ML19345G029

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Ack Receipt of Responses to IE Bulletins79-05A & 79-05B,per 800613 Request.Evaluation of Licensee Exceptions to Bulletins Encl
ML19345G029
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/1981
From: Reid R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Cavanaugh W
ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
IEB-79-05A, IEB-79-05B, IEB-79-5A, NUDOCS 8102190775
Download: ML19345G029 (5)


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t WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 February 5,1981 Docket No. 50-313 8

Mr. William Cavanaugh, III (PC N

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Dear Hr. Cavanaugh:

We have reviewed your letter datt - November 28, 1980, concerning our requests dated June 13, 1980, which related to your responses to IE Bulletins79-05A and 79-05B for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No.1.

We find that your responses adequately address the concerns stated in our June 13, 1980 letter and, therefore, we consider the matters resolved for ANO-1.

Our evaluation of your exceptions is enclosed.

Sincerely, l

Robert W. Reid, Chief l

Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Evaluation of Licensee's Exceptiens to lEB 79-05A

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cc w/ enclosure:

l See next page

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l t 102190 77f

i Arkansas Power & Light Company ccw/ enclosure (s):

Mr. David C. Trimble Manager, Licer: sing Arkansas Power & Light Company P. O. Box 551 Director, Bureau of Environmental Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Health Services 4815 West Markham Street Mr. James P. O'Hanlon Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 General Manager Arkansas Nuclear One P. O. Box 608 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Mr. William Johnson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

.P. O. Esx 2090 Russellville,. Arkansas. 72801 ;,

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Mr. Robert B. Borsum' Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division Suite 420, 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20014 M.NicholasS.peynolds Debevoise & Liberman 120017th, Street, NW Washington, DC: 20036 '

l Arkansas Polytechnic College Russellville, Arkansas 72801 Honorable Ermil Grant Acting County Judge of Pope County l

. Pope County Courthouse Russellville, Arkansas 72801 l

l Mr. Paul F. Levy, Director Arkansas Department of Energy 3000 Kavanaugh Little Rock, Arkansas 72205 Director, Criteria and Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460)

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D. C.

20460 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region VI Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR 1201 Elm Street First International Building Dallas, Texas 75270

Enclosure EVALUATION OF LICENSEE'S EXCEPTIONS TO IE BULLETINS70-05A & 79-05B.

ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ARKANSAS HUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET N0. 50 313 By letter dated November 28, 1980, the licensee provided further justifi-cation to the exceptions which were taken to the requirements of IE Bulletins79-05A and 79-05B.

The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's justifica-tion' t'o,the exceptions is pro' ided below.

v Item 8 IE' Bulletin 79-05A Our evaluation of the licensee's responses to Item 8 of IE Bulletin 79-05A dated June 13,1980, found the licensee to be generally in conformance with the Bulletin guidelines ~ xcept for the following:

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1)

In addressing the case' of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow path being

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. inoperable, the licensee's use of the term " cold shutdown" does not make it clear that the 1.icensee is not relying on the SG for cooling.

2) Also, in the.above case,.the licensee does not conform to the Bulletin position that the cooldown'shall be accomplished in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> because the.

licensee's commitment is qualified by a statement "12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or at the

. maximum safe rate"..

3) The licensee's procedures states that if both of the EFW pumps and the AFW pump are inoperable, the reactor will not be shutdown but rather, power will be reduced to less than 5% using the main feedwater pumps and maintained there until one of the EFW pumps or the AFW pumps is made operable.

Followi J that,.the reactor will be placed in cold shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or at the maximum safe rate.

The licensee's response to our request dated June 13, 1980, for further justi-I fication to (1)'above was that " cold shutdown" as defined by the Technical Specifications requires the reactor to be subcritical and the reactor coolant temperature to be lss than or equal to 200*F. With the reactor coolant sv *em less than or equal to 200*F the secondary side of the SG would not boil a.m the SG would not function as a heat exchanger. Further cooling normally is pro-vided by the decay heat removal system and in an emergency by the Emergency Core Cooling System. We agree with the licensee's position and find that the licensee's response to (1) above is acceptable and therefore we consider the matter resolved for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No.1 (AND-1).

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The licensee's response to our request for further justification to (2) above was that the AND-1 EFW systen consists, in part, of two EFW pumps.

One pump is motor-driven while the other is steam-driven.

If the flow-path containing the motor-driven pump is the one which is inoperable, a cold shutdown condition may not be attainable until this path is returned to operable. This occurs because main steam is used to drive the steam-driven pump. Therefore, the qualifying statement "or at the maximum sa*ca rate" would allow the licensee the time necessary to place a motor-driven pump in service.

We find that the lice',ee would normally be in compliance with the require-ments of the Bullet-except for tne use when the motor-driven EFW pump is out of service.

In this case, the reactor would be at less than 5% power operation until tne inoperable EFW pump was brought into service or other backup systems and components can be utilized. We find this acceptable and therefore we consider this matter resolved for AND 1.

The licensee's response to our request for further justification to (3) above was tnat because the main feedwater pumps (MFWP's) are turbine driven by main steam, cold shutdown cannot be achieved using only the MFWP's.

It is, there-fore, necessary to have in service either the motor-driven EFW pump or the motor-driven AFW pump in order to achieve cold shutdown.

We find that the licensee would normally be in compliance with the require-ments of the Bulletin and in the unlikely event that the EFW pumps and the small AFW pump;(which is used for startup) are out of service, the reactor.

would be at less than 5% power in order to provide feelsater flow with the steam driven MFWP's. We find this acceptable and therefore we consider the matter resolved for N;0-1.

Item 10 of IE Bulletin 79-05A Our rereview of the licensee's letter dated April 16, 1979, has observed that the licensee indicated that the AND-1 Technical Specifications require that prior to initiating maintenance on safety related components, the redundant components shall be demonstrated to be operable. We have verified this in l

the -Technical Specifications and find it acceptable. Therefore, we consider l

this matter resolved for #10-1.

l l

Item 4 of IE Bulletin 79-05B_

Our evaluation of the licensee's response to Item 4 of IE Bulletin 79-05B found the response to be complete except for implementing a requirement for a manual reactor trip for loss of offsite power.

The licensee has maintained the position that a manual trip on loss of offsite power is unnecessary.

Further-more, the licensee maintains a manual trip would result in a reduction in the margin of safety. The unit is designed to runback to approximately 15% power.

Initiating a manual trip would cause a loss of this pc tential power source and l

thus a reduction in the margin of safety.

The consequence of not achieving the runback is a turbine trip, and thus a reactor trip.

We have rereviewed the licensee's response and the operation of the reactor in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). We conclude that since the licensee l

has implemented an anticipated reactor trip on loss of main feedwater or turbine rip, the licensee has effectively implemented a reactor trip on loss of offsite l

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. power. A loss of offsite power will likely cause a turbine trip and therefore a reactor trip. We find the licensee's response acceptable and therefore con-sider this matter resolved for Atl0-1.

Concl usions Based on our review of the information provided by the ifcensee in response to IE Bulletins79-05A and 79-05B, we conclude that the licensee has acceptably responded to these Bulletins. The actions taken by the licensee demonstrate its understanding of the concerns and implications of the TMI-2 accident as they relate to At10-1. These actions have resulted in added assurance for the continued protection of the public health and safety during plant operation.

Dated: Febmary 5,1981 e

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