ML19351F497

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Forwards Info Re Plant Sys & Equipment & Engineering Studies Evaluating New Design Stds,In Response to NUREG-0737 Requests
ML19351F497
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/1981
From: Daltroff S
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-1.C.1, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.13, TASK-2.K.3.15, TASK-2.K.3.21, TASK-2.K.3.22, TASK-2.K.3.44, TASK-2.K.3.45, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8101130314
Download: ML19351F497 (53)


Text

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PM:1 AD Ei. PHI A ELECTRIC COM PANY 2301 M ARKET STREET

  • O. BOX 8699 1d81 1981 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 SMIELOS L. D ALTROFF ELacfasc o c oss

'"T1 January Re:

Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Mr. Darrell C.

Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission IIashington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Information Requested by NUREC 0737,

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" Clarification of TMI Action Plany Requirements"

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

Several of the TMI related requirements identified in NUREG 0737 request the licensee to submit specific information regarding plant systems and equipment, or the results of engineering studies evaluating new design standards.

A response to these requests is presented in the following attachments.

The number to the right corresponds with the TMI Action Plan identification numbers.

Attachment A-Shift Technical Advisor Training and l

Qualification (I.A.I.1)

Attachment B - Emergency Procedures (I. Col)

Attachment C - Design Review of Plant Shielding (II.B.2)

Attachment D-Poet Accident Sampling Capability (II.B.3)

Attachment E - Containment Prescure Setpoint (II.E.4.2(5))

Attachment F - Containment Purge Valve Operability OO/

I (II.E.4.2(6))

E Attachment C - Instrumentation for Inadequate Core Cooling (II.F.2)

Attachment H - Auto Restart of RCIC (II.K.3.13(b))

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l Attachment I - MPCI/RCIC Break Detection (II.K.3.15) l 810 n 3 0 3lT Y

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Mr.

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Eisenhut Page 2 Restart of Core Spray & LPCI Attachment J (II.M.3.21)

Attachment K - Auto Switchover of RCIC Suction (II.K.3.22)

Attachment L - Evaluation of Anticipated Transients (II.K.3.44)

Evaluation of Depressurzation (II.K.3.45)

Attachnent M At tachr

  • t N-Inplant Iodine Monitoring (III.D.3.3)

Attacna. ; O - Control Room Habitability (III.D.3.4)

Additional time beyond the January 1,

1981 submittal date identified in NUREG 0737 was required to permit a thorough review of all drafted material and ensure compliance with the NUREG 0737 requests.

We discussed this matter with your NRC Licensing Manager for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and a request for additional time to prepare this submittal was found acceptable.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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Very truly yours,

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Attachment

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ATTACHMENT A Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Requirement: Shift Technical Advisor (STA) (l.A.l.1) 1.

All licensees of operating reactors shall provide a description of th,eir STA training program and their plans for requalification training.

This description shall indicate the level of training attained by STAS by January 1, 1981 and demonstrate conformance with the qualification and training requirements in the October 30, 1979 letter.

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All licensees of operating reactors shall provide a li description of their long-term STA program, including

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qualification, selection criteria, training plans, and plans, l

if any, for the eventual phaseout of the STA program.

The a comparison of the licensee 1

description shall include

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program with sections 5 and 6 of the INPO document, " Nuclear

,2 Power Plant Shift Technical Advisor - Recommendations for j

Position Description, Qualifications, Education and trainica."

Response

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The request to defer placing the STA trainees on duty until after the completion of the training program (February IS, l

1981) was accepted in a letter dated December 17, 1980, R.

W.

jl Reid, NRC toe.

G.

Bauer, Philadelphia Electric Company.

The l

l current STAS will extend their duty period to cover the deferral period...

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The in-training STAS are participating in the long-teem STA

'j traininr arogram described in Section III below.

This program

(*ds the training requirements identified in the October x,

1979 letter, and closely parallels the proposed INPO training standard for STAS.

II. The selection criteria and qualification of STAS included the following individual requirements:

a.

The individual shall have a bachelor's degree in a l

science or engineering discipline applicable to power i

production from an accredited college or university.

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The individual shall successfully complete the STA tr-ining program described below.

The initial Peach Bottom STA candidates do not meet the INPO recommendations on minimum experience due to the present shortage of experienced individuals who meet item iia above.

A minimum experience criteria will be established for the Peach Bottom STA program at a later date in accordance with standards to be issued by the NRC.

It is our recommendation t' s t the minimum experience criteria for the STA should be ve r liberal in recognition of the present shortage of 1

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P experienced engineering personnel.

A restrictive experience criteria would further reduce the availability of potential STA candidatess The primary benefit of the STA program is to complement the experience and knowledge of the licensed operating shift personnel with someone with a technical background who is capable of an analytical evaluation of plant behavior.

The academic training requirenents (college and STA training) represent the primary means for satisfying this objective.

In lieu of the INPO experience critoria, we propose that the NRC standard should require the STA candidate to have a minimum of 12 mon.ths of power plant experien:e, with at least 6 months in a nuclear power plant.

Present planning has not addressed itself to the avantual phase-out of the STA program.

Each of the six STA candidates presently in training have a Bachelor of Science degree in either nuclear, mechanical, or electrical engineering.

Their engineering job experience ranges from three months to three years.

III. Shift Technical Advisor Training Program The long term Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Training Progran for Peach Bottom is designed to provide personnel possessing engineering and scientific degrees with the training i

necessary to function as a technical advisor to shift I

supervision during normal and emergency operating conditions.

l These phases, along with the length for each one for the j

training program presently in progress, cre listed below:

Phase I: Basic Academic Phase (6 weeks) l 'i Phase II: Management Administrative Ocatrols Phase (2 weeks)

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Phase III: Plant Systems Phase (7 1/2 weeks) j Phase IV: Accident Analysis Phase (2 weeks)

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l Phase V: BWR Simulator Training Phase (3 weeks)

Overall Program Review (1 week) l Upon completion of the training program a written examination will be administered to each trainee.

This examination will be patterned after the NRC-administered SRO license examination.

The examination for the STA candidates presently in training will be given February 17 - 18, 1981.

A description of each phase of the training program follows.

a.

Phrsa I: Basic Academic Phase This portion of the training program is a condensed version of,t h e course normally presented to candidates for a reactor operator's license.

The objective of the Basic Academic Phase is to provide the student with a t

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basic understanding of the scientific and engineering principles of reactor plant operation.

The curriculum includes the following topics:

classical physics, atomic physics, nuclear physics,, reactor core physics, reactor operations, introduction to nuclear power plant systems, theory and application of nuclear power plant systems, health physics, electricity and electronics, nuclear instrumentation, overall nuclear power plant operations and chemistry.

b-Phase II:

Managemeut/ Administrative Control Phase This phase of the trainir.t introduces the duties and responsibilities of the Shift Technical Advisor.

The objectives are to provide requisite leadership skills as well as an orientation on general plant operations and safety to ensure that each STA is familiar with plant management and administration controls, c.

Phase III: Plant Systems Phase Plant systems training encompasses essential nuclear steam supply, secondary, and emergency systems.

The trainee will learn the general description of the j

system, instrumentation and controls, int 9econnections with other systems, operational limits, and basic operation.

The provisions of Technical Specifications, including their bases, will be stressed.

Classroom sessions will be supplemented with frequent plant tours.

The purpose of these tours will be to familiarize the trainees with the locations of plant components and, where appropriate, to observe their operation.

An

-I examination will be given once each week.

Quizes will be administered each day on which no examination is given.

d.

Phase IV:

Accident Analysis Phase The objective of the Accident Analysis Phase is to prepare the Shift Technical Advisor to perform the accident assessment function by developing competence l

and experience in the analysis of plant conditions.

This segment of the program will require the trainee to l

draw on the knowledge gained during preceding phases to l

analyze hypothetical situations not covered by procedures.

In addition, significant transiunts or events from other plants will be discussed.

An examination will be administered at the completion of this phase.

Topics included in this phase are:

analysis of design basis accident, analysis of abnormal operational transients, previous BWR transients and significant events, and mitigating reactor core damage.

e.

Phase V:

BWR Simulator Training Phase 1

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i During this phase of tne training program each day of j

i instruction will be divided into equal periods of i

classroom and simulator instruction.

In general, i

evolutions which will be covered are normal operations,

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l moderate-frequency transients, and infrequent and limiting faults.

The specific evolutions will be i

selected so as to effectively familiarize the trainees with plant operation.

f f.

Requalification Training An annual requalification program will be conducted for Peach Bottom Shift Technical Advisocs.

This program will consist of two parts: a lecture series and BWR simulator training.

The STAS will attend the license operator requalification lecture series and annual I

simulator training session.

The lecture series will i

include a review of significant and/or potentially j

serious Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and industry k

events and of accident an transient analyses discussed il in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Both the lecture and simulator portions of the requalification program will emphasize the role of the STA in each situation.

This requalification program is consistent with the INPO recommendations.

XV. Comparison of the Peach Bottom STA Training Program with the INPO Recommendations (appendix C of NUREG 0737) j l

The academic training contact hours and subject material for each Peach Bottom STA candidate is in close agreement with the INPO recommencations.

The training is provided by the STA Training Program (approximately twenty-two weeks), plus the college training each STA candidete has previously received.

It should be noted that the INPO program would require approximately 26 weeks, excluding the college level 1

mathematics and prerequsites beyond high school academics.

However, this comparison does not take credit for the college level courses taken by the STA candidates.

Each candidate has taken many of the college level courses recommended, particularly in the areas of thermal sciences, electrical sciences, and reactor theory.

The personnel who are receiving the STA training for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station are graduate engineers.

The possession of an engineering degree by each trainee means that each person previously received some of the training recommended by INPO.

Based on our knowledge of engineering l

college curriculums, it was assumed that the following training had been received, and thus was not repeated during the STA training program:

High-school level and college-level mathematics High-school level chemistry

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o Most of the high-school physics (48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of classical physics review and atomic and nuclear physics were included in Phase I before proceeding to reactor core physics)

The remaining 430 hours0.00498 days <br />0.119 hours <br />7.109788e-4 weeks <br />1.63615e-4 months <br /> of college-level academics and 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> of plant-specific applied fundamentals recommended by INPO are included its the Peach Bottom program.

However, they are not included esclusively in Phase I (Basic Academics):

some of this training is introduced in Phase I, but continued in another phase where it is more effective.

To cite two examples:

1.

Plant-speciific reactor instrumentation and control is only touched upon during Phase I; it is covered more extensively in Phase III (Plant Systems) and Phase V (Simulator Training).

2.

Thermal sciencies (thermodynamics, fluid flow, and heat transfer) are introduced in Phase I.

They are discussed in more detail during Phases III (Plant Systems) and IV (Accident Analysis).

All of the INPO-recommended management / supervisory skills tcpics are presented during week one of Phase II (Management / Administrative Controls).

INPO recommends 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> of plant systems training.

The recommended systems are covered during Phase III (Plant Systems), along with others considered appropriate.

In addition, specific systems are discussed during the classroom l

segments of Phast V (Simulator Training) when necessary.

l All of the topics INPO recommends under the heading

" Administrative Controls" are included during week two of Phase II (Managemerat/ Administrative Controls) except Technical Specifications.

Our experience indicates that discussion of Technical Specifications is more effective when it accompanies the systems training.

Thus, Technical Specifications are presented extensively during Phase III (Plant Systems).

The General Operating Procedures segment of the INPO program is included in Phase V (Simulator Training) of the STA program.

INPO suggests 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of training concerning Transient / Accident Analysis and Emergency Procadures.

In the Peach Bottom f.erogram, part of this training on abnormal and ems cer.cy precedures is split between Phases IV ( Accident Analysis) and V (Simulator Training).

A 5*gnificant segment of the accident analysis phase (Phase IV) is devoted to discussion of transient and accident conditions, including how to recognize and deal with them.

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7 Phace V (Sisulator Training) of the program has bocn designod to cover those simulator exercises recommended by INPO plus other evolutions which our expetience indicates are warranted.

The INPO recommendation to include high school and college level subjects in the qualification requirements for STAS appears to be of little value, and would result in unnecessary administrative work to document the curriculum for each STA.

An engineering or scientific degree from an accredited college or university ensures that the STA candidate possesses the necessary technical background.

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COMPARISON OF THE PEACH BOTIOM STA TRAINING PROGRAM WITH THE INPO RECOMMENDATIONS INPO RECOM4ENDATIONS PECO TRAINING PROGRAM S etion Trainina/ Education Contact Hours 6.1.1 Prerequisites beyond STA candidates are assumed to have had this High School Diploma training in their previous academic training (based

-Mathematics 90 on possession of an engineering scientific

- Chemistry 30 degree from an accredited college or university)

- Physics 150 270 6.1.2 College - Level Academics

- mathematics 90 STA candidates assumed to have had 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> of

- reactor theory 100 mathematics for reasons stated above.

- reactor chemistry 30 All other subjects covered in phases I, III, IV,

- Nuclear materials 40 V of the STA Training Program.

- thermal sciencies 120 All ST1. candidates have had some or all of

- electrical sciences 60 these subjects in college.

- nuclear instrumentation 40 and control

- Nuclear radiation protection 40 and health physics 520 6.2 Applied Fundamentals 120 Phase I: Basic Academics (240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br />)

Plant Specific 6.3 Management / Supervisory 40 Phase II: Management Phase (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />)

Skills l

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._u-f COMPARISON OF THE PEACH BOTTOM STA TRAINING PROGRAM WITH TIE INPO RECOMMENDAT mNR INPO RECOMMENDATIONS PECO TRAINING PROGRAM s

S7ction Training / Education Contact Hours 6.4 Plant Systems 200 Phase III: Plant Systems (300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />) 6.5 Administrative Controls 80 Phase II: Administrative Control Phase (90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br />)

Technical Specifications covered in phase V.

6.6 General Operating Procedures 30 Covered in phase V 6,7 Transient /Acci?ent Analysis 30 Phase IV: Accident Analysis (80 Hours) and Emergency Procedures Also covered in phase V i

6.8 Simulator Training 100 Phase V: Simulator (120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br />) 9

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ATTACHMENT B i

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station j

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Recuirement:

Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures for Accidents and Transients (I.C.1)

Reanalysis of transients and accidents, and preparation of guidelines for development of emergency procedures should be completed and submitted to the NRC for review by January 1, 1981.

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Response

Philadelphia Electric Company has supported and participated in the General Electric BWR Owners' Group program to comply with this requ'rament.

Engineering personnel from our company have participated in various seminars held to review the proposed guidelines, and have monitored the progress of this effort through their contacts with the NRC Owners' Group.

BWR Emergency Procedure Guidelines (Revision 0) was submitted to the NRC on June 30, 1980.

In a seminar held with the NRC staff in early g

August 1980 to review the Emergency Procedure Guidelines, the g

staff indicated that, except for some technical justification of several items and the details associated with implementing the j

guidelines, they were satisfied that the material submitted met the requirements of this task.

The additional technical justification of the guidelines will be transmitted by the Owners' Group to the NRC sometime early in 1981.

Otherwise, we J

consider our response to this NUREG 0737 requirement to be l!

complete.

Plant specific emergency procedures for Peach Bottom 4

are being written to incorporate the content of the guidelines.

We will continue to work with the Owners' Group to respond to any requests to provide further analysis and justification of the j

emergency procedure guidelines.

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ATTACHMENT C Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station i

i Requirement:

Design Review of Plant Shielding (II.B.2)

Perrorm pl. ant shielding review to determine accessibility to vital areas during post-accident operations.

Response

In our letter of October 15, 1980, S. L. Daltroff to D. G.

Eisenhut concerning the reassessment of the shielding study (Attachment A, item II.B.2), it was indicated that post-accident radiation conditions will not impact on reactor building accessibility and the availability of the present radiochemistry laboratory.

Based upon the clarified source term design criteria and the expanded vital area criteria of NUREG 0737, the results presented in our submittal of January 31, 1980, S. L. Daltroff to H. R. Denton, indicate that the post-accident radiation conditions will not impact on accessibility to vital areas I

defined for PBAPS.

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y ATTACHMENT D Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Recuirement:

Post Accident Sampling Capability (II.B.3)

Provides additional clarification to the previous requirement to provide post-accident sampling capability.

If deviations from these clarifications are necessary, provide detailed explanation end justification for the deviations by January 1, 1981.

Response

g The post-accident sampling system previously designed and l

scheduled t.o be installed at Peach Bottom meets all NRC requirements identified in NUREG 0737.

The design details will be available for review as requested in Section II.B.3.

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i ATTACHMENT E Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Recuirement:

Containment Isolation Dependability - Containment Pressure Setpoint (II.E.4.2 position 5)

The containment setpoint pressure that initiates containment isolation for non-essential penetrations must be reduced to the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions.

The getpoint should be set within 1 psi above the maximum expected containment pressure.

Response

The present setpoint of the drywell pressure instrumentation that initiates containment isolation of non-essential penetrations is less than or equal to 2.0 psig.

Normally the drywell pressure is maintained in the 0.25 to 0.75 psig range.

However, a review of the containment pressure operating history at Peach Bottom revealed occassional excursions both above and below this range.

During the past two years, the drywell pressure of 1.0 psig was l

reached or exceeded 0.26% of the time.

Therefore, the current setpoint is within 1 psi of the maximum expected drywell pressure, and meets the criteria specified.

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I ATTACHMENT F Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station 3

Requirement:

Containment Purge alve Operability Criteria (II.E.4.2, postiivn 6)

Containment purge valves that do not satisfy the opera ~ility o

criteria set forth in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 or the Staff Interim Position of October 23, 1979 must be sealed closed.

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Response

Operation of the Peach Bottom containment purge and vent valves is in conformance with the above criteria as discussed in a letter dated December 11, 1979, S. L. Daltroff, Philadelphia Electric Company to T. A.

Ippolito, NRC.

The ralves have been limited to a maxirum of 37 degrees open whenever the reactor is not in the cold shutdown or refueling mode.

The maximum opening has been conservatively determined such that the isolation function can be successfully carried out in the required time period under DBA-LOCA loads.

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I ATTACHMENT G Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station j

Recuirement:

Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling (II.F.2)

Provide a description of anf additional instrumentation or controls proposed for the plant to supplement existing instrumentation (including primary coolant saturation monitors) in order to provide unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling.

Response

This requirement was originally identified in NUREG 0578, item 2.1.3b.

An analysis of existing instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling was performed under the auspices of the General Electric BWR Owners Group, and submitted to the NRC as enclosure 1 of a letter dated December 28, 1979, R. H. Buchholz, General Electric Company to D. F. Ross, Jr., NRC.

The study concludes that the current design provides an unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling.

Reactor j]

water level is directly measured on wide-range and fuel zone instruments, and represents the primary variable to detect

' -j inadequate core cooling.

The range of the level instruments overlaps to provide fuel range indication from normal operation

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Positive indication of injection of one ECC system is an alternative method for verifying adequate i

core cooling.

A primary coolant saturation meter is not required

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since the BWR always operates under saturated coimitions.

Philadelphia Electric Company has reviewed this analysis and l

agree with its conclusions.

However, comparison with the Peach Bottom design identified a need to record the wide range and fuel zone level indication and to recalibrate the fuel zone level instruments to increase their range slightly in order to conform with NUREG 0737, Appendix B, criteria 7.

Therefore, we are proposing a modification to record these level signals and recalibrate the fuel zone instruments by January 1,

1982, contingent upon equipment availability.

Additionally,Section II.F.2 of NUREG 0737 requests the licensee to consider the installation of core exit thermocouples.

As discussed in the BWR Owners Group coments (letter dated October 8,

1980, D. B. Waters, Chairman - BWR Owners Group to D. G.

Eisenhut, NRC), the incorporation of core exit thermocouples into I

the BWR design has already been considered in the development of Regulatory Guide 1.97.

We concur with the Owners Group recommendation that any further need to evaluate core exit thermocouples for BWRs should be pursued only as it relates to future revisions of Regulatory Guide 1.97.

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L ATTACHMENT H Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Requirement:

Auto Restart of RCIC (II.K.3.13(b))

The RCIC system initiation logic should be modified so that the RCIC system will restart on low reactor water level following a high reactor water level trip.

Response

Philadelphia Electric Company participated in the GE',aral Electric Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group program to study this l

recommendation.

The Owners Group report was submitted to the NRC in a letter dated December 29, 1980, D. B. Waters, Chairman, BWR Owners' Group to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC.

We concur with the caports' conclusion that the proposal will enhance the availability of the RCIC system while having no adverse affect on system function, reliability, or safety.

We are planning to implement, with minor rev3.sions incorporated to meet our plant unique design, the modification described in the Owners Group report by July 1, 1981.

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ATTACHMENT I Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Recuirement:

Modify HPCI-RCIC Break Detection Logic (II.K.3.15)

The HPCI and RCIC steam line break detection circuitry should be modified so that pressure spikes resulting from system initiation will not cause inadiertent system isolation.

Response

l Philadelphia Electric Company has participated in the General Electric EWR Owners' Group evaluation of this NRC recommendation.

Our review of the Owners Group evaluation report concludes that the addition of a time delay in the break detection circuitry should eliminate any spurious isolations that may occur as a result of flow peaks occurring during a normal system start l

transient.

The time delay fully preserves the break detection capabilities of the existing system and does not impact on the l

design basis accident analysis of HPCI and RCIC steam line breaks.

A 13 second valve closure delay period is assumed during l

the design basis evaluation of a t. team supply line break.

This delay results from the assumption that the DC isolation valve fails and that no offiste AC power is immediately available to the AC valve.

The proposed modification to the HPCI and RCIC break detection circuitry will involve a time delay of approximately 3 seconds.

The addition of this time delay will not result in any change in the total reactor fluid mass release when the design basis conditions are considered.

Tnerefore, the proposed stodification does not have any adverse safety i

implications.

We are proceeding to implement this change by July l

1, 1981.

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ATTACHMENT J Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Requirement:

Restart of Core Spray and Los Pressure Coolant -

Injection Systems (II.K.3.21)

The core spray and LPCI system logic should be modified so that these systems will restart automatically on loss of reactor water level following manual termination of system operation while an initiation signal is present.

Response

Philadelphia Electric Company participated in the General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group program to study this recommendation.

The Owners Group report was submitted to the NRC in a letter dated December 29, 1980, D. B. Waters, Chairman, BWR Owners' Group to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC.

We have reviewed this report and concur with its conclusion that the suggested modification would not enhance plant safety.

In fact, we believe that if the suggested modification was implemented, the escalation of control system complexity and restricted operator flexibility when dealing with anticipated events would result in a negative impact on plant safety.

The report does recommend modifications to plants with a High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, which is not applicable to the Peach Bottom design.

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ATTACHMENT K Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Recuirement:

Automatic Switchover of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Suction - Verify Procedures (II.K.3.22)

The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system takes suction from the condensate storage tank with manual switchover to the cuppression pool when the condensate storage tank level is low.

The licensee should verify that clear and cogent procedures exist for the manual switchover of the RCIC system suction from the condensate storage tank to tr.e suppression pool.

Response

System procedure S.3.5.J has been implemented to provide the operator with explicit instructions for the manual switchover of the RCIC system.

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ATTACHMENT L Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Recuirement:

Evaluation of Anticipated Transients with Single Failure to Verify No Fuel Failure (II.K.3.44)

For anticipated transients combined with the worst single failure and assuming proper operator action, licensees should demonstrate that the core remains covered.

Response

Philadelphia Electric Company participated in the General Electric boiling Water Reactor Owners Group program to analyze this event.

The Owners Group report was submitted to the NRC in a letter dated December 29, 1980, D. B. Waters, Chairman, BWR Owners' Group to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC.

We concur with the l

reports' conclusion that the core remains covered during the worst transient (loss of feedwater) combined with the worst single failure (HPCI failure).

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ATTACHMENT M Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Recuirement:

Evaluation of Depressurization with Other Than Automatic Depressurization System (II.K.3.45)

Evaluate depressurization modes other than full actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) so as to r? duce the possibility of exceeding vessel integrity limits by rapid cooldown.

Respor.se Philadelphia Electric Company participated in the General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group program to study this recommendation.

The Owners Group report was submitted to the NRC in a letter dated December 29, 1980, D. B. Waters, Chairman, BWR Owners' Group to D. G. Eisenut, NRC.

We concur with the report's conclusion that rapid depressuzation to avoid prolonged core uncovery is best, and vessel fatigue challenge is not i

substantially reduced by a slightly slower depressurization.

Therefore, no modifications are deemed neccessary as a result of i

this study.

l 1

W

- 18 s

5 ATTACHMENT N Peach Bottom Atomic Pcwer Station Requirement:

Improved Inplant Iodine Instrumentation Under Accident Conditions (III.D.3.3)

Each licensee shall provide equipment and associated training and procedures for accurately determining the airborne iodine concentration in areas within the facility where plant personnel may be present during an accident.

[

Response

The presens sampling methods and procedures used at Peach Bottom permit the measurement of in-plant iodine concentration during cccident conditions.

A description of this method follows:

i The sampling method uses portable air samplers with a combination (particulate filters and iodine sampling cartridge) sampling l

head.

The sampling heads use a glass fiber particulate filter end a CESCO style (2.25" dia. x 1.04" thickness) iodine charcoal cartridge.

The three cartridges (CESCO charcoal model No. 81-70SC727, Rade Co. charcoal model CP-100 and Rade Co. Silver Zeolite model No. GY-130) used at Peach Bottom fit this sample l

head.

The cartridge normally used is the CESCO charcoal cartridge model No. 81-70SC727.

When long sampling times are required a Rade Co. Charcoal cartridge model CP-100 is normally.

lised.

During emergency conditions with high xenon or krypton concentrations a Rade Co.

Silver Zeolite model No. GY-130 may be used.

Table 1 describes the types and the number of portable air samplers in use at this time for the Peach Bottom monitoring program.

l The iodine activity on the sample cartridge is determined by gamma isotopic analysis using a computer based multi-channel I

analyzer (Nuclear Data 6620) with three high resolution lithium drifted germanium (Geli) detector which is located in the Peach Bottom Counting Room.

The Counting Room is located in the Turbine Building at the ground level elevation.

The NRC Region I meeting, held in Arlington, VA, on Septelber 22, 1980, provided acaicional clarification of the source term design criteria for the plant shielding study.

A reassessment of the shielding study, based on this new clarification, indicates that the I

Counting Room dose rates are low enough to permit sample analysis during accident conditions.

Geli isotopic analysis permits iodine identification in the presence of xenon and krypton.

If the analysis of iodine becomes impor-fble due to interference (high background) from xenon or l

kryp' con, then Silver Zeolite cartridges will be used, or the charcoal cartridge will be purged with clean bottled nitrogen or i

bottled breathing air to reduce the interference.

If the use of Silver 2eolite does not sufficiently reduce the xenon or krypton 1

- 19

interference, the Silver Zeolite cartridges will also be purged with clean bottled nitrogen or bottled breathing air which is cvailable on site.

e 4

O O

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- 20

,e g

[

f

^

Attachment N Table 1 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Portable Air Samplers MODEL (1)

Quantity (2) 1.

Portable 11/24 VDC Rade Co. Model 2

No. H-809C (available in off-site emergency team kits) l 2.

Portable gooseneck constant flow air 8

sampler Rade Co. Model No. HD 28, 110 VAC with constant flow rate control 2.

Portable low volume air sampler Rade 15 Company Model AUS-28, 110 VAC with constant flow rate control 4.

Portable low volume air sampler 95 using Gast carbon vane vacuum pump, 110 VAC with critical flow orifices for flow rate control.

(1) All air samplers use Rade Co., Model No. 2500, combination (particulate filter and iodine sampling cartridgs) sampling heads.

The sampling heads use fiber particulate filter and the CESCO style (2.25" dia. x 1.04" thick) iodine sample charcoal cartridges.

The three iodine cartridges used at Peach Bottom fit this sample head.

(2) As of December 1, 1980.

Number subject to change based on l

failure and repair time.

l l

i 1

- 21

r M'DOH!Nr O PEAG BOFIQ4 A'ITMIC POWER STATICN NUREG 0737 REQUIRENENIS Requirenent: III.D.3.4 - Control Boan Habitability - Review Description In accordance with Task Action Plan iten III.D.3.4 and control roan habitability, licensees shall assure that control rom operators will be adequately ywLected against the effects of =midantal ralaaaa of tmic and radi w tive gases and that the nuclear power plant can be safely operated or shut down under design basis =ecidant canditions (Criterien 19, " Control Roan," of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for P'elaar Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50).

Licensees shall sutznit the results of their findings as well as the basis for those findings by January 1,1981. In providing the basis for the habitability finding, licensees tray reference their past sutznittals-Licensees should, however, ensure that these sulanittals reflect the current faciL.ty design and that the information requested in A**=r+==nt 1 is provided.

All licensees with control roars that do not meet the criteria shall identify appropriate nodifications.

A.

Amidantal Postulated Relamaad 'Ibxic Gaaam_

'Ihe hableability of the control roan has been assessed in accordance with NUREG 0737 including Standard Review Plans 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 6.4 and Regulatory niidaa 1.78 (Hazardous @=ical Baleases) and 1.95 Gmidant Chlorine Beleases).

Off-site (Rail Transportation Facilities)

Conrail's link and node report idan+4 fiad 455 =;="4 fic hazardous matar4 =1= trans-en1 =hi-Port Deposit Link (1.5 miles across the Susquehanna ported along the t

River and within 5 miles of the control roon air intake) for the 18 nonth rar4^d frun January 1978 to June 1979. Pv1=*ary Guide 1.78 establishes 30 shiprents per year as being frequent. 'Ihus, this screening criterian eliminated 360 hazardous ma ari=1= fran further mnsideration. Table 2-2 lists the rernaining 95 hazardous e

l maraviala frequently transported past PBAPS. A aarm dary screening criterion involved aliminating those==&ariala that are not c1==sified as tmic to hunans.

After this screening, 57 twic ma*ar4=1= frequently L.-Wund past PBAPS renain.

Of these 57, sane are isaners of each other. Table 2-4 lists the chemicals that were <= hinaa.

l

'Ihe 46 r==4nhv3 toxic hie =1= id11d1 are d -;-ned frequently past PBAPS (equal l

to or greater than 30 shipnents/ year) and which may have the potential to cause a mntrol roan operation inema=ritation are tabulated in Table 3-2.

71so *=h'1= tad l

are the parameters required as inputs for the =md=14ng evaluation.

I In anmrdance with NUREG 0737, the 46 toxic ma*=ri=1=, L--Wwid 30 or nore shipnents per year and potentially hazardous to hunans were==ammamd.

Eighteen ch==ic=1= were assessed to be potentially hazardous to the control roca, listed in Table 3-4, because control roan concentration -r=ad the stated tmic limits.

l I

l l

r l

Accrecate Prtbability of Occurrence Estimation Fegulatory Guide 1.78 says, in order to protect control rom personnel fran the potential toxicity effects of those ch=4cala, devices whis will adequately warn thm to initiate protective action aust be installed. However, the cuidance presented in NURE-75/087, Standard Feview Plan Section 2.2.3 says, design nodifica-tion may not be required if all potential toxic accidents and other external ran-mduced events did not occur frequently enough to be considered design basis. Se acceptance criteria of this d~=mt indicates:

"Me pr*hility of occurrence of the initiating events laading to potential consequences in access of 10GR100 (10-7 per year) exposure gnidatines should be estirated using asstaptions that are representative of the specific site, as is practicable. In additicm, because of the low pr*hilities of the events under censideration, data are often not available to pemit accurate calculation of the probabilities. Accordingly, the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of 10G R100 gnidalines of approximately 10-6 per year is acceptable if, when cabined with reasonable qualitative argunents, the raa14 tic pIchah41ity can be shown to be lower" (sphasis addad).

Seventeen additional less frequently transported toxic ch=im1= (8.5 to 29 ship-ments per year) were omsidered in the aggregate probability analyses and are tabulated in Table 3-5.

'IWelve of these d=icala are classified as a potential habitability problen to the control rom.

Se aggregate. probabilities of a toxic et=4 cal incan= citation to humans in the control room for d=4cala transported more than 8.5 shipments per year are sumarized below:

~

?ggregate Probability Scenarios Events / Year l

1.

Design basis neteorology 73 x 10-6 l

2.

Site meteorologya 56. 10-6 b

0.6 x 10-6 l

3.

S4N meteorologya and arv-idarit adjustment l

Assumes plune centerline strikes the intake. Concentrations will be a.

less due to plune maan*

b.

Not all hazardous material incidants result in an incapacitation. Isaks and minor spills usually only represent a local hazard. D ere have been few large spills. Incapritations at distances of 1.5 mile or nere are j

unlikely. A factor of 10-2 has been applied for spill severity for this y

j site.

Il H

Specific prnhah414 ties by material for miros 1 and 2 cre presented in Tables ll 3-15 and 3-15A respectively.

o Rus. no design nodifications to PBAPS are required for off-site rail transportation i

facilities at PBAPS because the man-irvhvwl arv-4 dant is a low prnhah414ty event. Of s

interest, mininum transit time for a toxic plune to reads the ocmtrol rom intake, with 1.0 nVsec. wind velocity, is about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

1 l

1 -.

l l

Cnsite Toxic Cherricals

'Ihe ensite gas sources are idellfied in Table 2-1 (Cuantity Stored, Type of Con *h, Iccation and Distance to Control Ibczn Intake). Se locations are shown cn the site arr' /.ent Figure 2-2.

Se results of the analysis of en-site toxic chic =1=

m presented in Table 3-1.

Bree of the eight chemicals stored on the site pose a potential control roczn habitability problan: chlorine, mr+vvi dioxide and sulfuric acid. However, the lower inhalation limit for humans is not e.W for mv+vv1 dinvi da.

S e spill area is significantly overestimated for sulfuric acid and sodiun hydroxide and the gases are nuch heavier than air.

Spills of sulfuric acid and sodiun hydroxide will be confined to the water treat-ment bnilaing surps. Bus, dinvine is the cnly significant cosite threat to centrol roczn habi*ahility. Se transit time for the toxic plune to travel fran the water treatment plant to the cxmtrol rocan air intake (535 ft.) at the rate of 1 ny'sec. is 163 seconds.

Proposed axiifications We are investigating the following ocnceptual options for ensunng control roczn habitability during a citicrine release:

1.

Provide chlorine alarms at water treatment facility to signal control roczn operators of an event and provide self-mntained breathing apparatus so that pa m mal can:

put Cx1 self-contained breathing apparatus.

a.

b.

shutoff intake and exhaust fans (about 5-10 minutes),

c.

close d="r= "

2.

Pan 1=na liquified chlorire gas system with a solid sodiun - hypochlorite chlonne systen.

3.

Provide in-line detectors and ventilation system ical*im can=hility.

bbdifications naadai for emnlianna with the cxmtrol rocxn habirah414ty requirements and a schedule for emnleim of the wndific*irma will be sutznitted to the NIC by April 1, 1981.

B.

Widarital Postn1=*ad Release of Padinactive (~aaae 2e habitability of the contIol roCxn has been asaanmad in accordance with WRm 0737. Se parameters utilized as inputs in the analyses are tabulated in Table 1.

Se exposures in the mntrol room are within General Design Criteria 19 and 10CFR100 gnidalines arxi are presented in Table 2.

Berefore, no design nodifica-tions to PBAPS are required.

-2h-0

~

b ATTACHMENT O Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station C.

Information Requested in NUREG 0737, III.D.3.4, Attachment 1 Control Room Habitability Eva:.uation l

f 1)

Request Control room mode of operati' ora, i.e., pressurization and filter recirculation for radiological accident isolation or chlorine releaet

Response

A radiation monitoring system in the fresh air intake duct work

)

monitors the radioactivity level in the incoming air.

If a high I

cctivity level is detected, the operating normal frs'h air supply fan stops and one emergency air supply fan starts.

b.

makeup air is diverted through one of the two high efficiency and charcoal filter train's automatically.

The control room is maintained in a pressurized condition during this emergency mode

'of operation.

If a high - high activity level is detected, all fans on the control room ventilation system trip, terminating all outside air makeup and forced recirculation.

For other forms of contamination, such as smoke, the control room can be purged with 100 percent outside air for a once-through flow using the air conditioning supply fans with the return air fans discharging to atmosphere at the radwaste building roof.

Automatic isolation capability for the makeup air is not provided.

2)

Control Room Characteristics a)

Request air volums control room

Response

176,000 ft3 b)

Requests control-room emercancy zone (control room, critical files, kauchen, washroom, computer j

room etc.

l Response: The control room ventilation system described in item (1) above, supplies the control room complex which consists of the control center and several adjacent offices and kitchen.

The only other area within the control room complex that involves,another ventilation system is the washroom which has its own exhaust system.

These are the only ventilation system that need to be considered in analyzing control room habitability.,

1

I c)

Request:

control room ventilation system schematic with normal and emergency air flow rates Response: See P&ID M-393, Rev. 8, " Ventilation Flow Diagram" enclosed d)

Request:

Infiltration leakage rate Response: In the emergency mode of operation the infiltration leakage rate is zero as the control room is maintained at a slight negative pressure.

e)

Request:

High efficiency particulate air (REPA) filter and charcoal absorber efficiencies.

Response

99.9% and 99.0% respectively f)

Request:

Closest distance between containment and air intake.

Response: See figure 2-2.

The direct line distance between the control room air intake and both priracy containment structures is 120 feet.

The distance between the normal drywell point I

of release (reactor building stack) and the control room air intakr is 305 feet.

l g)

R3questa layout of control toom, air intakes, containment building, and chlorine, or other chemical storage facility with dimensions.

Response: See Figure 2-2 for the layout, and Table 2-1 l

for the dimensions (distance between source l

and control room air intake).

h)

Request control-room shielding including radiation streaming from penetration, doors, ducts, stairways, etc.

Response: The control room is shielded by 2.5 feet thick coacrete walls and ceiling, and a 1 foot thick concrete floor.

1)

Request:

automatic isolation capability - damper closing time, damper leakage and area.

Response: Automatic isolation of the control room ventilation system has not been incorporated into the Peach Bottom design.

j)

Request:

Chlorine detectors or tc:ic gas (local or remote)

Response

Chlorine or toxic gas detectors presently have not been installed at Peach Bottom..

I k)

Request:

Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) availability (number)

Response

Approximately twelve self contained breathing units are maintained as part of the station Respiratory Protection Program.

They are I

stored in the Radwaste Building at elevation 116',near the laundry room, l

1)

Request bottled air supply (hours supply)

Response

A cascade manifold system is installed at elevation 116' Radwaste Building near the laundry room.

Six size 1A (2000 psi) breathing air bottles are provided for recharging the portable air tanks used with the SCBA's.

l m)

Request:

emergency food and portable water supply (how l

many days and how many people)

Response: Emergency food and water supplies are not provided for the control room.

These supplies can be delivered during any emergency expected by relief personnel.

n)

Request:

control room personnel capacity (normal and emergency)

Response: While no specific capacity level has been identified for the Peach Bottom control room, access is restricted to essential personnel.

During accident conditions the control room complement is expected to be 10 persons.

o)

Request:

potassium iodide drug supply l

Response: KI tables are presently stocked on site in the medical room (radwaste Building 135' elevation).

A written procedure is available for administration.

These KI tablets will be distributed by the Personnel Safety Team Leader as necessary.

They are intended only for emergency workers.

3)

Onsite storage of chlorine and,other hazardous chemicals a)

Requests total amoung and size of container Response: See Table 2-1 b)

Request:

closest distance from control room air intake

Response

See Table 2-1 and Figure 2-2 I

i w

l.

4)

Offsite manufacturing, storage, or transportation facilities of hazardous chemicals.

a)

Request:

identify facilities within a 5 mile radius Response: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station is located in a sparcely populated, rural area.

The area within the five mile zone is mostly undeveloped or used for farming.

Four industries are located within a 5 mile area (D

& D Sewing, Star Printing, Snyder Packjng Co.,

Black Bear Structures and National Mobile Concrete Corp.).

To our knowledge these industries do not pose a toxic chemical threat to the habitability of the control room.

No interstate highways pass within 5 miles of the control room.

Pennsylvania Highway Routes 74 and 372 are the principal paved roads within the 5 mile zone.

About a mile of Route 372 passes within 4 1/2 miles of the control room, and Route 74 comes as close as 3 miles.

The primary purpose of these roads is to serve the local area, and are not expected to be used to transport materials that would pose a hazard to control room habitability PBAPS is located

[

8 miles upriver of the conowingo Dam, and 7 I

miles downriver of the Holtwood Dam.

The presence of the dams inhibit commercial transportation on the Susquehanna River near Peach Bottom.

b)

Request:

distance from control room Response: See table 3-6.

The closest point to the conrail tracks is 1.5 miles c)

Request:

quantity of hazardous chemicals in one container Responses See Table 2-2.

d)

Request:

frequency of hazardous chemical transportation traffic.

Response: See Table 3-4.

5)

Technical Specifications (refer to standard technical specifications) a)

Request chlorine detect).on system Response: A detection system precently decs not c ist at Peach Bottom.

b)

Request:

control ro'or emergency filtration system including't..e c:pebility o aait..ain cha i s

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n,--

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r control room pressurization at 1/8 in water guage, verification of isolatioT by test signals and damper closure time *, and filter J

testing requirements.

Response: The Peach Bottom Technical Specifications for the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems requires the following 1)

Operability requirements for the control ecom emergency ventilation system

\\

2)

Minimum efficiency levels for the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers 3)

Minimum specifications for the carbon sample 4)

Minimum flow characteristics for the emergency fans.

5)

Operability and surveillance requirements for the control room intake air radiation monitors.

6)

Surveillance requirements to measure pressure drop across the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

ll 7)

Surveillance requirements to determine HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber efficiencies.

8)

.Survedl1ance requirement to verify operability of system humidity control ll The Peach Bottom Technical Specifications does not address a minimum positive pressure for the control room, nor does it address ventilation damper closure times.

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TABIE 1 LN-OFMANT ACCIDENT: PARAMETERS TABUIATED ECR POS'IUIMED AOCIDENP ANA'NSES DESIGN BASIS ASSUMPTICNS_

I.

Data and ons Used to Estirf M i'w-tive' Source fzxan Postulated Accidents 3440 A.

Power IAvel (Wt)

NA

.Burnup B.

100%

Fission Products Releases from Fuel (fuel damaged)

C.

I D.

Iodine Fractions 0.04 l

(1) organic 0, 1 (2) Elemental 0..$

(3) Particulate II. ' Data and Asstaiptions Used to Estimate Activity Released 0.5 C:stainment Imak Primary / day)

A.

5 Rate (%

2.78 x 10 B.

Wltsee of Primary Cantainment (CD ft.)

100 Contairsnent Release Secondary / day)

C.

6 Rate (t 2.5 x 10 D.

Wltane of Secondary Containment (CU.ft.)

11.5 E.

Imak Rate 'Dm:W h MSIV (scfh) 4 F.

Nnhers of Main'St.e;::s Lines G.

IAak Rate form M$iM Condenser 1.0 M law (t/ day)

H.

Wltane and surfam Area (All 3

Ft2 Ft l

4 Steam Lines)

I (1) Between Inboard and Qatboard MSIV 228.1 454.4 r

3842.6 7653.1 (2) Outboard and 'Darbine Stop 5 7,3 x 1 Valves 1.8 x 10 (3) 'lurbine Condenser Mlaw F.

Deposition Velocity for Iodines (Cm/Sec) 0.012 Partic_4 te 0.012

F Elemental 0.0 organic h%

G.

Valve Mcmsnent Times H.

SGIS Adsorption and Filtration Eff 4M***ias (%)

95 l!

(1) organic Iodines 95 (2) Elemental Iodine 95 (3) Particulate Iodine 95 (4) Particulate Fission Pr W u*3 l

l t

l.

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0,

'Ds21 (Continued) 3 III. Dispersion Data (sec/m );

/

- a>n m y wax.

l p/Q for Time Intervals of A.

3 (1) 0-8 hrs 1.01 x 10~4 S.95 x 10 (2) 8-24 hrs 4

3.79 x 10 (3) 1-4 days 1.67 x 104 (4) 4-30 days i

CR t!

IV.

Data for CR A.

Volume of CR(ft )

176,000 3

i B.

Filtered intaka (cfa) 3,000 99 C.

Efficiency of Carcoal (t)

-l adsorber 99.9 D.

Efficiency of HEPA (t) l :[,

10

, E.

thfiltered Inleakage (cfm) 0.0 l$

F.

Recirculation Flow Rate G.

M.Mn q Factors:

{

1.0 0-1 day 0.6 1-4 days 0.4 ij 4-30 days

..1 4.;

d

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'mBM 2 DBA - IOCA RADIO [cGICAL CCNSEQUENCES s

Ibses (REM)

Contcol 1 7 WyroM Skan Whole Body

<1x10~g"3 a) Fran Activity Tn=iM CR 2.7x1.~1 4.5x10-2 2.0xi b) Plune Shine

< 5,9xig-2 2.7x10~1 4.5x10-2

< 6.2x10-2 c) Direct h 2tal CR Doses h

O e

S e

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TABLE 2-1 ONSITE POTENPIAL GAS SOURCES Distance Ha?.ardous Stored Quantity to Control Room Material and Type Container Location Intakes (f t)

Chlorine 6 ton cylinders West of water plant 535 Carbon dioxide 6-ton tank Turbine b1dg, el 116' 175 from duct 6-ton tank Turbine b1dg, el 116 8 175 from duct 2 3/4-ton tank Emergency diesel bldg 540 2-ton tank Turbine bldg, el 135' 175 from duct Nitrogen 11,000-gal tank South end of Unit 2 265 6,000-gal tank Reactor b1dg 220 (stored as a liq 2id)

Sulfuric acid 4,000-gal tank Inside water treatment 540 33-gal tank plant Concentrated sodiun 4,000 gal tank Inside water treatment 540 hydroxide 56 gal tank plant Hydrogen 24 cylinders South side of 350 Unit 2 turbine bldg Helium Individual bottles Various Various Argon Individual bottles Various Various 9

's TAB 1.E 2-2 HAIARDOUS MATERIALS FREQUEterLY ( AT LEAST 45 SHIPMEfffS PER 18-MONTH DATA PERIOD)

TRANSPORTED BY RAIL PAST THE PEACR BOTTOM SITE tu ber of SMC tuber commdity Ca rloads Total Tonnace 49 012 30 Explosive bomb 95 4,787.0 49 041 20 Chlorine 316 150,640.0 49 042 10 Anydrous ara:tionia 47 22,898.0 49 042 90 Sulfur dioxide 58 4,699.0 "9 045 04 CO, gas, liquified 50 3,399.0 40 045 09 CO,, liquified 302 24,644.0 49 045 16 Dichlorodifluoromethane (Freon) 60 5,267.0 49 045 31 11-rionofluorot.richloromethane (Freon) 54 3,728.0 49 045 52 Monochlorodifluoranethane (Froon) 75 6,246.0 49 045 70 Refrigerants (Freon) 66 5, 729.0 49 057 03 Butadiene, inhibited 77 6,242.0 49 057 04 Butadiene (from petroleus) 63 5,043.0 49 057 06 Butane 62 4,503.0 49 057 25 Dimethyl other 23 4 7,656.0 49 057 34 Ethylene 69 4,635.0 49 057 48 Isobutylene.

66 4,635.0 49 057 52 Liquified petrolema gas 1,020 73,570.0 49 057 61 Methy1 chloride 62 2,777.0 r9 057 81 Propane 51 3,382.0 49 057 92 vinyl chloride 4,396 406,788.0 49 066 to Ethylene oxide 360 28,268.0 49 066 20 Propylene oxide 387 26,642.0 49 068 10 Acrylonitrile 202 13,295.0 e9 072 15 Ethylacrylate monomer inhibited 533 41,075.0 49 072 50 Methyl methacrylate 1,032 80,041.0 49 072 65 Styrene monormer irmibited 95 8,015.0 49 072 70 Vinyl acetate 53 4,290.0 49 081 05 Acetone 427 23,704.0 49 081 25 Carbon disulfide 221 53,920.0 49 081 62 Ethylene chloride 359 13,974.0 49 081 83 nexane 76 5,608.0 49 082 55 Pentane 53 3,594.0 49 091 28 Butyl acetate 65 5,611.0 49 091 29 Butyl alcohol 91 6,871.0 49 091 31 Isobuty1 ' alcohol 61 4,364.0 49 091 41 Denatured alcohol ethanol 59 10,896.0 49 091 60 Ethyl acetate 65 5,010.0 49 092 to Isopropyl acetate 45 2,411.0 1

I 49 092 30 Methanol 141 12,769.0 49 092 43 Methyl ethyl ketone 196 15,785.0 f

49 092 45 Methyl isobutyl ketone 66 4,136.0 1

49 092 66 Flarvaable liquid, n.o.s. (pinene) 48 3,314.0 49 093 50 Xylene 66 1, 533.0 1 of 3 I

I l

l l*

~

e f

I l

l

Il 1

o TA312 2-2 (Cont) tember of

=

STC thr.ber C&vnodity Carloads Total %nnace 49 101 02 Alcohol, n.o.s.

(in band) 119 10,436.0 49 101 34 Coal tar, light oil 150 10,726.0 49 tot 47 Compound, cleaning liquid 64 1,607.0 49 101 53 Compound, lacquer, paint 64 2,878.0 49 101 85 Flamnable liquid, n.o.s.

177 5,995.0 49 102 57 Petroleum distillate 87 5,665.0 49 102 59 Petroleus naptha 118 7, 293.0 49 102 80 Resin solution 119 3,462.0 49 102 97 Solvent, n.o.s.

103 4,123.0 49 131 03 Alcohol, n.o.s.

48 3,248.0 49 131 44 Formaldehyde 99 9,160.0 49 151 13 Fuel oil 64 4,618.0 49 141 85 Coratnastible liquid 754 52,311.0 49 151 87 Solwnt, n.o.s.

53 4, 293.0 49 152 10 Insecticide, liquid, n.o.s.

51 2,125.0 49 152 59 Petroleue naptha 76 3,493.0 49 161 41 Phosphorus, white 225 21,145.0 49 164 08 Calciure carbide 68 4,115.0 49 183 10 Ammonium nitrate 119 8,508.0 49 183 35 Hydrogen peroxide 72 3,191.0 49 187 15 Calcium hypochlorite 54 2,323.0 49 187 46 Soldium nitrate 55 2,640.0 49 212 20 Carbolic acid (phenol) 395 34,412.0 49 214 to Aniline oil, liquid 99 6,458.0 49 214 45 Motor fuel 473 37,024.0 49 214 75 Poisonous liquid 62 5,474.0 49 300 24 Hydrofluoric acid, anhydride 190 15,676.0 49 302 28 Hydrochloric (:suriatic) acid 121 11,196.0 49 302 31 Sydrochloric trauriatic) acid, spent 226 21,401.0 49 302 47 Phosphatic fertilizer 280 27,891.0 49 313 03 Acetic acid (glacial) 155 12,200.0 49 313 04 Acetic anhydride 104 8,877.0 49 314 04 Acid, liquid, n.o.s.

184 15,612.0 49 314 48 Propionic acid 64 5, 46 9.0 49 323 40 Chrcznic fluoride solution 198 18,942.0 s9 323 42 Ferric chloride solution 655 61,608.0 49 323 52 Phosphonas oxychloride 62 2,080.0 49 352 20 Alkaline corrosive liquid,

50 2,553.0 49 352 25 Potassiuse hydroxide (dry) 81 1,935.0 49 352 30 Potassium hydroxide (liquid) 692 54,968.0 49 352 35 Sodium hydroxide (dry) 295 13,997.0 49 352 40 Sodium hydroxide, (liquid) 761 67,181.0 49 356 45 Huxamethylenne, diamene 282 116,840.0 49 356 65 Monoethanolasmine 51 3,634.0 49 361 to Bromine 72 2,127.0 49 365 40 Corrosive liquid 298 17,200.0 49 365 58 Battery, electric, wet 66 3,942.0 2 of 3 i

e e

+

w

s 4

TABL3 2-2 (Cont) thamber of sMCtv.ber Comrodity Ca rloa ds Total Tonnaat 49 501 10 Acids, mixed loads 49 2,663.0 49 501 30 Freight forward traffic 65h 10,500.0 49 501 40 Shitper assoc. traffic 1,999 26,862.0 49 501 50 All freight rate shipments 2,000 25,781.0 49 599 28 Cxed snetallic loads e5 1,394.0 I

~l

.l

?

l

=

I.

!\\

,3 I

I

.I.

j Key:

n.o.s. = not otherwise specified Source: Conrail letter of october 27, 1980 3 of 3 1

6'l ll I

'i I

s

^

r TABLE 2-4 TOXIC CHD(ICALS COMBINED DUE TO THEIR SIMIIAR PHYSICAL AND 'IOXICITY PROPERTIES Combined Chemical Component Chemicals STCC Number Freon Dichlorodifluoromethane 49 045 16 Dichlorodifluoromethane -

Monochlorodifluoro-methane mi:c.ure 49 045 31 Monochlorodifluoro-methane 49 045 52 Refrigerants 49 045 70 Butadiene Butadiene, inhibited 49 057 03 Butadiene, from petroleum 49 057 04 Pentone Pentone 49 082 55 Coal tar, light oil 49 101 34 Petroleum distillate 49 102 57 Petroleum naptha 49 102 59 Fuel oil 49 151 13 Petroleum naptha 49 151 85 Ethyl Alcohol Denatured alcohol 49 091 41 Alcohol, n.o.s.

(in bond) 49 101 02 Alcohol, n.o.s.

49 131 03 Total Combined - 11 1

(

l Key: n.o.s. = not otherwise specified 1 of 1 106

_o.

.c- -

\\

TABLE 3-1 EVALUATION OF CONTROL StOOH liABITABILITY FOR ONSITE CllEMICALS Distance From Toxicity Peak Concentration At Commodity Duantity control Roomtml I.imi t fa/cu a 1 Cetant Rooms (a/cu_mL osesitv Storaoe

[gLtmi12 1 n eic.e Chlorine 4x1 tons 163 0.045 1130 20.7 Carix>si dioxide 6 tona 53 1.840 1393 22.5 sulfuric acid 4,000 gal 165 0.002 0.139 0.138 sodlum hydroxide 4,000 gal 165 0.002ta3 0.057 0.056 Nitrogen 11.000 gal 50 57.3t3 502.8 16.6 e

s 9

L3 b

we)

Y MiED N*

8 6 80cciqutional Safety andileelth Administratic;e (033IA) standard t a sasga,yxianit 1 of 1

?

t

.,___._.4._-

3LE 3-2

.j IIHVF PARTF.1.TERS 1TTILIZED ".H illE CO!TTROL ROOM CO..*H1 RATION HODEL tulecular Boiling vagor.

Specific vapor Diffusion

'Ib xici ty Wolght Point Density Gravity C

Hy Pressure Coef ficient Lisait cas e

  • lbxic Chnnical B Ano11 f*Cl (q/11 '

(q/cm31 (ca All feal /ql imm of H4) fem 2/s ec)

(q/te M

Q 0.045 R-1 Chlorine 70.9

-34.1 2.49 1.57 0.226 68.8 0.07 R-2 Anhydrous Amonia 17.0

-33.4 0.597 0.674 1.1 327.4 R-3 Sulfur Dioxide 64.1

-10.0 2.26 1.46 0.361 92.8 0.026 18.4

f R-4 Carbon Dioxide-Gas 44:0

-78.5 1.53 0.468 0.184 83.2 R-5 Carbon Dioxide-18.4 Liquid 44.0

-78.5 1.53 0.468 0.184 83.2 2.5 R-6 Fr eon 120.9

-28.2 4.85 1.49 R-7 sutadiene 54.1

-4.4 1.92 0.621 0.545 99.8 2.2 658.

R-8 Butane 58.1

-0.6 2.09 0.600 0.14 R-9 Dimethyl ether 46.1

-23.7 1.85 R-10 Ethylene 28.1

-103.9 1.13 0.566 1110.

415.

R-11 Isobutyl ene 56.1

-6.0 2.25 150,000 R-12 Methyl chloride 50.5

-24.2 2.03 R-13 Propane 44.1

-42.2 1.55 0.585 1.83 2.6 A-14 vinyl chloride E 2.5

-13.9 2.15 0.920 0.380 79.8 0.180 R-15 Ethylene oxide 44.1 10.7 1.49 0.897 0.476 138.5 0.240 l

R-16 Propylene oxide 58.1 34.3 2.00 0.831 225 0.20 0.07 R-17 Acrylonitrile 53.1 77.3 1.83 0.806 0.500 s

4.7 0A0 1.46 R-18 Ethyl acrylate 10 0.1 99.8 4.01 0.?24 R-19 Methyl methacrylate 4.7 0.20 0.15 monomoer 10 0.1 100.0 4.01 0.936 R-2 0 Styrene monomer 10 4.2 145.2 4.18 0.906 0.416 101.7 20.0 0.20 1.60 R-21 vinyl acetate 86.1 72.0 3.45 0.932 0.433 95.2 230.0 0.20 0.036 R-22 Acetone 58.1 56.2 2.33 0.791 0.528 128. 1 400.0 0.134 4.8 Q

R-2 3 Carbon disulfide 76.1 46.5 2.64 1.293 0.241

  • 84.1 625.0 0.109 12.6 R-4 4 Ethylene 238 432*C 0.20 16.2 h

chloride 99.0 83.5 1.240 165.0 0.20 17.9 R-2 5 Nexane 86.2 69.0 3.46 0.660 M

R-26 Penetane 72.2 e

36.1 0.626 591332*C 0.20 264.6 28.932*C 0.20 0.9 e 8 0.880 R-2 7 Butv1 acetate 116.2 126.5 24.0 0.20 0.310 R-28 matyl alcohol 74.1 100.0 2.97 0.808 R-29 Isobutyl alcohol 74.1 100.0 2.97 0.808 24.0 0.20 0.310 R-30 Ethyl acetate 88.1 77.2 3.04 0.895 0.459 102.0 18 6.0 0.0935 1.e 4 83732*C 0.20 0.834 0.923 R-31 Isopropyl acetate 102.1 90.0 y' J R-32 Methanol 32.0 64.7 1.11 0.792 0.600 262.8 260.0 0.162 0.520 R-33 Methyl ethyl 13 5a32 *C 0.20 0.294 0.806 ketone 72.1 79.6 NM R-34 Methyl 11.432*C 0.20 0.20f 0.802

    • q isobutyl ketone 100.2 128.0 R-35 xylene 106.2 140.0 3.66 0.870 0.400 96.0 2.0 0.20 1.74 1 of 2 12/04/80 l

. l......

u 9

-_ Q

....r*

j e

i TABLE 3-2 (Cont) e n>1ecular solling Vapor specific h

vagor Diffusion rual city

%:1ght Point P -91ty Cravity Cp Hv Pressure coef ficient. Limit (413 Tnalc chanical toAnn11 t*Cl sq/11 to/cie t scal M

.{ cal /ql_

imm of Hol, tem */s ect

_to/r@l n

81.432*C 0.20 1.90 0.789 R-36 Ethanol 46.1 78.5 R-3 7 Formildehyde 19 8.0 0.20 0.0 12 (3751 30.0 97.0 1.07 1.10 R-38 Hyd ogen l

2.9 0.20 0.0014 peroxide 34.0 150.2 1.36 1.47 R-39 Carbolic acid

}^

1.0 0.20 0.02

-l174.4 (Phenol) 94.1 101.9 3.77 1.058 0.561 1.5 0.079 0.c a.

R-40 Aniline oil 93.1 184.4 3.22 1.022 R-41

  • Mydrofluoric 301.0 1.0 Ct. 20 0.0 e acid 20.0 19.4 0.80 0.987 16.0 0.20 1.91 1.049 R-4 2 Acetic acid 60.1 110.1 R-43 Acetic anhydride 10 2.1 140.0 3.$2 1.057 0.390 92.2 10.0 0.20 4.17 R-44 Pliosphorus 0.45 0.20 0.31 oxychloride 153.3 105.0 0.615 1.675 1.0 0.20 0.0075 1.02 R-45 W>noethanolamine 61.1 170.0 R-46 Rrossine 15 9.0 58.7 6.41 3.12 0.10 7 44.9 380.0 0.109 6.63 i

.l _

t.

+

t O

C tc;g)

6. r
su29

~

C3 i.

au;9 g

p g-l u.:

2 of 2 12/04/80

[

l l

TABLE 3-4 i,

TOXIC CHEMICALS THAT MAY RESULT IN A CONTROL ROOM OPERA'IOR INCAPACITATION Source Case

'roxic Chemical Shipments /Yr Tons /Yr Ouantity N)

STCC Num!

' R-14 Vinyl chloride 2,931 271,189.3 8.39x 10 7 4L 057 R-16 Propylene oxide 258 17,759.6 6.25x10 7 49 066 1

- R-15 Ethylene oxide 240 18,843.4 7.12x107 49 066 R-1 Chlorine 211 100,425.7 4.32x108 49 041 R-6 R-9 Dimethyl ether 156 5,103.9 2.97x 10 7 49 057 R-4 2 Acetic acid 103 8,186.7 6.88x 10 7 48 313 R-17 A( rylci.itrile 135 8,863.2 5.97x10 7 49 068 R-33 Methyl ethyl ketone 131 10,523.3 7.29x10 7 49 092 R-43 Acetic anhydride 69 5,918 7.41x107 313 R-3 7 Methanol 94 8,512.6 8.22x10 7 49 092

'R-7 Butadiene 93 7,523.3 7.31x107 49 057 49 057 R-46 Bromine 48 1,418.0 2.56x107 49 361 R-3 7 Formaldehyde 66 6, 106. 1 8.39x107 49 131 R-12 Methyl chloride 41 1,815.3 3.89x107 49 057 R-3 Sulfur dioxide 39 3,132.6 7.35x107 49 042 R-21 Vinyl acetate 35 2.,860.0 7.34x107 49 072 R-13 R-2 Anhydrous ammonia 31 15,265.2 4.42x10 8 49 042 R-2 4 Ethylene chloride 239 9,316.0 3.38x107 49 081 l

i

~

1 of 1 12/20/80 o

= _._.

i i

TABLE 3-5 l

I LESS FREQUENTLY TRANSPORTED TOXIC CilEMICALS CONSIDERED IN j

AGGREGATE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS Control Room liabitability Problem Toxic Chemical STCC than1Ker Shipments /Yr Yes 3-Isopropanol 49 092 05 29 X

Methyl acrylate 49 072 45 25 Tetrahydrofuran 49 082 90 23 Y

Isobutyl acetate 49 092 07 23 X

'Ibluene

  • 49 093 05 19 X

Ilydrogen chloride 49 042 70 15 X

Pyridine 49 092 77 14 X

Ethylene dichloride 49 091 66 17 X

Trime thylamine 49 055 40 13 X

Dimethylamine 49 055 10 11 X

Acetaldehyde 49 072 10 11 X

Q Propyl acetate 49 092 68 11 X

m Ethyl mercaptan 49 081 69 10 X

D 4

Monoinethylamine 49 055 30 9.3 X

Allyl chloride 49 074 12 8.5 X

Cyclohexane 49 081 32 8.5 X

O Diethyl ether 49 081 56 8.5 X

W 49 081 57 W

ED 1 of 1

~

b~'

12/04/B 0

I TABLE 3-6 SECTOR DISTANCES AND TRACK LENGTHS FOR PROBABILITY EVALUATIONS Shortest Distance to Sector Track 22 1/20 -Sector (mi)

(1cn).

Length (mi)

NNW 2.8 4.5 2.6 N

2.1 3.4 1.1 NNE 1.6 2.6 0.9 NE 1.5 2.4 0.7 NEE 1.5 2.4 0.6 i

E 1.6 2.6 -

1.0 ESE 2.2 3.5 1.1 SE 2.7 4.3 2.6 l

t li i

1 of 1 12/04/80 k

-,~,r.

,~- ~

7 4

n.-

,,,+-

r

.,,,v,,-

.n PHILADEPHIA toECTRIC COHPAt4Y PEACH BOTT0F0 NUCLEAR STATION TABLE J-15 D

ALL to T0XIC CHElllCALS EVALUATED. 1977-1978 PEACH BOTT0!I ilETEOR0 LOGICAL DATA AccREGATE PR03 ABILITY OF T0XIC DESIGN BASIS METEOROLOGY O

CHEll1 CAL SPILL TRAtiSPORTED BY RAILROAo NO REDUCTION DUE TO SITE AND SECTOR 00HtaiItt0 SECTOR CollTRIBUTORS SPECIFIC INFORMATION (DOHNHIND DISTAt4CE(HILESin ttet N

tale HE EHE E

ESE SE

. ;' T0XIC CHEHICAL RAtN 2.60 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.40 1.00 1.10 2.60 SECTOR TOTAL O

VINYL CHLORIDE 1

0.0 0.0 0.260E-05 0.185E-05 0.187E-05 0.481E-05 0.0 0.0 0.111E-04

? PROPYLENE.0XIDE 2

0.325E-05 0.628E-06 0.228E-06 0.163E-06 0.165E-06 0.423E-06 0.628 %06 0.267E-05 0.815E-05

/~l ETHYLEHE OXIDE 3

0.302E-05 0.584E-06 0.213E-06 0.152E-06 0.154E-06 0.394E-06 0.584E-06 0.248E-05 0.758E-05 ETHYL CHLORIDE 4

0.301E-05 0.582E-06 0.212E-06 0.151E-06 0.153E-06 0.392E-06 0.582E-06 0.247E-05 0.755E-05 7

CHLORIttE 5

0.265E-05 0.514E-06 0.187E-06 0.133E-06 0.135E-06 0.346E-06 0.514E-06 0.218E-05 0.666E-05

~ ACRYLONITRILE 6

0.170E-05 0.329E-06 0.120E-06 0.852E-07 0.863E-07 0.221E-06 0.329E-06 0.140E-05 0.426E-05 CARBON DISULFIDE 7

0.0 0.117E-05 0.426E-06 0.304E-06 0.308E-06 0.789E-06 0.117E-05 0.0 0.417E-05 ACETIC ACID 8

0.130E-05 0.251E-06 0.912E-07 0.650E-07 0.659E-07 0.169E-06 0.251E-06 0.107E-05 0.32bE-05 G

HETHANOL 9

0.11*E-05 0.229E-06 0.832E-07 0.594E-07 0.601E-07 0.154E-06 0.229E-06 0.972E-06 0.297E-05 i

BUTADIEHE-IttiIBITED 1.0 0.117E-05 0.226E-06 0.824E-07 0.587E-07 0.595E-07 0.153E-06 0.226E-06 0.962E-06 0.294E-05 C

ACETIC AtttV0 RIDE 11 0.072E-06 0.169E-06 0.614E-07 0.438E-07 0.443E-07 0.114E-06 0.169E-06 0.717E-06 0.219E-05

- FORHALDEHYDE 12 0.830E-06 0.161E-06 0.584E-07 0.417E-07 0.422E-07 0.108E-06 0.161E-06 0.682E-06 0.208E-05 9

BRotlINE 13 0.604E-06 0.117E-06 0.425E-07 0.303E-07 0.307E-07 0.787E-07 0'.117E-06 0.496E-06 0.152E-05 I

HETHYL CHLORIDE 14 0.520E-06 0.101E-06 0.364E-07 0.261E-07 0.244E-07 0.677E-07 0.101E-06 0.427E-06 0.130E-05 SULFUR DIDXIDE 15 0.491E-06 0.950E-07 0.345E-07 0.246E-07 0.249E-07 0.640E-07 0.950E-07 0.403E-06 0.123E-05 VIHYL ACETATE 16 0.440E-06 0.852E-07 0.310E-07 0.221E-07 0.224E-07 0.574E-07 0.852E-07 0.362E-06 0.111E-05

_ TETRAHYOROFURAtt 17 0.289E-06 0.560E-07 0.204E-07 0.145E-07 0.147E-07 0.377E-07 0.560E-07 0.238E-06 0.726E-06 ilETHYL ETHYL HETONE 18 0.0 0.0 0.116E-06 0.827E-07 0.838E-07 0.215E-06 0.0 0.0 0.497E-06 F

HYDROGEH CHLORIDE 19 0.109E-06 0.365E-07 0.133E-07 0.947E-08 0.959E-08 0.246E-07 0.365E-07 0.155E-06 0.474E-06 PYRIDINE 20 0.176E-06 0.341E-07 0.124E-07 0.884E-08 0.895E-08 0.230E-07 0.341E-07 0.145E-06 0.442E-06 F

TRIHETHYLAllINE 21 0.164E-06 0.317E-07 0.115E-07 0.821E-08 0.831E-08 0.213E-07 0.317E-07 0.134E-06 0.411E-06 ACETALDEHYDE 22 0.138E-060.26SE-070.974E-080.695E-000.h04E-C0C.180E-070.268E-070.114E-06 0.347E-06 C

DIltETHYLAHINE 23 0.138E-06 0.260E-07 0.974E-08 0.695E-08 0.704E-06 0.180E-07 0.260E-07 0.114E-06 0.347E-06

,,. s_..,_

TABLE 3-15 (Cont) t y ETHYL HERCAPTAh 24 0.124E-06 0.244E-07 0.886E-08 0.631E-08 0.440E-06 0.164E-07 0.244E-07 0.103E-06 0.314E-04 H0HottETHYLAHINE 25 0.117E-06 0.224E-07 0.824E-08 0.587E-08 0.595E-06 0.153E-07 0.224E-07 0.94tE-07 0.294E-06 Q DIETHYL ETHER to 0.107E-06 0.207E-07 0.753E-08 0.537E-08 0.5%E-08 0.139E-07 0.207E-07 0.879E-07 0.260E-06 ALLYL CHLORIDE 27 0.107E-06 0.207E-07 0.753E-08 0.537E % 0.544E-08 0.139E-07 0.207E-07 0.879E-07 0.248E-06 y HETHYL ACRYLATE to 0.0 0.616E-07 0.224E-07 0.160E-07 0.14tE-07 0.415E-07 0.416E-07 0.0 0.219E-04 O

TOTAL PR08ABILITYs 0.727E-04 O

O O

0 4

+

0 O

O O

2 of 2

(,

4 g

r-r=

PHILADEPHId.ECTRIC COMPANY PEACH BOTTCH NUCLEAR STATION TABLE a-15A

?

(

ALL to 70XIC CHEllICALS EVALUATED. 1977-1978 PEACH 80TToll HETEOROLOGICAL DATA f

AGGREGATE PROSABILITY OF T0XIC WITH FULL CREDIT FOR SITE AND SECTOR,-

CHEllICAL SPILL TRANSPORTED BY RAILROAD SPECIFIC INFORMATION DCl0Gi1ND SECTOR CONTRIBUTOR 3 y

(00Ht#41NO DISTANCE (HILES))

HHH H

t#4E NE EHE E

ESE SE T0XIC CHEHICAL Rate (

2.40 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.40 1.00 1.10 2.40 SECTOR TOTAL CARBON DISULFIDE 1

0.415E-05 0.738E-04 0.248E-06 0.193E-06 0.213E-04 0.552E-06 0.781E-06 0.287E-05 0.975E-05 ETHYL CHLORIDE 2

0.255E-05 0.442E-06 0.150E-06 0.110E-06 0.129E-04 0.304E-04 0.431E-04 0.173E-05 0.585E-05

('

PROPYLENE OXIDE 3

0.223E-05 0.419E-04 0.152E-04 0.111E-06 0.133E-04 0.317E-04 0.442E-04 0.154E-05 0.534E-05 p CHLORINE 4

0.225E-05 0.390E-04 0.132E-04 0.949E-07 0.114E-04 0.248E-04 0.381E-04 0.153E-05

, 0.514E-05

(

ETHYLENE OXIDE 5

0.207E-05 0.348E-04 0.124E-06 0.944E-07 0.104E-04 0.274E-04 0.390E-04 0.143E-05 0.484E-05 O VINYL CHLORIDE 4

0.312E-04 0.132E-04 0.449E-06 0.421E-04 E.577E-04 0.154E-05 0.132E-04 0.312E-04

'0.410'l-05

(

HETHYL ETHYL HETONE 7

0.124E-05 0.225E-06 0.773E-07 0.544E-07 0.477E-07 0.141E-06 0.225E-04 0.880E-04 0.2s5E-05 b ACRYLONITRILE 8

0.117E-05 0.207E-04 0.497E-07 0.542E-07 0.598E-07 0.155E-04 0.219E-04 0.804E-04 f.274E-05

(

ACETIC ACIO 9

0.110E-05 0.190E-04 0.444E-07 0.4 '3E-07 0.557E-07 0.131E-04 0.184E-04 0.747E-06 0.25[E-05 O HETHANOL 10 0.012E-04 0.144E-04 0.444E-07 0.378E-07 0.414E-07 0.108E-04 0.153E-04 0.541E-04 0.191E-05

(

ACETIC AretYDRIDE 11 0.139E-04 0.128E-04 0.435E-07 0.318E-07 0.375E-07 0.881E-07 0.125E-06 0.502E 4e 0.170E-05 (4 FORilALDEHYDE 12 0.704E-04 0.122E-06 0.414E-07 0.303E-07 0.35 7-07 0.839E-07 0.119E-06 0.478E-04 0.141E-05

(

BROHINE 13 0.512E-04 0.888E-07 0.301E-07 0.220E-07 0.240E-07 8.410E-07 0.844E-07 0.348E-04 0.117E-05 O HETHYL CHLORIDE 14 0.440E-04 0.744E-07 0.259E-07 0.190E-07 0.224E-07 0.525E-07 0.745E-07 0.299E-06 0.101E-05 SULFUR DIOXIDE 15 0.414E-04 0.721E-07 0.245E-07 0.17vE-07 0.211E-07 0.494E-07 0.704E-07 0.283E-04 0.954E-04 e

^ VINYL ACETATE 14 0.373E-04 0.447E-07 0.220E-07 0.141E-07 0.189E-07 0.445E-07 0.431E-07 0.254E-04 0.854E-04 T

_ HETHYL ACRYLATE 17 0.218E-04 0.388E-07 0.131E-07 0.102E-07 0.112E-07 0.290E-07 0.411E-07 0.151E-04 0.513E-04 f TETRAHYOROFURAN 18 0.199E-06 0.353E-07 0.119E-07 0.924E-08 0.102E-07 0.244E-07 0.373E-07 0.137E-04 0.446. 04 C

SUTAOIEHE-ItetISITE0 19 0.188E-04 0.419E-07 0.204E-07 0.133E-07 0.183[-07 0.494E-07 0.336E-07 0.991E-08 0.374E-04

{ HYOROGEN CHLORIDE 20 0.144E-04 0.257E-07 0.884E-06 0.444E-08 0.775E-08 0.184E-07 0.257E-07 0.101E-06 0.330E-04

(

PYRIDINE 21 0.134E-04 0.240E-07 0.827E-06 0.403E-08 0.723E-08 0.172E-07 0.240E-07 0.940E.':#

0.315E-04 1R1tlETHYLAllIllE 22 0.125E 04 0.223E-07 0.748E-08 0.540E-00 0.472E-06 0.140E-07 0.223E-07 0.873E-07 0.293E-04

(

w OIHETHYLAHINE 23 0.117E-04 0.203E-07 0.490E-08 0.50SE-08 0.595E-08 0.140E-07 0.190E-07 0.797E-07 0.249E-04

TABLE 3'-15A (Cont) i y. ACETALDEHYDE 20 0.106E-06 0.189E-07 0.649E-08 0.474E-08 0.548E-08 0.135E-07 0.189E-07 0.739E-07 0.248E-06

  • ETHYL HERCAPTri 25 0.107E-06 0.185E-07 0.627E-08 0.459E-08 0.541E-0l 0.127E-07 0.180E-07 0.725E-07 0.245E-06 y
  • H0H0HETHYLAlt1HE 26 0.991E-07 0.172E-07 0.583E-08 0.427E-06 0.503E-US 0.118E-07 0.148E-07 0.474E-07 0.227E-06 ALLYL CHLORIDE 27 0.906E-07 0.157E-07 0.533E-08 0.390E-08 0.440E-08 0.108E-07 0.153E-07 0.616E-07 0.208E-06 go DIETHYL ETHER 28 0.734E-07 0.130E-07 0.439E-08 0.342E-06 0.376E-08 0.974E-08 0.138E-07 0.507E-07 0.172E-06 0

TOTAL PROSA81LITYa 0.561E-04 O

PROBABILITY DUE'TO CHEMICALS TRANSPORTED LESS THAN 30 TIMES PER YEAR 0.033E- 04 O

NOT ALL HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INCIDENTS RESULT IN AN INCAPCITATION.

LEAKS AND MINOR SPILLS USUALLY ONLY REPRESENT A LOCAL HAZARD.

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