05000219/LER-1980-050, Forwards LER 80-050/03L-0

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Forwards LER 80-050/03L-0
ML20002B126
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 12/02/1980
From: Finfrock I
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20002B127 List:
References
NUDOCS 8012090466
Download: ML20002B126 (3)


LER-1980-050, Forwards LER 80-050/03L-0
Event date:
Report date:
2191980050R00 - NRC Website

text

,

k OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FM 2 3 'JIr L)]

C"1"%.,#"ISe*','jg (609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 338

  • FORKED RIVER
  • 08731 c

uum s-December 2, 1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I United States Nuclear Regulato:y Comission 641 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket,lo. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-50/3L This letter forords three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-50/3L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

/

Ivan R. Finfr ck, Vice Presid it Generation IRF:dh Enclosures cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Mr. William G. Mcdonald, Director (3 copies)

Office of Management Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 8 012 0 9 0 f%.

5

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-50/3L Report Date December 2, 1980 Occurrence Date November 6, 1980 Identification of Occurrence The Containment Spray System high drywell pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C, and IP-150 tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1, item E.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specificacions, paragraph 6.9.2.b.l.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters:

Power:

Reactor 1773 MWt Generator 592 MWe 4

Flow:

Recirculation 15.6 x Ig gpm Feedwater 6.5 x 10 lb/hr Description of Occurrence On Thursday, November 6,1980, while performing the " Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test" (Surveillance Procedure 607.3.002), the IP-15A, IP-ISB, IP-15C, and IP-150 trip points were found to exceed those given in the Technical Specifications. The surveillance test yielded the following data:

Pressure Switch Desired Designation Setpoint As Found As Left IP-15A 5.2 psig 2.27 1.94 IP-15B 5.2 psig 2.24 1.98 IP-15C 5.2 psig 2.05 1.98 IP-15D 5.2 psig 2.12 1.92 l

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Reportable Occurrence Page 2

. Report No. 50-219/80-50/3L Apparent Cause of Occurrence l

Thecauseoftheoccurrengewasattributedtoinstrumentrepeatability. The is approximately 0.2-0.3 ps.1 psig and the long-term.epeatability of the instruments switches are set at 2.0 0 ig (2-3% of full range).

It is therefore possi' ale for the Technical Specificatior. limit of 2.0 psig to be exceeded by as much as 0.3 psig, yet the instruments are still operating within their design accuracy.

f l

Analysis of Occurrence The Containment Spray System is made up of two independent cooling loops, each of which is capable of removing heat from the primary containment in the event i

of a loss of coolant accident.

In order to initiate the Containment Spray System, a combination of a high drywell pressure signal plus a reactor low-low water level signal must be received.

l Although the high drywel,:ressure switches would have tripped at a slightly higher pressure than the desired setpoint, their actuation would have only been delayed a fraction of a second (approximately 0.1 second from the start of the design basis' loss of coolant accident). However, the reactor low-low water level setpoint is not reached until almost 4 seconds from the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident. Due to this fact, the delay in actuation of the pressure switches would not have affected the initiation of the Containment Spray System, and, therefore, the safety significance of the occurrence is considered minimal.

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Corrective Action

l The pressure switches IP-15A, IP-16B, IP-15C and IP-15D were adjusted to trip within the Technical Specification limit of 52 psig (note the "As Left" values for the switches in the Description of Occurrence). At the present time the problem of drifting associated with these pressure switches is being investigated.

The manufacturer of the instruments has also been contacted for possible measures to alleviate the problem.

Failure Data l

Manufacturer:

ITT Barton Model:

228A Indicating Pressure Switch Range:

0-10 psig i

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