ML19347B274
| ML19347B274 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1980 |
| From: | Key W, Kohler J, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347B268 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-80-14, 50-304-80-14, NUDOCS 8010140168 | |
| Download: ML19347B274 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000295/1980014
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-295/80-14; 50-304/80-14
Docket No. 50-295; 50-304
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Inspection Conducted: June 1 through July 31, 1980
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Inspectors:
J. E. Kohler g
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J. R. Wa ers p
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W. J. K
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Approved By:
R. L. Spessard, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 1
Inspection Summary
Inspection on June 1 through July 31, 1980 (Report No. 50-295/80-14; 50-
304/80-14)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of containment
purging, regulatory guide 1.108, diesel generator testing, TMI mods,
licensing administration, containment integrated leak rate testing, aux-
iliary feedwater pump requirements, violation of low pressure over pressure
protection, event V check valves, steam generator snubbers, damage to 'A
charging pump, steam gene ator tube rupture procedure, W-2 switches,
inadvertent boron dilution at cold shutdown, unresolved items, unit 2
return to service, violation of dilution requirements, operational safety,
maintenance, surveillance, LER's, IE Bulletin followup, refueling activi-
ties, maintenance during refueling, retests and procedure changes, refuel-
ing plant operations, spent ruel storage racks, and onsite review committee.
The inspection involved a total of 442 inspector hours onsite by 3 NRC
inspectors including 51 hours5.902778e-4 days <br />0.0142 hours <br />8.43254e-5 weeks <br />1.94055e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected, 1 item of noncompliance (Infraction -
violation of discharge dilution requirements - Paragraph 19) was identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- K. Graesser, Superintendent
- L. Soth, Operating Assistant Superintendent
- R. Ward, Senior Operating Engineer
J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- E. Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
K. Kofron, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
H. Studtmann, Quality Assurance Manager
C. Moerke, Station Nuclear Engineering Department
J. Marianyi, Technical Staff Supervisor
T. Parker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
P. LeBlonde, Technical Staff Engineer
A. Ockert, Technical Staff Engineer
- F. Lentine, Technical Staff Engineer
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- G. Plim1, Assistant Superintendent Administrative and Support
Services
B. Naughton, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
P. Kurth, Technical Staff Engineer
D. Waldon, Fuel Handling Supervisor
- P. Kuhner, Quality Assurance Department
- T. Rieck, Technical Staff Engineer
- T. Lukens, Quality Control Supervisor
- Denotes those present at management exit of July 31, 1980.
2.
Status of Unresolved Items
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-27-02; 304/79-26-02): Bergen
Paterson Steam Generator Snubbers.
See Paragraph 13 of this report.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-03-02; 304/80-02-02): Confirmatory
Order Item E.1.c.
An NRC position was provided to the licensee, and
actions by the licensee have been taken to implement the order require-
ment.
See Paragraph 10 of this report.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-07-01):
Confirmatory Order Item
A.3.
The licensee has taken the required action on Unit 2.
See
Paragraph 22 of this report.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-07-02):
Confirmatory Order Item
A.5.
The licensee has taken the required action on Unit 2.
See
Paragraph 12 of this report.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-07-03):
Confirmatory Order Item
B.6.
The 18 month refueling interval diesel generator surveillance
test was satisfactorily completed during the Unit 2 refueling outage.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-07-04): Confirmatory Order Items
with prefix E.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions described
in their June 26, 1980, submittal and has no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/80-12-01): Damage to IA Charging
Pump. Destructive examination of the 1A Charging Pump, which was
started with suction valves closed, revealed clad cracking on inner
surfaces and boric acid attack of base metal. These conditions are
unrelated to operational error.
A special report was submitted to
the NRC. See Paragraph 14 of this report.
(Closed) Unresolved Ite:n (295/80-12-02): Loss of Refueling Cavity
Water to the Containment.
The licensee has put calibration require-
ments on temperature dete: tors used in freeze plugging.
Procedure
changes were made to ensure the proper temperature detector is used.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-304):
Inadequate Seal Weld on Bellows
Transmitters. Licensee has checked with manufacturer (Barton) and
Westinghouse. Transmitters are acceptable for use.
3.
Sunnary of Operations June 1-July 31,1980
Unit 1
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The unit operated at power levels up to 100%.
occurred. Two unscheduled shutdowns occurred: on June 29, 1980, to
repair a component cooling water line to the IB RCP lower bearing,
and the unit was returned to service on June 30, 1980; on June 2,
1980, to replace springs in control blocks of Bergen Paterson steam
generator snubbers, and the unit was returned to service on June 3,
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1980. (See Paragraph 13)
Unit 2
Unit 2 refueling continued until July 26, 1980, when power operation
began after an 85 day refueling outage was completed. The outage
was extended from 56 days to take into account delays in completing
low pressure turbine repairs, seismic rework per IE Bulletin 79-02,
containment integrated leak rate testing and reactor coolant pump
seal maintenance.
The following reactor trips occurred:
July 26, 1980, on SG A Steam flow-feedflow mismatch from 40% power.
July 27, 1980, while investigating a rod control system anomaly.
All recovery systems functioned as required.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Purging of Reactor Containment
Paragraph 5 of Inspection Report 50-295/80-12; 50-304/80-12 discussed
the status of containment purging above the cold shutdown mode. As
indicated in that report, analysis performed on the Zion Station 48
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inch purge valves resulted in a determination that they would close
against all postulated accident differential pressures. The licensee
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transmitted this information to NRR on May 22, 1980.
By verbal notification, Zion Station was informed by the NRR Licensing
Project Manager that purging would not be permitted until the submittal
was reviewed and approved by NRR. No NRR review schedule was offered.
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The NRC Senior Resident Inspector informed the station of the ban on
purging. This item is open pending review by NRR (295/80-14-01).
5.
By conference call of April 10, 1980, between Zion Station personnel,
Zion NRC Resident Inspector's Office and NRh personnel, diesel
generator testing in relation to Regulatory Guide 1.108 was discussed.
The requirements of this guide were made mandatory for the Zion
Station by the February 29, 1980, NRC Confirmatory Order modifying
the Zion Station license.
The licensee submitted additional information to NRR on June 3,
1980, in order to further clarify the testing status of the fifth
diesel generator. No response from NRR has been received.
This item is open pending review by NRR (295/80-14-02).
6.
Diesel Generator Testing Duration
By letter of May 22, 1980, Commonwealth Edison informed NRR that
periodic tests performed on safeguards equipment which result in
diesel generator starts would be included in the data base for
cumulative diesel generator start / failure statistics. The only
discrepancy was that the safeguards diesel starts do not last one
hour in duration. Regular periodic tests of diesel generators last
one hour as required by the guide. Also, this matter was discussed
with the NRR Licensing Project Manager, on May 19, 1980. No response
from NRR has been received.
This item is open pending review by NRR (295/80-14-03).
7.
TMI Modification Approval
Zion Unit 2 installed a reactor vessel head venting system and
re.ctor vessel level indicator. Both of these designs required
specific NRR design approval. Designs were submitted in January
1980, and no NRR acknowledgement was received.
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The NRC Senior Resident Inspector discussed this item with the NRR
Licensing Project Manager, who indicated that NRR had not completed
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its review and had additional questions about the design. Verbal
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agreement was made to isolate the head vent at the automatic valves
and de-energize the valves closed. The station has performed this
action. This item is open pending NRR review (295/80-14-04).
8.
Licensing Administration
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The NRC Senior Reactor Inspector discussed with the licensee the
status of several long outstanding licensing issues:
a.
Containment Purging
b.
TMI Mode Approval
c.
Revised Fq Limit
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d.
Diesel Generator Testing per Regulatory Guide 1.108
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e.
Leak Testing Event V Check Valves
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f.
Variances with NRC Confirmatory Order
During the exit on July 31, 1980, the inspector made the following
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observation regarding the status of these items and licensing issues
in general.
The inability to get timely NRC action on licensing issues was
adversely affecting plant performance. With respect to the confir-
matory order, questions of order interpretations are arising which
cannot be administered at the NRC inspector's level.
The licensee responded that the difficulties appear to be within
the NRC, in that submittals that are sent in do not appear to get
timely review, in some cases for. years.
Additionally, this matter was discussed during a telephone conver-
sation between RIII supervision and CECO management personnel.
CECO
management indicated their awareness of the problem and that it was
being evaluated. The inspector will continue to follow this matter.
9.
Surveillance - Refueling
The inspector observed the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test on
Unit 2 to verify that the test was covered by properly approved
procedures; that the procedures used were consistant with regulatory
requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls;
that minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were
completed, special test equipment was calibrated and in service, and
required data was recorded for final review and analysis; that the
qualifications of personnel conducting the test were adequate; and
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that the test results were adequate. The leak rate was well below
the allowable limit of .0465W/0 day.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Auxiliary Feed Pump Requirements
During the inspection period, the inspector obtained the following
position from NRR on continued plant operation in the event that an
auxiliary feed pump and a diesel generator on the opposite bus are
out of service simultaneously.
Question
Would NRC Order Item E.1.c require an expeditious shutdown (if the
following is the case)?
(a) One of two motor operated AFW pumps is
out of service; (b) One of two diesel generators is out of service;
and (c) One operable steam driven auxiliary feed pump modified so
that no AC is required.
Position
The intent of E.1.c is as follows: A shutdown is required if the
disabled diesel in (b) would be required to support the otherwise
healthy motor-driven AFW pump,
i.e.,
shutdown if a loss of offsite
power would leave the plant with only one operable AFW train. A
shutdown is not required until the allowable outage time expires if
the disabled dia-al in (b) does not affect the readiness of the two
otherwise operoute AFW trains,
i.e.,
if the unavailable diesel is
paired with the already-failed AFW pump or is not paired with any
AFW train at all.
The licensee was informed of this position and has included it into
his operating procedures. Unresolved Item (295/80-03-02; 304/80-02-02)
is closed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Violation of Low Pressure Over Pressure Protection (LER 50-304/80-22)
During performance of the containment integrated leak rate test on
Unit 2,-it was discovered by the licensee that Technical Specification 3.3.2.6.1, requiring protection from overpressurization events, was
violated in that the power operated relief valves were not operable.
The inspector investigated the events which lead up to this technical
specifications violation and determined that the PORVs were not
operable because instrument air and the accumulators for the PORVs
were isolated and vented to comply with containment integrated leak
rate testing. Furthermore, the technical specification in question
was recently received (April 28, 1980) well after the CILRT procedure
was written.
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Analysis by the licensee showed that all sources of RCS over pressure,
(ESF pumps, RCPs, and accumulators) were out of service or vented
to containment, as was the reactor coolant system, for performance
of the containment integrated leak rate test. The inspector determined
that the only way to immediately comply with the technical specifica-
tion would be to terminate the leak rate test.
Based on the condition
of the containment with all RCS pressurization sources out of service
or vented, the inspector concluded that the leak test could continue
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without the possibility of overpressure transients occurring. The
licensee immediately complied with the requirements of the technical
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specification at the conclusion of the test by enabling the instrument
air to the PORVs and opening the PORV block valves.
Changes were
made to the CILRT procedure to ensure that future CILRTS comply with
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Technical Specification 3.3.2.6.1 by blocking open the PORVs before
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instrument air is isolated.
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This is a licensee identified item of noncompliance in which no
citation will be given.
12.
Event V Check Valves
NRC Confirmatory Order, dated February 29, 1980, (Item A.5) required
the licensee to conduct testing to assure that the LPI/RHR check
valves are in fact installed correctly and functioning as pressure
isolation barriers when the plant is at pressure and producing
power.
The requirement states " verification of valve operability
shall be performed whenever RCS pressure has decreased to within 100
PSIG of the RHR system design pressure."
Zion Unit 2 performed the verification on two occasions prior to on
line operation following the refueling outage. The first verification
was performed when the unit attained hot zero power for physics
testing. Subsequently, the unit was taken back to cold shutdown for
correction of unacceptable reactor coolant pump seal flow. Upon
heatup after RCP maintenance, the check valve leak rate test was
performed again.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the procedures used,
witnessed portions of the testing and analyzed the results.
It was
concluded that adverse system interaction caused the leakage rate
measurements to be erroneous in many cases. However, it was able to
be concluded that the valves were not installed backwards or failed
in the open condition. The preceding two acceptance criteria were
stipulated in the memo written by F. Rowsome, Deputy Director Proba-
,
bilistic Analysis Staff, dated January 25, 1980. With this specific
objective the plant was cleared for power operation and no repairs
were required.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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13.
Zion Unit 1 Steam Generator Snubbers
Zion Unit I shut down at 0500 on June 2, 1980, per Technical Speci-
fication requirements to perform modifications on the compensator
springs located in the control volve assemblies of the Bergen Paterson
steam generator snubbers. There is one control valve assembly per
steam generator; four steam generators per unit. Duration of the
Zion Unit I shutdown was approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Zion Unit 2 was ia
a refueling outage and had these modification p Tormed prior to
startup.
The deficiencies in the compensator spring were identified during
full scale testing of Zion steam generator snubbers being perforced
by Bergen Paterson in New Hampshire.
During testing to determine
the cause and effect on operability of fluid leaks previously identi-
fied, the bleed rate on the control valve assembly was found to be
slower than the .116 .6 inch per minute deaign range, thus requiring
a stiffer compensator spring. Details of this matter were previously
discussed in Inspection Reports 50-295/80-08; 50-304/80-08 and 50-295/
80-12; 50-304/80-12.
Unresolved Item (295/79-27-02; 304/79-26-02) is closed; however,
there are matters identified by a RIII specialist inspector in
Inspection Report 50-295/80-08; 50-304/80-08 which remain to be
addressed by the licensee.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
14.
Damage to IA Charging Pump
As referenced in Inspection Reports 50-295/80-01; 50-304/80-01 and
50-295/80-12; 50-304/80-12, destructive exam: nation was performed on
the 1A Charging Pump after attempts to decontaminate pump to a
sufficiently low level for shipment to Pacific Pumps failed.
Investi-
gation revealed clad cracking with boric acid attack into base
metal.
The licensee used ultrasonic examination techniques to investigate
Unit 2 charging pumps during tha 1980 Unit 2 refueling outage.
Both
of these pumps (2A and 2B) showed evidence of clad cracking similar
to that seen in Unit 1.
A Region III NDE inspector examined the 1A
charging pump specimens as well as the radiographs.
The licensee sent a report to the Director, IE Region III, dated
June 12, 1980, detailing the corrective action to be taken during
subsequent scheduled refueling outages. The Region III NDE inspector
concurs with the licensee that no immediate safety concern exists
and the pumps are acceptable for continued duty. Unresolved Item
(295/80-12-01) is closed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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15.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Procedure
Westinghouse, in conjunction with the Owners' Group has determined
that the steam generator ?.ube failure accident should not be miti-
gated by using RCS loop isolation valves in plants where such valves
are installed.
Zion Station has loop isolation valves, and the
presently approved emergency generating procedure calls for their
use.
The new procedure calling for other mitigating measures has not been
finalized and approved for plant use.
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The Senior Resident Inspector called attention to the discrepancy
between existing and recommended SG tube rupture recovering strategies.
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The licensee plans to expediously complete the new procedure.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
16.
Westinghouse W-2 Switches
Under a notice of 10 CFR Part 21, the licensee informed the NRC of a
defect discovered in a Westinghouse W-2 switch used in a safety
related application which intermittently would preclude automatic
actuation of the component.
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The licensee has checked all switches in the control room for similar
defects and has initiated a modification so that switch continuity
can be checked from control room status. lights.
Shift personnel
have been instructed, as always, to manually start any piece of
equipment that is required to start automatically and has failed to
start.
This occurrence, described in Licensee Event Report 50-295/80-24 has
no previous occurrences. The NRC issued IE Bulletin 80-20 covering
immediate actions that are required. The licensee plans to comply
with the bulletin.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
17.
Inadvertant Boron Dilution at Cold Shutdown
The inspectors reviewed letters of June 27, 1980 and July 11, 1980,
from Westinghouse to Zion Station regarding the possibility of an
inadvertent boron dilution while in cold or hot shutdown. The
licensee has taken certain immediate steps instructing operators
that certain valves be administratively closed while in cold or hot
shutdown conditions when the shutdown margin is less than 5%.
This item is open pending further review (295/80-14-05).
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18.
Zion Unit 2 Return to Service Af ter 1980 Refueling
On July 26, 1980, Zion Unit 2 completed an 85 day refueling outage
and began power operation. The outage was extended from the pre-
,
viously planned 56 days outage due to unexpected delays in completing
low pressure turbine repairs, seismic rework required by IE Bulletin 79-02 containment integrated leak rate testing and reactor coolant
pump seal maintenance.
The inspectors observed portions of the following startup tests
performed on Zion Unit 2 after attaining initial criticality:
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Isothermal Temperature Coefficient
Power Coefficient of Reactivity
Control Rod Worth Measurements
In all cases acceptance criteria were met.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
19.
Violation of Discharge Dilution Requirements
During a planned release on June 27, 1980, approximately 4000 gallons
from the OA Lake Discharge Tank were released to the Unit 2 discharge
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canal without verification of proper dilution flow. Only one Unit 2
service water pump was operating. This action was in violation of
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Technical Specification 3.11.3.A and was reported in LER 50-304/
80-23.
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The discharge permit required the discharge path be lined up to Unit
1 discharge canal. Through operator error, the discharge path was
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lined up to Unit 2 discharge canal. Since Unit 2 was shut down at
the time, only one service water pump was running. Resolution of
this item was to review the technical specification requirements
associated with liquid discharges with the appropriate licensed and
non-licensed operating personnel.
Failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.11.3.A is considered
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an item of noncompliance and is classified as an infraction.
20.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
the months of June and July,1980. The inspector verified the
operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records
and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours
of Unit 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to
observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,
fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance
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requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
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The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the
physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the
station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
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verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the
month of July, 1980, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of
the Isolation Valve Seal Water System to verify operability. The
inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system
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controls associated with radwaste shipments.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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21.
Mcnthly Maintenance Observation
t
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-
ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they
were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory
guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with
technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating
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the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and
were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior to returning components or systems to service;
quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished
by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certi-
fied; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention
controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs
and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment
maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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Unit 1
Unit 2
APDMS Power Supply Fans
Repair of Inner, Outer Air Lock
Hatches
System Aux Transformer
Component Cooling Water to
IB RCP Lower Bearing
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Following completion of maintenance on the APDMS system and inner
and outer door hatch, the inspector verified that these systems had
been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
22.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
,
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveil-
lance testing on the isolation valve seal water systems and local
leak rate testing and verified that testing was performed in accord-
ance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was cali-
brated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal
and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that
test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure
requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the
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testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel. Performance of this testing on Unit 2 was in conformance
with NRC Confirmatory Order (Item A.3).
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-
,
ities:
TSS-15.16.10.F, TSS-47 and TSS-44,
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
23.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel,
and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to
determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifi-
cations.
Unit 1
LER No.
80-22
RTD ITE-421A spiking low
80-23
Chg pump #1 insufficient flow
80-24
Service water pump failure
80-25
Out of tolerance function generator
INM-441B
80-27
Steam generator snubbers inoperable
80-28
IB diesel generator tripped
80-29
Loss of both channels of Heat Tracing
80-30
Air ejector off gas monitor failure
80-32
Fuel oil storage tank level inadequate
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Unit 2
LER No.
80-18
Contai.nment air sample valve failed to
close
80-19
Containment spray pump stop valve failure
80-20
SG 2A pressure XMTR drift low
80-22
PORV's inoperable during CILRT
B0-23
Insufficient number of service water
pumps during discharge
Additional findings relative to Unit 1 LER's 80-24 and 80-27 and
Unit 2 LER's 80-22 and 80-23 are discussed in paragraphs 16, 13, 11
and 19, respectively, of this report.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
)
24.
IE Bulletin Followup
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the
written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin,
that the written response included the information required to be
reported, that the written response included adequate corrective
action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin
and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded
copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management
representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written
response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the
licensee was as described in the written response.
IE Bulletin 79-05C & 79-06C
Nuclear Incident at Three Mile
Island Supplement
Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays
in Safety-Related Systems
Loss of Non-Class 1E Instrumentation
and Control Power System Bus During
Operation
Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type
II, 2 Inch, Tray Absorber Cells
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)
Reset Controls
No items of noncompliance were identified.
25.
Refueling Activities
The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the
core, all surveillance testing required by the technical speci-
fications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified
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that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related
equipment was performed as required by technical specifications;
observed two shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal,
inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed
in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures;
verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by
technical specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained
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on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling
was in accordance with technical specifications and approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
26. Maintenance Activities During Refueling Outage
The inspector reviewed maintenance activities during the Unit 2
refueling outage and verified that three selected activities included
the following:
Administrative approvals for removing the system from service
a.
and returning it to service.
b.
Hold points for inspection / audit and sign off by QA or other
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licensee personnel.
c.
Provisions for testing following maintenance.
d.
Provisions for assuring that system valves and breakers are
aligned for normal service.
Responsibility for reporting to licensee management deficiencies
e.
identified during maintenance.
The maintenance activities reviewed were:
The installation of reactor vessel level indication system, the
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installation of reactor vessel vent system, and repair of Boron
injection tank manway leak. The inspector witnessed the primary
leak test and observed housekeeping in the containment prior to
startup.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
27.
Plant Operations - Refueling
The inspectors witnessed various portions of the initial reactor
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startup after refueling, as well as verified through visual examin-
ation that the ECCS and the reactor coolant system were returned to
service according to approved procedures.
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The inspector verified that retesting of Primary Coolant modifica-
tions, Feedwater modifications and Auxiliary Feedwater modifications
was included in the startup sequence. The inspector also verified
that the startup check list required documented completion verification
and overall independent review. The inspector verified that pro-
cedure changes resulting from system modifications were reviewed as
required by the technical specifications.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
28.
Spent Fuel Storage Racks
,
Four of the twenty-four new high density spent fuel racks have
arrived onsite. Four have been installed in the spent fuel pool.
The inspector reviewed the procurement documents to verify that:
proper materials are specified, the required design and fabrication
codes have been invoked, critical dimensions are specified and
drilling of vent holes is required. The receipt inspection procedure
was verified to require inspections for damage, existence of vent
holes, proper identification and vendor documentation. The inspector
verified that the four racks received were handled and stored in
such a manner as to maintain cleanliness, prevent damage and permit
quality control surveillance. The procedures for removal of existing
racks and installation of new racks were reviewed for control of
rigging and handling, control of heavy loads over spent fuel, proper
location, and qualification of personnel directing operations in the
spent fuel area. The inspector examined at least two of the new
racks for appearance and size of welds, clean 1.iness, existence of
vent holes, obvious defects, and identification of cells. Vendor
certification papers were reviewed for NDE results, welder qualifica-
tion, material certifications, nonconformance reports and vendor
mandrell testing.
For at least one rack the inspector observed the following activities:
receipt and storage of new rack, clearance check using dummy fuel
element, removal of existing rack, installation of new rack and
neutron attenuation test.
During these observations the inspector
verified that the work was performed in accordance with approved
procedures, adequate QC inspection was performed, and no apparent
damage to the racks, pool, or spent fuel occurred.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
29.
Onsite Review Committee
The inspector examined the onsite review functions conducted during
the period of June I to July 31, 1980, to verify conformance with
technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. This
review included:
changes since the previous inspection in the
charter and/or administrative procedure governing review group
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activities; review group membership and qualifications; review group
meeting frequency and quorum; and, activities reviewed including
proposed technical specification changes, noncompliance items and
corrective action, proposed facility and procedure changes and
proposed tests and experiments conducted per 10 CFR 50.59, and
others required by technical specifications.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
30.
Response to Headquarters Request
In response to an NRC Headquarters Request, dated July 24, 1980,
requesting information on location of certain load centers and/or
circuit breakers, the licensee stated that no valve, required to be
locked by technical specifications, has its locking capability
located inside containment.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
31.
Organizational Changeg
During the inspection period, Mr. Ken Graesser assumed the duties of
Plant Superintendent.
Mr. Kurt Kofron assumed the duties of Mainten-
,
ance Assistant Superintendent.
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32.
Meetings Attended
The inspectors attended the following meetings during the inspection
period:
June 11-13, 1980
Resident Inspector Meeting Benton Harbor, MI
June 4-5, 1980
Quality Assurance Meeting CECO-NRR Bethesda,
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection
on July 31, 1980 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
activities. Yhe licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.
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