ML20003D614
| ML20003D614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1981 |
| From: | Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103270807 | |
| Download: ML20003D614 (63) | |
Text
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- BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY P. O. B O X 1475 B A LTIM O R E. M ARY L A N D 212O3
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O Washington, D. C.
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Cubject: Calvert Cliffs ?Iuclear fover flant IG Units ?'os. 1 & ?,I'ockets ':es. S-?l" % 50-319 Fire Protection "od!*ications Dear "r.
F5enhut:
10CFR 50.h8 renuires subnittal of certain infornstion within 30 days of the effective date of that Fection.
Ir'crnati :n remtired consists of:
a) Plans and schedu3 es for neetinc require ~.ents of Anne adix R; b) DesiFn description of nodifications to rect Anrendix R Section III.G.3 concerninc automatic shutdown esrahilities; c) Peauests for exenntion from Anpendix
- recuirenents.
t Plans and Schedules l
Plans and schedules for open Annendix R itens were discussed in our letter of 12/29/80, written in resncnse to vour letter of ll/2L/80.
Encionure 2 to your 11/M letter listed all remaininc itens required to meet Appendix R.
The discussions in our 12/20 letter renain valid, excent as discussed under "Exemntion Peauests" below, and except that our previous responses to SER item 3.3.7, cuality Assurance "rocram, have since been found acceptable by your staff; we vere inforned of this accentance in a recent phone conversation with your !'.r.
Thouch engineering, procurement, and installation schedules are tight, our intent is still to complete these items by the required comnletion dates listel in that letter, excent for specific chances to nlant systems required to neet certain aspects of the Safe Shutdown Study. ' houch these chances have not yet been specifically defined, they are likely to be limited by delivery of equipnent. We vill inform you, of course, of any chances in these schedules as plans become nore firm.
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n Your letter o' IP/?0/F1 reauag al '",i a ns-t o' our su'-i t r l of nlans and schetules ve include an asears ar*
cf our conrlianca with Feetions I!I.0, III..', and III.0 o' Arrorl: x '. na require 1 hv C'..5'.
Plans for Fection III.G (" ire "rotaation o' 'n'e 'hutievn Carabilitv ' are referred to above and are discussed in ictnil Lalow under "Alternste Fafe Shutdown". We have concluded that we connly with Section I!I.J (Rnercency Lighting). We also connly with Cection
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("CF Lube Oil Collection ), and this is further discussed below under "fxemptien Feauests".
Alternate Shutdovn Our "Fenort on Alternate "a 4 ^utievn" is attached.
"he nystans aeproach to safe shutdown detailed in this re-ort was develored to nrovide the alternative shutdown canabflity saee!" -i in Fection IT!.^.1 o' Arrendix R for all areas in the plant vhere sara thutievn cannot be assured ine to equipment or cable damage caused by a fire, or from fire surrression activities.-
The report renlaces page-70' 6 *k-cuch FEA-10 previously sunnlied to you as nart of our 12/P1/~n rubnittal which addressed Tecticn 3.2.1 of the Fire Protection SFF date d 3 '1"/'C.
Tauinnent lists and onerating descrintions originally nrenerrei vera intended to trovi de sa'e shutdown canability when combined with
- ire "rotection reasures.
~redit for automatic sunnression to nrotect unique devices, or redundant devices in close nroxinity, was subsequently not allaved by Annendix r, and therefore our nrevious approach has been replaced Sv a detailed systens analysis in order to identify alternate devices er nethods of creration available to achieve a safe and orderly shutdown.
General systen descriptions are sunplied to provide an overall understanding of nlant operation after a rostulated fire, as well as detailed descrintions includine device nunters.
"o better visualize interrelations, logic diagrans are included as attachnents to the renort. A senarate diagran is included for each systen functicn and all diacrans are designed to stand alone. Equinnent recuired for ore than one function is included on each anplicable diarran. The diarrann are constructed of rarallel and series paths representing the logical "or" and the lorical "and".
They are not flow diagrams.
No specific operation of a device is inplied by its presence on a diagram; the intent is only to show the various conhinations of equipment which the enerator nay use to achieve the required systen function.
In addition to all cables related to a particular device, analysis l.
is being perforned for all cables which are associated with the safe shutdown
, circuit either electrically or physically (i.e. where senaration in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 is not provided).
It should be noted that althouch t
. previous submittal.information addressed redundant channel racevave in each room, the' analysis presently underway vill curnly the steeific connequences
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to systen operation of each postulated ' ire, since individual circuite rathar than entire raceways are being studied.
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I and ^ centsinrents sra nitschei tr *be repcrt ss exannies. For there nrese, releestion of three rrecruricer instrurent loop transnitters, rercutine of their cables, and rercutinc of cables to esch FOF7 vere identified as necessarv to insure ssfe shutdrvn capability. Additionally, cable trays vere identified which cenpromised *he elesr herieental air space between redundant devices.
Fhelesine these trsvr trovides the required separation.
he mcdifications listed in the report are these required to provide alternate shutdevn carability independent of dansre to cabline snd equin ent in the plant areas addressed specifically in the c:r.
.nere the requirenents of Sections III.G.1 and !!I.~.2 are not net,.cdificatiens m.
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requirements to achieve cold shutdevn vithin ~2 hours. Fcr this criteria ve intend to follev the cuidelines of Feetien I and Section !!!.^.1.
C'viousiv, nedifiestions vill be done in accordsnee vith l' "r"
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retsiled analysis of all renaininc clant areas is centinuir.c.
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by your letter of 2/20/91 is an intecral part of the results of this d on a centinuine basis in erder to stuiy. As such, it vill be renerate meet these sched21es and vill not te available by 5/19/51. We believe the attached study, with detailed results for the two exsnple arens, vill trovide the information you require for evaluation.
Fre-ntion Feeuests 1.
Mose Tests Atpendix ?Section III.E, "ydrostatic Ecse Tests, steeifiec periodic tests at the creater of 300 psi or 50 nsi above esxinun fire -sin operatine pressure.
- ~FPA 106 specifies that the initial hece test te at 300 rei, with subsequent periodic tests at 50 nsi creater than nsxinu-operating tressure. The intent specified in vcur Technical Basis was to invoke requirerents of ';FFA lo6; the intent specified in yeur "~ennent Fesolutien" vas that "all hose vould be tested at a nressure creater thsn the maxinun pressure found in the fire trotec*ien vater distribution systens".
Thouph this was not listed by you as an open iten, ve brine to your attention that our interpretation of this section is for reriolic tests at 50 tri creater than naximun operatine nressure.
!f ar. exenttien is required for this interpretation, ve hereby request one.
2.
lube Oil Collection Arrendix ? Ceetion !!!.O requires that the ??? lute oil ecliection systen shall he "so designed, encineered, and installed... thst there is a Cafe Shutiovn Inrthouska".
ressonable sssurance that the systen vill withstan d P00R ORlG NAL
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- his critaria is mat corrletely Fv the 'yrte- 'urt in9* C la 2 i n t oi'
's! vert cliefs units.
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sunrorted and restraineI to Drevent P0va9 ant in Mr7 *irectf0n i:-ine 3 resien ?ssis Farthquake, rreviiine assursnee that
- hey.111 er'ern their function durinc cr followinr a fafe Shutde m Firthquake.
nr exa-rtirn is required for this desirn, ve hereby requaet ene.
3.
rire Farriers Appendix ? Sectien III.G discusses recuirerents for seraration of safe chutdevn equinnent into separate ' ire arear.
is silent rerardinc exactly how the criteria can he net, though in Fee.ien !!!." criteria are provided for fire doors when they are uset te serarste : ire area.
In previous resnonses, ve nroposei and rrovidei 'u3tification 'or selective use of vater curtains for certain openince in fire barriers. in lieu of fire doors.
This vould appear to be allovel by Ar;endix ^ prcvided water curtains could be shown to provide a fire ?1 rier neetine the arpliesble three-hour or one-hour criteria. Your disanrraval of our pronocals to neet SEF Iten 3.2.1 vas based on two reneral toints :
(a) The centention that the autorntic citar unrre:sien systen which nrevides the water curtain vill u: 1 vi c : e setuatei ani (b) Lack of evidence denenstratine a" activeness cf rueh a Farrier.
Fecarding point ia), it vould appear that the a: ustion nechanis-for the water curtain (fusible links) is sinilar to Pe rechanisn rernitted by Section III.N.3 for closure of doors.
"his slin retential for failure of actuation vould therefore anpet. to be necen*atie in Anrendix 7 Fecardine coint (b), ve are troposing nerfernance of - test F ' sn indenendent labor-atory to der.cnstrate the equivalence of a vtter curtcin to three-hour and/or
'*e therefore request an exerrtion fror the nrevious one-hour barriers.
staff internretatien which allows no crelit 'er water curtains, rendinc successful completion of the nroposed test.
'e vill finalize plans #ce the test unen receint of firm indication fren vru that such an antroac? vill be acceptable.
1 General All connitnents nade as a result of Annendix ? assune its status rer.ains the sse'.
Ecvever, it should be elc ely understood that the natters discussed herein are subject to the outcoma e' litiration currently nending in the I?nited States Court of Anneals for the 'istrict of Colutbla, of which our Conpany is a party, being:
Connecticut li cht and Pever Co., e t.31. v FEC (No. 81-1090).
"o vaiver of rights, ernress er implied, is intended as the result of any connittent or obliestion, :ontained in this letter, which nay later be inconsistent with the results of sail litiration.
Very truly yours, i
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?epc.n. On Alte nate Safe Shutde'.~
4f.4w Calve-t Cliffs "--'a-- Ocver "lant Units 1 snd 2 7/25/B0 Revised 2/19/61
Alternate Safe Shutdown Renuire=ents S"P Iten 3.2.1 Purtone This report addrerses the systems and equitment necessarv to reach hot and cold shutdown at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with U. S. '?uclesr Regulatory Co= mission 10CFR Part 50 Appendix R.
Modifications are croposed to provide alternate ssfe shutdown in the event of a postulated fire.
Definitions Hot Standby - That condition which exists after CEA's have been inserted into the core, per cent rated thermal power is 0, Keff is less than 0.99 and the averare coolant temperature is greater than or eoual to 300 F.
Hot Shutdovn - That condition which exists when per cent rated tower is 0.
K is less than 0.9o and the averare coolant temperature is gf greater than 200 F but less than 300 F.
Cold Shutdown - That condition which exists when per cent rated cover is 0, Keff is less than 0.99 and thc averace coolant temperature is less than or ecusl to 200*F.
Reactivity Control Function - That process required to place and maintain the reactor in a suberitical condition.
Reactor Coolant Make-un Function - That process reouired to maintain primary 5
coolant within the range of pressurizer level indication.
Reactor Heat Removal Function - That process reouired to carry decay heat from the primary system durins; the cool down process.
Process Monitoring Function - Instrumentation required to monitor process variables related to the above functions.
Suuport - Diesel generators, service water, corrrinications, etc. required to perform the above functions. -
e Assumntions 1.
Single failure criteria are net applicable.
2.
No other plant accidents are assu=ed to occur except as nreeinitated by the postulated fire.
3.
Ecuipment used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the postulated fire shall be capable of being povered by onsite and offsite power sources or by onsite power systens that are independent of the offsite power systems.
h.
Ecuinne.t usei srter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the nostulated fire can be nevered by offsite nover tources.
5 If a fire causes electrical shorts or overloads, trotective devices are assured to function nronerly except as effected by the postulated fire.
6.
After detection of a fire it is assumed thst reactor trip can be accor-plished from the control roon. In the event of a fire which necessitates evacuation of the control room, it is assuned that reactor trip can be accomplished prior to this evacuation followed by local trip of the h80 volt power to the rod control notor generator sets.
7.
A defense in depth aporoach was taken as dictated in Appendix R.
In the consideration of alternate safe shutdown, it was assured that the nostu-lated fire started and was not prometly extineuished by the combination of automatic supprussion and detection systems or manual surpression.
8.
It was further assumed that all ecuinnent and cables in a speciff e area, except where senaration is nrovided by over 20' of clear horizontal air space, are disabled by the postulated fire, but that valves remain functional and manual operators can be operated after the fire is extinguished.
Pipes and heat exchangers in systems normally carrying water are assumed to be undamaged by the fire.
9.
Local operation of cold shutdown r - ipment where available is assu ed possible since the postulated fire is assumed to be extinguished prior to commencement of cold shutdown procedures.
10.
Turbine trip can be accomplished manaally in the turbine hall.
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Descriptien of Shutdern Systers Unless noted all descriptions are applicable to both units. Unit 1 room nu=bers vill be referenced.
Systems Recuired for Hot Standby Reactivity control required to place an operating unit in hot standby is acco:plished by insertion of CEA's into the core. Interruption of 2h0VAC fro = motor-generator sets located in the switchgear roo=s, #h30 and #317, vill cause the rods to drop. Rod insertion is normally initiated fro = the control roo=, however 2h0 VAC can be re=oved locally in the cable spreading roo=, #306, or the h80 VAC supply to the motor-generator sets can be recoved locally in the switchgear rooms.
Reactor coolant inventory is maintained during cooldown by keeping both pressurizer PORV's or their motor operated block valves closed. All are located in the contain=ent. Additionally, one of two redundant reactor cool-ant pump seal leak-off header valves, one of two redundant reactor vessel vent valves, one of two redundant pressurizer vessel vent valves, one of two redundant shut down cooling return isolation valves, and all sa=ple header valves or the combined sample header valve must be maintained shut. In each case, redundant valves are both inside and outside the containment structure. Primary coolant system make-up can be supplied by one of three charging pu=ps fro = the concen-trated boric acid tanks or the refueling water tank.
Auxiliary feedvater can be supplied to the steam generators by one of two redundant steam driven A W pumps located in roon #603 Either pump can be supplied with stea= from a common header which is in turn supplied by either steam generator. Both A W pu=ps can drav vater from three condensate storage tanks, however for the purpose of this report, credit is taken only for conden-sate storage tank #12 which is covered in the Technical Specifications for Calvert Cliffs. AW pu=p feedvater discharge is supplied to a co==on header m
and then to either (or both) stea= generator through flow centrol valves located in roo: #316. 3cth flev centrol valves open en less of pcver er control air. Heat is re=oved frc= each stea: generator through an atzespherie d=p valve or eight stea generator safety valves. 3cth du=p valves are located in roc = #k26. One stea= generater and associated valves is sufficient L, reach het shut down.
Reactor coolant syste= press =e can be =aintained d=ing cooldoe using the pressuri:er heaters (electric). Redundant banks of heaters are fed frc= the switchgear roo=s, #!.30 and #317 If pressuricer heaters are incperable due to a fire, reactor coolant syste= pressure can be =aintained through use of the charging pu=ps.
The pressuricer can be pu= ped solid by one of three charging p=ps located in roc = #115 Charging p=p suction is provided frc=
cne of two cencentrated beric acid teh, Irrated in roo= #217, by gravity feed.
Boric acid frc= these tanks can also be supplied to the charging p=ps by one of two redundant beric acid p=ps.
Suction can also be provided frc= the refueling water tank. Charging pu=p discharge is delivered to the pri=ary coolant systen through one of two redundant charging line isolation valves er one of four redundant safety injection header valves. Reactor coolant syste pressure regulation can be achieved through use of the letdown syste=. All equipment which would be used in this process is located re=otely fro the pressuricer heaters. Adding further redundancy, if the letdevn syste= is inoperable, pressure can be =aintained at 1200 psi vith the high pressure safety injection pu=ps.
Suction is provided to the high pressure safety injection pu=ps frc= the refueling water tank and pu=p discharge is supplied to the reac-tor coolant syste= by opening one of four redundant high pressure safety injection header valves. Equipment required to operate the high pressure safety injection pu=ps is located in roc =s #118 and #119 and is separated frc= equip =ent required for the letdovn syste=.
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Residual heat can also be re=cved by providing water to the pri=ary system with the high pressure safety injection pu=ps and removing water to the quench tank through the pressurizer PORV's. This nethod, feed and bleed, is considered inappropriate since appendix 3 prohibits violating a pri=ary system boundary.
Additional redundancy to pressurizer heater failure is provided by the use of reflux boiling. No credit is taken for this alternate since reactor coolant level vould drop below the pressurizer. This condition is also in violation of appendix R.
Reactor cold leg te=perature, reactor hot leg te=perature, pres-surizer pressure and pressurizer level indications are needed to monitor natural circulation within the Reactor Coolant System.
Cold leg te=perature is nor= ally provided by TE-115 and "E-125 However, TE-ll1Y and TE-121Y plus four safety grade Tc signals for each loop are available in the Control Roc =.
Hot leg te:.perature is nor-ally provided by TE-111X and TE-121X.
However, two additional safety grade Th signals for each loop are available in the Control Roo=.
Pressurizer pressure is nor9a11v provided by either PT-100X or PT-100Y. However, four additional safety grade pressure signals are available in the Control Room. PT-103 or PT-103-1 provide low range pressure signals.
Pressurizer level is norm 11y provided by LT-110X and LT-110Y.
However, LT-103 which is calibrated for cold conditions is also available.
Steam generator level, stea= generator pressure, and auxiliary feed-vater pu=p discharge pressure indications are needed to =aintain adequate steam generator vater inventory.
Steam generator level is nor= ally provided by LT-1105 and LT-1106 on the main control board and in the auxiliary feedvater pu=p room. However, L
LT-ll21 and LT-1111 plus four safety grade level indications for each steam generator are also available in the Control Room.
Steam generator pressure is normally provided by PT-3991 and PT-k008 on the main control board and in the auxiliary feedvater pu=p room.
However, these pressures can also be read locally from gauges in each auxilirey feedvater pump room. Additionally, four safety grade pressure indications for each steam generator are available in the Control Room.
Auxiliary feedvater pump discharge pressure is normally provided by PT-h507 on the main control board. This pressure can also be read locally in each auxiliary feedvater pump room.
6-
Cold Shutdo_wn Reactivity control required to reach cold shutdown is trovided by increasine trinary coolant boration usine one of three charcine ru=ts loested in roon #115. Charrine nu=n suction is trovided frc= one of tvo concentrated borie acid tanks by rravit t feed or fre= the refueline water tank. Roric acid can also be provided fro: concentrated boric acid tanks bv one of two boric acid pu=ns.
Dunn discharge is introduced into the reactor coolant system throuch one of two charging line isolation valves or ene of four safety injee-tion header valves. All safety injection header valves can be eterated manually.
One of two redundant boric acid heat trace systems =ust be enerable.
Residusi hest is re=oved by the shutdown cooline syste= after nricarv coolant tenperature is reduced to belov 300 F.
One of two redundant low pres-sure safety injection pu=ps located in rooms ?ll8 and #119 is recuired to circulate pri=ary coolant throurh the shutdown cooling heat exchangers,also located in roo=s #118 and fil?. Heat is transfered frc= the shutdovn cooling heat exchangers to one of two co=ponent cooling heat exchancers by one of three redundant co=ponent cooling pu=ps.
Cc=ponent cooline heat exchangers and pu=ps are located in roo= $228. Component cooling heat exchangers tre cooled by the circulating salt vater syste=.
One of three saltvater rumes =ust be enerable.
All saltvater pu=es are located at the intake structure and are secarated by 61 feet horizontally. All valves recuired for residual heat re= oval can be placed in their shutdown positions either by the removal of pover or control air or can be nanually operated.
If a fire in the component cooling roo= disables all component cooling couipment, component cooling vater from the unaffected unit can be supelied for shutdown coolinq through existing riping. Unit 1 and Unit 2 component cooline and saltvater syste=s are in different areas and are therefore not affected by a co==on fire outside the control roe = or cable streading roe =s.
In the case
_7_
of a control room or cable spreading room fire, normal shutdovn cooling vill be employed.
Sunnort Systems Equipment required to reach hot and cold shutdown is povered from redundant trains consisting of hKV unit buses, h80V unit buses, h80V motor control centers, 120VAC instrument buses, 120VAC inverter buses and 125VDC battery buses. No single bus failure vill impair the ability to reach cold shutdown.
Each switchgear room is cooled by one of two redundant air condi-tioning units and one of two redundant control room air conditioners is required to insure control room habitability.
On loss of offsite power, output of two of three installed diesel generators is required to effect cold shutdown on both units. The diesel fuel oil transfer pump and room ventilation systems must also be operable.
All diesels can be supplied with cooling water from either Unit 1 or Unit 2 service water subsystems. All valves in the service water system can be placed in their required positions by removal of air or power.
Plant communications is provided by a page system and two sound povered phone systems. The page and one sound povered phone system are routed in common conduits. The second sound povered phone system is routed independently of any other communication system and does not pass through the cable spreading room. -
O Fire Analysis Centrol Ree A control roc = fire which necessitates evacuatien of the centrol roc = results in less of centralized control and precess =enitoring. As previously stated in assu=ptic: 6, it is assu=ed that reaeter sera = vill te atte=pted frc= the control roc = folleved by local trip of the L60VAC supply to the CF.A syste= in the svitchgear rec =s.
Isolatic: and Iceal control vill be provided as cutlined below:
1.
Reacter Heat Re=cval Fr.cticn:
a.
Provide electrical isolation frc= the control rec = and catie spreading roc = for CV-3936 and CV-3939 3cth valves can be operated =anually if required.
b.
Provide electrical isolation frc= the centrol roc = and cable spreading rec = and local operatic: for the pressurizer heaters.
c.
Provide electrical isolation frc= the control roc = and cable spreading roc = and 10 cal operatien in the svitchgear roc =s for the saltvater pu=ps, cc=ponent cooling pu=ps,
low pressure safety injection p*,.=ps and service water pu=ps.
d.
Provide electrical isolation frc= the control roc = and cable spreading roo= for Mov-652 and local operatien at its
- ctor control center.
e.
Auxiliary feedvater syste= (M3V h070, MOV k071, An' Pu=p 11, AW Pu=p 12, CV k511, CV h512) =odifications to provide independence frc= Centrol Roc = fires is being coordinated with Auxiliary Feedvater Modificatic=s Project.
2.. ' Reactivity Control Function:
a.
Provide electrical isolation frc= the cable spreacing roc =
and centrol roc = and local control for each charging ;,_ p.
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3.
Reactor Coolant Make-Up Function:
a Provide electrical isolation from the centrol roo= and cable spreading room and local control at their motor control centers for the PORV's. PORV's close on loss of power.
b.
Provide facilities to re=ove power from C.'-5h6h, CV-505, CV-507 and CV-516 independent of the control roo= and cable spreading room. These valves close on loss of power.
h.
Process Monitoring Function:
a.
For each reactor coolant syste loop, indication independent of the cable spreading roo= and the control room vill be provided for one cold leg te=perature, one hot leg te=perature, one steam generator pressure, one steam generator level.
Additionally, one pressurizer level and one pressurizer pressure vill be provided.
5 Support:
Diesel generator control cables will be isolated from the control room and cable spreading roo= to assure local operation of each machine. Isolation vill be provided as necessary to place service water syste= valves in the positions required to supply cooling water to the diesels.
b.
As covered in previous fire hazards codifications sub=ittals, an independent sound povered phone system was installed.
Additional jacks vill be installed in the ZA and Z3 svitchgear rooms and in the vicinity of CV-3839 and CV-3939 to provide com:m:nications between all areas where local control is to take place.
Cable Spreading Roo In addition to loss of control and process monitoring, a cable spreading room fire can cause loss of all DC power to the affected unit. Alternate
-125VDC supply will be provided to Unit 1 hKV switchgear, to Unit 2 hKV svitchgear and to the diesel generators as required to assure two of three plant diesels vill be available at all times.
Cable Chases (1A,1B. 2A, 2B, U1 and U2)
Electrical isolation of control cables vill be provided as noted previously to afford local equipment operation. Additionally, isolation vill be provided for equipment whose inadvertent operation could impair the ability to reach hot standby or cold shutdown. Isolation vill be situated to provide equipment operation independent of cable failure in these chases, or cables vill be rerouted outside chases where fire da= age can impair the ability to reach hot standby or cold shutdown.
Auxilian Feedvater Pump Room A cross connect pipe between Unit #1 and Unit #2 AFW Pump feedvater outlets vill be added. This vill provide auxiliary feedvater from the unaffected unit in the event of a fire that disables both AFW Pumps or both stea= supply valves. Manual valves at both ends of the pipe vill nor= ally be locked closed.
Design and installation of the cross connect pipe vill be evaluated in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedvater Modifications Project (additional AFW pumps-Electric).
Charging Pu::m Rooms Fire barriers vill be constructed so that no more than one pu=p is da= aged in a single fire. Cables to the charging pumps vill be afforded separation either by rerouting or vrapping.
Component Cooling Pump Rooms As noted previously, sufficient redundancy exists such that equip-ment loss in a co=ponent cooling pump room can be compensated for with equipment outside that room through existing syste=s. Cables to redundant equipment running through this room vill be afforded separation either by rerouting or vrapping.
S.errice Vster Su-n Soens Diecel generators can ettsin se-vice water frem either unit. Cablee to redundant equinnent runninr through these rooms vill to afforded setaration either by rerouting or vrspping.
Other Auxiliarv Building Areas Auxilitry building corridors and other areas containing esbles fron redundant eculo.cnt vill te compensated fer as follovs:
o 1.
Csbles to redundsnt nunes and valves vill be trovided ser"rstion as necessarr to prevent loss of snv function due to a sincie nostulated fire.
"'his separation vill te afforded either by rerouting or vrappinz.
2.
Cables for redundant auxiliary safe shutdevn instru=entation vill te afforded separation either by rerouting or vrapping.
3.
Isolation vill be provided as required for equip =ent whose inadvertent operation could inpair the ability to reach hot standby or cold shutdown.
Outdoor-Auxiliarv Feedvater Surelv
?.ro well water pumns vill be repovered fran diesel generators and facilities provided to pipe vell vater directly to condensate sto age tank #12 to provide sufficient auxiliary feedvater to remain in hot stand-bv for To hours.
12
S.=}?Y F
The numose of this renort was to outline a nlan of ecenliar.ce with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 10f'B50 Apnendix R. General descrintions are offered of the systems recuired to reach hot and cold shutdown. Where
- ruinerable to fire darace, siternste systens for reachine shutdown are included.
"'his informstion is detailed in logie charts and the acconnany-ing eenprehensive cotipment sunnaries. 'dodifications presently undervav at Calvert Cliffs.ake it unlikely that a fire can start and reach crocortions sufficient to cause videspread dr. age.
However, the additional nodifications detailed in this report provide a defense in depth approach to fire ha::ards and assure that cold shutdown can be reached regardless of any single postulated fire.
0 c
Index of Ch trts and 71acrs.s Attach ent ?!o.
Title 1
Alternate Safe Shutdovn - Functions Recuired 2
Logie Chart - Hot Standby - Resetor Heat Renoval Function 3
Comprehensive Feuinment Su=arv - Hot Standbv Reactor Heat Renoval Function h
Comrehensive 'ouin.ent Sur.arv - Hot Ctandhv Process '!onitoring 5
Logie Chart - Hot Standbv - Renetor Coolant
!!ake-up runction 6
Cc=trehennive Ecuin=ent Su=arv - Hot Standbv -
Reactor Coolant '!ake-un ' unction 7
Logic Chart - Cold Shutdown - Reactor Heat Se-oval
- unction 9
Connrehensive Ecuin ent Su.arv - Cold Shutdovn -
Reactor Heat Renoval Fua.ction 0
Locie Chart - Cold Shutdown - Reactivity Control ' unction 10 Co :prehensive Enuinnent Su= art - Cold Shutdown -
Reactivity Control Function 11 Si.nlified Flov Diacram - Chemical and Volune Control System 12 Si=elified Flov Diagram - Auxiliary Feedvater System
.13 Sinnlified Flov 71a can - Reactor Coolant Systen o
-1k-
Actach::nt 1
_AL"T*NA"T SA" SFCC'c _ nJ70 Ic;S ur U 3.3 FIRE
\\
Y Trip
!Reacter and l
Turbine Y
RER Hot Standby Attach. 2 l Y
RCTJ Eat Standby Attach. 5 i
i E07 S"AND3Y
\\
s Y
'RER Cold Shutdown Attach. 7 Y
RC Cold l
Shutdown Attach. 9 COLD SEJ2DO*C i
)
x Attach =ent 2 Er S*"A."23Y REAC"tR :JEA? RECVAL FJNOTION 1
i i
f F
i ATJ lJ~n P.:=p 11 Pe.7 12 I
i A?"4 Additional i
- Cross Conn. 91 AT4 Elee.
i
+
l Pipe P.:=p s See Pare 11 Mov ho70 Moy ho71 iT i
YY Y'T CV h511 CV-h512 i
i e
1 3tm. Gen)
St=. Gen.
Sfty V.v.
CV-3939j Srty.nr.
CV-3933, l
t I
i e
i See See PM-1 PM-2 i
i t
i Press.
[ Pres. Etr..
Heaters l Alt.
I i
I 6
Local Cond.SW Ind.
TK12 Lvl i
4 6
See PM-3 i
PT k507 V ___
l Attachm2nt 2-a PSESS*JR ~1~.4 EEA"T'S-ALTI"CATE (PE-ALTI l
i CV-517
'cVO-1B3 fManual i
i i
i y
CV-518!
CV-519 lCV-519 l
ass ygy,g 7 gy,gg7 l gy,g.y y
W y,gg, 6
I i
i 1
OV-260.
?nass i t
-n Borie Ac Borie Ae j itoV-508, McV-50c}
Pump 11 PL"p 12 l
i i
MOV-51h h0V-50h M07-501 I
and MOV-Sch BorieAc!
Borie Ac HeatTr.{
Heat Tr.
I I
k i
i i
- harging Charging Charging l Pu=p 11 Pu=p 12 P=p 13 l f
I f
i I
Y Y
4 i
CV-516 l'cV h1h2!
"0VLih3l l
CV-515 EPSI EPSI l EPSI i
Pmp 11 Pmp 12 l Pump 13 CV-110P CV-1100' l
I I
MOV-655 I
l CV-201P; CV-2010!
e i
i MOV-653!
i h40V-65h l l
See EPSI Aux.
i lMOV-616' )!OV-626I bov-636 biev-6L6j r---
i -
I l
i -
r I
a Attsch ent 2-b P'007SS '?" nim!'io di i
I I
I i
I "E 112CA TE 11203 TI 1120C TE 112CD
- E 111Y
- E 115 i
l l
1 I
i TE 112HA TE 112H3 TE112HO TE112E TE 111X l
l l
l I
I I
l l
l LT 1113A LT 11133 LT 1113C LT 11133 LT 1111 LT 1105 l
l l
l
}
l l
l PT 1013A
- 10133
- 1013C PT 10133 Pa 3001 l
l r
PROCESS '!O'TITO9INr; #2 I
l l
l l
1 I
l l-l l
l l
l 1
TE 122HA
- E 122H3
l l
l l
l l
1 l
l LT 1123A LT 1123?
LT 11230 LT 1123D LT 1121 LT 1106 I
I i
l I
l l
M 1023A P. 10233 o* 102'"
" '0237 M h009 l
l l
1.
Attschmmt ?-e PR00ESS "0!ir:0RI'i0 #3 I
i l
PT-103 PT-103-1 I
I I
I I
I I
I I
l M-100Y P*-102A P*-1023 M-1020 P"-1023 P"-100X L
I l
l l
LT-110X LT-103 LT-110Y l
4 t
-... =..
Atta::h=rnt 2-d EPS! AUX! LIAR!ES I
i
+
e l
Sit. Wtr.
Sit. Wtd S1t. Wtr.
Pump 11 Pume 12 l Sume 13 107-38ho I
l I
cV-51h9 LeCV-38ho l
CV-5165 c7-5160 CV-5163 CV-38h2 i
i i
CV-5166 cv-5206 CV-5208 2CV-38h2i I
1 i
CV-5162 J*Lt *2 Sit. vtr l
and comp.Cig.
CV-3823 07-3825 l
I cv-382h CV-3826,
A l
Comp.C1g.
Comp.C1gi Co=p. C1g.;
l Pu::rn 11 P.uro 12 Pume 13 {
l i
l. -
Att teh.ent 2-e Het StaQ 3eactor Heat Benoval ? unction 1.
"0V h070 Aw om Stern Surnlar '?sive 2.
MOV h071 Ar? Pump Steam Suvulv Valve 3.
CV h511 A W Flov Control Valve h.
CV h512 AFW Flow Control Valve 5.
CV-3939 Atmosnherie Dune Valve 6
CV-393o At-oneherie Du m Valve 7.
CV-518 Charcing Line Isolation Valve 8
CV-510 Chargins Line Isolation Valve o.
'!OV-617 Safety Injection Auxiliarv Header Vsive 10.
MOV-627 Safety Injection Auxiliarv Hesder 'laive 11.
!'0V-637 Ssfety Injection Auxiliary Hender Valve 12.
'OV 4h7 Safety Injection Auxilir.rv Header Valve
- 13. 'nV-503 Borie Acid Gravity Feed Valve
- 14. MOV-509 Berie Acid Gravity Teed Valve
- 15. ?:0V-501
'lolune Control Tank outlet valve
- 16. ?!OV-Sch Refueling Water Tank outlet Valve 17.
CV-517 Auxiliary Sprav Valve
- 18. CV-514 "CS Letdown 9 top Valve 19.
CV-515 PCS Letdevn Stop Valve 20.
CV-110?
Letdown Flow Control Valve 21.
CV-1104 Letdon Flow Control Valve 22.
CV-201P Letdeun Back-pressure Control Valve
- 23. CV-2010 Letdown Back-tressure Control valve 2h. MOV kih2 Refueling Water Tank Outlet Valve
- 25. MOV hih3 Fe#ueline Water Tank Outlet Valve
- 26. MOV-616 Hich Pressure Safety Injection Header Valve
- 27. MOV-626 High Pressure Safety Injection Header Valve
'!0V 6h6 Hirh Pressure Safety Injection Header Valve
- 30. PT h507 Steam Generator AFW Pu=p Discharge Header Pressure Trans=itter
- 31. MOV-656 Auxiliary Hirh Pressure Safety Injection Header Isolation Valve
- 32. MOV-51h Boric Acid Punn Outlet Valve
- 33. MOV-653 High Pressure Safety Injection Header Cross Connect Valve 3k. MOV-65h High Pressure Safety Injection Header Isolation Valve 35 MOV-655 High Pressure Safety Injection Header Cross Connect Valve
a Co=prehensive Ecuirment S"- ary Hot Standby Reactor Heat Renoval Auxiliary feedvater can be supplied from condensate tank #12 ty either steam driven auxiliary feedvater pump. Either stea= supply valve, MOV-h070 or MOV-k071, =ust be open to provide steam to the auxiliary feedvater pu=p header. Either flow control valve CV h511 or CV h512 must be opened to provide auxiliary feedvater flow to a steam generator. Heat is removed from the steam generators vic the steam du=p valves, CV-3939 and CV-3938. If either valve is inoperable, heat is removed through stea= generator safety valves.
Pressurizer pressure can be maintained di. ring cooldown with pres-surizer heaters. Reactor coolant system pressure can also be maintained by pumping the pressurizer solid with the charging pump and regulating pressure with either the let-down system or the high pressure safety injection pumps.
One 'of two boric acid gravity feed valves, MOV-508 or MOV-509 =ust be open and volume control tank outlet valve MOV-501 and refueling vater tank outlet valve MOV-50h must be closed to provide charging pump suction. Boric acid can also be supplied to the charging pumps with one of two boric acid pumps. In this case MOV-51h must be open. Either CV-518, CV-519, CV-519 bypass, or MOV-269 br its manual bypass) and one of four safety injection auxiliary header valves, MOV-617, MOV-627, MOV-637 or MOV-6h7 must be open to permit charging into the reactor coolant system. Auxiliary spray valve CV-517 must be closed to permit charging through CV-518, CV-519 or CV-519 bypass, otherwise manual valve CVC-183 must be closed and the safety injection auxiliary header must be Let-down line isolation talves, CV-515 and CV-516 must be open.
utilized.
Either CV-110P or CV-110Q must be open. Either CV-201P or CV-201Q must be operable in order to provide pressure control via the let-down system. If the let-down system is inoperable, charging pumps vill be secured and pressure _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _
=aintained by operating a high pressure safety injection pu=p.
Either MON ilL2 or MOV h1L3 cust be open to provide suction frc= the refueling vater tank.
High pressure safety injection header valve MOV-65L and one high pressure safety injection header valve, MOV-616, MOV-626, MOV-636 cr MOV-6k6 =ust be open.
High pit.ssure safety injection header cross connect valve ICV-653 =ust te open to utilize HPSI pu=p 12 and cross connect valve MOV-655 as well as MOV-653,
=ust be open to utilize HPSI Pu=p 11.
One of the redundant beric acid heat trace systems =st be operable.
Reactor coolant system pressure regulatien can also be achieved without charging pu ps,using only the high pressure safety injection system as suc=arized previously.
Use of the high pressure safety injection pu=ps requires co=ponent cooling to provide cooling and seal vater. To provide ec=ponent cooling to the HPSI pu=ps, one of three salt water pu=ps must be operable to supply cooling for the ec=ponent cooling syste=.
Etergency discharge control valve CV-51k9 =ust be :aintained shut. Cc=ponent cooling heat exchanger #11 (21) salt water inlet and outlet valves, CV-5160 and CV-5206, and ec=penent cooling inlet and outlet valves, CV-3823 and CV-382h, =ust be open, or co=ponent cooling heat exchanger #12 (22) salt water inlet valve, CV-5162, outlet valves CV-5203 and CV-5163, and co=ponent cooling inlet and outlet valves, CV-3825 and CV-3826 must be open. One of three component cooling pu=ps =ust be operable. Component cooling water from the unaffected unit can also be supplied through existing equipment. -
Attach = tnt L Cc ;rehensive ::irrent S---arv Hot Stanoby Process Monitoring Reactor coolant syste= loop 11 (21) cold leg temperature is provided by '"E-n2CA. TE-n2C3, TI-112CC, TE-112CD, TI-111Y and IE-n5 Loc; 12 (22) cold leg te_perature is provided by TE-122CA, TI-122C3, TI-122CC, TI-122CD, TE-121Y and CE-125. Loop n (21) het leg te=perature is provided by 3-n2EA, TE-112E3, TI-n2EC, TE-112ED and TE-111X. Loop 12 (22) hot les tenperature le provided by TI-122EA, TE-122H3, '"I-122EC, E-122ED and TE-121X.
Stea= generator #n (21) level is provided by LT-1113A, LT-in33, LT-11130, LT-1113D, LT-1111 and LT-1105 Stea= generater #12 (22) level is provided by LT-n23A, LT-11233, LT-n230, LT-1123D, LT-1121 and LT-1100.
Stea= generator #11 (21) pressure is provided by PT-1013A, PT-10133, PT-1013C, PT-1013D and PT-3991. Stes: generator #12 (22) pressure is provided by PT-1023A, PT-10233, PT-10230, PT-1023D and PT h008.
Eigh range pressurizer pressure is provided by PT-102A, PT-1023, PT-102C, PT-102D, PT-100X and PT-100Y. Lev range pressure is provided by PT-103 and PT-103-1.
Pressurizer level is provided by LT-110X, LT-103 and LT-n 0Y.
Auxiliary feedvater pu=p discharge header pressure is provided by PT-k507 Ccudensate storage tank #12 level is available in the ecatrol ree:
and locany at the tank.
-2h-
i 3
Attach = Int 5 HOT STA'TD3Y REACMR C00LA'C MA.U-UP RJ?ICTIO?T (I!!V}"CORY vAI?CE"A' ICE) 1 I
i ERV hC2 lMOV-kO3i I
I i
I I
ERV-kok jMov-kO5:
l l
ii l
l i
CV-515 lCV-516 ICV-110P j Manual l
l j
l lCV-110Q Manual l
l l
I CV-505
- CV-506 I
I l
CV-5h65 lCV-5466 CV-sh6h CV-5k67 I
f MOV-651.-
Mov-652 i
i 1
, CV-507 I
i l
CV-103 i CV-104 I
1 1
CV-105 CV-106 t
i i
Attnehr.ent 5.
Mot etanibv Resetor coolant fiake-un vuncti_o_n 1.
ERV h02 9CS Pover over. 9elief Valve 2.
ERV hoh RCS Power Over. Relief Valve 3.
mV h03 RCS Motor oner. Block Valve for rRV h02 h.
't9V h05 RCS Motor Over. Block Valve for FV h0h 5.
CV-515 RCS Let-down Stop Valve 6
CV-516 RCS Let-down Ston Valve 7.
CV-504 7CP Seal Leak off Ston v lve a
8 CV-506 RCP Seal Leak Off Ctop Valve 9.
CV-Sh65 Saarle valve 10.
CV-sh66 Samnie Valve 11.
CV-sh67 Fample Valve I
12.
CV-5h6h combined Sa-vie Feader Valve
- 13. CV-50?
RCP Bleed 9elier Isolation valve Ik.
CV-110P Let-down Flow Control Valve
- 15. CV-110Q Let-down Flow Control Valve
- 16. CV-103 Reactor Vessel Vent Valve 17.
CV-10h Reactor Vessel Vent Valve
- 18. CV-105 Pressurizer Vessel Vent Valve 19 CV-106' Pressurizer Vessel Vent Valve 20.
MOV-651
' Shut-down Cooling Return Isolation Valve 21.
MOV-652 Shut-down Cooling Return Isolation Valve
-?6-
\\
l Comprehensive Ecuipment Su==ary Hot Standby Reactor Coolant Make-up Reactor coolant inventory is maintained by: 1) Closing either power operated relief valve ERV-h02 or its motor operated block valve MOV h03 and power operated relief valve ERV-h0h or its motor operated relief valve MOV-h05;
- 2) Closing one of two redundant leak-off header valves, CV-505 or CV-506;
- 3) Closing sample valves CV-5h65, CV-Sh66 and CV-5h67 or tr e combined sa=ple header valve CV-5h64; h) Closing reactor coolant pu=p bleed relief isolation valve CV-507; 5) Maintaining one reactor vessel vent valve, CV-103 or CV-10h, closed; 6) Maintaining one pressurizer vessel vent valve, CV-105 or CV-106, closed; 7) Closing either RCS letdown stop valve, CV-515 or CV-516, or both letdown flow control valves, CV-110P and CV-110Q or their manual block valves;
.and 8) Closing either shutdown cooling return isolation valve MOV-651 or MOV-652.
If for residual heat removal it was necessary to utilize a charging pump and the letdown system for pressure control (in the event of pressurizer heater loss), CV-515 and CV-516 vill be held open. In this case, however, reactor coolant make-up is accomplished with the charging pump and water from the concentrated boric acid tanks.
L -
COLD SHU""JO'S Attach =rnt 7 P.EACTOR EA'" RDt0V_AL l
\\
i i
31t. k't,r.
I fC'v,-3Sho j
Prp 11 P m 12 N-,
l CV-51h9 i
2CV-3Sho l
CV-5165 CV-5160 CV-5163 1CV-3Bh2 l
l I
CV-5166 CV-5206 CV-5208 2CV-38h2 l
l CV-5162 Unit #2 Sit. *n't:
CV-3823 CV-3825 and l
ce==.
C1g.
CV-382h CV-3826 Co=p C1g.
Cc=pC1g.
Co=p C1g, P=n ' '
t2=o 12 P2]._ 13 CV-3828 CV-3830 i
l
(
LPSI LPSI P=p 11 P=p 12 i
i MOV-651 l
MOV-652 i
r 1
MOV-615 M07-625 MOV-635 Mov-6h5 L_
3 i
i CV-306 l
CV-657 i
MOV-658 _ _ _.. _
_ -a Cold Shutdown Reactor Heat Removal 1.
CV-51h9 Energency Discharge Control Valve 2.
CV-5165 Co=ponent Cooling #12 Ex. Auxiliary Outlet Valve 3.
CV-5166 Co=ponent Cooling #12 Ex. Bypass h.
CV-5160 Co=ponent Cooling #11 Ex. Saltvater Inlet Valve 5
CV-5206 Co=penent Cooling #11 Ex. Saltvater Outlet Valve 6.
CV-3823 Component Cooling #11 Ex. Component Cooling Inlet Valve 7
CV-382h Component Cooling #11 lix. Co=ponent Cooling outlet valve 8.
CV-5163 Component Cooling #12 Ex. Saltwater Outlet Valve 9
CV-5208 Co=ponent Cooling #12 Ex. Saltvater Outlet Valve 10.
CV-5162 Co=ponent Cooling #12 Ex. Saltvater Inlet Valve 11.
CV-3825 Co=ponent Cooling #12 Ex. Co=ponent Cooling Inlet Valve 12.
CV-3826 Component Cooling #12 Ex. Component Cooling Outlet Valve 13 CV-3828 Shut-down Cooling #11 Ex. Co=ponent Cooling outlet Valve Ik.
CV-3830 Shut-down Cooling #12 Ex. Component Cooling Outlet Valve 15 MOV-651 Shut-down Cooling Return Isolation Valve
- 16. MOV-652 Shut-down Cooling Return Isolation Valve 17 MOV-615-Lov Pressure Safety Injection Header Valve
- 18. MOV-625 Low Pressure Safety Injection Header Valve 19 MOV-635 Lov Pressure Safety Injection Header Valve 20.
MOV-6h5 Lov Tressure Safety Injection Header Valve 21.
CV-306 Saiety Injection Flow Control Valve 22.
CV-657 Shut-down Cooling Te=perature Control Valve 23 MOV-658 Shut-down Cooling Ex. Isolation Valve 8
1 l --
Attach =:nt 8 Comprehensive Eauitment Su==ary Cold Shutdovn Reactor Heat Re= oval One of three saltwater pu=ps must be operable to supply cooling for the component cooling system. Emergency discharge control valve CV-51h9 must be maintained shut. Component cooling heat exchanger #11 (21) saltvater inlet and outlet valves, CV-5160 and CV-5206, and component cooling inlet and outlet valves, CV-3823 and CV-382h must be open or co=ponent cooling heat exchanger
- 12 (22) saltwater inlet talve, CV-5162, outlet valves CV-5208 and CV-5163, and component cooling inlet and outlet valves, CV-3825 and CV-3826 must be open to provide a flovpath to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. One of three component cooling pu=ps must be operable and either shutdown cooling heat exchanger #11 (21) or #12 (22) component cooling outlet valve CV-3828 or CV-3830 must be open. One of two low pressure safety injection pumps must be operable.
Cooling and seal water for these pumps is obtained from co=ponent cooling, outlined above. Both shutdown cooling return isolation valves, MOV-651 and MOV-652 must be open and one of four low pressure safety injection header valves, MOV-615, MOV-625, MOV-635 and MOV-6h5 must be open. Low pressure safety injection flow control valve CV-306 must be closed. Shutdown cooling heat exchanger isolation valve, MOV-658 and shutdown cooling temperature control valve CV-657 must be open.
All CV's except CV-306 and CV-657 can be placed in their required shutdown position by removal of control air or power. CV-306, CV-657 and all MOV's can be manually operated.
If a fire in the component cooling room disables all component cooling pumps or both heat exchangers or their associated valves, component cooling water can also be supplied from the unaffected unit through existing piping to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers on the affected unit. Valves.
1-CV-38ko, 2-CV-38ko, 1-cV-3842 and 2-CV-3Bh2 =ust be open. Unit 1 and Unit 2 equipment for component cooling and saltvater systems are in different rooms and only a control room fire could effect both units. In this case, normal shutdown cooling vill be employed with all valves placed in their required positions manually (MOV-652 vill be operated locally at its Mcc),
and all pumps operated locally in the switchgear rooms.
B r
Attach:ssnt 9 COLD SHU"'DOVN REAC*1VITY C0F"ROL FUNCTION l
l
+
2harging
- harging
- harging Pump 11 Pump 12 L Pu:rm 13 i MOV-501 MOV-50h I
i Boric Ac Boric Ac
!OV-508
!cV-509 Pu=p n Pu=p 12 I
I
!l
,0 l
MOV-51h 1
l l
l l
l Borie Ac Borie Ac Heat Tr.
Heat Tr.
i I
I l CV-183 i CV-517
, Manual.i F
CV-518 i
CV-519 CV-519 Bveass S/
V I
I l
l l
Mov-617 MOV-627 MOV-637 Mov-6h7 I
I i
l I
i Mov-269 Mov-269j Bynass -
l I
I.
Attachstnt 9-a Cold Shutdown Resetivity Control Function 1.
MOV-501 Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve 2.
MOV-50k Refueling Water Tank Valve 3.
MOV-508 Boric Acid Gravity Feed Valve 4.
MOV-509 Boric Acid Gravity Feed Valve 5.
MOV-514 Boric Acid Pump outlet Valve (To Charging Pumps) 6.
CV-518 Charging Line Isolation Valve 7.
CV-519 Charging Line Isolation valve 8.
MOV-617 Safety Injection Header Valve 9
MOV-627 Safety Injection Header Valve
- 10. MOV-637 Safety Injection Header Valve 11.
MOV-647 Safety Injection Header Valve 12.
CV-517 Auxiliary Spray Valve
Comprehensive Ecuipment Su-a7 Cold Shutdown Reactivity Control one of three charging pumps must be operable to provide boric acid to the reactor coolant system. Volume control tank outlet valve MOV-501 must be closed. Refueling water tant outlet valve MOV-50h must be closed. Either boric acid gravity feed valve MOV-508 or MOV-509 must be open. If neither valve can be opened, boric acid can be supplied to the charging pump suction with either boric acid pump. In this case MOV-514 must be open. One of two redundant boric acid heat trace systems must be operable. Either CV-518, CV-519 or the CV-519 bypass valve, or MOV-269 or its manual bypass and one of four safety injection auxiliary header valves, MOV-617, QV-627, MOV-637 must be open to allow charging into the reactor coolant system. Auxiliary spray valve CV-517 must be closed to permit charging through CV-518 or CV-519, otherwise manual valve CVC-183 must be closed and the safety injection header isolation valve, MOV-656, must be closed in order to utilize the safety injection auxiliary header.
-3h-
Atta ?.~.er.t 11 a.
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e Roo= 230 - Unit 1 Contain=ent Hot Standby Reactor Heat Re= oval Function - See Attachunts 2 te 2a Equipment in Contain=ent (non-instru=entation) 1.
Fressurizer Heater 2.
Pressurizer Heater Alternate Equip =ent:
a) 1-CV-515 RCS Letdown Stop Valve b) 1-CV-516 RCS Letdown Stop Valve c) 1-CV-51T Auxiliary Spray Valve d) 1-CV-518 Charging Line Isolation valve e) 1-CV-519 Charging Line Isolation Valve Analysis:
- 1) Pressurizer heater cables enter the containment through the east electrical penetration roo= and are routed only on the east side of the contain=ent.
1-CV-51T cables enter the containment through the vest electrical penetration roo=.
1-CV-517 and 1-SV-517 are located in the southwest side of the con-tain=ent at elevation h5'-0".
Since separation of over 20 feet of clear
- horizontal air space is present,1-CV-517,1-SV-517 and their related cables are not subject to a fire con =on to the pressurizer heaters or their related cables. Therefore, either pressurizer heaters or an alternate path utilizing charging or HPSI pu=ps vill be available to =aintain RCS pressure.
- 2) A ce==on fire can affect 1-CV-507 (see sheet T) and 1-CV-517, however, I
charging pumps and pressurizer heaters vill be unaffected allowing charging to compensate for RCP seal bleed-off,and pressurizer heaters to offset pressurizer spray. 1-CV-517 can be closed manually after the postulated fire to permit charging without a concurre.nt need for pressuriser heaters.
Additionally,=anual valve 1-CVC-183, located outside contain=ent, can be closed eliminating pressurizer spray, and charging acco=plished through the safety injection auxiliary header.
- 3) 1-CV-518 and 1-CV-519 are affected by a co=on fire. If neither valve can be opened, charging can be accc=plished through safety injection auxiliar/
header valves which are all outside containment.
- 4) 1-CV-515 and 1-CV-516 can be affected by a co==on fire. If neither valve can te opended, RCS pressure can be =aintained by EPSI pu=ps or pressurizer heaters. Pressuriser heater cables are separated from 1-CV-515, 1-SV-515, 1-CV-516, 1-SV-516 and related cables (all routed to the vest electrical penetration room) by over 20 feet of clear horizontal air space and HFSI pumps and related valves are outside containment.
Modificatiens 1.
General Centain=ent Modificatica - see sheet 10 1.
Room 230 - Unit 1 Containment Hot Standby Reactor Heat Removal Function RCS Instrumentation - See Attachment 2b Equipment in Containment:
- 1) RCS Loop 11 Hot Leg Temperature Transmitters 1-TE-112HA, 1-TE-112HB, 1-TE-ll2HC, 1-TE-112HD and 1-TE-1112.
- 2) RCS Loop 11 Cold Leg Temperature Transmitters 1-TE-112CA, 1-TE-112CB, 1-TE-112CC, 1-TE-ll2CD, 1-TE-111Y and 1-TE-115
- 3) Steam Generator 11 Level Transmitters 1-LT-1113A, 1-LT-1113B, 1-LT-1113C, 1-LT-lll3D,1-LT-1111 and 1-LT-1105 h) Steam Generator 11 Pressure Transmitters 1-PT-1013A,1-PT-1013B,1-PT-1013C and 1-PT-1013D.
- 5) RCS Loop 12 Hot Leg Temperature Transmitters 1-TE-122HA, 1-TE-122HB, 1-TE-122HC,1-TE-122HD and 1-TE-12LX.
- 6) RCS Loop 12 Cold Leg Temperature Transmitters 1-TE-122CA, 1-TE-122CB, 1-TE-122CC,1-TE-122CD,1-TE-121Y and 1-TE-125.
- 7) Steam Generator 12 Level Transmitters 1-LT-ll23A, 1-LT-1123B, 1-LT-1123C, 1-LT-1123D,1-LT-1121 and 1-LT-1106.
- 8) Steam Generator 12 Pressure Transmitters 1-PT-1023A, 1-PT-1023B, 1-PT-1023C and 1-PT-1023D.
Analysis:
Instrumentation is assured for at least one RCS Loop and associated Steam Generator since:
- 1) 1-TE-111Y, 1-TE-115, 1-TE-111X, 1-LT-1105 and 1-LT-1111 are located in RCP bay 11 and related cables routed directly to the east electrical penetration room.
- 2) 1-TE-121Y, 1-TE-125, 1-TE-121X, 1-LT-1121 and 1-LT-1106 are located in RCP bay 12 and related cables are routed directly to the vest electrical penetration room.
- 3) Transmitters and related cables listed in 1) and 2) above are separated by over 20 feet of clear horizontal air space and therefore are not affected by a common fire.
h) Redundant Steam Generator 11 and 12 pressure transmitters, 1-PT-3991 and 1-PT h008 respectively, are located outside containment.
Modifications
- 1) General Containment Modification - see sheet 10 h-
Poem 230 - Unit 1 Containment Hot Standbv Reactor Heat Removal Punction Pressurizer Instrumentation - See Attachment 2e Ecuitment in Contain ent:
- 1) Pressurizer pressure transmitters (high range) 1-M-102A,1-?"'-1023, 1-P"'-102C,1-PT-102D,1-PT-100X and 1 "T-100Y.
- 2) Pressurizer pressure transmitters (lov range) 1-?"-103 and 1-PT-103-1.
- 3) Pressurizer level transmitters 1-LT-110X, 1-LT-110Y and 1-LT-103.
Analysis:
- 1) 1-LT-110% and 1-PT-100X are located together at elevation h5'-0" e.pproximately 20 feet horizontally from 1-LT-110Y and 1-PT-100Y.
This space, however, contains vertical cable trays and is not clear air space. All cables related to these devices are routed to the east electrical penetration room. Redundant devices and related cables are sub,1ect to damage from a common fire.
- 2) 1-PT-103 is located less than 20 feet horizontally from 1-P"'-103-1.
Both devices are at elevation h5'-0" and all related cables are routed to the east electrical penetration room. Both devices and related cables are subject to damage from a co==on fire.
l Modifications:
- 1) 1-LT-110Y, 1-PT-100Y and 1-PT-103-1 vill be relocated to provide 20 feet of clear horizontal air space between these devices and the vertical cable trays. -.
- 2) Cables related to 1-LT-110Y,1-PT-100Y and 1-PT-103-1 vill be rerouted to the vest electrical penetration room in order to provide 20 feet of clear horizontal air space between these cables and those of 1-LT-110X, 1-PT-100X and 1-PT-103
- 3) General containment Modification - see sheet 10 e
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-6.
Roc = 230 - Unit 1 Containment Rot Standby Reactor Coolant Make-Up Function - See Attachment 5 Equip =ent in Containment:
- 1) 1-ERV h02 RCS Power Operated Relief Valve
- 2) 1-MOV-h03 RCS Motor Operated Block Valve
- 5) 1-CV-515 RCS Letdown Stop Valve
- 6) 1-CV-516 RCS Letdown Stop Valve
- 7) 1-CV-506 RCP Seal Leak Off Stop Valve
- 8) 1-CV-5h65 Sample Valve
- 9) 1-CV-5h66 Sacple Valve
- 10) 1-CV-5h67 Sa=ple valve
- 11) 1-CV-507 RCP Bleed Relief Isolation Valve
- 12) 1-MOV-652 Shutdown Cooling Return Isolation Valve
- 13) 1-CV-103 Reactor Vessel Vent Valve ik) 1-CV-10h Reactor Vessel Vent Valve
- 15) 1-CV-105 Pressurizer vessel vent Valve
- 16) 1-CV-106 Pressurizer Vessel Vent Valve Analysis:
- 1) 1-ERV h02, 1-MOV-h03, 1-ERV-kok and 1-MOV h05 m e located in the pressurizer house and related cables are routed in close proxi=ity to the east electrical penetration room. All cables are subject to damage from a coz=on fire.
- 2) 1-CV-515, 1-EV-515, 1-CV-516 and 1-SV-516 are located less than 5 feet apart and are subject to da= age from a co==en fire, however, redundant valves,1-CV-110P and 1-CV-110Q are located outside the containment.
- 3) 1-CV-506 has a redundant valve,1-CV-505, located outside the contain=ent.
h) 1-CV-Sh65, 1-CV-5h66 and 1-CV-5h67 have a redundant valve, 1-CV-5k6k, located outside the containment.
- 5) 1-CV-507 opens on loss of power or air alleving RCP seal bleed-off.
Zio redundant equipment is available. This valve, however, can be closed =anually after the postulated fire is extinguished and RCP seal bleed-off (kgp=) can be tolerated until this time.
-T-
- 6) 1-MOV-652 has a redundant valve,1-MOV-651 located outside the containment.
- 7) 1-CV-103, 1-CV-10h, 1-CV-105 and 1-CV-106 are solenoid operated, 125VDC valves. All valves are controlled manually, close on loss of power, are nor= ally closed (de-energized) and have both their positive and negative leads opened by centrol switches in the control room.
Each valve is povered by a separate cable (i.e. no two valves utilize conduc. tors in one co=on jacket). The series of four unique " hot shorts" required to open both valves on either the reactor or pressurizer vessel is not considered credible.
Modifications:
- 1) Cables to 1-ERV-h02 and 1-ERV h0h will be rerouted in separate conduits with no other cables. These valves close on loss of power therefore inadvertent operation due to hot shorts will not be possible.
~
- 2) General Containment Modification - see sheet 10
Roc = 230 - Unit 1 Contain=ent Cold Shutdown Reactivity f ontrol Function - See Attach =ent 9 Equip =ent in Contain=ent:
- 1) 1-CT-517 Auxiliary Spray Valve
- 2) 1-CV-526 Charging Line Isolation Valve
- 3) 1-CV-519 Charging Line Isolation Valve Analysis:
- 1) 1-CV-518 and 1-CV-519 are affected by a co==on fire, however, if neither valve can be opened, charging can be acco=plished through one of four safety injection auxiliary header valves, all located outside of the contain=ent.
- 2) ~ Pressurizer spray due to <*a-age to 1-CV-517 can be co=pensated for by pressurizer heaters. As noted on sheet 1 pressurizer heaters and related cables and 1-CV-517 and related cables are not subject to' da= age due to a con:=on fire. 1-CV-517 can be closed =anually after the postulated fire is extinguished. Additionally, =anual valve'l-CVC-183 is located outside contain=ent and can be c1csed to eli=inate pressurizer spray. In this case, the safety injection auxiliary header vill be utilized for charging.
Modifications:
No =odifications are required.
_9_
Room 230 - Unit 1 Containment General Containment Modification
- 1) Instrument trays ZElCF19, ZFlCLlT, ZDICFOT and ZGlCL10 run east and vest at elevation 10'-0" and present the only fire propogation path between RCP bay 11 and RCP bay 12 and between east and vest penetration halves at higher elevations. These trays vill be covered with fire barriers top and bottom to prevent a firo from being transmitted accross the containment by one or more of these trays. Note that this is notint;nded to protect the cables in these trays since they do not contain cables for equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
2.
The fire detection system vill be extended to all areas containing
' equipment or cables required for hot standby or cold shutdown. The zones vill be arranged to give a clear indication of which containment half (east or vest) is involved in order to provide quick identification of the equipment to be used to achievo a safe and orderly shutdown..
Room 229 - Unit 2 Containment Hot Standby Reactor Heat Removal Function - See Attachments 2 & 2a Equipment in Containment (non-instrumentation):
1.
Pressurizer Heaters 2.
Pressurizer Heater Alternate Equip =ent:
a) 2-CV-515 RCS Letdown Stop Valve b) 2-CV-516 RCS Letdown Stop Valve c) 2-CV-517 Auxiliary Spray Valve d) 2-CV-518 Charging Line Isolation Valve e) 2-CV-519 Charging Line Isolation Valve Analysis:
1.
Pressurizer heater cables enter the containment through the east electrical penetration room and are routed only on the east side of the containment.
2-CV-517 cables enter the containment through the vest electrical penetration room. 2-CV-517 and 2-SV-517 are located in the soutvest side of the con-tainment at elevation h5'-0".
Since separation of over 20 feet of clear horizontal air space is present, 2-CV-517, 2-SV-517 and their related cables are not subject to a fire common to the pressurizer heaters or their related cables. Therefore, either pressurizer heaters or an alternate path utilizing charging or HPSI pumps vill be available to maintain RCS pressure.
2.
A common fire can affect 2-CV-507 (see sheet 17) and 2-CV-517, however, charging pumps and pressurizer heaters vill be unaffected allowing charging to compensate for RCP seal bleed-off, and. pressurizer heaters to offset pressurizer spray. 2-CV-517 can be closed manually after the postulated fire to permit charging without a concurrent need for pressurizer heaters.
Additionally, manual valve 2-CVC-183, located outside containment, can be closed eliminating pressurizer spray, and charging acco=plished through the safety injection auxiliary header. *
- 3) 2-CV-518 and 2-CV-519 are affected by a co==cn fire. If neither valve can be opened, charging can be accomplished through safety injection auxiliary header valves which are all outside containment.
k) 2-CV-515 and 2-CV-516 can be affected by a co= mon fire. If neither valve can be opened, RCS pressure can be =aintained by HPSI pu=ps or pressurizer heaters. Pressurizer heaters cables are separated from 2-CV-515, 2-SV-515, 2-CV-516, 2-SV-516 and related cables (all routed to the vest electrical penetration room) by over 20 feet of clear horizontal air space and HPSI pumps and related valves are outside containment.
Modifications:
1.
General Containment Modification - see sheet 20..
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Roon 229 - Unit 2 Containment Hot Standby Reactor Heat Removal Function RCS Instrumentation - See Attachment 2b Equipment in Containment:
- 1) RCS Loop 21 Hot Leg Temperature Transmitters 2-TE-112HA, 2-TE-ll2HB, 2-TE-112HC, 2-TE-112HD and 2-TE-111X.
- 2) RCS Loop 21 Cold Leg Temperature Transmitters 2-TE-112CA, 2-TE-112CB, 2-TE-112CC, 2-TE-112CD, 2-TE-111Y and 2-TE-115
- 3) Steam Generator 21 Level Transmitters 2-LT-1113A, 2-LT-1113B, 2-LT-1113C, 2-LT-1113D, 2-LT-1111 and 2-LT-1105 k) Steam Generator 21 Pressure Transmitter 2-PT-1013A, 2-PT-10133, 2-PT-1013C and 2-PT-1013D.
- 5) RCS Loop 22 Hot Leg Temperature Transmitters 2-TE-122HA, 2-TE-122HB,
.2-TE-122HC, 2-TE-122HD and 2-TE-121X.
- 6) RCS Loop 22 Cold Lee Temperature Transmitters 2-TE-122CA, 2-TE-122CB, 2-TE-122CC, 2-TE-122CD, 2-TE-121Y and 2-TE-125.
l
- 7) Steam Generator 22 Level Transmittera 2-LT-ll23A, 2-LT-11233, 2-LT-11230, l
2-LT-1123D, 2-LT-1121 and 2-LT-1106.
- 8) Steam Generator 22 Pressure Transmitters 2-PT-1023A, 2-PT-1023B, 2-PT-1023C and 2-PT-1023D.
Analysis:
Instrumentation is assured for at least one RCS Loop and associated Steam Generator since:
- 1) 2-TE-111Y, 2-TE-115, 2-TE-111X, 2-LT-1105 and 2-LT-1111 are located in RCP bay 21 and related cables routed directly to the east electrical penetration room.
2) 2-TE-121Y, 2-TE-125, 2-TE-121X, 2-LT-1121 and 2-LT-1106 are located in RCP bay 22 and related cables are routed directly to the west electrical penetration room.
- 3) Transmitters and related cables listed in 1) and 2) above are separated by over 20 feet of clear horizontal air space and therefore are not affected by a co:mnon fire.
k) Redundant Steam Generator 21 and 22 pressure transmitters, 2-PT-3991 and 2-PT-k008 respectively, are located outside containnent.
Modifications:
- 1) General Containment Modification - see sheet 20.
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Roo= 229 - Unit 2 Containment Hot Standby Reactor Heat Re= oval Function Pressurizer Instrumentation - See Attachment 2e Equipment in Containment:
- 1) Pressurizer pressure transmitters (high range) 2-PT-102A, 2-PT-lC23, 2-PT-1000, 2-PT-102D, 2-PT-100X and 2-PT-100Y.
- 2) Pressurizer pressure transmitters (low range) 2-PT-103, and 2-PT-103-1.
- 3) Pressurizer level transmitters 2-LT-110X, 2-LT-110Y and 2-LT-103 Analysis:
- 1) 2-LT-110X and 2-PT-100X are located together at elevation h5'-0" approxi=ately 20 feet horizontally from 2-LT-110Y and 2-PT-100Y.
This space, however, contains vertical cable trays and is not clear air space. All cables related to these devices are routed to the east electrical penetration room. Redundant devices and related cables are subject to damage from a ec==on fire.
- 2) 2-PT-103 is located less than 20 feet horizontally from 2-PT-103-1.
Both devices are at elevation h5'-0" and all related cables are routed to the east electrical penetration room. Both devices and related cables are subject to da= age from a co==en " ire.
Modifications:
- 1) 2-LT-110Y, 2-PT-100Y and 2-PT-103-1 vill be relocated to provide 20 feet of clear horizontal air space between these devices and the vertical cable trays. - _.
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- 2) Cables related to 2-LT-110Y, 2-P"'-100Y and 2-PT-103-1 vill be rerouted l
to the west electrical penetration roc = in order to provide 20 feet l
of clear horizontal air space between these cables and those of 2-LT-110X, 2-PT-100X and 2-PT-103
- 3) General Containment Modification - see sheet 20.
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Room 229 - Unit 2 Containment Hot Standby Reactor Coolant Make-Up Function - See Attachment 5 Equipment in Containment:
- 1) 2-ERV-kO2 RCS Pcver Operated Relief Valve
- 2) 2-MOV h03 RCS Motor Operated Block Valve
- 5) 2-CV-515 RCS Letdown Stop Valve
- 6) 2-CV-516 RCS Letdown Stop Valve
- 7) 2-CV-506 RCP Seal Leak Off Stop Valve
- 8) 2-CV-5h65 Sa=ple Valve
- 9) 2-CV-5h66 Sa=ple valve
- 10) 2-CV-Sh67 Sample Valve
- 11) 2-CV-507 RCP Bleed Relief Isolation Valve
- 12) 2-MOV-652 Shutdown Cooling Return Isolation valve
- 13) 2-CV-103 Reactor Vessel Vent Valve ik) 2-CV-10k Reactor Vessel Vent Valve
- 15) 2-CV-105 Pressurizer Vessel Vent Valve
- 16) 2-CV-106 Pressurizer Vessel Vent Valve Analysis:
- 1) 2-ERV h02, 2-MOV h03, 2-ERV h0h and 2-MOV h05 are located in the pressurizer house and related cables are routed in close proxi=ity to
, a east electrical penetration room. All cables are subject to damage from a com=on fire.
- 2) 2-CV-515, 2-SV-515, 2-CV-516 and 2-SV-516 are located less than 5 feet apart and are subject to damage from a co= mon fire, however, redundant valves, 2-CV-110P and 2-CV-110Q are located outside the containment.
- 3) 2-CV-506 has a redundant. valve, 2-CV-505, located outside the conteinment.
h) 2-CV-5h65, 2-CV-5h66 and 2-CV-5h67 have a redundant valve, 2-CV-5k6h, located outside the containment.
- 5) 2-CV-507 opens on loss of power or air allowing RCP seal bleed-off.
No redundant equipment is available. This valve, however, can be closed =anually after the postulcted fire is extinguished and RCP seal blee'd-off (hgpm) can be tolerated until this time.
- 6) 2-MOV-652 has a redundant valve, 2-McV-651 located outside the containment.
- 7) 2-CV-103, 2-CV-10h, 2-CV-105 cod 2-CV-106 are solenoid operated, 125VDC valves. All valves are controlled =anually, close on loss of power, are normally closed (de-energized) and have both their positive and negative leads opened by control switches in the control room. Each valve is powered by a separate cable (i.e. ne two valves utilize conductors in one co= mon jacket). The series of four unique
" hot shorts" required to open both valves on either the reactor or pressurizer vessel is not considered credible.
Modifications:
- 1) Cables to 2-ERV-402 and 2-ERV h0h will be rerouted in separate conduits with no other cables. These valves close on loss of power therefore inadvertent operation due to hot shorts will not be possible.
- 2) General Containment Modification - see sheet 20. -
Room 229 - Unit 2 Containment Cold Shutdown Reactivity Centrol Function - See Attachment 9 Equipment in Contain=ent:
- 1) 2-CV-517 Auxiliary Spray Valve
- 2) 2-CV-518 Charging Line Isolation Valve
- 3) 2-CV-519 Charging Line Isolation valve Analysis:
- 1) 2-CV-518 and 2-CV-519 are affected by a ecc=on fire, however, if neither valve can be opened, charging can be accomplished through one of four safety injection auxiliary header valves, all located outside of the containment.
- 2) Pressurizer spray due to da= age to 2-CV-517 can be co=pensated for by pressurizer heaters. As noted on sheet 1 pressurizer heaters and related cables and 2-CV-517 and related cables are not subject to damage due to a common fire. 2-CV-517 can be closed manually after the postulated fire is extinguished. Additionally, =anual valve 2-CVC-183 is located outside containment and can be closed to eliminate pressurizer spray. In this case, the safety injection auxiliary header will be utilized for charging.
Modifications:
No modifications are required. -- ---.---------- -
a
Roc = 229 - Unit 2 Centainment General Containment Modification
- 1) Instrument trays ZF2 CLOT, ZD2CF08 and ZE2CF18 run east and west at elevation 10'-0" and present the only fire propogation path between RCP bay 21 and RCP bay 22 and between east and west penetration halves at higher elevations. These trays vill be covered with fire barriers top and botto= to prevent a fire from being transmitted across the containment by one or more of these trays. Note that this is not intended to protect the cables in these trays since they do not contain cables for equip =ent necessary for safe rhutdown.
- 2) The fire detection system vill be extended to all areas containing equipment or cables required for hot standby or cold shutdown. The zones will be arranged to give a clear indication of which centain=ent half (east or vest) is involved in order to provide quick indentificatien of the equipment to be used to achieve a safe and orderly shutdown.
,. _..