ML19350B162
| ML19350B162 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perkins, Cherokee  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1981 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Dail L DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103200024 | |
| Download: ML19350B162 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3..q e
REGION 11
- f 101 MARIETTA ST N.W., sulTE 3100 o,
b-ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
. o MAR l' 1M1 In Reply Refer To:
RII:JP0 CE6) 9 u-49D 50-488 4
50-489, 50-490
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Ouke Power Company 3 v.g
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\\Ls. QIdQ%g #/g Q ATTN:
L. C. Dail, Vice President d
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Design Engineering P. O. Box 33189 yh, E
(O Charlotte, NC 28242 NC @J Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 81-05 contains information that may be applicable to your facility regarding the consequences of a degraded de system.
No specific actions or responses are requested at this time; however, pending the results of an ongoing NRC staff evaluation of this matter, further licensee actions may be requested.
i Should you have any questions regarding this information notice, please contact this office.
Sincerely, C
k y-James P. O'Reilly Director Esc'losures:
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1.
IE Information Notice No. 81-05 2.
. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices cc w/ encl:
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J. T.-Moore, Project Manager P
- 81_08200 N
SSINS No.:
6835 Accession No.:
8011040271 IN 81-05 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
1 D
3 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 March 13, 1981
.IE INFORMATION NOTICE No. 81-05:
DEGRADED DC SYSTEM AT PALISADES
Purpose:
Th'e. intent of.this. notice is to enhance nuclear power plant safety by improving the' reliability of the dire'ct" current (dc) distribution system in nuclear powe plants.
Toward this end, this information notice alerts hciders of operating licenses and construction permits of an event that degraded the de system at the Palisades facility and jeopardized plant safety.
Description of Circumstances:
On January 6, 1981, while performing monthly surveillance tests on both station batteries, maintenance personnel inadvertently opened the breakers from both station batteries to their 125 volt dc buses and left them open for approxi-mately one hour. We view this personnel error as a common-mode failure that, if left uncorrected, would lead to a complete station blackout [i.e., total loss of both alternating current (ac) and de power].
Since the plant.was in a normal mode of operation, de power was being supplied by the ac system via the battery chargers; therefore, de power was never
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interrupted during this period, Nevertheless, as described later, the safety of the plant was jeopardized. A loss of offsite power during this period would, in the absence of manual action, result in the loss of all control power, blocking the automatic transfer of power to the onsite diesel generators.
In many des _igns, such losses would also block the starting of the diesels.
In
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contrast; the Pal'fsidss' design wo'uld not" block'the starting of the diesels;-
however, the loss of control power would block the connecting of the generators to their emergency buses so that a complete station blackout would still result.
l In either case, the blackout would persist until the battery breakers were manually reclosed or manual actions taken (e.g., manually c'osing the breakers i
from the diesel generators to their emergency buses and the required down stream l
load breakers.) During this time the ability of the plant to remove decay heat would be severely restricted.
Since the tripping of the battery breakers is not annunciated in the Palisades control room, a subsequent loss of offsite i
power would lead to an undetected common-mode failure.
Such a failure would be difficult.to diagnose, thereby limiting the operator's ability to take timely corrective action. -Consequently, an inordinate amount of time could be required to bring the plant to a normal mode of decay heat removal.
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.I IN 81-05 March 13, 1981 Page 2 of 2 Plants designed to conform with Regulatory Guide 1.47, " Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety," will automatically alert the operator whenever a battery is disconnected from its bus, thereby precluding a Palisades type of event.
As a corrective measure, Palisades is planning to install annunciators in the control room that will alert the operator whenever a station battery has been disconnected from its bus.
The information herein is being provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.
Recipients should review the information for possible applicability to 'their facilities.
If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested.
No written ~ response to this Information Notice is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Attachment:
Recently issued IE Information Notices o
9 Attachment IN 81-05 March 13, 1981 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORVATICN NOTICES Information Cate of Notice No.
Subject
_ Issue Issuec to 81-06 Failure of ITE Model 3/11/81 Ali pcwer reactor K-600 Circuit dreaker facilities with an OL or CP 81-04 Cracking ir Main Steam 2/27/81 All power reactor Lines facilities with an CL 81-03 Checklist for Licensees 2/12/31 All ;cwer reacter Making Notificaticns of facilities with an Significant Events in OL Accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 81-02 Transportation of 1/23/81 All Radiography Radiography Devices licensees 81-01 Possible Failures of 1/16/81 All power reactor General Electric Type facilities with an HFA Relays OL or CP.
80-45 Potential Failure of 12/17/80 All PWR facilities SWR Backup Manual Scram with an OL or CP Capability 80-44 Actuation of ECCS in the 12/16/80 All PWR facilities Recirculation Mode While with an OL or CP in Hot Shutdown 80-43 Failures of the Continuous 12/5/80 All power reactor Water Level Monitor for facilities with an the Scram Distnarge Volume CL or CP at Dresden Unit No. 2 80-42 Effect of Radiation on 11/24/80 All power reactor
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Hydraulic Snubber Fluid facilities with an OL or CP OL = Operating Licenses CP = Construction Permits
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