation will be initiated with the intent to make the necessary modifi-
cations to prevent recurrence.
This item will remain open pending the
inspector's review of the licensee's corrective action (368/8024-01).
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guicas and industry codes
or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting con-
ditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable;
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning
components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained;
activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials
used were properly certified; radiological controls were icplemented; and,
fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance
which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Job Order 3048, Repair Charging Pump Suction Line Crack
Job Order 5001, Repair 2P7B
Job Order 4660, Repack 2P7A
Job Order 2029, Calibrate 2PIS-0795
Following comp.ation of maintenance on the emergency.feedwater pumps (2P7A
and 2P78), the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to
service properly.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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7.
Operational Safety Verfication (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operators.
The inspectors
verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout
records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours
of accessible areas of the units were conducted to observe plant equipment
conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive
vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct
interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented
in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified
implementation of radiation protection controls.
The inspector walked down
the accessible portions of the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Air Start Systems,
Unit 2 Na0H injection systems, and the Unit 1 "B" Low Pressure Safety In-
jection system to verify operability.
The inspector verified the breaker
alignment on the following engineered safety features 480 volt motor
control centers:
Unit 1 - 85, 851, B52, B53
B6, B61, 862, 863
Unit 2 - 295, 2851, 2B52, 2853, 2B54
286, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2864
No breaker misalignments were identified but the inspector noted several
other discrepancies such as indication light bulbs burned out, breakers
labeled erroneously,-breakers not labeled, alignment procedure update
needed, and drawing update needed.
The licensee corrected most of these
items prior to the end of the inspection period and had initiated corrective
action on the remaining items.
The inspector also witnessed portions of
the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments
and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility opera-
tions were in conformance with the requirements established under technical
specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
During a tour of the Unit 2 auxiliary building on December 12, 1980, the
inspector noted that control of keys to doors providing access to high
radiation areas was not consistent with a commitment made by the licensee
in a letter to the Commission dated August 27, 1980, in' response to Inspection
Report 368/80-11.
This letter provides, in part, the corrective action
taker as a result of infraction 368/8011-3 which related to the licensee's
failure to provide. adequate access control to high radiation area doors.
One item of corrective action specified for this infraction was that
" . . . Issuance of keys'to high radiation area doors has been removed
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from Plant Security responsibility and is under the administrative control
of Health Physics personnel and the shift supervisor." Contrary to the
above, the inspector was provided a key to door 359 by Plant Security
personnel without any administrative controls by Health Physics personnel.
Door 359 provides access to the Unit 2 South Piping Room which is a posted
High Radiation Area with accessible whole-body radiation of 100 millirems
per hour.
(368/8024-02)
8.
Exit Interview
"
The inspectors met with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant General Manager) and
other members of the AP&L staff at the end of various segments of this
inspection.
At these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of
the inspection and the findings.
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