ML19352B009
| ML19352B009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1981 |
| From: | Caphton D, Troskoski W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19352B005 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-317-81-03, 50-317-81-3, 50-318-81-03, 50-318-81-3, NUDOCS 8106020549 | |
| Download: ML19352B009 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000317/1981003
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Region I
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Report No.
50-317/81-03
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50-318/81-03
Docket No.
50-317
50-318
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License No. DPR-53
DPR-69
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
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P.O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203
Facility Name:
Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2
Inspectior,at:
Lusby, Maryland
Inspection conducted: January 26-30, 1981
Inspectors:
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W. Troskoski, Reactor Inspector
date signed
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Approved by:
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D. L. Caphton,' Chief, Nuclear Support
dat6 signed
Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on January 26-30, 1981 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/81-03
and 50-318/81-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee actions on previous
items; fuel handling operations, and surveillance testing related to refueling
Technical Specifications for Unit 2; startup testing and data reduction for Unit
1; IE Circulars; and, administrative controls.
The inspection involved 32 inspector-
hours onsite by a region-based NRC inspector.
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Resul ts : Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in
four of the areas, one item was found in one area (level 5, failure to follow
procedures, Detail 6).
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Petails
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Persons Contacted
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Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
M. Bowman, Nuclear Engineer
J. T. Carroll, Operations Supervisor
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J. A. Mihalcik, Nuclear Engineer
- L. B. Russell, Plant Superintendent
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, as well as employees
of Combustion Engineering.
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Other Accompanying NRC Personnel
R. Architzel, Senior Resident Inspector
- C. Callahan, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-318/79-01-01):
Tagout Log Not Current. A
random sampling of locked valves and tagged valves in the Turbine Building
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and Auxiliary Building was conducted to verify conformance witn procedure
CCI-1128, Safety and Safety Tagging, 7/17/78.
Several valves associated
with tagout numbers 87440, 87442, and 87457 were carried as active tagouts
in the log, but were not tagged in the field.
At the time, it was noted
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that the licensee had initiated a program to correct such discrepancies.
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Procedure CCI-1128 has since been revised (change 3,12/24/80).
During a
unit shutdown, a single reactor operator is assigned the system lockout and
tagout duties for each shift, which includes upkeep of the Unit 1 and Unit
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2 operations tagout logs.
The inspector reviewed these logs and discussed
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the current tagout status with the assigned reactor operator.
Checks were
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conducted in the field and in the control room for compliance with tagout
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No.1334, Safety Injection Leakoff to Reactor Water Tank.
No discrepancies
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were identified by the inspector.
This item is closed.
3.
Fuel Handling Operations - Unit 2
Scope
Three shifts of refueling operations, including parts of a 4-12 and 12-8
backshift, were observed by the inspector in both the control room and the
fuel floor.
Direct observations of the ongoing activities were made to
verify that:
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Refueling crew makeup was as required (TS 6.2.2);
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Shutdown boron concentration exceeded minimum requirements (TS 3.1.2.7
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and 3.9.1);
Flux monitoring in the control room with an audible indication on the
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fuel floor was consistent with procedures (TS 3.9.2);
Dedicated communications between control room persnnnel, the refueling
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machine operator, and the spent fuel pool were maintained (TS 3.9.5);
Fuel floor housekeeping was acceptable, with loose parts controlled;
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Containment integrity was maintained (TS 3.9.4);
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Water leeel was greater than 23 feet above the top of irradiated fuel
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assemblies seated in the reactor pressure vessel (TS 3.9.10);
Refueling machine interlocks were tested (TS 3.9.6);
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Shutdown cooling was in operation with a flow rate > 3000 gpm (TS -- 3.9.8);
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Fuel accountability was in accordance with procedures; and,
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Shift turnovers were conducted per administrative procedures.
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Findings
a.
Boron Concentration
Technical Specification 3.9.1 requires a shutdown boron concentration
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sufficient to ensure either (1) a keff 1 0.95 or (2) a minimum concen-
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tration of 1720 ppm; for whichever condition is the more restrictive.
This calculation was determined to be 2100 ppm by licensee procedure
NEP-4, Rev. 2, Unit 2 Refueling Bor.on Concentration, Attachment NEP 4-
13.
Critical refueling boron concentration and refueling inverse
boron worth (ppm /%Ap) values used in NEP-4 calculation were provided
by the fuel vendor, Combustion Engineering, in a letter to Baltimore
Gas and Electric, document number 9676-524, dated 12/30/80, for the
third refueling outage of Unit 2.
The inspector held discussions with
control room personnel, and reviewed sections of FH-6, Core Reloading
Procedures, Rev. 6 for 1/28-29/81, to verify that minimum concentration
requirements were met.
No discrepancies were identified.
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b.
Reactivity Control Systems
Through discussions with licensee representatives and review of control
room panels and controls, the inspector verified that the limiting
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conditions of operation for the refueling mode (mode 6) were met in
that:
(1) High Pressure Safety Injection Pump No. 23 provided a flow path
from the refueling water tank to the Reactor Coolant System (TS 3.1. 2.1) .
(2) The refueling water tank prov'ded a borated wate source that met
volume, concentration and temi rature requiremer.ts (TS 3.1.2.7).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Inverse Multiplication (1/M)
During the fuel loading, the inspector reviewed the sections of Fuel
Handling Procedure FH-6(Rev. 6) that dealt with neutron flux monitoring.
Observations of data being taken and 1/M computations being made were
conducted on 1/28/81 to verify procedure adherence.
Independent 1/M
calculations were also made by the inspector as a check on the licensee's
calculations.
No discrepancies were identified.
4.
Startup Testing - Unit 1
Scope
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Sections of the licensee's Startup Testing Program were reviewed to verify
that the tests were performed in accordance with technically adequate and
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approved procedures and Technical Specification requirements.
Test data
were also reviewed to verify that the results meet acceptance criteria.
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Findings
The inspector revi wed Post-Startup Test Procedure (PSTP)-2, Unit 1, Cycle
5, Initial approacr. to Criticality and Low Power Physics Testing, Rev.1.
Data and acceptance criteria were compared for:
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(1) Critical boron (AR0, 532 F)
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(2)
Isothernal Temperature Coefficient
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(3) CEA Group Worths
(4) Critical boron (5320F; 5, 4, 3, 2,1, Full Inserted)
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Each was within its defined specifications.
Technical 3pecification 3.1.1.1 requires that the shutdown margin shall be
determined to be > 4.3% ao before exceeding 5% of rated thermal power.
The
licensee successfully demonstrated this by meeting the above acceptance
criteria parameters of procedure PSTP-2, that were presented in the following
Baltimore Gas and Electric documents prepared by Combustion Engineering:
1.
BG&E-9676-468, 10/17/80, "Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 5 HZP
' Critical Boron Concentration".
2.
BG&E-9676-452, "Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Cycle 5 Licensee Submittal".
The inspector notes that Baltimore Gas and Electric is to submit a summary
report of plant startup and power escalation testing following modifications
of the plant due to the new core design.
Pending NRC review of this startup
report, the inspector has no further questions at this time.
5.
IE Circulars
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IEC: 80-17, Fuel Pin Damage Due to Water Jet From Baffle Plate Corner, was
issued July 23, 1980.
This circular identified a fuel pin failure mechanism
that has appeared only in certain Westinghouse PWR's.
However, it has been
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distributed to all PWR's since there may be other plant specific designs of
the 'as built' core baffle that could contribute to similar fuel pin failures.
Recommended actions included (1) determination of core locations that might
be subject to water jet impingement upon fuel pins that c.ould potentially
be damaged by fretting, (2) examination of fuel pins that were discharged
from those locations, or are now at those locations (during the next refueling
outage), and (3) take appropriate actions to correct / prevent occurrence of
this problem.
The inspector discussed these problems with licensee representatives.
These representatives stated that to date, there has been no observed fuel
pin damage due to water impingement.
Selected fuel assemblies have been
discharged and inspected for this specific phenonena during past refuelings,
with negative results.
The licensee further stated that the fuel vendor,
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Combustion Engineering, had been contacted when the circular was issued.
The fuel vendor indicated to the licensee that fuel pin damage of the kind
addressed by the circular had not occurred at any of the C-E plants.
When
the inspector requested docum6ntation of the licensee - fuel vendor discussions,
the licensee's representative stated that they would request a written
letter from Combustion Engineering.
Based on these discussions, Circular
No. 80-17 is closed.
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6.
Lifted Wires and Temporary Jumpers
Scope
The inspector reviewed procedure CCI-117A, Lifted Wire and Temporary Jumper
Log, approved 12/23/80.
This procedure superseded CCI-117, and requires an
independent verification by a second person or a fun::tional test to conclusively
prove the proper installation or removal of the lifted wire or temporary
jumper.
Findings
The inspector audited both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Lifted Wire or Temporary
Jumper log books located in the shift supervisor's oHice.
Both log books
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contained an out of date copy of CCI-117.
The shift supervisor ordered
these copies replaced with the current revision, CCI-117A.
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Inspection of the logs identified a number of jumpers that have been in
place for several years. A sampling inspection of several of these idertified
the Steam Lines Drain #4 (Unit 1), serial No. 76-8, had been installed on
1/23/76 and the jumper removed on 1/16/81, after CCI-117 had been revised
to require an independent verification of removal.
No evidence existed
that this jumper was removed in accordance with the new procedure and that
the second verification was conducted.
The inspector stated concern regarding
the other jumpers that predated the new procedure.
The licensee's representative
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acknowledged this concern.
Failure to follow the current Lifted Wire and Temporary Jumper Log procedure,
CCI-117A, is an item of noncomplit ce (50-317/81-03-01).
7.
Facility Tours
The inspector conducted several tours of the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings
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during all three shifts to observe radiation monitoring and control practices,
shift manning, general housekeeping, use of fire barriers and fire watches
during welding, and compliance with technigal specifications.
No items of
noncompliance were observed.
8.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were presented to the licensee management
(denoted in Detail 1) at the end of this inspection.
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