ML19350C110
| ML19350C110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350C108 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-42596, NUDOCS 8103300488 | |
| Download: ML19350C110 (3) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WA4HINGTON, D. C. 20555 V-
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTCR REGULATI0fl SUPPORTING AMENDriENT NO. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 t
l THE TOLED0 EDISON C0!iPANY AND l
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLU!11 HATING COMPANY DAVIS-9 ESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. I 1
l D0JKET NO. 50-M5 l
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INTRODUCTION By letter dated September 16, 1980, the Toledo Edison Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1.
The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the THI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements. The licensee's request is in Lirect response to the NRC staff's letter dated July'2,1980.
II. BACXGROUND INFORMATION By our letter dated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirenents established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident. Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1,1980. Our evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to oc letter to the licensee dated May 6,1980.
In order to provide reasonable assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits detemined acceptable following the '
implementation of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requestej that licensees amend their TSs to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as appropriate. This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2,1980. Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable. The licensee's application is in direct response to our request. Each of the issues identified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.
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. III. EVALUATICN Emercency Power Suoply Requirements The pressurizer water level indicators are important in a post-accident l
situation.
Adequate emergency po' er supplies add assurance of post-w accident functioning of these components. The licensee has the requisite emergency power supplies. The existing TSs already provide appropriate i
surveillance and actions for the pressurizer level indicatcrs and thus are acceptable.
l Direct Indication of Valve Position i
The licensee has provided a direct indication of power operated relief valve (PORV) and safety valve position in the control room. These indi-cations are a diagnostic aid for the pint operator and provide no auto-matic action. The licensee has provided TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requirment; thus, the TSs are accept-able end they meet our July 2,1980 model TJ criteria.
Instrumentation for Inadeouate Core Cooling The licensee has installed an instrument system to detect the effects of low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling. These instruments.
subcooling meters, receive and process data from existing plant instrumentation. We previously reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation l
dated May 6, 1980. The licensee submitted TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month chanc.c! calibration requirement and actions to be taken in the event of component inoperaoility. We conclude the TSs are acceptable as they meet our July 2,1980 model TS criteria.
Diverse Containment Isolation l
The licensee currently has containment isolation system design so that diverse l
parameters will be sensed to ensure automatic isolation of ncn-essential systems under postulated accident conditions. These parameters are low l
reactor coolant system pressure and high containment pressure. We have l
reviewed this system in our Lessons Learned Category "A" Safety Evaluation dated May 6,1980. The design is such that it does not result in the auto-matic loss of containment isolation after the containment isolation signal is reset. Reopening of containment isolation would require deliberate opera-tor action. The licensee's current TSs list each affected containment isola-tion valve and provide for the appropriate surveillance and actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
Auxiliary (Emergency) Feedwater Flow Indication The licensee has installed auxiliary feedwater flow indication that meets our testability and vital power requirements. We reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated May 6,19CO. The licensee has proposed a TS with 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration requirements. We find this TS acceptable as it meets the criteria of our July 2,1980 model TS
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. Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Our request indicated that the TSs related to minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA. The licensee's application would add one STA to each shif t ta perfom the function of accident assessment. The individual per for.ing this function will have at least a bachelor's degree or aquNent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents. Based on our review, we find the licen-see's submittal to satisfy our requirements and is acceptable.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this detemination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 151.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact l
statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
V.
CONCU'SION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
i-'l (1) because that amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences.of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significar.t decrease in a safety margin, the i
i amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manners ind (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
l Date: liarch 24, 1981 l
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