ML19345G404

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Certified Minutes of ACRS Subcommittee on TMI-1 801128 & 29 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re NRC Status Rept on Evaluation of Util Compliance w/790809 Order & Other Restart Matters. Schedule & Attendance List Encl
ML19345G404
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 01/14/1981
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-1799, NUDOCS 8104070179
Download: ML19345G404 (25)


Text

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N ko ISSUE DATE: 1/14/81 t

' g MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 WASHINGTON, DC NOVEMBER 28 & 29, 19EC The ACRS Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 met 28 & 29, 1980 to H St., NW, Washington, DC or November 1046, 1717 in Room discuss the "NRC Staff Status Report on the Evaluation of Licensee's Com-pliance with the NRC Order, dated August 9, 1979," (NUREG-0680), and o matters relating to the restart of Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

f 13, 1980 Notice of this meeting was pub 1:shed in the Federal Register on November l

A copy of th' detailed schedule of presentations is Attachment B.

(Attachtent A).

No written One written statement from a member of the public. was received. A list reports were issued or approved by the Subcommittee at this meeting.

of documents and presentation handouts provided to the Subcommittee during A list of attendees is shown in Attach-shown in Attachment C.

the meeting is Mr. Richard Mcjor was the Designated Federal Employee present at the ment D.

meeting.

Introduction _

TMI-1 was shut down for a refueling outage at the time of the T On August 9, 1979, accident.

by RRC to remain down through a July 1, 1979 order.

the NRC issued a follow-up order giving reasons for its earlier order and specified that hearings by the ASLB would be required before restart.Furth l

I This implied a review by the ACRS.

l tne NRC Staff to conduct such a review.

Management Changes

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The purpose of the GPU Nuclear Grout 18 to manage level of protection for the health and safety of the public an Group has stated that it will pnerate electricity from the GPU its employees.

Nuclear Stations in a reliable and efficient manner D confoma i

nts with all applicable laws, regulations, licenses, and other requ remeThe manag and the directions and interests of the owners.

losophy is first of all to perform safely, not just to h

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In the future, Currently, Metropolitan Edison owns and operates TH ill become the operator of the plant.

The structure of the Corporation ated from the present GPU Nuclear Group.Over the past year, new additional will be essentially that of the Group. talent has been added to the G

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2-11/28&29/80 TMI-1 Restart Emercency Planning The Licensee presented their current program in aergency planning.

For example, They highlighted the emergency communications nei. work.

from the TMI control room to the Emergency Offsite Facility, the technical support center, B&'n', NRC, etc., GPUNC/TMI intends full compliance with the final rule on emergency planning and will con-fom to the guidelines in NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluat' ion of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. " The Staff will report on further submittals in the area of emergency planning in a supplement to the restart SER.

Startup and Test Program Among the scatures of this TNI-1 will have a restart test program.

program will be a natural circulation test similar to those for NTOL The natural circulation tests include tests to:

plants.

determine the effect of loss of pressurizer heaters on saturation margin.

determine the effect of steam generator level on natural circulation flow.

determine the effect of steam generator pressure on natural circulation flow.

detennine the effset of isolating one steam generator on natural circulation flow and temperature distribution, and on saturation margin.

An integrated leak All secondary side modifications will be tested. Reactor coolant system heatup and hot rate test will be performed.

There functional tests similar to a new plant will be perfomed.

will also be a test of the anticipatory reactor trips on loss of tur-bine or feedwater pumps.

Plant Operations /Frocedures GPU noted that since the accident, both the TMI-1 operations staff and maintenance staff have grown. There are hundreds of plant procedures that have been revised and reviewed.

(For example:

250 maintenance procertures, 25 emergency operating procedures,15 abnonnal opersting procedures, etc. have been revised.)

GPU briefly reviewed the operating history of TMI-1. It started operation at full power in September of 1974. Major operatforal occgrrences were described such as condenser tube leaks. The unit was down for refueling when the accident at Unit 2 occurred. TMI-1 would begin its fifth cycle at the next restart.

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, 11/28&29/80 TNI-1 Restart I

GPU described their operator retraining program. The goal is to provide a retraining program for operators exemplifying the philosophy of promoting safe, reliable plant operations, including proper response to transients.

It was stated that their program meets or exceeds requirements imposed by varicas NUREGs, Reg. Guides, CFR, ANSI standards, and recommendations by INP0. Instructors will have a senior reactor operators license.

In the future GPU will purchase a plant specific simulator which will duplicate the TMI-1 control room. The retraining program itself consists of a 1ecture series attended by operators once every six shift rotations or approximately 240 hrs./yr. as well as on-the-job training.

Control Room Human Engineering The TMI-1 control room design review was discussed. A review team was fomed of members of the GPU engineering staff, the TMI-1 operating

. staff, engineers from MPR Associates.(a consulting fim), and several human engineering consultants. A full-scale control room mock-up using photographs of the control board was constructed. A walk through-talk through of key operating procedures was made. The control room design contained both strengths and areas where improvements are being pur-Among the improvements is a more concise, boardered grouping of sued.

instruments and controls associated with a particular system on the con-trol board. This amounts to basically better labeling and demarcation.

Scales on some instruments are being changed to make them more readable.

Control room lighting will be improved.

In the future, a new system of alam prioritization will be explored.

Plant Technical Issues / Modifications The Licensee presented guidalines based on analyses and actual plant transients for filling OTSCs in preparation for natural circulation without over cooling the primary system (anticipatory OTSG fill following a reactor trip). Main feedwater or if conditions warrant emergency feedwater is used.

If the main feedwater system is being

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used, it will feed through the start-up valve which limits the flow.

For nomal feedwater temperatures, this aci.ieves the desired esult.

Opentors are instructed to watch steam generator pressure (secondary This action sida) and remain within 100 psi of the control set point.

relates back to the primary system by keeping the pressurizer on scale and will keep the primary pressure above the HPI set point. For very low feedwater temperatures (below 100*F) only one OTSG at a time should be filled.

If forced flow is lost before reaching the 50% filled con-dition the operator should swit'ch to emergency feedwater.

When using emergency feedwater the operatt.i keeps the OTSG within 100 pti of the control' set point. The operator uses either the 2 motor-driven pumps or the one turbine-driven pump, not all three. If forced RCS flow is lost before reaching 50% filled condition, then feedwater flow is.kept on and the steam generator level is always increasing. If there are indiations that natural circulation has been lost, the operator should go to full EFW flow even if i; results in overcooling the pri-mary systam.

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TMI-1 Restart GpU gave their position on a reactor vessel water level indicator.

The GpU position is that the reactor pressure vessel water level measurement is not used in present operator guidelines, no addi-tional operator actions have been identified that could be based on water level, and a RPV water level indicator could provide con-fusing information to an operator leading to improper actions.

Currently, the NRC Staff believes that a reactor pressure vessel level indicator is useful. They are monitoring the development of these devices and believe they will be available in the near future and will probably require them.

It appears that the Staff's position and that of B&W owners in general and GpU in particular are polarized on this issue. Whether a reactor pressure vessel water level device will be available before TMI-1 is ready for restart is questionable.

The qualifications of the EW system were discussed. The system piping is seismically qualified from the condensate storage tanks to the steam generator. GPU is in the process of reviewing some of the seismic qualifications for equipment at the present time including pumps, valves, and turbine.

It appears all equipment is qualified.

Remotely operated block valves will be added to terninate EFW to a ruptured steam generator. The EFW pumps will be tested by a 48 hr.

. endurance test. Additional modifications are being made to the E N system instrumentation and controls. These modifications include:

a redundant, seismic I, 2-hour air supply; redundant, safety grade flow indication, and condensate storage tank low-low level alarm.

Containment isolation was discussed. Both the automatic isolation signals and the isolation system design were covered. All nonessential systems are isolated by diverse signals. Essential systems such as ECCS are not isolated, reactor cociant pump support services are isolated only on appropriate signals. There is still disagreemenc between the Staff and Licensee over when to isolate reactor coolant l

ptmip support services (the Licensee believes 30 psig to be appro-priate, the Staff believes 4 psig is appr a riate) although the Staff has agreed to reconsider their position and may eventually l

agree to the Licensee's position. Isolation of these services at an inappropriate time, such as before the pumps are tripped, could lead to reactor coolant pump seal failure and reactor coolant pump motor damage. The Licensee wants to keep these services avail-able as long as possible whether or not the pump is running.

As a result of lessens learr.ad requiremen'.s, a plant shielding and environmental qualification study of equipment for spaces and systems l

which may be used in post-accident operations was performed. As a result of this study, some remote operators for valves to eliminate the need for access to certain areas were provided. Some additional shielding was also found to be necessary around lines which could contain radioactivity in a post-accident situation. The shielding review has not yet been submitted to the Staff.

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TM1-1 Restart The Licensee reviewed modifications to the plant for post-accident monitoring and sampling. Mcdifiation for accident monitoring include: containment pressure (0-175 psig), H m nitoring (0-10%),

2 reactor building sump water level (0-10'), and reactor building radiation (10-10 R/Hr). The ability exists to sample the RCS liquid 7

and the containment atmosphere. The time necessary to complete a sample analysis is three hours. The Staff noted that Reg. Guide 1.97 should be to the printer in the next week or two. The next version will include ACRS coment from the 247th meeting. The Staff has not completed its review of the Licensee submittal in this area.

The Licensee has compared TMI-1 to Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, Draft 3.

The Licensee noted there are additional drafts of this revision with which TM1 has not been compared.

Items called for in Reg. Guide 1.97 which are not now at TMI-1 included:

no on-line boron concentration (there is a grab sample) reactor coolant system pressure guage range falls short of the 3000 psi specified for non-CE designed plants - 2500 psi is the existing range no RPV water level monitor no fixed real time dose rate monitors in the site environs (portable capability, however) no instruments to determine containment fan cooler heat removal rate no instruments to determine containment sump temperature do not have emergency damper position indications in all cases (many do) do not have exact requirements for temperature measurements on meteorological tower for atmospheric stability monitoring pressurizer level is not from top to bottom of pressurizer; upper head and lower shell are not covered j

reactor coolant drain tank temperature monitor does not reach the speci'ied 750*F -- the current upper range is 200-300*F containment tr.nperature monitor '#ill not reach temperature as high as 400*F Other than these items. TMI-1 has the capabilities specified in this particular draf t of Reg. Guide 1.97.

No additions will be made until final criteria are issued.

TMI-1 has installed one thermal hydrogen recombiner. The piping iss in place to connect a second recombiner; a second recombiner is stored on-site for use if necessary. The reactor coolant system high point vents used to remove noncondensibles such as hydrogen from the system l

post-accident, will be located in three areas. Hot leg vents (candy-cane) will vent directly to open space in containment. Each vent is l

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, TMI-1 Restart capable of venting i of the RCS volume in one hour. The reactor vessel vent will vent directly to open space in containment. It will use an It will be capable existing core barrel thermocouple connection for a tap.

of venting i of the RCS volme in one hour. The pressurizar will vent to the reactor coolant drain tank which will then be vented to open space in containment. Venting will be controlled to avoid RCS de-pressurization. A study has been perfomed for GPU by Lehigh University on hydrogen mixing and the potential for stratification in containment.

This report has been distributed to members and consultants.

The Licensee has made n.odifications to the Integrated Control System /

Hon-Nuclear Instrumentation. A failure modes and effects analysis l

was perfomed and tests will be run on equipment to verify the analysis.

Modifications were made to certain valve failure modes which could lead to primary system overcooling or depressurization (such as pressurizer spray valves -- changed from fail mid-open to fail closed on loss of signal). Instruments will be provided in the control room independent of ICS/NNI such as OTSG pressure, pres-surizer level, RCS pressure, make-up tank level, etc. to give These instruments are intended to operators more information.

help bring the plant to hot shutdown if the ICS is lost.

Improve-ments have been made to the electrical supply to the ICS/NNI system.

The Licensee reported on the thema1/ mechanical effect of HPI on The key issues vessel integrity for a small break LOCA with no EFW.

are to assess the potential for thermal shock to the RV resulting from co.ld safety injection flow, assess fluid stream mixing in the RV downcomer and assess operator actions to throttle HPI flow The concern raised by the Bulletins and Orders Task Force was to balance keeping the fuel cool during a feed and bleed mode of rates.

l cooling vs. keeping the vessel hot within 10 CFR 50, Appendix G limits.

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B&W has completed a bounding analysis which was perfomed to en-GPU is reviewing this report velope all B&W operating plants. internally and will submit a report to the Staf The most limited plant (not TMI-1) shows adequate results through an additional i effective full power year assuming no flow mixino in W cold leg piping or RV downcomer and instantaneous cooldown of the surface If 30". downcomer mixing is i

of the RV metal to HPI fluid temperature.

assumed, the most limiting plant shows adequate results through an addi-tional 1.5 effective full power years.

i The The Licensee discussed de power failure consequences at TMI-1.

scenario investigated was based on NUREG-0305, " Technical Report on D.C. Power Supplies in Nuclear Power Plants." The scenario assumes loss of both batteries, a generator trip, 'ollowed by loss of offsite The Licensee noted differences Ntween the plant design in power.

NUREG-0305 and TMI-1. For example, auxiliary transfomers art f~1 directly from the substation through a separate path so if the Sen-erator trips there is no manual switching required (which could re-sult in loss of offsite power) to energize the auxiliary transfomers.

Procedures are written instructing the operator in how to deal with the loss of a battery, particularly as it applies to putting the

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11/2B&29/80 TM1-1 Restart A study is underway to identify possible second battery in jeopardy.

These sources of events which might lead to losing two batteries.

events include bus transfers and places where operators can manually No firm conclusions have been reached tie the batteries together.

The Licensee noted there has not been a loss of offsite pcwer yet.

a t TMI.

The method for valve position indication on the prassurizer PORY and the two pressurizer safety valves was discusseo. The require-ment was to install a reliable and unambiguous indication of valve l

(The original method of position to the control room operator.

valve position indication was in the form of reactor coolant drain tank level, pressure, and tespei3ture, and in addition the pres-ence of some temperature elements on each tailpipe.) The additional means of valve position informatioa is provided in the forr. of an accelerometer on the PROV tailpipe and differential pressure trans-Safety valves have differential mitters on a down stream elbow.

The differential pressure transmitters located on down stream elbows.

Their sensitivity is under pressure transmitters are still an open item.The Licensee noted however, the purpose Staff review.

indicate valve position, not measure flow.

The Licensee noted the progress being made on plant modifications.

Their current schedule is to complete modifications and be in a position to restart by August, 1981.

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Feedback of Ooerating Excerience k from

.Tne Licensee described their approach in getting feedbacThi.s functi operating experience.

analysis section of the systems engineering department of GPU I

Results of research programs such as LOFT are being l

Nuclea r.

The current status of recent events monitored through B&W.

throughout the industry are monitored through the NSAC noteped system which reports and updates significant events daily I

INP0/NSAC groups.

Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG1 The Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG) program was This program is intended to satisfy NUREG-0578 described.

Recommenation 2.1.9c which is to provide the analyses, emergency procedures, and training to substantially improve operator per The are caused or aggravated by inappropriate operator actions.

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TMI-1 Restart 11/28&29/80 program is funded by six B&W owners. The guidelines are to be executed after each reactor trip.

Instructions are based on key symptoms. At the current level of progress, traces of primary and secondary pressure vs. temperature are displayed on a CRT. The symptoms aie arranged to diagnose events. The operator's response to events are intended to be prioritized in the future. The Licensee noted they are pursuing this program vigorously, but cautioned there are still difficulties to be resolved.

Additional Questions The Licensee was asked if they were doing any studies on mitigation of accidents such as the use of a filtered vented containment. They responded by saying they were not. The NRC Staff was asked if TMI-1 should be evaluated relative to high population density similar to Limerick, Zion, and Indian Point. The Staff replied that the popula-tion at TMI was a factor of 3 less than these other plants.

It was further pointed out that TMI has not been selected for a reliabilitv r+a bation by the Staff.

Crystal River was the first plant selecte'o for this, which is a research effort. The next phase will incluo:

four more plants, including one B&W unit, but not TMI-1.

Procress/ Status Report on Studies Required by the NTOL List and NUREG-0737 Listed below are a number of studies and analyses required by the NT0L List and NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."

No formal presentations were made, rather the Subcommittee questioned the Licensee on progress in these areas. Completion of these studies is not currently a requirement for restart, but adequate progress must be demonstrated.

hard-wired safety grade anticipatory reactor trip for loss of feedwater and turbine trip (II.K.2.10)*

demonstrate that the PORY pressurizer will open in less than 57, of all anticipated overpressu.e transients using revised setpoints and antici-l patory trips for a range of plant conditions which might occur during a fuel cycle (II.K.2.14) i analyze the effects of slug flow on OTSG tubes l

after primary system voiding (II.K.2.15) evaluation of the effects of reactor coolant pump damage and leakage following a small break LOCA, and concurrent with loss of offsite power that results in loss of seal cooling (II.K.2.16) analysis of potential voiding during transients (II.K.2.17) benchmark analysis of sequential AFW flow to OTSG (II.K.2.19) -- Status of Staff review analysis of system response to small break LOCA which repressurizes the reactor coolant system to the PORY setpoint (II.K.2.20)

  • The parenthesis includes a reference to an Action Plan section.

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9-11/28329/80 TMI-1 Restart automatic PORV isolation system (automatic closure of PORY block valve -- to protect against a small break LOCA -- to close on pressure decay of primary system following PORV operation) (II.K.3.1) report on safety effects of PORY isolation system (once PORY is isolated, can a safety valve open and stick?) (II.K.3.2)

Plant Security (Closed)

The Subcommittee heard a presentation on plant security in closed session. Separation of the two units, access to vital areas, and lessons learned from the review of the Sandia study on plant security were covered.

Closinc Remarks The Subccmmittee Chairman noted that if the full ACRS concurs, a progress report on the status of the TMI-1 restart will be pre-The report pare,4 during the Committee's December 1980 meeting.

would concentrate on what the Committee felt to be the most As the remaining outstanding issues are re-important issues.

solved and SER supplements are produced, an additional Subcom-mittee meeting (s) would be required before a final ACRS review of modifications made to TMI-1 in preparation for restart.

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For additional details, a comolete transcript of the meeting is avail-I

(

NOTE:

able in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H St., NW, Washington, DC 20555 l

or from Alderson Reporters, 300 7th St., SW, Washington, DC, (202)554-2345).

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l Federal Resister / Vel 45. Ns. 221 / Th:nday. November 13. teso / Notices 75030 as halted espptaes last. ems of Board train stop squFm:st ts provide an secommesianon huers. responnes and Guard notes that by ple=ng the f ont au6ble and vsaa! alarm which will sekted cornspesdence an a!.o pnmded m-rks en the upnver highway bndse Indicate that the system is function.ng b of charst AH mquesta fw ocpin must be and the after marks on the downriver during both pnscknowledgement and In wntas toenc% noosumendena or highway bridge.it would appear Q*,'fM'. wuh=g on. D C. 25Hd" y**

postacknowledgment proceduns.

pessible to construct (1) a pne:se trackAmtrak's October :: letter nports the rar.se and (2) accurate lateral ranges with the cooperation of the Atch: son.

3,f,.y Board show=g the bounds of the visual hmnel Topeka and Santa Fe, Amtrak hat may be purcissed from the Neuenal Wupie copin of Safety Board repons ints th highway bndge opening In developed a modiScatfon to the train Tect.mcal tr.fonr.4 eon semca. t!.S thne wsyn it should be pouable to give stop eyste= that will previde an suihle Depa.enent of comunerce. Synas$ald.Va.

the strnner the infor=staan he needs to and visus! alarm wbch willindicate be in shape for the radroad bndse even that the system is functioning dunng far UAC teaHeX:tisoe) arset.

before he transits beneath the Erst both prenckscw!edgment and Margarus t. Finhar.

highway bndge. Coast Guard says pestacinowledgment.De train stop phalen /A,guart,m, ogaf another potenualimprovement is a eystem modi $ cation was applied to range to aid manners in passing close to A= trak SDP40 locomotive s515 on Neves6er 7 isso.

the e:st bank near the Conrad Shipyard September 4.1980. at Amtrak's Redondo yo u m m. _,

l l Coast Guard wiH investgate these Shop at f.co Angeles.Both Amtrak and an m essa -

possibdites through range design an:!ysis. and subjectsve test:ng which AT&SF penonnel were involved in the l

modication and tests that fo!! owed.

Il will be accomplished either la field or

' ship simula:or experiments. Cout and au tests wen succeuful. AttachedNUCLEAR REQULATORY Guard expects to complete the redesign to Amtrak's letter la a copy of the train jCOMMtSSION ef pnsent enge in Sacal year 1980. the stop mo65 cation details and winna havesugation sf range for Conrads Point diagram developed for this project.

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f3 fiscal year 131. and the construction Inst uctics toimplement this Three Mlle t'aland Nuclear Powee Plant, bas:d on the abs v 6 $ scal year 1983.

mod:ficaton will be released With nspect to. commendation M*

lame 6ately. Amtrak reports.

Unit No.1; Meetmg A-do-#, from Amunk. October 8.

he ACRS Subcommittee on the Three 30.:0, wbch aoked Coeat Guard to 22.-Respense is to a recommendation Mile Island Nuclear Power piant. Unit' nxs:ss the entens used to commence issued September 15 as a result of No.1 (DD-11 wd! hold a meeteg on high water limitations in the Berwick investigaton of the accident wbeh Nove=ber :&-29.19ec. in Room 1046.

Bay VoselTra!Itc Service area and occurred at L!nden.N.J., July 9.1360.

1717 H St NW. Washington. DC to hophment hmitations based on the when Amtrak Train 2.:5 was struck by a nyiew the modi 5 cat 2cn made to TMI-1 neuessment. Coast Guard says the

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entens have been reassessei The

15. foot piece of bufer rail. One in preparation for a restart foucwing the I

act2vation entena for imposing the passenger was kiHei and is passengers TMI-: accident. Notice of this meetmg l

hmitati:ns on vusels require a were injure? (See 45 FR 63544.

was published October 24.

l sustam d elevsted nver stage of 3 fut September 25.1m)

In accordance with the proceduns Amtrak reports that protective tbove mean sea level or more for 5 measures for moving all maintenance-of.

outlined tn the Federal Register on consecutive days, plus the prediction October 7.1980. (45 FR e6535). oral or that the nver stage wiU n=am at 3 feet way equipment were i= mediately wntien statements may be presented by above mean level or more for an estab!!shed after the incident, except for cd6tional five consecuuve days.De,

the movement of continuous welded rail members of the public. recordings win be pastted oQ % thou pcrtion ent:non of 3 feet above mean sea leve.vairA-6 Meu 6 & move nem of of the meeting when a transcript is being or core has been lowered to 2.5 feet and these trains were luued on March 31.

kept, and questions may be asked only la nsw in effect. Coast Guard says the 1980 (copies provided). Amtrak also by members of the Subcommittee.its rest of the enteria re=ains the same.

nports that two employus have been aansultante, and StaH. Persons desiring

&smined for,their failun to adhere to to make oral statements should notify 30-w a e o t a

o these instructions.

the Designated Federal Employee as far

' g In ad6 tion. Amtrak notes, to date 508 in advance as practicable so that Na supervisors of alllevels were gfven appropriate arrangements can be made to e

r ed Berwick Bay Vessel Traffic Service clanes on the proper protection and to allow the necessary time durug the operating procedures. Coast Guard movement of maintenance-of way me.g for such statementa.

reports that the proposal to cod:fy the

'9"iP**"d in Amtrak."" safety tramma De entire meeting win be open to O" CI*

I Berwick Bay VIS operating procedures conducte s

will be published m the Federal Register m bile classroom which was moved to public attendance except for those wesions dunna which the Subcornmittee latir this year under Docket No. 73.-186.

various locations on the Northeast Ands it necessary to discuss proprietary -

Corridor. A slide presentation of all infonnation. One or mon closed Railroed maintenance of-way equipment was R-aNs.from the Nationo/r tilroad given to the supervisors with the usual sessions may be necessary to discusa such information. (Sunshine Act Passenger Corporution (AmtraA).

question and answer period. Amtrak Exemption 4). To the extent practicable.

October 22. Isac -Latter la in further also states that plr s an being these closed senions win be held so as nsponse to a recommendation issued formulated for utablishment of a to memm inconvenietce to members June 3 as a result ofinvestigation of the Permanent location for the education of the public in attendance.

Amtrak derailment at Lawrence.Kans and training of maintenance-of wey The agenda foe the subject meeting Octtber 71979.The Safety Board on supervisionin aD phases of operations shad be as foDows:

100 p September 17 commented on Amtrak's and safety.

  • hiday. November 28,1 initi:1 response of June 20 (45 FR 5:521.

Note -8 aste copies of safs'y Board amtilL%e conc.bsion ofbuemesa.

August 7.1980) The recommendetion sapoets are svagable without char 9e. as laag asked Amtrak to redesign automatic A4aamed A

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Federal Regleter / Vct. 45, No. 221 I Tismoday. Novemoer 13.1suu ; isen=.

Saturtfoy. November 3. J Commission has made' appropriate De application for the _-- ? -mt e.m. until the conclusion of business.

!bdtnas as requtad by & Act and the complies with the stradards and t

During the initial portion of the Commission's rules and requistions in to requirements of the Atomic Energy Act 1

i meeting. the Subcommittee. along with CFR Chapter 1. which an set forth in the of1954. as amended (the Act). and the t

f cny of its consultants who may be license amendment. Price public notice Commission's rules and regulation. De pesent, will exchange prehnunary of this amendment was not required Commission has made pppropriate

' ews regarding matters to be since this amendment does not involve a fin 6ngs as required by taw Act and the vi considered dunng the balance of the signincant hazards consideration.

Comminion's rules and regulations in to De Commission has determined that CFR Chapter 1.which are set forth in the meeting The Subcommittee will then hear the issuance of this amendment will not license amendment. Prior pubbe notice pruentatons by and bold discussions result in any significant environmental of 6is amendment was not required i

with representatives of the NRC Staff.

impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR since the amendment does not involve a l

the Metropolitan Edison Cornpany their SL5(d)(4) an environmentalimpact algnificant hazards consideration.

consultanta. and other interested statement or negative dadaretion and ne Com= inion has determined that l

environmen'a!!apact approlul need the issuance of this amendment will not Further information regardmg topies not be prepared in connectaon with result in any signi5 cant environsnenta!

persons.

to be discussed. whether the meeting iauance of this amendment.

hepact and that pursuant no to Olt I

has been cancelled or reschedu!ei the For further detalla with nopect to this 823(d)(4) an environmenta';mpact statement or negative decLe stion and l

Chairman's ruling on requests for the action. see (1) the applications for aavironmenta! impact appsisal ed opportunity to present oral statements amendment dated September 19.

not be pnpared in conmetion with and the time allotted therefor can be October 7, and October 17,1sec. (:1 lasuance of this==aadment.

etnalned by a prepaid telephone call to Amendment No. 5 to t Area =* No. DPk-For further details with rupect to thia Se cognizant Designated Federa!

23. and (3) the t%=== ton's related action. see (1) the application for Employee.Mr. Richard Major (telephon' Safety Evaluation. A!! of these items are amendment dated June :3,1 sea (2) 302/s34-1414 between s.15 a.m. and 500 available for public faspection at the Ameninent No. Se to Ucense No. DPR-P.m. EST.

Commission's Public Document Room.

25. an 1 (3) the Commission's related

)

I have determineiin accordance with I?t7 H Street. N.W. Washmgton. D.C.

Safety Evaluation. All of these items are l

Subsection 10(d) of the Federal and at the Har.sville Memonal Ubrary.

available for public Inspechon at the l

Advisory Commattee Act. that it may be Home and Fifth Avenuaa Hartsville, Comission's Public Document Room.

necessary to close some portions of this South Carolina 29550. A copy ofitems 1717 H Strut. NW. Washington. D.C.

meeting to protect proprietary (2) and (3) may be obtained upon and at the White Plains Pubhc Ubrary.

Informacon.The authonty for such request add.-eued to the U.S. Nuclear 100 Martue Avenue. White Plains. New I,

clesure is Exemption (4) to the Sumhine Regu! story Commission. Washmgton, York. A copy ofitems (2) and (3) may be Act. 5 USC E5 b(c)(41-D.C 20555. Attention: Duwetor, Dmsion obtained upon request addressed to the Deted. Nowember 8, teso-of Ucansing.

joka C Hepa.

Deted at Bethesda. Md. this tand day of Weshidston.D.C 30555, Attention-AdWeary Cunmicree Maaayerrent Officer October. teso.

Director, Division d'Mw yeom

- - w ror i3e u.ama, as, int.,, C.,ami %

Dated at Bethode.Md.this stat day of escam cous m>+us Saaves A.Varsa.

i

'I*I'gulatory Commiss on D ion of me (Docaet Isa. 50-291)

Chef. Operoung Asociars M No. 2.

Caronna Power and Ught Co.t maes conc numee Drds on c%nung.

l lasuance of Amendment to FacWty yeor.sw.as w n.auaas I j

Opersting Ucense I*'***"'***

De U.S. Nuclear Rcgulatory Commission (the Commission) has Conacudsted EcEson Cornpany W 16ew fDecast lea, so-731 lasued Amendment No. 52 to Facility YA ICasuance W Amendment to Operating Ucense No. DPR-23 lasued to Fecmty Operating Ucense kW M N NW Carolina Power and Ught Company (the Appucation for Renewsi of Amended The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory licensee), which revised Technicel Commission (the Commission) has Facmty Operating Ucense Specifications for operation of the H. B.

lasued Admendment No. e4 to Facility ne United States Nuclear Regulatory Robinson Steam EIectne Plant, Urut No.

Operating Ucense No. DPR-28, issued to Commission (the Commission)is

2. (the facility)locared in Darlmron the Consolidated Edison Company of considering renewal of Amended County, South Carolina.De arnendment New York,Inc. (the licensee), which Facility Operating Ucense No. R-33.

la effective as of the date ofissuance.

revised Technical Specifiestions for leeued to General Electric Company (the De amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications related operation of the ladian doint Nuclear licensee), for operation of the Nuclear C*nerating Unit No. 2 (the fac!!!ty)

Test Reactor located at the licecaee*a to the setpointa, calibrations and

!ccated in Buchanan.Westchestar Va!!ecitos Nuclear Center naar survelliance requirwments assodated County, New York. The amendinent is Fleasanton. California.

with the deg*aded voltage protection affective as of November t 1eso.

De renewal would extend the system for Class 1E equipment.

The amendment consists of changes expiretion date'of Amended Fadlity The appIlcation for the amendment f.

complies with the standards and to the Technical Specifications to reflect Operating Ucense fio.R-33 to October l

requirements of the Atomic Ena2Ty Act additional systems required by the 31.199?.in accordance with the tf1954, as amended (the Act), and the january 31.Igrig Fin Protection Safety linnece'ertimely applicatlos for renewal

' dated June 13,1973, Commission's rulee and regulebona.De Ivaluetion Repart.

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ACRS SUBCOP.ITTEE !EETING ON TMI-1 RESTART P/)VEMBER 28 8 29, 1980 WASHINGTON, DC TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FRIDAY, NOVEw3ER 28, 1989 APPR3XIMATE TIME Opening Remarks / Discussion of Schedule 1:00 p.m.

1:15 p.m.

I.

==

Introduction:==

(NRC Staff / MET. ED.)

Status of ASLB Hearing A.

Schedule for Completing Actual Plant Modifications B.

Required Before Restart Status of Open Items / Schedule for Opplement to SER (Staff)

C.

Financial Status D.

GPUNC Management Discussion (Organization)

E.

2:15 p.m.

II. Emergency Planning

  • A.

Emergency Plan Co n nications S.

Regional Coccittee Statusvs. TMI Emergency Plan Comparison C.

NUREG-0610/0554 D.

Emergency Plan New Instrumentation Requirements BREAK 3:15 p.m.

Plant Operations / Procedures - Overview

  • 3:30 p.m.

III.

Procedures for Transfer of Radioactive Gases and Liquids A.

Out of Primary Containment Radwaste Solidification / Storage B.

ATOG (Abnormal Transient Operational Guidelines)

C.

Procedures / Status - Symptom Based Procedures Procedures for Verification of Ccrrect Perfonnance D.

Of Operator Activity Procedures for Feedback of Operating Experience E.

Overall Past TMI-1 Operating Experience Summary Operator Retraining - Philosophy, Program Goals (Include F.

l G.

Simulator)

Status of Upgrading RO & SRO (fluid flow, heat transfer, plant transients)

Administration of Training Program l

Training for Mitigating Core Damage i

Following eacn presentation time will be given for a response by the NRC Staf l

l

=

~

.. = -

n

. TMI-l RESTART NOVEMBER 28 S 29, 1980 APPR0xTMATE TIME 5:30 p.m.

IV. Startuo and Test Program - Overall Program

  • A.

Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip - Test Procedures B.

System, Leak Test Program C.

Natural Circulation 6:30 p.m.

V.

Con:rol Room Human Engineering

  • RECESS until 8:00 a.m. Saturday Morning 7:00 p.m.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1980 APPROXIMATE TIME Plant Technical Issues / Modifications - Overall Status (including 8:00 a.m.

VI.

FHS separation)=

EFW (Seismic qualifications, 48 ht. test, long-term safety A.

grade automatic initiation, flow indication, environmental qualifications)

Analysis of Anticipatory Steam Generator Fill (expanded B.

system response)

C.

Inadequate Core Cooling - Reactor Vessel Level D.

Containment Isolation: reactor protection system trip signal to initiate automatic containment isolation, RCP Seal Services, letdown flow, etc.

Shielding Study / Modifications E.

Licensee's Position With Regard to Implementation of F.

Reg. Guide 1.97/ Post Accident Sampling, Radiation Monitor Range, Containment Pressure Indication, etc.

Monitoring, Reactor System G.

H, Recombiner, Purging, H2 High Point Vents l

BREAT, l

10:00 a.m.

ICS Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, CR-3 ICS Fixes, 10:15 a.m.-

H.

in general, status of Licensee response to recommenda-tions in BAW-1564 including:

investigation of the feasibility of modifying the ICS to allow some of the ICS power feeds to be supplied from a separate source I

Following each presentation time will be given for a response by the NRC Staff.

l l

l

- - - - ~ "

i

. TMI-I RESTART NOVEMBER 28 & 29, 1980 APPROXIMATE TIME further review of the electrical distribution system to determine whether the reliability of the ICS/N'll power supplies can be improved (questions raised by Crystal River being applied at TMI-1) systems fine tuning, procedural changes and minor system modifications, in order to reduce or prevent feedwater oscillation inclusion of manual control of ICS in the Operator Accelerated Retraininq Program I.

Reactor Vessel Thermal / Fracture Mechanics J.

DC Power Failure Consequences K.

Emergency Power to PZR Heaters, level Instruments, Relief and Block Valves Yalve Position Indication L.

Integrity of Systems Which Contain Radioactivity Outside M.

Containment Long-Term Modification Status - Staff Disagre:ments (Wrap-up)

N.

LUNCH 12:30 p.m.

1:30 p.m.

VII. QCL List - Imcact on OA Scoce*

1:45 p.m.

VIII., Lessons Learned / Technical Soecification Chances

  • 2:00 p.m.

IX. Status of Long-Term Order Items

  • Emergency Planning (Included in Item II)

A.

ICS Failure mode / Effects (Covered under VI.H) 3.

Small Break Analysis (AT0G, LOFT, Semiscale, etc.)

C.

Category B Models of NUREG-0578 (Covered under VI)

D.

General Discussion of Lessons Learned Requirements and X.

l Other Issues

  • A.

Additional Questions: (NRC Staff / Met. Ed.)

Is Met. Ed. doing studies on mitigation of accidents?

For example, use of filtered vented contaimnent, core retention device, etc.

How does the Staff view TMI-1 with regard to surrounding population density? Should it be analyzed in a manner similar to Indian Point and Zion?

Following each presentation time will be given for a response by the NRC S o

4-TM.I-1 RESTART N3VEMSER 28 & 29, 1980 APPR3XIV. ATE TIME Will a Will the Staff review TMI-1 as part of IREP?

reliability evaluation be perfomed? By whom? When?

Progress / Status Report on Following Studies Required by B.

NTOL List and NUREG-0737 hard-wired safety grade anticipatory reactor trip for loss of feedwater and turbine trip (II.K.2.10) demonstrate that the PORY pressurizer will open in less than 5% of all enticipated overpressure transients using revised setpo nts and antici-i patory trips for a range of plant conditions which might occur during a fuel cycle (II.K.2.14) analyze the effects of slug flow en OTSG tubes after primary system voiding (II.K.2.15) evaluation of the effects of reactor coolant pump damage and leakage following a small break LOCA, and concurrent with loss of offsite power that results in loss of seal cooling (II.L.2.16) analysis of potential voiding during transients (II.K.2.17) benchmark analysis of sequential AFW flow to OTSG (II.K.2.19) -- Status of Staff review analysis of system response to small break LOCA which repressurizes the reactor c60lant system to the FORY setpoint (II.K.2.20) automatic PORV isolation system (automatic closure of PORV block valve -- to protect against a small break LOCA -- to close on pressure decay of primary system following PORY operation) (II.K.3.1) report on safety effects of PORV isolation system (once PORY is isolated, can a safety valve open i

l and stick?) (II.K.3.2)

Securf ty* - separation of units, access to plant during and 3:30 p.m.

XI.

emergency if key card system malfunctions, lessons learned (CLOSED SESSION) from Sandia report

[ CLOSED SESSION]*

3:55 p.m.

XII. Closing Statement to Licensee 4:00 p.m.

XIII. Executive Session 5:00 p.m.

XIV. Adjournment 1

Following each presentation time will be given for a response by the NRC Staff.

-e w.

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Attachnent 'C LIST OF DOCUMENTS AND PRESENTATION HANDOUTS FOR THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON 1hREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, U NOVEMBER 28 & 29, 1980 WASHINGTON, DC Letter, M. Lewis, member of Public, to R. Major, ACRS Staff, dated 11/18/B0 regarding comments for ACRS TM1-1 Subcommittee meeting 1.

on November 28 & 29, 1980.

Handout from H. Silver, NRC, " Proposed Sequence of Group A, Subgroups 1 & 2. Issued v ' Witnesses Identified to Date" 2.

1 1, "ASLB Hearing Status" 1

3.

Handout from E. Wallace,

" Restart Open Items Status Summary."

Handout from E. Wallace, ~

Handout from P. Clack, GPU, 'GPU Nuclear Group Organization" 4.

Handout from R. Rogin, GPU, " Emergency Comunication."

5.

Handout from G. Miller, GPU, "Three Mile Island Unit 1 Restart 6.

7.

Test Program."

Handout from R. Toole, GPU, " Operation Staff."

Handout from M. Ross, GPU, "TMI-1 Reactor Power Summary."

8.

Handout from R. Long, GPU, " Operator Retraining Program,"

9.

Handout from R. Keaton, GPU, "TMI-1 Control Room 10.

11.

12.

Handout from R. Keaton, GPU, " Reactor Vessel Water Level Measurement.

OTSG's."

Handout from R. Chisholm, GPU, "EFW System Instrument & Control 13.

14.

Modifications."

Handout from R. Chisholm, GPU, " Modifications for Post Accident 15.

Monitoring."

Handout from G. Lehmann, GPU, "TMI-1 EFW System Restart."

t Handout from G. Lehmann, GPU, "Three Mile Island Unit No.1, 16.

Table 2, List of Containment Penetrations Requiring Isolation 17.

Hancout from D. Ross, GPU, " Enclosure, The Concern of TMI Action Plan On Hi-Radiation. "

II.F.2 to Determine

  • Logical Implemenation Date for Reactor Vessel 18.

Level Instrumentation."

Haniout from R. Chisholm, GPU, "ICS/NNI Improvements 19.

of HPI on Vessel Integrity for Small Break LOCA With 20.

Report on D.C. Poser Supplies in Nuclear Power Plants."

21.

Handout from D. Croneberger, GPU, "TMI ill Pressurizer Relief Lines."

Handout from D. Croneberger, GPU, " Plant Modification Status -- NRC 22.

23.

Order ' Items."

Handout from D. Croneberger, GPU, "Open Issues."

Handout from D. Croneberger, GPU, " Quality Clas 24.

25.

Handout from R. Keaton, GPU, "Small Break Analysis and Feedback 26.

27.

of Operating Experience." Handout from G. Broughton, GPU, "ATOG -

28.

Guideline Program."

Documents supplied to the Board on the subject matter of Demetrios Basdekas concern regarding, " Safety Implications of Control System 29.

and Plant Dynamics and Their Relevance to the TMI-1 ASLB Hearing."

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