05000346/LER-1981-017-03, /03L-0:on 810309,train 2 Hpi/Low Pressure Injection cross-connect Isolation Valve Dh 63 Would Not Open from Control Room During Quarterly Valve Surveillance Test 5051.13.Caused by Faulty Torque Switch in Valve Operator

/03L-0:on 810309,train 2 Hpi/Low Pressure Injection cross-connect Isolation Valve Dh 63 Would Not Open from Control Room During Quarterly Valve Surveillance Test 5051.13.Caused by Faulty Torque Switch in Valve Operator

ML19350D097
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	04/07/1981
From:	Matheny D TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19350D095	List: 05000346/LER-1981-017, Forwards LER 81-017/03L-0 05000346/LER-1981-017-03, /03L-0:on 810309,train 2 Hpi/Low Pressure Injection cross-connect Isolation Valve Dh 63 Would Not Open from Control Room During Quarterly Valve Surveillance Test 5051.13.Caused by Faulty Torque Switch in Valve Operator
References
LER-81-017-03L, LER-81-17-3L, NUDOCS 8104130313
Download: ML19350D097 (2)

LER-1981-017, /03L-0:on 810309,train 2 Hpi/Low Pressure Injection cross-connect Isolation Valve Dh 63 Would Not Open from Control Room During Quarterly Valve Surveillance Test 5051.13.Caused by Faulty Torque Switch in Valve Operator

Event date:
Report date:
3461981017R03 - NRC Website

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EVENT DATE 14 75 REPOftT DAT E 41 0 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROGABLE CONSEQUENCES h o 2 l (NP-33-81-16) On 3/9/81 at 1225 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.661125e-4 months <br /> durinn the routine nerformance of Ouarteriv i

lol3]l Valve Test ST 5051.13, operators determined that the Train 2 1Iinh Pressure Tniection/_j 10141 l Low Pressure Injection (!!PI/LPI) Cross-Connect Isolation Valve Dil 63 would not open I

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The Train 2 cross-tie was declared inoperable fron the controll o o Iroom. The station entered the action statenent of T.S.

3.5.2.a.

There was no dangenj lto the health and safety of the public or station personnel. There would be adequate l o 7 l 0 lH l l ti e to manually open this valve locally with a handwheel had it been required.

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33 J4 3S 36 31 40 41 42 4J 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORHECTIVE ACTIONS 11101 iThe cause was a faulty torque switch in the valve operator of DII 63 The switch I

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- DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-16 DATE OF EVENT: March 9, 1981 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: High Pressure Injection (HPI)/ Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Cross-Connect Isolation Valve DH 63 inoperable from control room Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 222 and Load (Cross INE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On March 9, 1981 at 1225 hours0.0142 days <br />0.34 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.661125e-4 months <br /> during the routine perfor-uance of ST 5051.13, Exercising of Testable Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Valves Quarterly Test, operators determined that the Train 2 HPI/LPI Cross-Connect Isolation Valve DH 63 would not open from the control room. ECCS Train 2 LPI/HPI cross-tie was declared.inoperabic from the control room. The station entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.a which states that the inoperable ECCS train must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the plant must be placed in a hot standby condition within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

i Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause for the failure of DH 63 was a faulty torque switch. The torque switch operated in an erratic manner,, causing a torquing out of the valve with less than the setpoint torque applied 1

to the valve.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Train 1 ECCS was operable. Train 2 was also operabic except that it could not be placed in the " piggy-back" mode from the control room. There would be adequate time to manually open this valve locally with the handwheel should that mode be required.

Corrective Action

Under >bintenance Uork Order 81-1770, the torque switch was re-placed. At 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> on March 11, 1981, ST 5051.13 was satisfactorily completed

.and DH 03 was declared operable. At that time the station was removed from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.5.2.a.

Failure Data: A previous torque switch failure was reported in Licensee Event Report NP~33-79-33 (79-030).

LER 181-017 4

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