ML19347A814
| ML19347A814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/31/1980 |
| From: | Ott W NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-44FR75167, FRN-45FR55402, FRN-45FR55413, RULE-PR-50 NUREG-0685, NUREG-685, NUDOCS 8009300303 | |
| Download: ML19347A814 (58) | |
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~~~~~^'~-~~~~~~5 Environmental Assessment for Effective Changes to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E to 1C CFR Part 50; Emergency Planning Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants L__:^:_. z z :T :
atoIuWshed ugust 1 )
W. R. Ott Division of Siting, Health and Safeguards Standards Offico of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi.' aion Washington, D.C. 20555
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ABSTRACT The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has prepared an Environ-mental Assessment for changes to the regulations governing emergency planning requirements.
Based on this assessment, the Director, Office of Standards Develop-ment determined that an Environmental Impact Statement would not be prepared for the rule changes and directed that a " Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" be-prepared and published in the Federal Register.
The Environmental Assessement is presented and the Federal Register notice is attached as Appendix B.
(Included in Appendix B is an analysis of comments received on an earlier draft version of this Assessment (45 FR 3913, January 21, 1980).) The effective rule changes are included as Appendix C for completeness.
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page 1.
Introduction.........................
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2.
Need for the Amendments; Rejection of the No Action Alternative....................
1 4
3.
The Proposed Action.....................
2 4.
Impact of the Proposed Action................
4 5.
Summary...........................
11 I
Appendix A - Replacement Power Costs of Shutting Down Operating Nuclear Power Plants, 1981....
12 Appendix B - Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact for Effective Rule Changes.
17 Appendix C - Emergency Planning Rule Changes........
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1.
Introduction In late 1979, the Commission published proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.33, 50.47, and 50.54 and Appendix E, in the Federal Register (44 FR 75167, December 19, 1979).
Since these amendments-to the regulations governing the licensing of production and utilization facilities were substantive and might have had a significant impact on the human environment, the Commission directed that an environmental assessment be prepared to determine whether an environ-mental impact statement should be developed for the rule changes.
A draft Environmental Assessment (DEA) was published in the Federal Register es'part of the " Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" for the proposed amendments (45 FR 3913, 'anuary 21, 1980).
Comment periods J
for both the proposed amendments and the draft Environmental Assessment ended on February 18, 1980.
Comments were received that resulted in modifications of the proposed amendments and the Environmental Assessment.
l This document (NUREG-0685) contains the text of the final Environmental Assessment.
Appendix B contains the Federal Register notice containing the
" Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" for the effective amendments and the analysis of the comments submitted on the DEA.
Appendix C contains the text of the effective amenaments.
2.
Need for the Amendments; Rejection of the No Action Alternative Until now, regulations concerning emergency planning required that the applicant for a nuclear power plant operating license be prepared to take pro-tective measures within the site boundary in the event of an' accident.
The applicant was also required to develop plans that, among other things, incor-porate agreements and arrangements for the taking of protective measures by w
State and local government authorities when the consequence c an accident might extend beyond the site boundary.
Offsite participation of State and local authorities was on a voluntary basis.
Several recent studies 5 have criticized the state of preparedness for 1
radiologicrl emergencies in the vicinity of operating nuclear power plants.
The events that occurred at Three Mile Island confirmed some of the criticisms contained in these reports.
Because of the accident at Three Mile Island, the various reports, and the NRC's own assessment of the health and safety significance of emergency planning, the Commission saw a need to act to upgrade those portions of its regulations concerning emergency planning and prepared-ness. This decision to upgrade the regulations was a rejection of the alterna-tives of taking no action or of taking more drastic action that could have an immediate, detrimental impact on the nation's energy supply (i.e., immediate i
shut down of nuclear power plants).
To rectify shortcomings in emergency preparedness, the Commission decided that it was necessary to develop rule changes to the emergency planning require-ments in 10 CFR Part 50.
3.
The Proposed Action In its deliberations leading to issuance of the effective amendments, the Commission determined that emergency planning should not only be upgraded but
' EPA /NRC Task Force Report, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NURFG-0396, December 1978.
2GA0 Report, " Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should be Better Prepared for Radiological Emergencies," EMD-78-110, March 30, 1979.
3" Report of the Siting Policy Task Force," NUREG-0625, August 1979.
4 Senate Bill S.562, involves concurrence and adequacy of State and local emergency plans.
(See Congressional Record - Senate, Vol. 125, No. 95, July 16, 1979, pages S9461-59506.)
sCongressionalReport,"EmergencyPlanningAroundU.S.NuclearPowerPlants:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight, House Report 96-413, August 8, 1979.
2
that' adequate' emergency planning should be made a condition of license issuance and for continuation of operation.
The effective rule changes make issuance of an operating license for and the continuation of operation of a nuclear power plant dependent on an NRC finding that the overall state of emergency prepared-
'!ess, including the State and local governmental emargency plans, is adequate.
The rule changes also introduce into the regulations the use of " Emergency i
Planning Zones" (EPZs) as the areas within which local and State authorities must have plans that the NRC has found to be adequate.6 The effective rule i
changes also require certain changes related to onsite emergency preparedness, which essentially upgrade existing onsite plans. The effective rule includes i
separate consideration of those plants already licensed for operation.
The content of the effective rule is influenced by the need for prompt action and the determination that it is appropriate to allow a reasonable time for the preparation and implementation of adequate emergency plans.
The effective rule 1
identifies April 1, 1981, as the reasonable date by which plants now in opera-tion should come into compliance.
An additional three months is allowed for installation of warning systems.
The licensability requirement in the regulation requires, ultimately, that the NRC determine that State and local emergency response plans are adequate or that operation may be permitted upon a finding that, for example, (1) the defi-ciencies in the plans are.not significant for the plant in question, (2) adequate
" Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in the EPA /NRC iask Force Report (see footnote 1).
In most cases, they will be a circle of radius about 10 miles (16 km) for the plume inhalation exposure pathway and about 50 miles (80 km) for the ingestion exposure pathway.
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor will be determined by the emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such local-conditions as, demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, 1
and local jurisdictional boundaries.
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l interim compensating actiens have been or will be taken promptly, or (3) there are other compelling raasons for continued operation.
If the Commission makes a determination that the state of emergency preparedness at a site is inadequate, it must decide whether to shutdown the plant in question, allow it to continue to operate, t.r take other appropriate enforcement action.
For purposes of reactor operation, only the proposed emergency plans for governmeniw' intities wholly or partially within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zones shall be examined.
State and local authorities have in common with the NRC the responsibility to protect public health and safety.
To that end, the Commission is seeking the active cooperation of State and local governments in the development and implementation of upgraded plans for the protection of the public health and safety.
4.
Impact of the Proposed Action The ef fective rule changes state that (a) where there are identified defi-ciencies, (b) when the deficiencies in the plan are significant for the plant in question, (c) when adequate interim compensating actions have not or will not be taken, or (d) when there are no other compelling reasons, consistent with the protection of public health and safety, for license issuance or con-tinued operation, and (e) when no other appropriate enforcement actions can be taken a new plant will not be allowed to begin operating or an operating plant will be required to shut down.
While this is not a requi' a9nt for State.and local governments, the States are concerned with meeting
_ 'nergy needs of their residents.
In the opinion of-the NRC staff, to meet this need as well as that of protecting public health and safety, it is likely that the States will cooperate _to ensure the continued safe operation or timely commencement of safe. operation of nuclear generation ~ capability within their jurisdiction.
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The NRC's Office of State Programs recently published a staff study c;ntitled "Beyond Defense in Depth:
Cost and Funding of State and Local Govern-I ment Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Commercial Nuclear Power Stations," NUREG-0553, October 1979.7 This study sampled several States' emergency _ plans and the state of preparedness that had been developed under existing regulations, some of which had NRC concur-rence.
The study identified a range of costs per plant to State and local governments, which the data indicate depends largely on the relative differ-ences in population distribution and radiological transport characteristics of the plant locations.
Some important considerations that were found to affect cost; include emergency plan exercises, comunications, radiation moni-toring, warning systems, emergency planning zones, and local technical directors.
Typical costs for State and local government programs to achieve adequacy in radiological emergency response plans for a 10-mile (16 km) Emergency Plan-ning Zone are presented in Table 1.
For a State, the initial costs of planning, exercises, training, and resources (communication and radiation monitoring instrumentation) typically total about $240,000 wi'h associated annual updating costs of about $44,000.
For local governments, the initial costs tyoically 1
total about $120,000 (four jurisdictions) with annual updatir g costs of about
$30,000.
The typical total costs to State and local governmen'.s to obtain 7Ihis document has been issued by the NRC staff and is used here only as a source for technical data on costs.
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TABLE 1 2-TYPICAL COSTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DEVELOP EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAMS WITHIN A 10-MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE *
(State with one plant) 3 State Local Total (4 jurisdictions)
Plan i
Initial
$100,000
$40,000
$140,000 Update
$ 10,000/yr
$ 4,000/yr
$ 14,000/yr Preparedness f
Exercises
$ 20,000/yr
$20,000/yr
$ 40,007/yr Training Initial
$ 20,000 None
$ 20,000 Update
$ 4,000/yr None
$ 4,000/yr Resources Initial
$100,000
$60,000 (communications) $160,000 t
Update
$ 10,000/yr
$ 6,000/yr
$ 16,000/yr Total Initial
$240,000
$120,000
$360,000 Update
$ 44,000/yr
$ 30,000/yr 5 74,000/yr i
- Information taken from NUREG-0533, "Beyond Defense-In-Depth:
Cost and Funding of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Commercial Nuclear Power Stations," October 1979 i
t 6
an NRC fir. ding of adequacy in their emergency response plans would be about
$360,000 initial cost plus $74,000 in annual updating costs.
NUREG-0553 did not contain estimates of the costs of installing warning systems that would have a capability of notifying (within 15 minutes) everyone within 10 miles that a site emergency was in progress.
Estimates provided by commenters on tha draft Environmental Assessment indicate an installed cost of around
$500,000 plus a nominal yearly maintenance cost.
This will bring typical costs to about one million. dollars per plant.
Costs incurred in regard to multiple-unit plants will result in lower per unit costs.
Costs per unit in areas with more individual governmental authorities involved and/or higher populations will be higher.
The upgraded onsite requirements are centered around the following emer-g?ncy preparedness improvements:
1.
More detailed emergency response plans and procedures with a well-defined staff and formal emergency organization.
2.
Improved communication capability with backup power sources.
3.
Standard emergency classification and notification schemes coupled with annual public information bulletins.
4.
Improved accident consequence prediction capability based on real-time meterological information and ability to notify offsite officials within 15 minutes of an accident.
5.
.Onsite technical support center with adequate emergency facilities and equipment.
6.
Facilities for onsite treatment of contaminated injured; ability to control workers rediological exposure during accidents, including exposure during life saving actions by workers; and facilities for
. personnel decontamination.
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7.
Improved emergency preparedness training and formal drills, exercises, and audits to ensure adequacy of the program.
The impacts of these onsite improvements will vary with the existing state of preparedness at a specific site and are different from the offsite costs already discussed.
To attain an acceptable state of emergency preparedness onsite, initial costs are expected to be about one quarter to one half of the costs projected for the same process offsite.
This will amount to a range of between $250,000 for a less complicated site to about $750,000 for a complicated site in an area of high population density.
For sites in areas of high population density, additional costs may be associated with such items as dynamic evacuation analyses and shelter surveys and communications and warning systems.
Areas experiencing high population growth rates may also experience additional costs.
A likely cost to achieve an NRC favorable finding in radiological emergency response plans for a typical nuclear oower plant is therefore around $1,250,000 and is unlikely to exceed
$2,000,000 for sites with the highest population densities.8 These costs of implementation of emergency preparedness may be compared to other costs incurred in the construction of a typical 1000 MWe nuclear power plant or to the tax and fee burden that is usual for such an installation.
The capital investment in plant and equipment is on the order of $1 billion at "These costs reflect inclusion of information on the cost of siren systems from several commenters (see Appendix B, comment 11).
Northeast Utilities provided a more detailed breakdown of total costs than other commenters but quoted special conditions such as large numbers of small towns within the EPZ which escalated their figures.
Although total estimates for Northeast Utilities were on the order of 4 to 5 million dollars per site, uncertainty in the direct applicability of their figures to other sites led the staff to consider their estimates beyond the usual range of costs associated with i
implementation of the effective rule changes.
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the present time, and the State and local tax and fee structure, although quite variable, amounts to an average of about 2.5 percent of that capital investment per year (or about $25 million per year for a $1 billien investment).9 A parti-cular exception would be publicly owned utilities such as the Tennessee Valley Authority that make payments to State and local governments in lieu of taxes and also have a much lower rate structure.
When compared to these investment and tax burden figures, even for the case of publicly owned utilities, the costs of implementation of the requirement for an NRC favorable finding in the State and local emergency plans within the EPZ does not seem unreascoable.
Another potential major impact is that associated with shutting down those plants for which.the NRC cannot make a favorable finding on the adequacy of the State and local governmental radiological emergency response plans, or for which a favorable finding is no longer warranted.
An estimate for these costs is presented in Appendix A for plants that are forecast to be in operation in 1981.
The estimate is based on the cost of replacement power for one month, taking into consideration the fuel mix associated with the replacement power for the State in which each plant is located.
For a typical 1000 MWe power plant, these costs range from $2.6 million per month for replacement by all coal-fired capacity (Prairie Island) to $27.9 million per month for replacement by all oil-fired capacity (San Onofre).
It should be noted that effects of shutdowns could be magnified several times when multiple-unit plants are involved or when a single governmental authority has several plants within its jurisdiction.
'J" Coal and Nuclear:
A Comparison of the Cost of Generating Baseload Electricity by Region," NUREG-0480, December 1978.
9
While the variation in replacement power cost is significant, even those plants with low replacement power costs will exceed the projected costs for implementation of adequate emergency plans if a shutdown lasts beyond one month and thus the utility management will have a strong incentive to expedite the emergency planning process with every available resource.
Also associated with replacement power generated by coal or oil burning power plants are the health effects attributable to gaseous and particulate emissions from those power plants.
It is difficult to quantify these health effects because of the variability in fuel composition, the variation in effi-ciency and pollution control equipment of the older units usually pressed into service for replacement power, and the lack of accurate epidemiological and other data connecting these emissions with health effects.
However, there are definite indications that these emissions could have a significantly greater impact on public health than the emissions of the nuclear power plants which they would be replacing.10'11 It should be noted, though, that the health effects from the coal or oil units represent a very small incremeatal risk to f
the average individual in the public.
Thus, even if extended periods of shut-down occurred, the impact would be small in an absolute sense.
The proposed rule allows a reasonable opportunity to achieve compliance and the health impacts of these rule changes should therefore be insignificant.
It should be noted that the time periods and deadlines quoted in the effective rule (April 1,1981, for plans and implementation and July 1,1981, for installation of warning systems) have been chosen to idlow reasonable time
"'" Health Evaluation of Energy Generating Sources," AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, Journal.of the American Medical Association, November 10, 1978, Vol. 240, No. 20, p. 2193.
11" Health Effects Attributable to Coal and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Alternatives,"
NUREG-0332, September 1977.
10
to acMeve compliance or request permission to continue or begin operation in spite of noted deficiencies.
As a result, the Commission anticipates that shut-downs will be few and of short duration.
5.
Summary The Commission has decided that a need exists for a change in the rules governing consideration of emergency planning in the licensing of nuclear power plants.
The effective changes meet the requirements for the upgrading of emer-gency planning with respect to siting and design features as determinants of l
license issuance or continuation.
The impacts (costs) of compliance are within a reasonable range when compared to capital investment costs and the State and local tax and fee burdens associated with the construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
It is expected that nuclear power plant shutdowns under this rule will be infrequent and of short duration and that the impacts on the human environ-ment of the proposed rule will be insignificant.13 Therefore, it is not neces-sary to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed rule changes.
'"This assumption is critical to the decision that an Environmental Impact State-ment should not be prepared.
The basis for this assumption was that, since State and local authorities have the responsibility, in common with the NRC, to protect public health and safety and are concerned with meeting the energy needs of their citizens, it is likely that they will cooperate to ensure the continued safe operation or timely commencement of safe operation of nuclear generation capability within their jurisdiction.
The only significant adverse reaction by the State and local governments that must bear this burden has been that complications in funding of State programs and lead time for equipment acquisition might make it difficult to completely satisfy all of the planning and preparedness requirements by the date set forth in the proposed rule changes.
As a direct result of this, the deadline for submitting plans has been extended to April 1, 1981 and for having warning systems in place has been extended to July 1, 1981.
This extension should be sufficient in most cases.
It should also be noted that the Commission has chosen the alternative that requires Commission action to initiate a shutdown.
Conditions are specified that the Commission will use in each case to determine whether an exemption is warranted.
When arrayed together, the lack of any significant adverse comment from State and local governments, the necessity for Commission action before a plant will be shutdown, and the conditions for granting an exemption all argue convincingly that the assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration is sound.
Thus, the assumption is retained in the final Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0685) and the impacts of extended shutdowns are not considered valid impacts of these rule changes.
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APPENDIX A REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS OF SHUTTING D0WN OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, 1981 If a nuclear plant is ordered shut down, the power that would have been generated by the plant will be generated by another plant if the capacity is available.
A cost estimate was prepared and is shown in the accompanying Table A-1 for replacement power for one month.
The list of operating plants for 1981 was taken from the forecast in NUREG-0380, October 19, 1979, excluding Indian Point 1 and TMI 2.
It was assumed that each utility would replace the power with coal-fired and oil-fired capacity at the ratio the State where the plant is located currently uses these fuels for steam-electric plants.
It was assumed that no replacement hydrogenerating capacity would be available because it would already be fully used.
In addition, the availability of hydroelectric capac'.ty is highly weather dependent.
Supplies of coal and oil, particularly oil, are highly uncertain for next year.
Thus, these fuel mixes may be altered considerably.
Similarly, coal supplies could be changed substantially by strikes I
and severe weather.
Coal and oil costs were based on January 1979 prices from the Department of Energy.
Coal costs for 1981 were increased by 15%.
Oil costs (residual) were doubled over January 1979 prices.
This estimate is conservative since i
the present price (January 1980) has already exceeded twice the January 1979 price.
Neither of these assumptions are likely to be near the prices actually prevailing in 1981.
(Oil prices in particular are highly uncertain.)' It does seem reasonable however, to assume that oil prices in January 1981 will be no lower than current levels.
Also, if oil prices continue rising, past experience indicates ~that coal prices will follow.
12
The weighted cost of fuel for each plant was adjusted downward by 6 mills /
kWh, which is the approximate savings of nuclear fuel costs by not operating the nuclear plant.
No adjustment for non-fuel operating and maintenance costs was made, although average operating and maintenance costs for nuclear plants are lower than those for fossil fuel plants, especially those that would be brought into operation to replace the nuclear capacity.
It was assumed that the nuclear plants operate at an annual average 65 percent capacity factor.
This will likely be higher in the early months of 1981 as utilities will be experiencing their winter peak demand for elec-tricity.
The average capacity factor will likely be lower in the spring when nuclear plants are typically shut down for refueling.
The above patterns will 1
be repeated for the summer and fall.
Given these uncertainties, especially in fuel prices, the monthly replace-ment costs shown in the Table A-1 should be taken only as indicators. What is clearly shown is that oil-dependent areas are quite vulnerable to substantial cost increases.
These are California, the entire Northeast Power Coordinating Council plus New Jersey, Florida, and Arkansas.
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TA8LE A-1 SHORT-TERM REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR NUCLEAR UTILITIES Ratio of Coal Fuel Costl Weighted:
Net Fuel Replacement Power Reliability MWe to 011 Use C/108 Btu Ave. Fuel Cost Costs 3 Costs $ 1x108 Council Plant (CER)*
Coal Oil Coal Oil Mills /kWh Mills /kWh Per Mo.*
NPCC N.Y.-Fitzpatrick 821 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 15.9 N.Y.-Ginna 470 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 9.1 Conn.-Haddam Neck 575 oil 245 60.4 54.4 14.9 N.Y.-Indian Point 2 873 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 16.9 N.Y.-Indian Point 3 965 1
4 134 218 45.8 40.8 18 7 Maine-Maine Yankee 825 oil 182 44.8 38.8 15.1 Conn.-Millstone 1 660 oil 245 60.4 54.4 17.1 Conn.-Millstone 2 870 oil 245 60.4 54.4 22.5 N.Y.-Nine Mile Point 1 620 1
4-134 218 46.8 40.8 12.0 Mass.-P11gris 1 655 oil 201 49.4 43.4 13.5
. Vt.-Vermont Yankee 1 514 oil 201 49.4 43.4 10.6 Mass.-Yankee-Rowe 175 oil 201 49.4 43.4 3.5 N.Y. Shorehae 854 1
4 134 218 46.8 40.8 19.8 SERC Ala.-Browns Ferry 1 1065 coal 146 20.7 14.7 7.5 Ala.-Browns Ferry 2 1D65 coal 146 20.7 14.7 7.5 Ala.-Browns Ferry 3 1065 coal 146 20.7 14.7 7.5 N.C.-Brunswick 1 821 coal 143 20.3 14.3 5.6 N.C.-Brunswick 2 821 coal 143 20.3 14.3 5.6 Fla.-Crystal River 3 825 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 23.8 Ala.-Farley 1 829 coal 146 20.7 14.7 5.9 Ga.-Hatch 1 786 coal 132 18.7 12.7 4.7 Ga.-Hatch 2 786 coal 132 18.7 12.7 4.7 Va.-North Anna 1 907 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.9 14.4 5.C.-Cconee 1 887 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.4 5.C.-Oconee 2 B87 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.4 S.C.-Oconee 3 887 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.4 S.C.-Robinson 2 700 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 66 Fla.-St. Lucie 1 802 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 23.1 Va.-Surry 1 822 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.2 12.9 Va.-Surry 2 822 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.2 12.9 Fla.-Turkey Point 3 693 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 20.0 Fla.-Tutkey Point 4 693 1
3 132 336 66.7 60.7 20.0 Ala.-Farley 2 829 coal 146 20.7 14.7 5.9
SHORT-TERM REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR NUCLEAR UTILITIES (Continued)
Ratio of Coal Fuel Costi Weighted:
Net Fuel Replacement Power Reliability MWe
'to Oil Use C/108 Btu Ave. Fuel Cost Costs 8 Costs $ 1x108 Council Plant (DER)*
Coal Oil Coal Oil M111s/kWh Mills /kWh-Per No.*
N.C.-McGuire 1 1180 coal 143 20.3 14.3
- 7. 8 Tenn.-Sequoyah 1 1140 coal 147 20.7 14.7 8.0 Va.-North Anna 2 907 2
3 161 203 39.2 33.2 14.3 S.C.-Summer 1 900 4
1 147 186 25.8 19.8 8.5 ECAR 5
852 coal 137 19.5 13.5 5.5 Penn.-Beaver Valley Mich.-Big Rock Point 72 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4
.7 Mich.-Cook 1 1054 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4 10.8 Mich.-Cook 2 1100 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4 11.2 Ohio-Davis-Besse 1 906 coal 137 19.5 13.5 5.8 Mich.-Palisades 805 4
1 130 258 27.4 21.4 8.2
' MAAC Md.-Calvert Cliffs 1 845 1
1 150 225 38.4 32.4 13.0 Md.-Calvert Cliffs 2 845 1
1 150 225 38.4 32.4 13.0 N.J.-Oyster Creek 650 1
3 163 255 52.9 46.9 14.4 Penn.-Peach Botton 2 ID65 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 9.2 Penn.-Peach Bottom 3 1065 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 9.2 N.J.-Salem 1 1090 1
3 163 255 52.9 46.9 24.3 Penn.-Three Mile Island 1 819 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 7.0 Penn.-Susquehanna 1 1052 5
1 118 247 24.1 18.1 9.1 N.J.-Sales 2 1115 1
5 163 255 52.9 46.9 24.8 MAIN Ill.-Dresden 1 200 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.1 Ill.-Dresden 2 794 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.1 Ill.-Dresden 3 794 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.1 Wisc.-Kewaunee 535 coal 111 15.7 9.7 2.4 Wisc.- Point Beach 1 497 coal 111' 15.7 9.7 2.2 Wisc.-Point Beach 2 497 coal 111 15.7 9.7 2.2 111.-Quad Cities 1 789 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.0 111.-Quad Cities 2 789 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 7.0 Ill.-Zion 1 1040 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 9.3 Ill.-Zion 2 1040 8
1 124 335 24.8 18.8 9.3
i SHORT-TERM REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR NUCLEAR UTILITIES (Continued) 2 Net Fuel Replacement Power Ratio of Coal Fuel Cost 8 Weighted Relishility MWe to 011 Use 4/108 Btu Ave. Fuel Cost Costs 3
-Costs $ 1x108 Council Plant (DER)*
Coal Oil Coal Oil Mills /kWh Mills /kWh Per Mo.*
MARCA Neb.-Cooper Station-778 coal 100 14.1 8.1 3.0 lowa-Duane Arnold 538 coal 109 15.4 9.4 2.5 Neb.-Fort Calhoun 457 coal 100 14.1 8.1
- 1. 6 Wisc.-Lacrosse 50 coal 111 15.7 9.7
.2 Minn.-Monticello 545 coal 80 11.3 5.3 1.4 11.3 5.3 1.4 Minn.-Prairie Island 1 530 coal 80 Minn.-Prairie Island 2 530 coal 80 11.3 5.3
.1.4 SWPP Ark.-Arkansas 1 850 1
5 112 202-44.1 38.1 15.2 Ark.-Arkansas 2 912 1
5 112 202 44.1
-38.1 16.2
.WSSC-m.
en Colo.-Fort St. Vrain 330 coal 69 9.8 3.8
.5 Calif.-Humbolt Bay 65 oil 263 64.7 58.7
- 1. 7 Calif.-Rancho Seco 918 oil 263 64.7 58.7 25.6 Calf.-San Onofre 1 436 oil 263 64.7 58.7 12.2 s
1130 oil 263 64.7 58.7 31.5 Ore.-Irojan Calif-Diablo Canyon 1 1084 oil 263 64.7 58.7 30.4 Calif.-San Onofre 2 1140 oil 263 64.7 58.7 31.8
'" Design Electrical Rating 8From U.S. DOE /EIA-0075/1-(79), Monthly Report, Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility Plants, Data for January 1979, Tables 2 and 5 Prices escalated to January 1981, coal increased by 15%, fuel doubled from January 1979, net plant
- 2 heat rate 11,000 Btu /kWh 3 Fossil fuel prices'less nuclear fuel price of 6 mills /kWh 465% plant capacity factor 5Used Ohio fuel and prices as plant is in ECAR 8 Assumed 100% oil because intertied with all oil utilities
APPENDIX B NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 EMERGENCY PLANNING:
NEGATIVE DECLARATION; FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT I!! PACT FOR EFFECTIVE RULE CHANGES AGENCY:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:
Final Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact.
SUMMARY
On January 21, 1980 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a
" Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" (45 FR 3913, January 21, 1980) for proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 50 SS50.33, 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix E that deal with emergency planning requirements for nuclear power plants (44 FR 75167, December 19, 1979).
A draft Environmental Assess-ment accompanied the draft Negative Declaration.
The comment period ended on February 18, 1980.
Sixteen sets of comments were submitted and have been analyzed (see Supplementary Information).
Although all 16 commenters felt that the draft Environmental Assessment was inadequate to support the Finding of No Significant Impact, the staff analysis does not support this view.
The commenters suggested that some points in the draft Environmental Assessment were in error, some required much more detailed discussion, and some points had been ignored.
The errors have been corrected and do not significantly affect the earlier conclusion.
The' levels of detail and the omissions are generally related to the penalties associated with noncompliance with the rule.
The staff originally judged that invocations of the noncompliance penalties (i.e., nuclear power plant shutdown) would be infrequent and of-short duration and the associated impacts would thus be insignificant.
Commenters asserted that there will be frequent and long-term 17 l
shutdowns which will have severe impacts which would require detailed considera-tion in an Environmental Impact Statement.
The staff analysis has supported the judgment of infrequent, short-term shutdowns and thus concludes that no additional detailed studies are necessary.
Minor revisions have been made in the environmental assessment reflecting comments received but its conclusions have not been altered.
Based on this assessment, a final determination has been made by the Director, Office of Standards Development, that the proposed rule changes will not have a signifi-cant impact on the human environment and, therefore, that an environmental impact statement will not be prepared for these rule changes.
DATES:
The rule changes for emergency planning published in this issue of the Federal Register will~become effective 75 days after publication.
ADDRESSES:
Copies of the Final Environmental Assessment, NUREG-0685, and the comments received by the Commission may be examined in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W, Washington, D. C. and at local Public Document Rooms.
Single copies of the final Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0685) are available for. purchase through the NRC GP0 sales program for $4.25 (USNRC, Attention Sales Manager, Washington, D.C., 20555).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Standards Development, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555 Telephone:
(301) 443-5966.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:
Sixteen sets of comments on the " Draft Negative. Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" and supporting draft Environmental Assessment (DEA) for the proposed rule changes on emergency planr.ing (10 CFR Part 50 9550.33, 50.47, 18
and 50.54 and Appendix E) were received.
The groups that submitted comments are identified on the Table together with their principal comments.
No comments were received from State or local governments, other Federal
~
agencies, or public interest groups.
The main point of each set of comments was that an Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared for the rule changes and that the Environmental Assessment "... inadequately addresses the environmental impact of the Emergency Planning Proposed Rule and the economic and social impacts on U. S. industry of long-term or permanent premature shutdowns of nuclear plants" (AEP).
The comments have been reconstructed into 14 general criticisms, which have been analyzed for their relevance to the validity of the conclusions in'the " Draft Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact."
One matter warrants additional mention here.
An assumption was made in preparation of the DEA that shutdowns of nuclear power plants as a result of actions taken under these rule changes would be infrequent and of short duration.
This assumption is critical to the decision that an Environmental Impact Statement sh'ould not be prepared.
The basis for this assumption was that, since State and local authorities have the responsibility, in common with the NRC, to protect public health and safety and are concerned with meeting the energy needs of their citizens, it is likely that they will cooperate to ensure the continued safe operation or timely commencement of safe operation of nuclear generation capability within their jurisdiction.
The only significant adverse reaction by the State and local governments that must bear this burden has been that complications in. funding of State programs and lead time for equipment acquisition might make it difficult to completely satisfy all of the 19 i
l
f* atrix Display of Corinenters and Major Comments N
Corvrentersl E
j d
x
=
O g
m b
8 8
S
=
d m
a a
j g
=
^
Major Coments
'-m 1.
Alternatives inadeouately X
X X
addressed 2.
Impacts of shutdowns X
X X
d d
X X
X X
underestimated (costs) g g
3.
Health effects of fossil X
X b
h X
X substitution underestimated j
]
4 Challence assumotion nf iafreoveat, s'iort durstion X
X X
X X
X X
X X
shutdovns 5.
Judgement on State X
X X
X X
X X
cocoeration unsubstantiated 6.
Long-tem impacts not X
X X
X X
addrassed 7.
Psycholooical and physical risks of false alarms not X
X X
X X
X evaluated
)
8.
Use of fuel-mix improper, variation in cost of X
X X
X X
replacement oower 9.
Significant impacts due to linkage between approval X
X X
X X
and continued operation
- 10. Proposed rule prior to X
X FEMA j
- 11. Costs too low (15 minute X
X X
X X
X X
warning system not included)
-w
- 12. Decisions granting exemptions or resumption of operation should be classified as X
categorical exclusions under Corri1ssion's NEPA regulations
- 13. No consideration of costs X
X to utilities 14 No consideration of plants X
under construction Key to Corinenters AIF - Atomic Industrial Forum PASNY - Power Authority of the State l l~
Yank. At. - Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
of New York Com. Ed. - Commonwealth EdisonZ BG&E - Baltimore Gas and Electric Con. Ed. - Consolidated Edison Company D & L - D-Sevois & Libeman (for of New York. Inc.
three utilities)
AEP - American Electric Power Service Duke - Duke Power Company Corporation SPP&T - Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
eel' - Edison Electric Institute Trowbridge (for eight LLLM - LeBoeuf. Lamb. Leiby & rdacRae utilities)
(for five utilities) 00E - U. S. Department of Energy NU - Northeast Utilities LNRA&T - Lowenstein, Newman, Reis,-
Axelrod & Toll (for two utilities) 2 l
Two letters l
l 20 L
planning and preparedness requirements by the date set forth in the pro-posed rule changes. As a direct result of this, the deadline for plans and implementation has been extended to April 1, 1981, and the deadline for having warning systems in place has been extended to July 1, 1981.
l These extensions should be sufficient in most cases.
'T It should also be noted that the Commission has chosen the alterna-tive that requires Commission action to initiate a shutdown.
Conditions are specified in the regulation that the Commission will use in each case to determine whether a shutdown is warranted.
When considered together, the lack of any significant adverse comment from State and local govern-ments, the necessity for Commission action before a plant will be shut down, and the conditions for whether a shutdown is warranted, all argue con-vincingly that the assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration is sound. Thus, the assumption is retained in the final Environmental Assessment (NUREG-0685) and the impacts of extended shut-downs are not considered valid impacts of these rule changes.
The 14 reconstructed general comments and a discussion of each follow:
1.
Three commenters (see Table) contend that alternatives to the pro-posed rule changes are inadequately addressed.
They specifically mention 1
alternative ways of achieving the same end such as proposing legislation.
In view of the existing safety record of the nuclear industry and the lack of effective preparation for the TMI accident, the Commission
- had the following three alternatives from which to choose:
A.
The Commission could take no immediate action itself while encouraging other parties, i.e., the Congress, other Federal Agencies, the States,.and the utilities themselves to take effective action.
This "no action" alternative would be counter to the Commission's legislative mandate 21
l l
to protect public health and safety.
In fact, the TMI accident was a clear indication that this " urging without requiring" emergency prepared-ness had proved to be ineffective.
This alternative clearly could not stand in the face of the Commission's responsibility in this area.
B.
The Commission is a regulato f agency and has as one of its chief tools the authority to issue regulations that bind those parties l
that it regulates.
If an effective method for achieving protection of l
public health and safety is available through promulgation of regulations with specific requirements and penalties and conditions governing those f
i requirements and penalties, this should be the proper way for the Commis-sion to proceed.
C.
If the Commission judged that danger to public health and safety was significant and imminent because of continued operation of existing l
i plants whi"
,tctive regulations are developed, it had the authority to impose immediate shutdowns until a solution could be found.
The safety record of nuclear power, including the TMI accident, does not support an industry-wide judgment of imminent, significant danger.
However, potential does exist for significant harm to the public in the event of a severe i
accident and the events at TMI suggest that plans must be made to account for this potential problem.
Notwithstanding this potential, given the
(
likelihood of an accident requiring off-site emergency protective measures, immediate industry-wide shutdown and the attendent severe long-term impacts are not warranted.
Alternatives A and C are clearly unacceptable.
The discussion of alternatives in the Final Environmental Assessment has not been changed l
from that in the Draft-Environmental Assessment.
l 22 l
2.
Seven commenters (see Table ) assert that the unpads of shutdowns cre underestimated and that shutdowns of multiple unit plants or several in the same State were not considered.
l The DEA was prepared with the understanding that ever increasing fuel prices make it difficult to make stable predictions of the costs of replacement power.
While individual values of replacement costs may be in error, the upper end of the range of costs of replacement power, which is compared in the Environmental Assessment to the costs of compliance, is only changed by about 36% when the heat rate is changed as suggested.
The response to comment eleven indicates that the costs of compliance wsre also underestimated.
The relative comparison of these two costs was used to demonstrate the strong economic incentive that exists for all parties to strive for effective emergency planning and preparedness.
The staff agrees that the net plant heat rate assumed in the DEA is low and therefore changed the assumed heat rate from 9400 8tu/kWh to 11,000 Btu /kWh.
Accordingly, the cost figures have been modified in the Final Environmental Assessment; but these modifications do not alter the conclu-
-sions of the Environmental Assessment.
The question of multiple plant shutdowns because of a common reason, i.e., an unacceptable State plan or multiple units on a site where the local plan is unacceptable, is a more difficult problem.
The State plans are j
only a part of the overall Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) program to enhance the ability of State governments to handle emergencies.
The economic incentive for the utilities to help the States in every way possible should result in the preparation of plans and equipment for a nuclear plant emergency that will be a sound, significant contribution to the overall capability of a State to handle many different kinds of 23 i
emergencies.
The provision of conditions that permit issuance of an oper-ating license or continuation of operation, the extension of the compliance date and deadline for warning systems to be in place, and the record of cooperation from the States up to the present time make it unlikely that any State's program will be so deficient that shutdown of all plants in the State will be required.
The potential that an unsatisfactory local plan might result in the shutdown of all units on a specific site appears to be significantly greater.
Depending on the size and number of the units involved, the incentive of the utility for aiding the local governments is also greater. The potential magnitude of the impact of shutdown in these cases is two to three times greater than for the single unit case, and this determination has been added to the Environmental Assessment. In any case, it would appear that whether these impacts, if severe enough, constitute "other compelling reasons" to permit continued operation will be determined in the individual
)
reviews.
3.
Four groups comment that health effects of fossil substitution are underestimated in the draft Environmental Assessment and that other effects are ignored.
The critical assumption in the draft and final Environmental Assessment is that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration.
In such a case, the fossil generating capacity is simply that which is available for normal replace 7ent power during refueling and maintenance outages and would probably be used in periods of peak demand until the utility phases it out of the generating system completely.
(The impacts are thus ones that occur anyway, but at a different time.
Short, infrequent shut-downs will only change the time period for suffering an impact that will 24 I
most likely be felt eventually anyway.) For such short-term replacement, no new plants will be built.
The draft and final Environmental Assessment accepts these impacts as a consequence of infrequent and brief shutdowns.
(A more accurate analysis might conclude that there is zero cumulative impact because the useful life of the replacement capability is unaltered.)
The discussions in the Final Environmental Assessment are unaltered on this subject.
4.
Nine commenters challenged the assumption that shutdowns would be infrequent and of short duration and questioned the lack of treatment of the availability of replacement capacity.
The assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration is critical to the validity of the Environmental Assessment.
At the time when the Draft Environmental Assessment was prepared, this assumption was based on the assertion that State and local governments (having in common with NRC the responsibility to protect public health and safety) will cooperate to provide fully for protection of the public.
Since that time, the Commission, in cooperation with FEMA, has been working diligently to help State and local governments develop satisfactory emergency plans and programs.
The response of the State and local governments has confirmed the validity of the earlier assumption.
In addition, no State or local government provided any comment on the Draft Environmental Assessment, thus indicating at least tacit agreement with the basis for the assumption.
Since the basis for the assumption of infrequent shutdowns has not received substantive challenge from the parties directly involved, but there has instead been activity that tends to confirm the assumption, it will remain as a fundamental assumption of the final Environmental Assessment.
25~
The availability of replacement capacity also hinges on this assumption.
Part of the purpose of reserve cc.pacity is 'eplacement during plant outages.
As long as shutdowns are infrequent and of short duration, they should fit into this normal pattern of utilization of replacement capacity.
No additional discussions of this topic have been prepared for the final Environmental Assessment.
5.
Seven commenters contend the judgment that "... it is likely that the States will cooperate to assure the continued safe operation or timely commencement of safe operation of nuclear generation capability within their jurisdiction" is unsubstantiated.
While this assumption was made in the absence of first-hand information, the experience of the Commission since December 1979, in attempting to work with State and local government officials, has confirmed the accuracy of this assumption.
6.
Five commenters assert that impacts of long-term shutdowns are not addressed.
The assumption that shutdowns will be infrequent and of short duration defines the scope of this Environmental Assessment. As described above, long-term shutdowns are not the expected result of these rule changes.
The goal of these rule changes is +.imely implementation of adequate emergency plans and programs.
The draft and final Environmental Assessment' address the impacts of this action based on the expected consequences and practical considerations of implementation of the provisions of the rule changes.
No analysis of the effects of long-term shutdowns has been added to the final Environmental Assessment.
26
7.
Six commenters contend that psychological and physical risks to the public of false alarms are not evaluated.
The Emergency Action Level Guidelines (NUREG-0610) recommend notification of the public when a " Site Emergency" has been declared. The expected frequency of an event of this type is predicted to be 1 in 100 to 1 in 5,000 per reactor per year.
The high end of this range indicates that two such warnings might occur over tt;e effective life (40 years) for ever>
five units.
The low end indicates one event over the life of 125 units.
Far from causing excessive psycholgical and physical risks, this kind of behavior should lead to a more accurate public perception of the true incidence of risk from nuclear power facilities and a more practical and considered response to an emergency when one occurs. No change has been made in the final Environmental Assessment.
8.
Five commenters assert that the use of the mix of fuels already in use in the State is a poor predicter of what would be the fuel replacement capacity for a specific plant shutdown.
A generic assessment must make some averaging assumptions or become hopelessiy lost in detail.
In this case, the commenters are correct that this is a " gross assumption."
It is, however, sufficient to establish the range of costs for-replacement power, which is the way the detailed information was used.
No change has been made in the mix of fuels used to generically assess the range of costs of replacement power.
9.
Five commenters observe that all of the significant impacts are due to linkage between adequacy of emergency plans and continued plant operation.
These commenters agree that the impacts of compliance are insignificant and that if there were no penalty associated with inadequate emergency preparedness then an Environmental. Assessment or no Environmental Assessment 27
would be appropriate.
The thrust of the rule is to protect the public through adequate emergency planning.
The thrust of the shutdown provision is to protect the public in the event that adequate provision has not been and is not being made to provide adequate emergency planning and preparedness.
The decision of how the public shorld be protected has been made, i.e., either emergency planning and preparedness is adequate or a plant may be placed in a condition of safe shutdown.
The State and local author-ities have the responsibility to determine which option is in the best interest of their citizens.
The linkage remains in the effective rule changes. No additional discussion has been provided in the final Environ-mental Assessment.
10.
Two commenters observed that ;he proposed rule was issued prior to the expanded role of FEMA in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
The NRC and FEMA are working closely to establish and carry out their respective roles in emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
The effective rule has been changed to reflect this change in relationship between the two agenciea.
However, the substantive provisions of the rule have not changed, only the parties responsible for specific actions.
11.
Seven commenters assert that the costs of implementation are too low and that there may not be enough time allowed to achieve adequacy in all areas of emergency planning and preparedness.
The draft Environmental Assessment based its estimates of cost of implementation on information contained in "Beyond Defense in Depth: Cost and Funding of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Commercial Nuclear Power Stations,"
NUREG-0553, October 1979.
This report did not consider the costs of a 28
warning system that would effectively warn everyone within 10 miles within 15 minutes of the time when the decision to warn the public is made.
The cost estimates in the draft Environmental Assessment thus do not include the costs of 15-minute notification.
The estimates provided by the commenters have been used to revise the cost estimate in the final Environmental Assessment.
It should be noted that all cost figures are approximate and are only intended to give an estimate of the normal magnitude of costs and fees associated with building and operating a nuclear power plant.
Significant variations from these costs for individual cases should be expected.* These changes do not affect the earlier conclusions of the draft Environmental Assessment.
In response to comments that more time might be needed, the deadline for plans and implementation to be completed has been extended to April 1, 1981, and the deadline for installation of warning systems has been extended to July 1,1981 to allow for procnecment problems.
Appropriate changes have been made in the Environmental Assessment but the earlier conclusions remain unaffected.
12.
One commenter suggested that decisions on shutdowns, allowing continued operation despite inadequate plans, or the resumption of opera-tion after a shutdown should be listed in 10 CFR Part 51 as a categorical exclusion.
The categorical exclusions in Part 51 are those Commission actions that have been judged as a class not to have any significant environmental
- Northeast Utilities indicated costs as much as 2.5 time those quoted in the Environmental Assessment but also cited unusual complications such as large numbers of local governments that escalated their costs.
Since this single estimate was not confirmed by other State or utility commenters, the values were considered beyond the usual range of costs.
29
impact and thus have been excluded from further consideration under those portions of the Commission's regulations that implement the National f
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
The Commission will consider this as a comment on the on00ing rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 51 (45 FR 13739).
13.
Two commenters noted that no consideration was given to the costs to the utilities of those portions of the rule changes that upgrade previous onsite requirements.
Th,is oversight has been corrected.
While these costs added a significant increment to the total cost of implementation, this total cost is still low compared to the reference costs of (1) replacement power, (2) tax
- y and fee burden, and (3) capital investment.
While several of the cost figures in the final Environmental Assessment have bcr.r. revisea upward, i
the comparison of these costs has remained unchanged and the conclusions i
of the Environmental Assessment are unchanged.
- 14. One commenter observed that there is no consideration given to plants under construction.
The cost estimates were forecast for all plants scheduled to be oper-ating by the time the rule was to become effective.
To go beyond this period would only complicate the estimates with future costs of greater uncertainty.
The purpose here was to present an approximation of the relative significance of the c'est impacts to determine whether a more detailed analysis is necessary.
The relative magnitude of these costs is well established by the information at hand and these are clearly suffi-cient to support a decision without the preparation on environmental impact statement.
30
t APPENDIX C EMERGENCY PLANNING RULE CHANGES PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 1.
Paragraph (g) of Section 50.33 is revised to read as follows:
S 50.33 Contents of applications; general information.
(g) If the application is for an operating license for a nuclear power reactor, the applicant shall submit radiological emergency response plans of State and local governmental entities in the United States that are wholly or partially within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ),1 as weil as the picns of State governments wholly or partially within the ingestion pathway EPZ.2 Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be deter-mined in relation to the local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The size 1 Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396, EPA 520/
1-78-016, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Govern-ment Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.
2If the State and local emergency response plans have been previously pro-vided to the NRC for inclusion in the facility docket, the applicant need only provide the appropriate reference to meet this requirement.
31
of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.
The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
2.
A new Section 50.47 is added.
!j50.47 Emergency plans.
(a)(1) No operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency prepared-ness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
(2) The NRC will base its finding on a review of the Federai Emergency Manage-D ment Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on a question of adequacy.
(b) The onsite and offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet ;ne following standards:1 1.
Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Emergency l
Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the 2These standards are addressed by specific criteria in NUREG-0654; FEMA-REP-1 entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radio-logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants - For Interini U e and Comment" January 1980.
32 i
various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.
2.
On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility acci-dent response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmen-tation of response capabilities is available, and the inter-faces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
3.
Arrangements for requesting and effectively usinq assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local C.aff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.
4.
A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of whi a include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on infor-mation provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.
5.
Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State,and local response orgac'zations and for notification of emergency personnel by all response organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been estab-4 lished.
6.
Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.
33
l l
7.
Information la made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emer-gency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors),
the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of infor-mation during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of*informa-tion to the public are established.
8.
Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.
9.
Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assossing and monitor-ing actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.
10.
A range of protective cctions have been developed for the plume l
exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with l
Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
11.
Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers.
The means for controlling radio-logical exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective 4ction Guides.
12.
Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.
13.
General plans for recovery.and reentry are de,21oped.
14.
Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will 34
be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.
15.
Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.
16.
Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.
(c)(1) Failure to meet the standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this sub-section may result in the Commission declining to issue an Operating License; however, the applicant will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satis-faction of the Commission that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operation.
(2) Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabili-tie as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land charat.teristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.
The plans for the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
3.
Saction 50.54 is amended by adding five new paragraphs (q), (r),
(s), (t), and (u).
35
S50.54 Conditions of licenses.
(q) A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 550.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this Part.
A licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a research reactor or a fuel facility shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the requirements in Appendix E of this Part.
The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of $50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E of this Part.
The research reactor licensee and/or the fuel facility licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the requirements of Appendix E of this Part.
Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plans shall not be implemented without application to and approval by the Commission.
The licensee shall furnish 3 copies of each proposed change for approval; and/or if a change is made without prior approval, 3 copies shall be submitted wishin 30 days after the change is made or proposed to the Director of the appropriate l
NRC re~gional office specified in Appendix D, 10 CFR Part 20, with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or, if appropriate, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.
(r) Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operate a research or test reactor facility with an authorized power level greater than or equal to 500 kW thermal, under a license of the type specified in 650.21(c), shall 36
submit emergency plans complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for approval within one year from the offective date of this rule.
Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or 4
operate a research reactor facility with an authorized power level less than 500 kW thermal, under a license of the type specified in s50.21(c), shall submit emergency plans complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for approval within two years from the effective date of this amendment.
(s)(1) Each licensee who is authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power reactor shall submit to NRC within 60 days of the effective date of this amendment the radiological emergency response plans of State and local govern-mental entities in the United States that are wholly or partially within a plume exposure pathway EPZ, as well as the plans of State governments wholly or partially within an ingestion pathway EPZ.1 2 Ten (10) copies of the above plans shall be forwarded to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation with 3 copies to the E rector of the appropriate NRC regional office.
Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power reactors shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in-radius.
The exact size and configuration of the'EPZs for a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in rela-tion to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected TEmergency Planning Zones JPZs) are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016,
" Planning Basis for the L+velopment of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans.n Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"
December 1978.
21f the State and local emergency response plans have been previously pro-vided to the NRC for inclusion in the facility docket, the applicant need only provide the appropriate reference to meet this requirement.
37
by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The size of the EPZs also may be deter-mined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.
The plans for the ingestion pathway EPZ shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway.
(2) For operating power reactors, the licensee, State, and local emergency response plans shall be implemented by April 1, 1981, except as provided in Section IV,0.3 of Appendix E of this Part.
If after April 1, 1981, the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency and if the deficiencies are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission will determine whether the i
reactor shall be shut down until such deficienci c are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate.
In determining whether a shutdown 1
or other enforcement action is appropriate, the Commission shall take into i
l e
i account, among other factors, whether the licensee can demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction that the deficiencies in the plan are not significant for the plant in question, or that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons for l
continued operation.
(3) The NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determi-nations,as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.
Nothing in this j
paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Commission to i
l take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission or at l
any time other than that specified in this paragraph.
38
(t) A nuclear power reactor licensee shall provide for the develop-ment, revision, implementation, and maintenance of its emergency prepared-ness program.
To this end, the licensee shall provide for a review of its emergency preparedness program at least every 12 months by persons who have no direct responsibility for implementation of the emergency preparedness program.
The review shall include an evaluation for adequacy of interfaces with State and local governments and of licensee drills, ex:rcises, capabilities, and procedures.
The results of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, shall be documented, reported to the licensee's corporate and plant management, and retained for a psriod of five years.
The part of the review involving the evaluation for adequacy of interface with State and local governments shall be available to the appropriate State and local governments.
(u) Within 60 days after the effective date of this amendment, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall submit to the NRC plans for coping with emergencies that meet standards in Section 50.47(b) and the require-ments of Appendix E of this Part.
4.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, is amended as follows:
1 39
APPENDIX E--EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report III. The Final Safety Analysis Report IV. Content of Emergency Plans V. Implementing Procedures I.
Introduction Each applicant for a construction permit is required by 650.34(a) to include in the preliminary safety analysis report a discussion of preliminary plans for coping with emergencies.
Each applicant for an operating license is required by S50.34(b) to include in the final safety analysis report plans for coping with emergencies.
This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness.
These plans shall be described generally in the preliminary safety analysis report and submitted as a part of the final safety analysis report.
The potential radiological hazards to the public associated with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities licensed under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 involve considerations different than those associated INRC staf f has developed two regulatory guides:
2.6, " Emergency Planning for Research Reactors," and 3.42, " Emergency Planning in Fuel Cycle Facilities and Plants Licensed Under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70;" and a joint NRC/ FEMA report, NUREu-0654; FEMA-REP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment," January 1980, to provide guidance in developing plans for coping with emergencies.
Copies of these documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20555.
Copies of these documents may be purchased from the Government Printing Office.
Information on current prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.
40
with nuclear power reactors.
Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning 2
Zones (EPZs) for facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which compliance with the requirements of this Section and Sections II, III, IV, and V is necessary will be determined on a case-by-case basis.3 II.
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report shall contain sufficient information to ensure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans fe; both onsite areas and the EPZs, with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such cor.siderations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, land use, and local jurisdictional boundaries for the EPZs in the case of nuclear power reactors as well as the means by which the standards of 650.47(b) will be met.
As a minimum, the following items shall be described:
A.
Onsite and offsite organizations for coping with emergencies and the means for notification, in the event of an emergency, of persons assigned to the emergency organizations.
l ZEPZs for power reactors are discussed in NUREG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016,
" Planning Basis for the De'celopment of State and Local Government Radio-logical Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.
The size of the EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.
Generally, the plume exposure path-way EPZ for nuclear power plants with an authorized power level greater than 250 MW thermal shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 ku., in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area about 50 miles (80 km) in radius.
3 Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as guidance for the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response plans.
41
i B.
Contacts and arrangements made and documented with local. State, and Federal governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies, including identification of the principal agencies.
C.
Protective measures to be taken within the site boundary and within each EPZ to protect health and safety in the event of an accident; procedures by which these measures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of an evacuation, who authorizes the evacuation, how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the evacuation is to be carried out); and the expected response of offsite agencies in the event of an emergency.
D.
Features of the facility to be provided for onsite emergency first aid and decontamination and for emergency transportation of onsite individuals to offsite treatment facilities.
E.
Provisions to be made for emergency treatment at offsite facil-ities of individuals injured as a result of licensed activities.
F.
Provisions for a training program for employees of the licensee, 1
including those who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the licensee but whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radio-l logical emergency.
G.
A preliminary analysis that projects the time and means to be employed in the notification of State and local governments and the public in the event of an emergency.
A nuclear power plant applicant shall perform a preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate various j
sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions.
l L
42
H.
A preliminary analysis reflecting the need to include facilities, systems, and methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and out-side the site boundary, including capabilities for doca projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the onsite technical support center and of the near-site emergency operations facility in assessing information, recommending protective action, and disseminating information to the public.
III.
The Final Safety Analysis Report-The Final Safety Analysis Report shall contain the plans for coping with emergencies.
The plans shall be an expression of the overall con-cept of operation; they shall describe the essential elements of advance planning that have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency situations.
The plans shall incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite agencies.
That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with the licensee.
The plans submitted must include a description of the elements set out in Section IV for the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)2 to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an i
emergency.
43 i
IV.
Content of Emergency Plans The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily l
be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elementssetforthbelow,i.e.,organizationforcofigwithradiation l
emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery.
In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in Section 50.47(b),4 and they will be evaluated against those standards.
The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time j
required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations.
A.
ORGANIZATION The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency.
Specifically, the following shall be included:
- These objectives are addressed by specific criteria in NUREG-0654; FEMA-REP-1 entitied " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Sur, art of Nuclear Power Plants for Interim Use and Comment" January 1980.
44
1.
A description of the normal plant operating organization.
2.
A description of the onsite emergency response organization with a detailed discussion of:
a.
Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the indi-vidual(s) who will take charge during an emergency; b.
Plant staff emergency assignments; c.
Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures.
3.
A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization.
4.
Identification, by position and function to be performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for making offsite dose projections, and a description of how these projections will be made and the results transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, and other appropriate governmental entities.
5.
Identification, by position and function to be performed, of other employees of the licensee with special qualffications for coping with emergency conditions that may arise.
Other persons with special qualifications, such as consultants, who are not employees of the licensee and who may be called upon for assistance for emergencies shall also be identified.
The special qualifications of these persons shall be described.
45
6.
A description of the local offsite services to be provided in support of the licensee's emergency organization.
7.
Identification of, and assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with emergencies.
8.
Identification of the State and/or local officials responsible for planning for, ordering, and controlling appropriate protec-tive actions, including evacuations when necessary.
B.
ASSESSMENT ACTIONS The means to be used for determining the magnitude of and for con-tinually assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participa-tion of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for deter-mining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety.
The emergency action levels shall be based on in plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring.
These emergency action 15 els shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant and State and local governmental authorities and approved by NRC.
They shall also be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.
-C.
ACTIVATION 0: diili.uiY ORGANIZATION The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of_ progressively larger segments of the total emergency 46
organization shall be described.
The communication steps to be taken to slert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described.
Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensoru that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for notification of offsite agencies shall be described.
The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies.
The emergency classes defined shall include:
(1) notifica-tion of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency.
These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0654; FEMA-REP-1.
D.
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 1.
Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become neces-sary, shall be described.
This description shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.2 2.
Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for public notifica-tion and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination cf informa-l l
tion during an emergency.
Signs or other measures shall also be used 47 l
l
to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident
- occurs, 3.
A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emer-gency.
The licensee shall demonstrate that the State / local officials have the capability to make a public notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition.
By July 1, 1981, the nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that adminis-trative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
The design objective shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes.
The use of this notification capability will range from immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substan-tial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system. Where there is a decision to activate the notification system, the State and local officials will determine whether to activate the entire notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner.
The responsibility for activating such a public notification system shall remain with the appropriate government authorities.
48
E.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including:
1.
Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring; 2.
Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment; 3.
Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of onsite individuals; 4.
Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate emergency first aid treatment; 5.
Arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies on site; 6.
Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured indi-viduals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary; 7.
Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside the site boundary; 8.
A licensee onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency; 9.
At least one onsite and one offsite communications system; each s; stem shall have a backup power source.
All communication plans shall have arrangements for emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of communication.
49
Where consistent with the function of the governmental agency, these arrangements will include:
a.
Provision for communications with contiguous State / local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Such communications shall be tested monthly.
b.
Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organizations.
Such communications systems shall be tested annually.
c.
Provision for communications among the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations facility; and among the nuclear facility, the principal State and local emergency operations centers, and the field assessment teams.
Such communications systems shall be tested annually, d.
Provisions for communications by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations facility.
Such communica-tions shall be tested monthly.
F.
TRAINING The program to provide for (1) the training of employees and exer-cising, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties and (2) the participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency shall be described.
This shall include a description of 50
specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:
a.
Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency organization; b.
Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including control room shift personnel; c.
Radiological monitoring teams; d.
Fire control teams (fire brigades);
e.
Repair and damage control teams; f.
First aid and rescue teams; g.
Medical support personnel; h.
Licensee's headquarters support personnel; i.
Security personrel.
In addition, a radiological orientation training program shall be made avail-able to local services personnel, e.g., local Civil Defense, local law enforcement personnel, local news media persons.
The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of emergency preparedness exercises.
Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communication networks, test the public notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties.
j Each licensee shall exercise at least annually the emergency plan for each site at which it has one or more power reactors licensed for operation.
Both full-scale and small-scale exercises shall be conducted and shall include participation by appropriate State and local government agencies as follows:
51
1.
A full-scale exercise which tests as much of the licensee,
' a, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without man-der sry public participation shall be conducted; a.
For each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operation, at least once every five years and at a frequency which will enable each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full-scale exercise per year and which will enable each State within the ingestion pathway to participate in at least one full-scale exercise every three years.
b.
For each site at which a power reactor is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued after the effec-tive date of this amendment, within one year before the issuance of the operating license for full power, which will enable each State and local government within the plume exposure EPZ and each State within the ingestion pathway EPZ to participate.
2.
The plan shall also describe provisions for involving Federal emerger.cy response agencies in a full-scale emergency prepared-ness exercise for each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operation at least once every 5 years; 3.
A small-scale exercise which tests the adequacy of communi-cation links, establishes that response agencies understand the emergency action levels, and tests at least one other component (e.g., medical or offsite monitoring) of the offsite emergency response plan for licensee, State, and local emergency plans for jurisdications within the plume exposure pathway EPZ shall be conducted at each site at which one or more power 52
re ctors are located and licensed for operation each year a full-st. ale cxtrcise is not conducted which involves the State (s) within the plume cxposure pathway EPZ.
All training, including exercises, shall provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak areas that need corrections.
Any weaknesses that are identified shall be corrected.
G.
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are main-tained up to date shall be described.
H.
RECOVERY Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described.
V.
IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES No less than 180 days prior to scheduled issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to possess nuclear material, 3 copies of each of the applicant's detailed implementing procedures for its emergency plan shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor R2gulation or, if appropriate, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
In cases where a decision on an operating license is scheduled less than one year after the effective date of this rule, such implement-ing procedures shall be submitted as soon as practicable but before full l
pow:r operation is suthorized.
Prior to March 1, 1981, licensees who are authorized to operate a nuclear power facility shall submit 3 copies i
l 53
each of tha licensee's emergency plan implementing procedures to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor 'agulation.
Three copies each of any changes to maintain these implementing procedures up to date shall be oubmitted to the same NRC Regional Office with 10 copies to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or, if appropriate, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards within 30 days of such changes.
PART 70-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL j
2.
Section 70.32 is amended by adding paragraph (i) to read as j
follows:
S 70.32 Conditions of licenses (i) Licensees required to submit emergency plans in accordance with 6 70.22(i) shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans approved by the Commission.
The licensee may make changes to the approved plans without Commission approval only if such changes do not decrease the effec-tiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the requirements -of Appendix E,Section IV,10 CFR Part 50.
The licensee shall furnish the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, with h copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix D, Part 20 of this Chapter, each change within six months after the change is made.
Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the 54
.~
i cpproved emergency plan shall not be implemented without prior application to and prior approval by the Comission.
(S:c. 161b., i., and o., Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201);
Sec. 201, as amended, Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat. 1242, Pub. L. 94-79, 89 Stat. 413 (42 U.S.C. 5341.)
1 P
R 1
i 4
55
U S. NUCs ( All HEGUL A10RY Ct2.*%SSION NUREG-0685 UIBLIOGHAl' HIC DATA SHEET 4.1lT Li A%U GUd1lT LE f.htJ Vohnau" fin, of pproprLete)
- 2. (tc.*we biro A)
Environmental Assessment for Effective Changes to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50; Emergency Planning
- 3. nLCIF R N T'S ACCESUON f O.
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants
- 7. AUTHOR (S)
- 5. DATE HEPORT CCNPL E TED William R. Ott
" "$'jy I " ^j"980 i
- 54. filu GHfbNG OHGAMZAllON f4 AME AND MAILING ADDRESS (tvlude 2,p Codel D ATE REPORT ISSusD Environmental Protection Standards Branch l MAR wouw Division of Siting, Health and Safeguards Standards August 1980 Office of Standards Development
- c. Iteme u,*/
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D. C.
20555 8 Ite-e ua4*>
17 SW,'NSOHiNG OHG ant 2ATION NAME ANYarbILirdG ADDHESS (/rs/ad lip Code)
M Environmental Protection Stanc s ranch
- 10. PHOJECT/ TASK /WORi< UNIT NO.
Division of Siting, Health and Safeguards Standards Office of Standards Development
- 11. CON THACT NO.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 N/A
Environmental Assessment N/A
- 15. SUPPLEh*EN TARY NOTES
- 14. (tenve blank)
Contains text of comment analysis and effective regulation.
- 16. AHS rH AC T (200 words or /ess)
The staff of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has prepared an Environmental Assessment for changes to the regulations governing emergency planning requirements.
Based on this assessment, tne Director, Office of Standards Development determined fiat en Environmental Impact Statement would not be prepared for the rule changes and directed that a " Negative Declaration; Finding of No Significant Impact" be prepared and published in the Federal Register. The Environmental Assessment is presented and l
the Federal Register Notice is attached as Appednix B.
(Included in Appendix B i.s an analysis of cop 1ments received on an earlier draft version of this Assessment (45 FR f
3913, January 21,,1980).) The effective rule changes are included as Appendix C for completeness.
l l
- 17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT' ANALYSIS 174. DESCRIP IORS 17tt IDENTiflCHS/OPEN ENDED TERMS N/A
- 18. AVAIL ABillTY STAIEMENT
- 19. LE CURITY CLASS (This report /
- 21. NO. OF PAGES Unclassified Unlimited
- 20. SECURITY CLASS (This papel
- 22. PHICE S
teQc t onu 335 (s.s n