ML19345G076
| ML19345G076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1981 |
| From: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Aswell D LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102190895 | |
| Download: ML19345G076 (7) | |
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4 UNITED STATES
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k(yelll0Eba FEB 0 31981 Louisiana Power & Light Company
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ATTN: Mr. D. L. Aswell 7
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Vice President, Power Production 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 c.;
Dear Mr. Aswell:
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SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFOR% TION We have detemined that certain additional information is required in order to pemit us to complete our review of your application for an operating license for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
The enclosed round two requests for additional information were prepared by the Auxiliary Systems Branch and are numbered 010.33 thru 010.40.
Please advise us of the date you expect to provide responses to the enclosed request.
If you require any clarification, please contact the staff's assigned project manager.
Sincerely,
- cAcv Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing
. Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Infomation cc w/ enclosure:
See next page 8102190 % S A
O Mr. D. L. Aswell Vice President, Power Production Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 cc:
W. Malcolm Stevenson, Esq.
Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Mr. E. Blake
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a, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. D. B. Lester Production Engineer Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Lyman L. Jones, Jr., Esq.
Gillespie & Jones 910 Security Homestead Building 4900 Veterans Memorial Boulevard Metairie, Louisiana 70002 Luke Fontana, Esq.
Gillespie & Jones 824 Esplanade Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70116 Stephen M. Irving, Esq.
t One American Place,. Suite 1601 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825 Resident Inspector /Waterford NPS P. O. Box 822 Killona, Louisiana 70066 l
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Aux;liary Systems Branch Second Round Request for Additional Information Waterford Stean Electric Station, Unit No. 3 Locket No. 50-382 010.33 Your response to Question 010.14 concerning the containm.:n polar crane is (9.1.4) j (RSP) not acceptable. The preoperational and inservice testing and administrative controls identified are not adequate means for assuring that a potential polar crane load drop could not result,and thereby cause unacceptable damage
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to reactor coolant system components or fuel which may lead to adverse radiological consequences.
It is our position that you perform an analysis of the effects of dropping of any of the loads handled by the polar crane along the crane's path of travel wnere unacceptable consequences could occur, and provide us with the results of that analysis.
If it cannot be demon-strated that adverse effects will not occur from the dropping of these loads, then the polar crane must be designed in accordance with the guidelines of Branch Technical Position ASB 9-1 or NUREG-0554. Note that NUREG-0554 super-sedes Regulatory Guide 1.104.
010.34 Your response to Question 010.20 is not complete. Address the following (9.3.3)
(RSP) concerns:
1.
You indicate that the equipment and floor drainage _ system piping is non-seismic Category I.
Describe the means provided for assuring protection of safety related equipment in all areas of the plant from flooding as a result of failure of the drainage system (such that it is unable to carry away water) and all non-seismic water carryin3 piping systems (such as the fire protection system) in these areas follow 1.,g a SSE.
Include the emergency feedwater system (EFS) pump rooms in this
, discussion. It is our position that flooding in safety related equipment areas not result in an inability to safely shutdown the plant following a SSE.
2.
Your response to our question indicated-that there was no problem'asso-ciated with moderate energy piping failures in the area of the EFS pump rooms. Describe in more detail which moderate energy piping systems in the area of the EFS pump rooms were assumed to crack in your moderate energy piping analysis and justify why th9se cracks would not result in the need to shutdown the plant (no reac'.or ur turbine '. rip occurs). The EFS pump rooms should be fully water tight to assure system operability in the event of turbine trip and concurrent loss of offsite power.
010.35 Your response Question 010.25 is not comolete. Verify that isolation dampers (9.4.2)
(RSP) 037 A/B and 038 A/B will assure adequate isolation of all potentially con-taminated areas of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) and the capability to maintain a negative pressure in those areas in the event of a fuel handling accident. Your mooified design will allow operation of the large capacity nonnal FHB ventilation system supply (AH-14) and exhaust fans (E-20 A/B) with dampers D-35 A/B and D-36 A/B partially open inorder to provide air flow for l
cooling the spent fuel pool pump rooms. Verify that unacceptably large air flow will not enter the contaminated areas of the FHB thus compromising the ability to maintain a negative pressure, or will not cause air to be drawn unprocessed from the contaminated areas through the new fuel storage vault, corridor, or bulkhead gate and maintenance tool storage area with the normal FHB ventilation system operating following a fuel handling accident.
It is
_3 our position that you assure that unacceptable quantities of radioactive con-taminants will not escape the FHB in the event of a fuel handling accident with the normal ventilation system operating to cool the spent fuel pool pumps, or provide some other means of assuring a proper operating environ-ment for these pumps or other means of assuring safe operation of he spent fuel pool should these pumps be unavailable.
010.36 Your response to Question 010.31 it not complete.
(10.3.1)
(10.4.7)
(10.a.9) a) Describe the provisions in ycur plant design for assuring proper opera-tion of the main steam and main feedwater isolation valves, atmospheric dump valves, and the steam supply valve to the emergency feedwater pump turbine all of which are exposed to exterior environmental conditions under conditions of extreme cold and hot weather. This discussion should include possible effects on these valve'. under all plant operating conditions including shutdown during periods of extreme cold.
b) Describe the provisions in your plant design and/or operating procedures for assuring that the main steam safety valve set points are always within ASME Code allowable limits during all modes of operation for which they are required to be operable. This discussion should include the effects of extreme cold and hot weather on the set points as these j
valves are exposed to exterior environmental conditions, and should address any potential compromise in the performance of the emergency feedwater system (EFS) with variations in the set points, i.e. if steam generator pressure increases (lowest safe *.y valve set point rises), then EFS flow delivered to the steam generator will decrease.
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.4 010.37 Describe the means proviced to the operator to detect floccing in the turbine (10.4.5) building as a result of failures in the circulating water system piping and/or expansion joints. This discussion should include the actions taken by the c:erator upon cetection of this flooding inorder to protect safety,rc, lated equipment and the potential consequences of celays in taking nese actions.
010.38 Verify tnat tne precperational test program proposed for Waterford will (10.4.7) include provisions to verify that unacceptable feecwiter/ steam generator vaternammer will not occur daring normal plant startup and shuttcwn proce-cures.
010.39 We are continuing our review of Appendices 10.4.9A and 10.4.95 of the FSAR (10.4.9) wnica address tne requirements of TMI-2 Task Action plan Item II.E.1.1 and the Maren 10, 1980 letter concerning the Emergency Feedwater System (EFS).
evaluation including the reliability study. We have the following additional questions at this time. Further questions may result in the future as our review progresses.
1.
Recornendation GS Verify that your proposed revised tech. spec. for performance of an EFS flow test after an extended shutdcwn will state that this test be perfonned after any cold shutdown of 30 days or longer, not just af ter the EFS has been out of service for testing or maintenance.
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2.
Additional Short Term Recoccendation 1 - Verify that the low-low level alarm on the condensate storage pool is fully redundant all the way from the pool to the control room annunciators and is pcwered from separate, redundant battery backed power supplies.
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Additional Short Term Recommendation 2 - After performing the t8-hour EFS pump endurance test, the following information should be submitted for each pump:
- 1) A brief des;ription of the test method _ (including flow schematic diagram) and how tne test was instrumented (i.e., where and how bearing temperatures were measurec). 2) A discussion of how the test conditions (pump flow, head, speed and steam temperature) compare to design operating condi tions. 3) Plots of bearing / bearing oil temperature vs. time for each bearing of each AFW pump / driver demonstrating that temperature design limits were not exceeded. 4) A plot of pump room ambient temperature and humidity vs. time demonstrating that the pump room ambient conditions do not exceec environnental qualification limits for safet) related i
equipment in the roca. 5) A statement confinning that the pump vibratien i
did not exceed allowable limits during tests.
010.40 The design for the spent fuel pool cooling system includes only one -spent fuel (9.1.3)
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(RSP) pool cooling heat exchanger. Describe hcw acequate spent fuel pool cooling is provided when the heat exchanger is out of service for maintenance purposes' i
l (tube plugging or retubing).
It is our position that unacceptable levels of l
radioactivity not result from the spent fuel pool wnile the heat exchanger
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is undergoing maintenance.
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