ML19350B688
| ML19350B688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1980 |
| From: | Baunack W, Chung J, Kister H, Linville J, Mccann J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350B671 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333-80-15, NUDOCS 8103230310 | |
| Download: ML19350B688 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000333/1980015
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Region I
Report No.
50-333/80-15
Docket No.
50-333
License No. DPR-59
Priority
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Category
C
Licensee:
Power Authority of the State of New York
P. O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093
Facility Name:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station
.nspection at:
Scriba, New York
I.ispection conducted:
August. 30, 1980 - October 24, 1980
Inspectors:
E
A2
0 /98
. BaunacT, Senior Resident Inspector
'dat'e signed
[8u
/2
O!Pr>
. Linvitle, Resident inspector
- date signed
N hde
/ W / 6 / St3
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J. Chung, Reactor Inspector (Emerg. Drill Only)
' dat6 signed
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/1llo/20
J. McCann, Reactor Inspector (Emerg. Drill Only)
/ date signed
Approved by:
/
b/So
'H. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
6dat6 signed
No. 4
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 30, 1980 - October 24, 1980 (Report No. 50-333/80-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection by the Resident inspectors (146 hours0.00169 days <br />0.0406 hours <br />2.414021e-4 weeks <br />5.5553e-5 months <br />) of
licensee action on previous inspection items; in office review of Licensee Event
Reports (LER's); licensee event followup; closeout of IE Bulletins and Circulars;
Operational Safety Verification; Observation of Physical Security; Emergency
System Operability; inspector witnessing of surveillance tests; maintenance
observations; emergency drill observation; operational event; and containment
vent and purge valve operation.
Results:
Of the eleven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were noted
in nine areas.
Three items of noncompliance were idantified -in one area (Deficiency -
failure to follow an operating procedure.
Infraction - failure to control access
to vital area and to respond to vital area door alarm.
Infraction - failure to
follow health physics pracedures), and one item of noncompliance was identified
in another area (Deficiency - failure to report an event correctly).
Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
8103230310
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OCS Numbers
50333-800307
50333-800322
50333-800324
50333-800325
50333-800327
50333-800328
50333-800405
50333-800408
50333-800409
50344-800410
50333-800415
50333-800417
50333-800418
50333-800421
50333-800422
50333-800428
50333-800429
50333-800430
50333-800501
50333-800507
50333-800509
50333-800513
50333-800521
50333-800528
50333-800529
50333-800530
50333-800607
50333-800610
50333-800678
50333-800703
50333-800710
50333-800714
50333-800717
50333-800804
50333-800805
50333-800806
50333-800807
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50333-800810
50333-800812
50333-600814
50333-800815
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50333-800903
50333-800913
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50333-801002
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
R. Baker, Superintendent of Power
N. Brosee, Maintenance Superintendent
V. Childs, Assistant to Resident Manager
R. Converse, Operations Superintendent
W. Fernandez, Technical Services Superintendent
H. Kieth, Instrument and Control Superintendent
E. Mulcahey, Radiological and Environmental Services Superintendent
E. Connelly, Security and Safety Supervisor
R. Pasternak, Resident Manager
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspec-
tion including Shift Supervisors, Administrative, Opearations, Health
Physics, Security, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, and Contractor
Personnel.
2.
Licen44e Action on Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-333/80-02-01):
Failure to search the outer
garments of one non-regul:r 'mployee, though contrary to established practice
at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, did meet the requirements
of the NRR Supplemental Staff Position on Personnel Search Requirements.
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Consequently, the item of noncompliance was withdrawn (Reference Region I
Letter dated July 17, 1979).
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-333/79-16-07):
Storage and calibration facility
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not established and calibration and verification procedure not established.
The inspector verified that Maintenance Procedure No. 110, On-Site Calibra-
tion and Verification, had been issued and that a storage and calibration
facility has been established.
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3.
In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
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a.
The inspector reviewed LERs to verify that the details of the events
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were clearly reported.
The inspector determined that reporting require-
ments had been met, the report was adequate to assess the event, the
cause appeared accurate and was supported by report details, corrective
actions appear appropriate to correct the cause, the form was complete,
and generic applicability to other plants was not in question.
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LERs 80-02*,80-026, 80-027*,80-028, 80-029*, 80-030*, 80-031*,
80-032* 80-033, 80-034*, 80-035*, 80-036*, 80-037*, 80-038*,
80-039*, 80-040*, 80-041*, 80-042*, 80-043*, 80-044*,80-045, 80-
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046*,80-047, 80-048*, 80-049*, 80-050*, 80-051*, 80-052*, 80-
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053*, 80-054*,80-055, 80-056*,80-057, 80-058,80-059, 80-060*,80-061, 80-062*,80-063, 80-064*, 80-065*,80-066, 80-067, 80-
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068,80-069, 80-070,80-071, 80-072*,80-073, 80-074, 80-075*,80-076 were reviewed.
- Reports selected for onsite follow-up.
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b.
LER 80-036 reported that APRM "F" should have been declared inoperable
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April 9, 1980 because it did not have the two required LPRM inputs
from each level.
For a period totalling approximately seventy one
minutes between April 9, 1980 and April 11, 1980 either APRM B or APRM
D was bypassed.
Since the licensee failed to insert a trip on the RPS
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channel during this time, he was operating in a manner less conserva-
tive than the least conservative aspect of Technical Specification
Table 3.1-1, Note 1.
Consequently, the licensee was required to make
prompt notification of this event.
It was not reported until May 16,
1980.
This failure to comply with reporting requirements is an item
of noncompliance.
The licensee resubmitted this LER as a prompt
report to correct the record (50-333/80-15-01).
LER 80-046 Supplement I was submitted to report out of specification
test results on June 7, 1980, 38 days after the original LER 80-046
event occurred.
The licensee was required to submit a separate LER
for the second event.
This failure to comply with reporting require-
ments is an item of noncompliance (50-333/80-15-01).
4.
Licensee Event Followup
a.
For thosa LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by asterisks in
paragraph 3), the inspector determined that adequate corrective action
has been or is being taken, that the report accurately describes the
event, that the report satisfies the reporting requirements, and that
the report cause was accurate.
b.
LER 80-038 reported the failure of 10 MOV 57, the RHR discharge to
radwaste primary containment isolation valve to fully close in response
to a close signal.
The licensee has not yet submitted the supplemental
report describing the cause of the failure.
The licensee committed
to submit this report at the end of the refueling outage which ended
in August.
This item is unresolved (50-333/80-15-02).
LERs80-040, 072, and 075 reported multiple failures in the
"B"
MOV inverter.
The inspector told the licensee that additional action
is necessary to enhance the reliability of the LPCI MOV inverters.
The licensee agreed to submit a supplemental report describing this
action.
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This ites is unresolved (50-333/80-15-03).
LER 80-041 reported a release of I-131 in excess of Technical Specifi-
cation Ifmits during refueling operations.
The inspect.c informed the
licensee that followup reports should not be dependent upon the results
of NRC Inspection Reports and that the followup report had not been
submitted.
This item is unresolved (50-333/80-15-04).
LER 80-050 reported main steam isolation valve 29-A0V-86C failure of
Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT).
The inspector noted that the licensee
has not submitted.the followup report identifying other valves which
failed LLRTs during the refueling outage which ended in August.
This
item is unresolved (50-333/80-15-05).
LER 80-056 reported a trip of emergency diesel Generator C on high
circulating current due to a dirty or defective contact on the voltage
regu'stor droop switch.
The fullowup report on the investigation has
not been submitted.
This item is unresolved (50-333/80-15-06).
LER 80-065 reported the failure of the Standby Gas Treatment System
due to water backup on the discharge line common to both trains.
The
NRC is evaluating '5e generic aspects on this item.
Although the
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ifcensee is taking interim corrective measures to prevent recurrence,
he has not determir. ' what action will be taken to correct the problem.
This item is unresoi
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LER 80-066 reported
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taproper settings of core spray pipe break
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detection switches due
instrument drift.
The licensee committed to
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install new switches of . tifferent design to prevent recurrence by
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October 1980.
This ites i unresolved pending completion of the
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modification (50-333/80-15 ,~).
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5.
Closeout of_ IE Bulletins and Circul
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a.
The inspector reviewed the folic
7g site documents related to IE
Bulletins to verify that the lice ..ca's responses were timely, accurate,
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and adequate.
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(1) IEB 78-12, Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel
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(2) IEB 79-15, Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies.
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(3) IEB 79-28, Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA 180 Limit
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Switches at Elevated Temperatures.
(4) IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 inch, Tray
Adsorber Cells.
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(5) IEB 80-09, Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies.
(6)
IEB 80-14, Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability.
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IEB 80-16, Possible Loss of Emergency Notification System With
Losr of Off-Site Power.
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(8) IEB 80-16, Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc., Models
1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with Either "A" or "D" Output
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Codes.
No inadequccies were identified.
b.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's action in response to the follow-
ing IE Circular to determine that the ifcensee has received it, reviewed
it for applicability and had taken appropriate corrective action.
IEC 78-09, Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2 Contactors.
6.
Operational Safety Verification
a.
Control Roogi Observations
Using a plant specific checklist, the inspectors independently verified
plant parameters and equipment availability to ensure compliance with
the limiting cenditions for operations of the plant Technical Specifi-
cations.
Items checked included:
Switch and valve positions.
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Alarm Conditions
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Meter indications and recorder valves.
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Status lights and power available lights.
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Computer printouts.
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Comparison of redundant readings.
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The inspectors directly obsterved the following plant operations to
ensure adherence to approved procedures:
Routine power operations.
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Plant startup, heatup and main generator synchronization.
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Drywell final inspection.
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Observed issuance of RWP's and Work Requests / Event / Deficiency
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Forms.
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Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room opera-
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tors to verify that the reasons for them were understood and
corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and
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shift manning on both day and back shifts.
Shift turnover check-
lists and log review by the oncoming and offgoing shifts were
also observed by the inspectors.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records
(1) Shift logs and operating records were revia ved to verify that:
Control Room Logs were filled out and signed.
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Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide suffi.-ient
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detail to communicate equipment status.
Shift turnover sheets were filled out and signed.
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Logs and records are maintained in accordance with procedural
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requirements.
(2) The following logs and records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor Log.
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Senior Nuclear Operator Log.
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Auxiliary Operators Log.
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Night Orders.
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Core Performance Daily Surveillance Test, RA-23A.
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Diesel Operating Log
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Shift Turnover Check Sheet
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Plant Tours
(1) During the inspection period, the insp0ctors made observations
and conducted tours of plant areas ir,cluding the following:
Control Room
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Relay Room
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Reactor Building
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Turbine Butiding
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Electric Bays
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Pumphouse - Screenwell
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Drywell
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Cable Tunnels
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Lable Spreading Room
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Auxiliary Boiler Building
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Battery Rooms
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Site Derimeter
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(2) The following determinations were made:
Monitoring Instrumentation: The inspectors verified that
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selected instruments were functional and indicated parameters
were within Technical Specification limits.
Radiation Protection Controls:
The inspectors verified that
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the licensee's radiation protection policies and procedures
were adhered to.
Specific observations included:
Access control including barriers, tagging, posting,
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and ma.atenance of step-off pads.
Handling, storage and use of protective clothing.
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Confirmation of licensee survey results by independent
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measurement.
Verification that requirements of RWP's in effect are
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appropriate and are being followed.
Verification that radiation protection instruments in
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use are being calibrated as required.
(3) The following items were observed during the tours and identified
-to the licensee as an item of noncompliance (50-333/80-15-09).
The "Frisker" on the 300 level foot Reactor Building exit
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was found to be inoperable on October 12, 1980, and the
" Friskers" at the Standby Gas Building exit, and the 272
foot level Turbine Building exit to the electric bays were
found to be inoperable on October 14, 1980.
The above
control points are required by the licensee's Radiation
Protection Procedures,Section III.C to have Count Rate
Meters installed, set up, calibrated, and alarm point set to
provide for personnel monitoring.
On October 11 and 14, 1980 the inspectors observed th'at Step
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Off Pads at the recirculating pump set room and the Reactor
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Building Track Bay (October 11, 1980) and at the northeast
300 foot level of the Reactor Building (October 14, 1980)
were found to be in disrepair in that they were torn away
and did not provide a distinct separation from the contaminated
area and clean area.
The licensee's Radiation Protection
Operating Procedure,Section III.A.2, states that "the Step
Off Pad is the main deterrent for controlling the spread of
contamination and are placed as entrance / exit areas to
contaminated areas."
On October 11, 1980 the inspectors observed that contaminated
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protective clothing was stacked loosely on the floor at the
step off pad in the Standby Gas Treatment Room.
The licensee's
Radiation Protection Operating Procedures,Section II.A.6.2,
states that " removed clothing must be placed in the appro-
priate clothing hamper."
It was further observed that no
clothing hampers were available at the step off pad.
The
placement of contaminated clothing on the floor at the exits
of contaminated areas increases the potential for spreading
contamination.
The above conditions were immediately corrected by the licensee
after being identified by the inspector.
Additiunal items relating to health physics controls were discussed.
These included, protective clothing laying about in many areas;
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respirators, trash, and protective clothing all in the same con-
taminated waste containers; waste containers missing at Step Off
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Pads; and at the restricted area sign at Reactor Building entrance
laying on floor.
General Plant Housekeeping:
The detrimental affect of poor
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housekeeping practices on radiation protection controls was
discussed with the licensee in conjunction with the items of
noncompliance identified above.
The inspectors will continti
to review and evaluate the licensee's efforts in this area
during future inspections.
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Fluid Leaks:
No significant fluid leaks were observed.
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Piping Vibrations:
No excessive piping vibrations were
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observed and no adverse conditions were noted.
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Control Room Annunciators:
Selected lit annunciators were
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discussed with control room operators to verify that the
reasons for these alarms were understood and corrective
action, if required, was taken.
Fire Protection: The inspectors verified that selected fire
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extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule,
that fire stations were unobstructed, and that adequate
control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintained.
On October 11, 1980 the fire door between the diesel generator
switch gear rooms was observed as being open and unattended.
This door is required by Procedure F-0P-22, Diesel Generator
Emergency Power System to be kept closed when the diesel
generators are required to be operable.
In addition the
door is labled " Fire Door to be Kept Closed".
This item is
considered to be an item of noncompliance (50-333/80-15-10).
With the exception of the item identified above, no items of
noncompliance were identified.
7.
Observations of Physical Security
The inspectors made observations and verified during regular and off-shift
hours that selected aspects of the plants physical security systems and
organization were in accordance with regulatory requirements, Physical
Security Plan and approved procedures.
a.
Physical Security Orgaaization
Observations and several discussions with personnel indicated
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that a full time member of the security organization with authority
to direct physical security actions was present, as required.
Manning of all three shifts on various occasions was observed to
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be adequate and minimum staffing requirements were satisfied.
All security members observed appeared to be capable of performing
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their assigned tasks.
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b.
Physical Barriers
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Physical barriers in the protected and vital areas were frequently
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obseriad to assure that they were intact and randomly checked by
p?. trolling guards.
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THIS PAGE, CONTAINING 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC
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DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
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8.
Emergency System Operability
The inspectors verified operability of selected safety systems by procedure
review and by performing a walkdown of accessible portions of the systems.
The following were included in the system verification.
Confirmation that the licensee's system lineup procedures match plant
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drawings and the as-built configuration.
Verification that vaivas are in the proper position and locked (sealed)
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as required.
System instrumentation is functioning and there are obvious deficiencies
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such as inoperable hangers or supports.
The following systems were inspected.
Both trains of the standby liquid control system, using the check list
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in F-0P-17.
Emergency service water system using the check list in F-OP-21.
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No items of noncocaliance were identified.
9.
Inspector Witnessing of Surveillance Tests
The inspector witnessed the performance of several surveillance tests to
verify the following:
Surveillance test procedures conform to Technical Specification require-
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ments and have been properly approved.
Test instrumentation is calibrated.
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Applicable limiting conditions for operation are being met.
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Systems are properly returned to service.
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Test data is accurately recorded, meets Technical Specification
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requirements, and is properly reviewed.
Testing is performed by qualified personnel.
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The inspector witnessed the performance of the following surveillance
tests:
Procedure No. NDEP 9.4-3, Ultrasonic Examination - Procedure for
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Detection of Water in Horizontal or Vertical Piping Runs, Revision 0,
September 12, 1980 performed on October 11, 1980.
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Procedure No. F-ISP-12, HPCI Steam Line Low Pressure Instrument Func-
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tional Test / Calibration Revision 7, August 1979 performed on September
30, 1980.
Procedure F-ST-4C, HPCI Pump Operability Test, Revision 6, December 1,
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1978. This test was performed on September 13, 1980 to verify HPCI
operability following an HPCI area fire sprinkler system accidental
initiation.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10. Maintenance Observation
On various occasions the inspector witnessed work performed and the main-
tenance or secondary containment integrity in accordance with Maintenance
Procedure No. 57.5, Procedure for Opening and Sealing Electrical Conduit
Sleeves, Revision 6, September 26, 1980.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Emergency Drill
a.
The insp2ctors witnessed the performance of a scheduled energency
drill conducted on September 11, 1980. The drill scenario was a
complete severence of the Reactor Core Isolation System Steam Line
between the isolation valves with the Reactor at full power late in
the fuel cycle.
b.
The inspectors witnessed the drill from the following locations.
DnergencyCenter(SeniorResidentInspector)
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Control Room (Resident Inspector)
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Downwind Survey Team (Regional Inspector)
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In-Plant Survey Team (Regional Inspector)
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c.
The following observations were made:
Personnel responded to the drill in a timely manner.
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Actions were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
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Designated persons were assigned to evaluate the drill.
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d.
A critique was conducted on September 12, 1980. The licensee identi-
fied certain areas in which improvements could be made. The inspectors
cor.nents were also taken under consideration at this time.
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The inspectors had no further questions with regard to the areas
reviewed.
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12. Operational Event
The inspector witnessed the plant cooldown following a reactor trip from
full power on October 13, 1980.
The trip resulted from a MSIV closure
which was initiated by the "B"
RPS H-G set tripping due to contractor
personnel, working on fire modifications, dropping a piece of scafolding on
it. Relief valves initially lifted to control pressure.
The highest
pressure recorded was 1087 PSIG. HPCI was then used manually to control
level and pressure until the MSIV's were reopened and a normal cooldown
using bypass valves was begun.
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Discussions with personnel and a review of plant records indicated the
following:
All safety systems functioned as required.
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No releases were associated with the event.
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Personnel response appeared to be appropriate.
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No items of nonceupliance were identified.
13. Containment Vent and Purge Valve Operation
The inspector reviewed the licensee's correspondence file regarding the
implementation of the interim NRR position on containment purge and vent
valve operation. The licensee has taken action to limit containment vent
and purge times by modifying the procedure for cycling pressure suppression
chamber and drywell vacuum breakers, for controlling and maintaining the
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required differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression
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chamber, and for inerting and deinerting the containment during reactor
operations or hot shutdown operations. The operability of butterfuly
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valves has, on an interim basis, been demonstrated by installing stops to
limit containment vent and purge valve travel. The licensee has not made
modifications to segregate containment ventilation isolation signals to
ensure at least one of the safety injection actuation signals is uninhibited
and operable to initiate valve closure when any other isolation signal may
be blocked, reset, or overridden. Rather they have committed not to use
the keylocked " Emergency Manual Override" switch when a real isolation
signal is present without prior NRC approval. The inspector was informed
by NRR that this condition was accepted for the interim.
This issue will
be reviewed again during a future inspection (80-BC-01)
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14. Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are those items for which further infonnation is required
to detennine whether the item is acceptable or an item of noncompliance.
Unresolved items are discussed in paragraph 4.b of this report.
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Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were
held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and
findings.
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