ML19345G301
| ML19345G301 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341B548 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8103180108 | |
| Download: ML19345G301 (55) | |
Text
,,WR REGUI.ATORY CCMMISSICN 9o.
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DATE:. February 1.1.,
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Washington, D. C.
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1 UNITED STATES OF MiERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 3
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BRIEFING ON LOFT REVIEW GROUP a
5 6I Nuclear Regulatory Co=nission R
Room 1130 8
7 1717 H Street, N.W.
A Uashington, D.C.
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d Wednesday, February 11, 1981
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Y 10 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 n.m.
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11 BEFORE:
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12 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Chairman
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13 VICTOR GILINSKY, Conmissioner l
14 '
PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner n
2 15 JOSEPH 11. HENDRIE, Commissioner 5
y 16 STAFF PRESENT:
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17 SA!!UEL J. CHILK, Secretary PAUL BOLLWERK, Staff Attorney lii 18 '
WILLIMt J. DIRCKS, Executive Director for Operations 5
DENNY ROSS
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19 BRIAN SHERON M
ROBERT CAPER 20 ROBERT !!INOGUE HAROLD SULLIVAN 21 GARNET MCPHERSON HAROLD DENTON 22 l BOB BERNERO 23 i
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_P _R _O _C _E _E _D _I _N _G _S 2
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
This afternoon we will hear a i
3, presentation from a review group that the Commission had asked to i
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be set up.
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5i Last year the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards E
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6i recommended action be taken to deccamission the LOFT program at R
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As a result of the Commission's budget delibera-L' i
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tions, the Commission tasked the EDO to set up a review group and i
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9 as a result the gentlemen who sit opposite here have labored 10 l diligently over the last several months to-attemot to pull z
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11 together a wide variety of information and reached some fairly 3
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13 ! delibe' rations.
E 14 This is driven at the moment by the fact that, although 2
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we have submitted a budget p.coposal for the FY 82 budget, we do 5
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16 l have a budget revision process under way at the moment and also, w
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we do have hearings coming up in front of the Congress where it is a
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to be expected one of the issues will be raised, "What is the 2
19,
commission's position with respect to LOFT?"
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20 l So, I think it is a matter of considerable interest to 21 us.
It is the largest program in the research budget.
The 22 research budget takes up about half of the total budget of the 23 '
agency so, therefore, this is a very significant item as far as y
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dollars are concerned.
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25 It also is a major element, has been a major elemen.t in i
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the planning in the past for the safety research.
So, it is 2
not an action - either continuation or cutting it off - that we 3, can take lightly.
It is not an action we will take without care-i I
4l fully giving some deliberation to the report.
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3; This afternoon the primary purpose of the meeting is not 9
l 6 ) for the Commission to reach a decision, but rather for the R
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Commission to hear from the review group and to ask any questions j
8 that mighe be of intrxest to us.
Bill?
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9 ffR. DIRCKS:
I would just like to indicate that Denny ic g
10 Ross was appointed. chairman of the review group.
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As you pointed out, the report of the review group will 3
y 12 be technical in nature.'
The budgetary implications of the project 5:
13 will be discussed at a later period.
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l 14 Bob fiinogue and Harold Denton are also attending the 2
15 meeting and wil' he available to discuss the report as it develops.
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16 With that, Denny?
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d 17 fir. ROSS:
Let's turn to the first slide.
This is a 5
18 report of the LOFT special review group.
I have with me today 1
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19 several members of the group.
On my left is Bob Caper, or the M
20 executive secretary,who is also largely responsible for the editing 21 and producing of the report on time.
22 To my right is Brian Sheron, who is the coordinating 1
23 ' author of Chapter 4; and in the first row of the audience -is 24{ Bob Bernero who is primarily responsible for the " Risk" portion l
25, in Chapter 7.
Let's go to slide 2.
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As nreviousiv stated, the initiative for the review group 1
2 came from an ACRS report last summer.
Among other things - and on 34 the slide is a direct quote from a page of the ACRS report, which l
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4 lis at NUREG 0699.
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Some of the critical elements of the recc=mendation were, e
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,e they thought the test should be run through fiscal ' 82 and then de-e K
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5 7 l commissioned unless other support was manifested.
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9 now and then; and thr'ough 82 they endorsed the funding at the 1
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Those who represented the viewpoints z
of the committee at that time, the discussions I had with them 5
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14 ; last summer and expect to report, I think, to the Commission soon.
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i I do not believe the quote that is on the slide in front 5
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16 of you now represents their final judg=ent.
I guess we will have BW g
17 to see their letter when it arrives.
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E 18 At any rate, that was the initiative for the group.
E 19 : Commission Document SECY-30-348, issued in October of 1980, was x
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20 ; the impetus for the group which was forned.
Let's go to slide 3.
1 21l On the screen is the printed charter of the review 2
22 i group.
I will point out a few things that were important to us.
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e 23 l We were supposed to consider whether LOFT should be decommissioned j l
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25 j at the needs of the reacror regulation; to look at the LCFT prograd 1
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overall from the perspective of the overall research program.
2 We were supposed to consider whether LOFT would respond 3
to the needs of the regulatory bodies and whether the facility 4
would remain sufficiently flexible.
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We were supposed to publish a final report on February 9
j 6l 3, and we did; and then, af ter follow-up discussions with the E
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7 Commissioners - which is where we are today - presumably the group
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would be dissolved.
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9 The single' thought'that emerged - I think it is important i
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10 from-thecLOFT review group,.there was consensus for continued E
h 11 support through fiscal '83.
Now, there are 15 members of the group B
y 12 and.this represented a consensus opinion.
In the report are sore
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2 15 ' run even beyond that.
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16 But as far as the fiscal '83, we all supported that, w
6 17 The final report of which I spoke was eatitled, "NUREG i'
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18 0758."
copies are at the back of the room.
They are not with a l
19, hard-back cover yet and they will be coming out of the printer's 5
i 20 soon.
Next slide.
21
-There were two classes of members of the review group, 22
. government employees and consultants.
The top half of the slide I
23 ' shows the government employees; some from NRC; one from NASA; the 1
24-Department of Energy is also represented.
I should mention that 25 Andy Pressesky, the Department of Energy member, is also here.in I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMP ANY, INC.
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the audience, i
2 A number of consultants, Ivan Catton from UCLA, who is 3,
also an ACRS consultant
- Fred Finlayson, thac I mentioned a minute 4
ago; Peter Griffith, who has consulted on thermodynamics and 5' loss of coolant phenomena for many years with the NRCf Herb Isbin, g
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6; a former member of the ACRS and a researcher in thermodynamics for EM 7
well over 30 years; Herb Kouts, a former member and chairman of Ml 8
ACRS and well known to the Commission.
Randy Pack from INPO who q
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assisted us largely on Chapter 5 on operational matters; Bill
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10 Snyder from Sandia worked principally on " Risk", although het z=
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Next slide.
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13 On the report structure itself, which you have, the i
h 14 introduction discusses the purpose and scope of the review group, b
E 15 ' The group activities - we only met three-times, we met on November 5
y 16.l 17 to get organized and hear some research presentations; we met
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17 : on December 9 and 10 im Idaho Falls, heard some more presentations s
5 18 from both research and ECG people and also witnessed the LOFT
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-test, small break test and core heat-up test.
I would like to add 5
20 at this point, our impression of the LOFT testing was highly 21 favorable.
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olan and execute a' test, and within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> after the test was 24 ) over, while we were getting ready to leave, we took back with us 4
1 25 i data that had been analyzed overnight and printed out in hard.
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1I copies the next morning on how fast the core heated up.
They have 2
an impressive ability to digest a large amount of data and present 3
it in a usable form.
The " quick-look" report came out two or 4i three weeks later; and the data report two or three weeks after g
5 that.
So, the facility is very well organized for running tests.
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6 They ran it within an hour of where they said they would run it R
7 two m.onths or so in advance.
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8l In Chapter 2 is a summary and findings, and I will discus @
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9 those again at the end of th'is afternoon's presentation.
Chapter'3 io 10 is a history of LOFT.
Chapters.4, 5.and 6 are rather determi-E j
11 nistic.
Chapter 4 discusses safety analyses in general and how 3-j 12 LOFT might help.
Chapter 5 is the operational aspects and how 3
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Chapter 6 is degraded cooling
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14 phenomenon and how LOFT might contribute.
Chapter 7 is the risk
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15 reduction that would be associated with Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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The linkage that you might associate during a physical
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20 failed to survive, would the other one automatically be suspect.
21 We also tried to consider if something had to be done at all,-was it better done in LOFT or perhaps done elsewhere.
We 22 t i
.23 corm'nt on this throughout the report and also this afternoon.
i 24 The' slide in front of you, " Regulatory Needs Considered,"'
25 y the first bullet, LWR Safety Analysis is covered mostly in j
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Chapter 4 where we looked at LOCA anticipated transients in the 2
sense that the milder transients would not challenge the fuel; and 3
in severe transients it would perhaps cause a fuel heat-up or 4
even to the extent of getting into core melt.
,I 5 li The second bullet on degraded cooling we discuss in e
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The word " mild" refers to a transient that could be e
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turned around but could have some core damage.
The revere s
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9 Operational aspects, the human factors, we discuss that '
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10 in Chapter 5 and, as I said,. risk reduction is in Chapter 7..
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5 11 Next slide, please.
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14 research and I&EL that LOFT was a multi-purpose test facility that dk 2
15 could contribute to all of thera functions that I just mentioned.
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16 The ACRS view that we noted in our report was that LOFT was one a
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The way we looked at LOFT, it was primarily LOCA 20l oriented and the use of it between now and its decommissioning 21, date should emphasize mostly LOCA, as we will discuss later.
i 22 The human factors and degraded cooling aspects were I
23, decidedly. secondary, or at least that was our finding.
24 There has been' talk from time to time on what is 25 referred to as a mortgage.
This term _goes back to roughly the.1973 3
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time span when the Co=nission was finishing its deliberations on 2
the emergency cooling system hearing, preparing a new 50.46 to 3,
Part 50 and Appendix K to Part 50.
4 It was thought at that time - and in cur report we i
5' quote frca the Cc=nission opinion - that this was not the end of e
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and quantification of the nargin of safety, n
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20 we divided up into subgroups and had subcennittees for the majcr t
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Brian was the subcc=nittee chairman for Chapter 4, which.i 21 h
22 h is the role of LOFT in LWR safetv analysis.
He is going to go l
1 t-23 } through a few slides which will terminate in what thereviewgroupl' s-24 ',l is recc==ending, that is a suggested test matrix for LCFT.
So, l'
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MR. SHERON:
Briefly, in Chapter 4 we start out by 2
discussiag the role of LOFT in the safety analyses in that how it 3
plays a role in our licensing determinations.
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4l LOFT is, as you can see, 1/60 of scale facility.
It is I
5i far from full scale.
It does have atypicalities associated with e
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3 6: it, a five and-a-half foot nuclear core versus 12 foot in a e
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commercial plant.
The facility only has one active loop, the j
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For comparison, the only other integral systems f acility z
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When you say that, are there integral
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One I an aware of is PKL, which is in E
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Germany.
I am not quite sure, maybe someone in Research can g
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tell me the scale.
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MR. MCPHERSON:
I am sorry, I did not know you were P;
19 j going to ask the scale.
There is a LOBI in ESPRA which is M
20 [ three times the size of semiscale, therefore 1/500, so that would i
21l be 1/1000 scale for PKL.
22,
There is a facility called Rosa in Japan which is about 23 '
the same size as semiscale.
r 24f MR. SHERON:
The use of LOFT in the licensing arena is 26 primarily one of assessing codes, computer codes, used for safety s
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analyses.
These include not only the NRC-developed codes such as 2
TRAC or RELAP-4, RELAP-5, or whatever, but also we use it for 3
assessing the industry's computer codes.
4 Now, this is done primarily through what we call the 5l Standard Problem Program and more recently has been termed
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Examples of these are the L2-3, large break LOCA test; d
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the L3-1, LOFT small break test; and most recently L3-6, which z
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3 12 The usefulness of LOFT in terms of its data is not to E_
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take something that occurs in LOFT, thermohydraulic phenomena
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j 15 i that is not the case.
The link is by the computer codes.
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j 16 hope that LOFT as a goal will represent the appropriate thermo-A h
I7 hydraulic phenomenon that occurs, or that we think occurs, in E
3 18 the large PWR.
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19 l For example, if a pipe is expected to have to float a n
20 stratify, in other words, the liquid falls to the bottom and steam 2I on the top, as opposed to being sort of mixed up, one would hope 22 that LOFT might represent those type conditions rather than 23 l something else.
24 What'we do, we assure ourselves that our computer 25
_ codes.can predict with reasonable accuracy the LOFT facility as t
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well as other facilities like semiscale and with that assurance 2
we then apply them to predictions of large PWRs.
3, Now, as Denny said previously, the role of LOFT was l
4 h originally to help solve the LOCA problem, and primarily it was g
5 the large break LOCA problem as opposed to small break or event say 0
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6l an intermediate break event.
g-7 The goal in this was not only, as Denny said, to pay m'
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of what we call the " mortgage" but it was openly considered to be'
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the goal to revise-Appendix K.
Once we had a sufficient data z
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h 11 back to try and rewrite Appendix K to take into account all of the 3
y 12 new information that we learned since the rule was first 5
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gs I4 Now, as you recall, I think it was in January of '78, the 15 staff did send down an action paper requesting Commission g
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17 I believe it was in June that the Commission gave us the go-ahea~
l' on that.
We d.d start doing work in preparing for proposed rule-5 18 ]
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19 making wuen the Three Mile event occurred and then, of course, that g-n 20 work'wac suspended.
21 But work was under way and one can only assume that 22 sometime in the future we would like to go back and revise the 23 rule.
24 !
Since the accident, I should point out, the ole of LOFT 3
.25 j has also changed or, I should say, has been re-oriented from d-a 3
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focusing almost primarily on large breaks.
It is now being used 2
to look at small breaks and also anticipated transients which are 3
attributed more significant contributors to risk, which you will 4
hear about later.
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me ask you to go back for N
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a second to the business of revising Appendix K.
What would be
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Were there substantial savings in d
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10 safety margins?
Where was that effort headed?
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MR. SHERON:
That effort at the time was geared towards g
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Both
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The decay heat is the 1971 A&S standard i:
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The c.'.rconium water reaction rate is e
p 17 l called the Baker Just Correlation which has been shown to be 5
18 conservative with' respect to recent data.
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MR. ROSS:
Commissioner Bradford, were you interested in d
20 who would benefit from a proposed rule change?
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFOED:
I just wondered in what
] direction it was headed ar.d what the implications wers for the 22 23 future.
24h FGl. POSN:
L think the bigger implication was that it 4
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and that is rather subjective and hard to ascribe the benefits, say ;
2
.n dollars.
3 There were some indirect implications that we had some 41 discussions on with reactor vendors that if they had a more t
5 precise rule that used more precise calculations, then in fact
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8 This, perhaps, is not the most desirable thing to happen, d
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10 smaller pumps,-or.at least proposals for same.
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11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I didn't mean to indicate a d
12 bias one way or the ott.er.
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13 MR. ROSS:
~No, I am just saying, we did have the I
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As I recall, I believe we did speculate, although it mk 2
15 has been three yea;-a, that if the rule were adopted in a new form 5
g' 16 or you used a realistic calculation plus some arbitrary units of d
17 i measurement such as standard deviations and licensed that way, w
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18 then who would benefit.
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19 i I think to the extent the codes are credible, the public A
20 would benefit because they would have a more believable assessment l
! of LOCA.
The plant operating staff would probably benefit because 21 22 they also would have something that was not arbitrary and biased i
23 ' high.
But then there are perhaps some more undesirable side 24 Qeffects of tuning a reactor to another code.
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But right now few, if any, reactors are LOCA-limited..
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if you abolished Appendix K in terms of megawatts electric, I i
2 don't think it would be much if any change in the nation's electric 1
3 posture.
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MR. SHERON:
Could I have the next slide, please?
I s-5 One of the things we considered, and we looked at, as A
6-a matter of fact, with a very keen eye, was the scaling of the 9
8 7, LOFT facilit'..
It has been, I guess, repeatedly criticized on a J
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number of occasions that it is too small; too many atypicalities, 3
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and therefore the information that is gotten from the facility is z
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g 12 long as I have been employed with the Commission, and I do not E
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One would certainly not expect it_to traces of clad 23 6
17 temperature,.or whatever, to perfectly overlay.
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similarity or scaling distortion in a LOFT facility shows up i
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be beneficial in this area, but we did feel that this type of 2
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Was that list developed, was there any 23 l other assumption built into it, such as it would be run for two
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MR. SHERON:
No, it was strictly derived if somebcdy 2
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Can I have the next slide, please?
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20 This slide shows our recommended list of tests that we 21 believe should be run in LOFT prior to decommissioning.
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which would uncover the core.
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Can I have the next slide, please?
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18 Are there any other questions?
This concludes my
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n 20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I guess I was looking with some 21 interest comparing your list with the one on 415, which is the 22 current LOFT test plan.
I am trying to find the overlap.
I 23 MR. SHERON:
'I think, if it is a fair statement, I r
24 think.that the Office of Research is going to give that.
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- CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
-I was just wondering whether you.have N
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any comment.
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2 MR. SHERON:
For the most part we retained most of their 3
tests - not all of them.
The Designation A --
4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
I know, is one that you came up with.
5' MR. SHERON:
Is what we consider to be additional.
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I know.
So, I an assuming that the R
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That's correct.
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I looked at the rest, and there are f
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The table you are referring to is Table 4.2, 3
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I guess it would be fair to say that m
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2 15 MR. ROSS:
That's correct.
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A substantial adjustment to. it.
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We found that, for example, steam a
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We saw nothing unique.
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Virtually none'of the L9/L10 series survived 21 in our report.
I 22 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now,-as I recall in previous t
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That's correct.
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21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now, can I ask you about your NRR l
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Yes, sir.
24 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
The sense in reading the repo.t thar i
if it had im0 lied,much '
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in the way of input, had done this on an informal basis.
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Yes.
Let me qualify that.
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In 1976 was the last formal LOFT, five E
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What has been transmitted over, though, is z
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Did you find evidence of Research 5
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They have approached us or come over and i
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Let me pick up.
For as long as I can 24 remember there has been a research review group on LCFT on which 25, NRR traditionally had one or two members at the reviewer level.
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Right.
5 18 MR. SHERON:
So, up until that time the facility was 19 still in-the preparation stage, you might say, and there was a
20 really no need to go back and redefine what had already been 21 defined.
l 22 i MR. ROSS:
For that matter, until last fall I don't i
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I think everyone 23 24 l kind of thought this would run forever.
We had never tried to i
4 25 I prioritize LOFT at all.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Going back to the test matrix 2
that you have recommended, and the coupled comment that you think 3, LOFT ought to be kept running through fiscal
'83, which of those 1
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If we were still trying to get the LOCAs, 2I! the large and' intermediate break LOCAs, then, I think, the group 22*
would be there hanging on, go ahead and finish LOCA.
23
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Actually, this theory about running it because you s
-j ALDERSON RE_P_ORTING COMPANY,_INC,
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might need it is better expressed in Fred Finlayson's letter.
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deserves consideration.
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'n 20 we-felt this work was needed, should be done.
The 21 action plan makes it clear that there is agreement that work 22 should be done, but it could be done better elsewhere.
We think 23 ' that the existing reactor simulators, upgraded as required, would 24 I more closely satisfy the four criteria.
Therefore, we do not i
25, think that LOFT is the appropriate place to do human factors 1
- ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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research.
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We think some good will come out of that.
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operator action or resumption of power, or pumping capability the i
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Now, you say that group nay also j
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The charter of-that group does call upon it 21, at some point in time to express a view on the needed research, yes.
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25 j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You are not sure when that comment N
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2l MR. ROSS:
It might be a function of interest expressed l
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that given one of those LOCAs the appropriate systems functioning 2: at a minimum will indeed cool the core.
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Let's go to the next Y
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that could be learned that would either assist us in finding ways 2l to turn the transients around, to better understand them, how t
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As you heard, the 3
human-machine interface group cane to the conclusion that
.n 4 f general this is not the right facility to do it.
i 5I So, there is risk significance but the facility really e
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MR. ROSS:
The next slide, please.
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On page 2-3 of your report starts the findings.
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I will run down them quickly.
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2 15 l said, the better data should come from operating reactors if N
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A few LOFT transients should be 2
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LOFT has some better instrumentation and these would help 5:
5 18 index LOFT to simulators and LOFT to operating PWRs.
5 l
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20 !
the inadequate core cooling area.
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21 j The second bullet, now that the end of LOFT is more 22 clearly in sight than it was a year ago, that MRR should take l steps to make sure that its essential needs are met before LOFT 23
- 24I, is closed out.
I 25 Point number three, the analysis side of LOCA, the a
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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code assessment side, is a companion of large tests such as LOFT, 2
and we think that it would be helpful if the code assessrcat were 3
expedited since the two efforts were phased in mo.
closaly.
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Point four, we did find that LOFT is useful as a test 5
bed for new instrumentation for reactors, but it is not a sole n
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justification.
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Point five, the severe fuel damage studies are 8
peripheral, especially ones that are partial core melts.
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15
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20 million a year.
It was not obvious to us that the facility could 21 not be run at a leaner level.
We discussed the theory - and that 22 was all we had, a theory because we did not have time to prove it -
23 ! that the test series could be continued with substantially fewer 24 l people; and that the same test matrix could be executed for the i
25 f same money,. but stretched out over a longer period of time.
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i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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We did not have time to explore it in further detail, l
2 we thought that such a study ought to be instituted.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Did you discuss that possibility i
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15 l CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Let me first ask, Vic?
Joe?
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No.
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Peter?
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18 CO!1MISSIONER BRADFORD:
Could you just talk for a minute E
about that sentence that struck me as odd in your report, and 19 A
20 I guess also Mr. Finlayson's letter, that it should be noted that 21 Ehe fission product clean-up system was never completed.
What is 22 the history behind that?
23 l MR. ROSS:
Now, the research people are prepared to talk 24 i to this.
There are_some capital items, budget items on completing, 25, adding on -- I.think it is principally liquid waste cleanup i
~ ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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systems.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
You remember, the original LOFT, 3
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desert and build one, and run it, and we will melt it down and i
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Is that the original circa '62, e
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Yes, then when the whole concept Y
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My understanding is, they have modest clean-N
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The innlication I took from 22,
23 this was that it was something that the group sort of expected i
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MR. ROSS:
I don't think I either expected it or did 2I not expect it.
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I don't think so because by the I
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Would your recommendations b'e 19 very different if it were there?
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No, the amount of dollars is actually, what t
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It takes time to get'it.
But I don't think our l
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2 15 were neve-z there.
It is something you would need if you start 5
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20 additional question.
I did not have the impression they could 21 do that very -well, that if they had such an event, that could well 22 be the last substantial LOFT test.
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23 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
You sent a couple of letters to the 24l industry which you included in your report, and at least the 25 ] impression,_'certainly the reading that I get on this, you got.back
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lukewarm - at best - support for the continuation of the project.
2 MR. ROSS:
Of course, the General Electric viewp6 int 3
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Yes,'except they did say that none
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That's true.
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'21 with it.
Every time you fiddle around and study it some more, 22 l you may raise some questions.
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is damned useful to have those experiments."
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That is sort of the NRR position, 3
too.
4l COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Nell, in the sense the licensing i
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The Westinghouse approach was decidedly more Sj 14 constructive than the usual industry party-line.
2 15 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I was surprised that they were Y
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W 17 j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Well, to get to my question, I con-z 5
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20 they feel that the facility is so valuable that were we to be 21l considering shutting it down, that they would be leaping in with 22 ! contributions to keep it open.
23l MR. ROSS:
That's correct, that is my understanding.
24 Ne have heard some indication that EPRI might be interested in l
lt5 making some financial contribution.
I have not seen it in t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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2 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Denny, did you and the group see the 3 lletterthatcameinfromMr. Williams?
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Yes.
At our January meeting in Paolo Alto I
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Yes, that's correct.
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18 COM!!ISSIONER BRADFORD:
Denny, let me ask you one more E6 a
question.
If in fact the program that you recommend here is 19 a
20 carried out, would we then be able to say at the end of that i
21I that LOFT had more or less achieved the objectives for which at l
22 least its last edition was launched?
23l MR. ROSS:
Yes, I think so, with the companion code 24 assessment, they go hand in hand.
But I think if our LOFT test i
25 j matrix were done-and the codes assessed -- I do not think we have c
4 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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done anything until we have somehow quantified margins of safety.
2 But LOFT plus the codes together can do that, I think.
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absent LOFT the air bans sill just be wider and the uncertainty l
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But the codes you are speaking of N
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They are really different codes.
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5g 10 It seems like the code development goes on, and on, II and on.
I think they, like LOFT, need to be curtailed also and 3
g 12 say, "That's enough, get into production."
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All right.
Don *t go away, though.
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15 MR. liINOGUE:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
si 10 Before I start I would like to point out that not only
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P" 19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Yes.
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2I MR. 21INOGUE:
We. reviewed the results of the review 22lgrouedeliberations, looking basically at two goals, both of I
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ALDERSON REPQRTING COMPANY. INC.
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Appendix K, but also in the context of work that would throw light 2
on the ability of some of the codes that we have to pronerly 3
characterize system transients.
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test program and reviewed it in that context with a great deal of e
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42 1
We also looked in some detail, as best as we could in 2
the relatively short time that we had this list, at the question 3
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5 20 Sullivan will speak for us because some of the reaction that wo 21 have on the report is technical in nature and, I think, should I
22 ) properly be discussed in this open meeting; but the budgetary 23 ' material we will have ready for you by Friday.
24 i With that, if ' may, I will turn it over to Dr. Sullivan.
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25 B1R. SULLIVAN:
We have organized our comments and have
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some viewgraphs, you have them in front of you.
Could I have 2 i the first viewgraph?
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with the review group's description.
The emphasis that we 2
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high-priority test that the review group also recommenced that 1
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1 24 ',
MR. MINOGUE:
May I interject, it is important to i
25.
realize, these are the came tests.
The order is different, bpt I
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there are no tests on this list that are not on the other list 2
that Dr. Ross discussed.
MR. SULLIVAN:
There is the test description for the 3g i
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Does that account for the w='5 18 difference between January '83 and April '84?
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No.
The January '83 is our best A
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I 22l MR. MINOGUE:
Including'two of the contingency tests, 1
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24k COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Where is the April '84 date?
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That is the estimated date and it should 25j 3~
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be the research estimated date for completing the total test 2
matrix as it was proposed by the special review group.
3; COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I see, the whole "schmear."
1 4f MR. SULLIVAN:
The whole "schmear."
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Got you.
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Are you going to address why you E
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We could.
I think that it is more 5
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That is why we 21
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22 l COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
In the upper plenum injection 23 l large break?
24,
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Yes, it-is upper plenum injection, not i
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It does not simulate a UHI plant, it is only the low d
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pressure injection.
2 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But the injection is what, hot-3, lake injection?
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It is hot-lake injection.
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There are six two-loop Westinghouse plants 9
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21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Or to the present.
I 22 l MR. ROSS:
Sir?
23j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
It'is looking to the present plant i
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MR. ROSS:
Right.
1 ii ALDERSON REPORTING COMPAMY, ONC.
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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
What is the nature of the thermo 2
stress that is concerned?
3 MR. MINOGUE:
Don, would you like to address that?
4 MR. MCPHERSON:
The LOFT fuel has very long upper a
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The stress is not one that would be, i
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That is the case.
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21 I MR. SULLIVAN:
If we can have the next slide.
22 i The next slide presents the research proposed test l
j matrix.for LOFT, and it again gives the description of the test, 23 24 the priority, and then there are two additional columns and they l
25 } _ address wnere the data night be used.
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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Now, this has "need" and you use l
2 the term "might be used."
There is a substantial difference.
3, MR SULLIVAN:
There is a need.
We are addressing a need<
4 MR. MINOGUE:
This is the point I tried to make at the I
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beginning.
I thought it was important to review these tests from 6
the point of view of their broad applicability to understand the R
7 transients, and not just the narrow Appendix K mortgage issue.
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Right.
But are you saying that d
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11 MR. MINOGUE:
I think a better way to put it would be, atestofthistypewouldimprovetheunderstandingofaparticular(
j 12 4
g 13 category of transients in a way that we are going to have to a
h 14 develop.
It'is probably the cheapest way or the easiest way to 2
15 get this kind of data for this kind of code verification for this 5
16 facility.
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M 18 is too strong.
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19 j CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
After all, we are going to have to M
20 make some sort of a decision on the facility.
I am trying to 21 find out what the staff is telling us, that they believe that 22 this set of tests is required in order to do the degraded core 23 '
rulemaking in a responsible fashion.
I 24l MR. MINOGUE:
What is required to do the degraded core L25 rulemaking well is codes that'you can have same credence in, that y
I i
i ALDET< SON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 l will define the transients that the fuel will see ever a wide I
2l range of access.
i3I This test, run on this facility, or these tests, would i
4' be aimed at giving you that kind of confidence in the code.
The i
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This is not a.
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7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
But if, let's say, none of the tests sj 8
are run, would you then say that means that the agency can't a
i 9
responsibly _go ahead with the rulemakina?
i 0y 10 MR. MINOGUE:
I think that the experience that we have El 11 had to date with the application of these codes has not been a
f 12 terribly favorable.
It is a good thing we have this facility to
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You answered "yes", Bob, to the c!
15 ' question.
Let me make sure you heard clearly the question.
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6 17 ; agency could not responsibly go ahead with degraded core rule-w=
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MR. MINOGUE:
I'm sorry, I spoke'with ny brain not in 5
27 gear.
I think that the degraded core rulemaking is going to 21 !, require certain improvements in the codes.
This is one way of 2
22]doingthat.
It seems to be a particularly attractive way.
I 23 : would not say it is the only way.
24 MR. SULLIVAN:
One of the things that we should note i
25 is that in each of the cases the tests are both responsive - in 1
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three cases they are both responsive to the rul(making and also 2, to Appendix K.
3 You also see the last column is the Research estimated 3
1 4l date that the test would be performed.
You come to the bottom of I
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that, and it is June of83.
Dj 6j There is a note on the left-hand side, and it says i
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that we have estimated out of the four contingency tests that only nj 8,
two would be necessary.
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If all of them were to be run, the June io
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Also, the priority category has been asserted in two a
p 12 places, and we would like to address the clad burst possibility.
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15 but the possibility does exist.
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17 ! real possibility, and we have calculated it would rupture.
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18 fore, we would get clad rupture.
E 19 In each of the cases we believe that the contamination 20 of the facility would be minimized mainly because there is very 21 little burn-up of the fuel, and we do not expect fuel melting.
22 j Can I have the next slide?
l 23 '
The benefits of the proposed text matrix are that it f
24 i does address-the high priority ~ concerns, and those concerns 25 ) of the review group.
It means having u fixed program, and that a
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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gives us a capability of having a fixed ccmoletion date, an orderly 2< shut-down on the facility, and greater efficiency in the orogram 3 lleading to lower costs.
4 It also has the inherent capability.of getting scme e
5 inout from the degraded core rulemaking process before the shut-A" 3
6,down would occur.
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6 preplanned.
We also expect to have a usable core at the end of our d
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test series in case of reactivation of the facility.
One of the io 10 significant benefits is that there is a low probability of 3) 11 contaminating the facility.
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12 MR. MINOGUE:
One of the things that we are trying to E-1 13 l pull together some cost estimates for would be to terminate the
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14 operation of the facility as a test facility and re-assign the x
15 technical staff, but retain a maintenance staff to pull the core ji z
j 16 out but maintain the water chemistry periodically; heat the system M
6 17 l up with the pumps, cycle the valves, and so on, to maintain it x
18 at.least as a facility in an operational condition for several i
19 lLyears.
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5 20 l Of course, the staff would be disbanded.
It would not 21 mean it would be in what we call a " stand-by" mode.
But at 22 least-it would be retrievable.
That is the significance that i
23 withfthis sequence you end up with one good core.
24 l MR. SULLIVAN: 'Could I have the next slide?
1 25 If there were fuel failures, it would leave us with not e
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53 I
a sufficient amount of fuel, we would also have problems in 2l the decontamination of the facility, and these are potential l
3l problems.
4; Another sienificant problem that we see is that I&L has s
5 not reviewed the test matrix as we have given it to you, and they j
6 have not committed to the budgets or schedules.
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14 There is some uncertainty in the decontamination and Y
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15 decommissioning, and we will address those problems on the 13th.
g 16 May I have the next slide?
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18 a severe core damaging experiment in the LOFT facility.
The 5
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The goals would M
20 be to look at the progress of fuel dastage_ through a large core; 21 the transport or fission products and fuel fragments within the 22 system, and any questions that may arise from the degraded core 23, rulemaking.
24 I MR. MINOGUE:
Can I interrupt?
This test, of course, is 25 not.on the review group recommended list.
It is discussed in the
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report as socething that one might consider, but it is not on 2
their recommended list.
3, CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Would you need to put in the fission 4
product -- system?
f 5l MR. MINOGUE:
Yes.
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MR. SULLIVAN:
Can we have the next slide?
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expected to occur.
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If these occur, then there would be a very sizeable z_
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proposed matrix.
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18 MR. MINOGUE:
There are two elements to this, and we 19 should differentiate them.
The decontamination system as A
20 referred to earlier would be techniques either by bleeding feed, 21,
of getting the radioactive water out very quickly and then later i
22 l decontamination.. That would not deal with an extensive dispersal 23 i of core melt material through the_ system.
There, the problem 24 l you would have would be one of the decommissioning costs.
That could really skyrocket if.you had extensive core damage, even 25 3 b
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with this relatively cold fuci you could end up with a very, very 2
high decommissioning cost.
3; CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
As we are seeing in the large power 4! reactor.
I l
g 5i MR. MINOGUE:
That's right, another TMI 2 or worse, in 9
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The other aspect of this is that there are other j
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damage phenomena, PBF can do this; the ACRR can do it; some of b
10 this work can be done by ' heating and out-of-power work.
So, there-j 11 are alternative ways of getting this.
My reaction to this is 3
y 12 that when you look at it on balance, the risk of really
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14 that you might get from a one-shot test in this rather complex 5
2 15 facility, looking at core damage mechanisms when in fact you have 5
16 '
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d 17 i on fuel damage mechanisms, even in very severe accident environ-5 18 ments.
-5" 19 MR. SULLIVAN:
OK, in conclusion, we see that we need a
R 20 to define a final test matrix, and that needs to be done in a 21
_ systematic way.
22_
We would also see that the' test should have no further 23 !. changes unless absolutely necessary, unless something extra-24 ordinary occurred and we had'to change.
That the test planning that we have done maximizes the piggy-back aspects or runninq
- 25 3
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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multiple tests at the same time.
Also, minimizing the test-to-test 2
configuration changes.
3 We see that if we could achieve the first two objectives, 4
that we would have a fixed budget for the completion of the program, s
5 and a fixed schedule for completing the tests.
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in a budgetary sense to make sure that the funding was in the
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10 MR. MINOGUE:
It 'is my feeling that if we lay out the Ej 11 test program in a very organized, systematic way and say, "This y
12 is it," getting full NRR sign-off, and so on, then we can really 5
13 sit down and talk turkey with the people at INEL, and we can l
14 ' work together to figure out a way to try to keep the costs -
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15 this is a very high operating cost facility - to keep the costs 5
g 16 down during the remaining tests.
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All right.
Vic?
reter?
18 Thank you.
Harold, why don't you come up here for a
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Just tell us what NRR's M
20 views are.
21 MR. DENTON:
I don't have a planned presentation.
We 22, were heavily represented on the task force, as you observed.
23 !
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24 views about the value of LOFT tests during the past several years, 25 what you find is that most of the tests are now considered of high ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
57 1
potential value to us would not have been on the test matrix in 2
'76.
Our interest in understanding phenomena has shifted.
I 3
I think there is less interest these days in getting a 4
ten-percent accuracy improvement on the stylistic large breaks e
5 than there was at one time.
The main efforts that I have in any 5
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-l 18 these tests.
But I am not particularly interested today in i
t 19 trying to define the calculational exactitude, or say, large A
20 breaks, for example.
21 l This experiment is so expensive, it takes a dis-i 22 proporticnate share, I think, of our resources.
I think it could I
23 ' be terminated ' af ter completing a series of tests that Bob and I, 24 l and Denny could work out, that'would have the maximum _ potential
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3 Lucie and the 25 J for exploring phenomena from cases as we saw in St.
~ ALDERSON REPORTING _ COMPANY, INC.
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1 Arkansas transient where it was not sc=ething that was anticipated
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2; to go that way.
3, CHAIPS.AN AHEAFSE:
Joe, any questions?
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CCMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Not for hin.
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CHA. AMAN AHEARNE:
Peter?
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6 L COMMISSIONER BPADFORD:
Harold, with regard to the R
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11 MR. DE7 TON:
I think they have.
I can't say they have 3
y 12 no significance, but by the time we balance out all the effects 5
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are still being approved today that were approved before the LOFT 16 '
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We have not wz 18 relaxed our requirements because of LOFT.
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I understEnd that.
A 20,
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
But the approving staff engineers
' 21 have a considerably more confident feeling as they stamp those 22'> papers "OK" than they did before those tests..
23a'.
MR. DENTCN:
That's right.
I think that is ' that kind 24, of intangible information.that the models cover all the important e
25 j phenc=ena and are reasonably accurate that you get with each N
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successive test.
But the payoff of each test in the same style is 2
less and less.
3 The original test matrix was sort of set up with the 4
large breaks in mind.
In fact, right after the very first test e
5 we had some discussions with Research over changing the scope of M
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8 out new phenomena.
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I guess I have the sense from b
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They were not improvements on things that had z
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They just had.not been m
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They may in fact have been reassuring, but they still 2
15 were not something that had emerged from the analyses done.
5 16 MR. DENTON:
Let me ask Denny who oversees that area to g
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19 MR. ROSS:
I think Harold pretty well summed it up.
M 20 There is no overall " smoking gun", so to speak, to borrow a 21 phrase.
22,
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Steaming?
23 MR. ROSS:
An occasional abnormality that we look.at.
i 24f The concept for a large break'LOCA of recovering the core by
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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injection, which is a shock on a system - the potential for 2
steam-water interaction, dynamic load, that is a fundamental 3
concept of a PWR.
Without that, you not only could not license i any more, you could not even run the ones you have, 4 !
e 5l I think LOFT showed that there is no fundamental error E
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If we were running closer to the margins,
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18 they are phenomena that have just been totally missed.
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21! steam-line break simultaneously with a small loss of coolant i
22 ! accident, and muybe mass transfer through the heat exchanger.
23 - To model those things gets complicated and it is reassuring to 24 l a modeler to have run at least one test like that to be sure that 25 the model is basically sound.
But then, I think the subsequent ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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tests just tend to refine the predictability.
2 I feel sure, too, that by the time these test series 3 yhave run there will be some more operating experiences which you 4, will find very interesting, and in spite of our best-laid out i
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12 COMMISSIONER-BRADFORD:
Let mc try to state what I Ec l
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18 those phenomena don't have a big enough effect on the overall
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20 any great significance.
21 That is,_that knowing about them may be nice, but it is 22 jnot very important from a licensing standpoint.
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23 MR. DENTON:
That either the design was such that they i
24 j were running well below the temperature limit to begin with, and 25 1 adding these effects did not put them over the limit. -People do
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AL._DERSON REPORTING C. ')MPANY, INC.
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I not necessarily design them with a result right at 2,400 to begin l
2 with.
So, in many designs there are margins.
3, So, when you incorporate this, it makes a minor change.
4; I think I can say, Denny, that it has not affected the design of i
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5j a plan.
They affect our calculated maximum temperature, but it 9
6 is in a small effect.
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7 MR. ROSS:
We have seen for the rule, Appendix K s
j 8 I requirements do affect to a small degree the plant design.
About dc 9
the time the rule came out, combustion modified it to design to 10 put in higher pressure stored energy injection tanks.
Ej 11 We have seen where some people would raise or lower the k
j 12 l pressure, raise or lower the mmount of water in the storage tanks Ef 13 to get what Harold was taklking about, the last degree.
In fact, i
14 ! if-the tank was supposed to have 800 cubic feet they could put in e
2 15 820 cubic feet and lower the clad temperature from 2,203 to 5
g 16 1,994, and get a " Good Housekeeping" seal of approval.
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But that is about 5
19, the largest degree the plant designs have changed, upper-head 20 injection notwithstanding.
21 -
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Well, plant designs have nct 22 h changed because these things have resulted in a net decrease 23 g in the predicted clad temperatures.
They were already acceptable 24 l under Appendix K and they are a lot more accaptable now.
If the t
- 25, wetting phenomenon added some peculiar fashion run the other way, I
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that would have been regarded with considerably less - what 1lI 2l should I say - calm and dignity in the rack.
3 J So, I think Charlie Williams has a certain point.
s 4 I MR. MINOGUE:
I would like to make a point.
The thing s
5 that made a big change in design was the publication of Appendix 9
h 6
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It set a speed limit that very clearly brought a halt 7.
7 to a trend in the design of cores and in terms of the margins that s
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y 12 as to whether or not those margins were really there or not.
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But the big design
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I think the point that, all of us are trying to get x
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'back to TMI.
Since TMI that existing facility has been and is M
20 being used, and is useful in exploring system transients.
I 21 personally think'the Appendix K mortgage has been paid, but the 22 exploration of systems transients with that facility is a very l-23 j useful piece of information.
24l It'really is not that related to whether or not the 25 margins were greater or less than people thought when Appendix K t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, !NC.
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I was developed, and whether or not you can fine-tune some of these 2
ECCS designs.
Thank you.
3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Peter?
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I am learning a lot.that I had no S
5 thought I had asked.
8 3
6 (Laughter.)
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I really was just trying to get, M
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MR. DENTON:
I think from a scientific standpoint they k
g 15 are interesting, but whether from the licensing viewpoint they x
d I0 l did not affect things because we don't allow people to operate W
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right at the boiling point of water.
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18 make that much difference.
cs I9 l I don't say that to disparage the tests because they sa i
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kind of information.
I think the types of tests that have been i
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I there is really no basic misunderstanding about these, and if we 2
preserve our large margins as we think are in our approach today, 3
it is unlikely that any unexplored region would have a major enough 4l effect to really change our view.
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5' CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Tom?
E 6
MR. MURLEY:
Could I just make a point thatCI think has R
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been missed?
In every test, virtually, in. LOFT we found something s
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But in nearly every case it has d
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11 conservatively.
I 12 So, the margin has increased with time.
I think that is 5a 13 an important. point.
So, we have not had to derate any plants 5=
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14,
because of ECCS calculations.
5
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15 I can recall probably a half a dozen times when a z
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And we have not had to shut plants down because 5$. 18 we knew we had this margin.
That is not the case for our P
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structural codes.
M 20,
When they came in, what, a year, two years ago and 21 said, "We have an error in our codes," we wound up having to shut 22 down five plants.
I am getting off the path there, but the 23,' point is,- it is valuable to know you have that margin, and I 24 think it helps good regulation to have-it.
20 MR. ROSS:
At the risk of pursuing it too much, I i
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think I finally see where your question was headed.
2 (Laughter.)
3j MR. ROSS:
A few years ago there was a research i
1 4j observation for boiling water reactors that the spray distriburion 4
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If the pressure went up, there "R
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I do not think anything like that B*
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Harold, let me ask you a relatively 5I. 19 unr elated question, but it was brought up both in the report and 5
20 Bob Bernero's point.
I 21 I The question of putting in a reactivitar into each 22 ! plant.
Do you.have any comment on it?
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DENTON:
I like-the idea.
It is not a new idea, we 24-l talke/. about it internally _during the action plan development.
We 4-25 jare getting an awful -lot of experience in real reactor. operation J
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and such a recorder would be a lot better than trying to pick out 2l some of the ink tracings on some of our rather course charts.
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How about the cable that runs g
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from.it to Bethesda, can you do without that?
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I was trying to avoid that issue.
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How many plants have those?
2 15 l MR. DENTON:
They all have some sorts, but usually they a=
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I do not have a good feel for how many.
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No.
I think it varies, sometimes on the E
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20 the next plant so start out.
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But we are doing a very interesting - not really a 22 prototype, but beginning at Sequoyah I where they have installed 23 on an experimental basis a machine that we provided it through two channels cf 24 j _ Oak Ridge to measure three channels of neutrons; 1
25_ f pressure,- and two channels of temperature.
A modest recording.
3 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
68 1' They are trying to develop a reactor signature.
They are being 2
recorded.
I don't know, something may turn up out of it.
3 MR. DENTON:
I think the idea has merit, and it was i
4i something that we thought we would move toward eventually.
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Thank you.
The other question I had,.
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9 and I am not sure who would be the right person, Denny or Bob, to 2o
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I think it was embedded in Finlayson's letter, the 2
If 11 l issue that, do the people at Idaho working on LOFT represent in E.
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14 represent a sort of an essential core that if the progran phases
$j 15 out, the loss of that will have effects which are much greater I
y 16 l than just the effects of closing out LOFT?
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The simple answer is, yes.
We are looking ww 18 at some alternatives in terms of other programs that might E
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19 ' appropriately be placed at the lab.
I really feel that might be n
20 more appropriately discussed Friday.
That is one thing we are 21 still working on.
I 22 &
But this is a very competent. group of people.
They.have 23 done a very fine job there - and I mn talking really about the 24 l technical' people involved,.not the support staff so mach.
They 25 (are a very imporrant resource and we ought to find a way that l
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
69 l
1 assures some orderly, continued use of that resource.
i 2
CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Harold?
3 MR. DENTON:
There are certainly issues before us 4 ;such as iodine or igniters, core catchers, which you would think e
5 a facility like this would be well suited for.
But apparently, 9
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when we have explored some of these individual cases it usually R
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works out.that since it was not designed for these and access is
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difficult, and so forth, it turns out usually researchers choose ec 9
other arenas for these other tasks, rather than this one, i
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I would like to second that.
A lot of E
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'E 15 peripheral second-order uses, some of the human factors work N
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But the total value of those and the inherent overhead N
I 18 costs of the facility are such that in a sense the facility is not 5
19 very marketable as a broader research facility than just these M
20 relatively narrow areas we have been discussing.
I 21 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:
Joe?
22 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
I wanted to simply offer my 23l thanks and congratulations to the group that put together a
- 24 f report on time, it was a good piece of work; and also my thanks 25 to the _research staff uno have since February 3 collected them-
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ALDERSON F;EPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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selves and gathered a response in an orderly way that we have 2l heard a good part of today and will hear some more about later.
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3f CHAIRMAN AECARNE:
I wa'.1 certainly second the remarks e
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All of you did a very fine piece of work.
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and this is of significance assistance.
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it particularly useful to us.
.:.ank you.
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.9 (Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m. the meeting of the Cc= mission Y
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