ML19345F293
| ML19345F293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1981 |
| From: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Groce R Maine Yankee |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8102170125 | |
| Download: ML19345F293 (5) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION el WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
,o January 21, 1 981 Docket No. 50-309
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Mr. Robert H. Groce Senior Engineer - Licensing
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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company is s
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25 Research Drive Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 klj 6%/
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Dear Mr. Groce:
In a letter dated April 24, 1978 we issued our Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station. Section 3.0 of this report identified 16 items (marked with an asterisk) for which we required additional information to assure an acceptable design prior to actual implementation of the modifications.
Based on our review of your submittals dated October 12, 1978, October 16, 1979, May 31,1979, August 16, 1979 and December 5,1980 additional items are now resolved as discussed in the enclosed SER supplement. This leaves three asterisked items unresolved. Based on your letter of October 14, 1980, additional items have been completed; however, referring to section 3.0 of the SER transmitted by out letter of April 24, 1978, asterisked item 3.1.9 requires additional information in the form of design details from you for our review. to our letter dated November 24, 1980 listed outstanding items (asterisked and non-asterisked).
Item 3.1.9, Fire Bart ier Penetration Seals, was inadvertently omitted from the enclosure 2 list. By copy of this letter itei 3.1.9 should be included. Please j
accept our apologies for any incoannience that may have been caused by this omission.
Sincerely, i
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Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Supplemented SER cc w/ enclosure:
I See next page l
l 8102 J 70 /M f
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company '
cc:
Mrs. L. Patricia Doyle, President E. W. Thurlow, President SAFE POWER FOR MAINE Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Post Office Box 774 Edison Drive Camden, Maine 04843 Augusta, Maine 04336 First Selectman of Wiscasset Mr. Donald E. Vandenburgh M'unicipal Building Vice President - Engineering U. S. Route 1 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Wiscasset, Maine 04578 20 Turnpike Road Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 Director, Criteria and Standards Division Of.fice of Radiation Progra=s (ANR-460)
John A. Ritsher, Esquire U.S. Environ = ental Protection Agency Ropes & Gray Washington, D.O.
20460 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 1 Of fice Mr. John it. R. Paterson ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR Assistant Attorney General JFK Federal Building State of Maine Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Augusta, Maine 04330 Stanley R. Tupper, Esq.
Mr. Nicholas Barth Tupper and Bradley Executive Director 102 Townsend Avenue Sheepscot Valley Conservation Boothbay Harbor, Maine 04538 Association, Inc.
P. O. Box 125 David Santee Miller, Esq.
Alan, Maine 04535 213 Morgan Street, N. W.
Wiscassett Public Library Association High Street Mr. Paul Swetland Wiscasset. Maine 04578 Resident Inspector / Maine Yankee Mr. Torbert H. Macdonald, Jr.
c/o U.S. NRC Office of Energy Resources P. O. Box E State House Station #53 Wiscasset, Maine 04578 Augusta, Maine 04333 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman Robert M. Lazo, Esq., Chairman Manager - Washington Nuclear Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Corraission C-E Power Systems Washington, D. C.
20555 Combustion Engineering, Inc.
4853 Cordell Ave., Suite A-1 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California Bodega Bay, California 94923 State Mahning Meer Mr. Gustavo A. Linenberger Executive Department Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory comission tft,ft[',t S
g Washington, D. C.
20555 Augusta, Maine 04330
1 ENCLOSURE ADDITIONAL FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW MAINE YANKEE DOCKET NO. 50-309 l
Hose Stations, Section 3.1.2(a)(b)(d)(e)
In the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, it was.our concern that adequate manual fire suppression capability was not provided for the pro-i tection of safety related equipment and cables.
J By letters dated October 12, 1978 and October 16, 1979 the licensee proposed the following modifications:
1.
For new hose stations or existing stations that are having their nozzles replaced, the new nozzles will not require going through the straight stream mode prior to going to the fog mode, 2.
The substandard pipe fitting at hose station 79 is to be replaced and hose limited to 75 feet,.and 3.
A hose. station connected to the primary water system for containment is to be provided.
Based on our review, we conclude that with the preceding fire protection modificat.icns, the hose stations meet the guidelines of Section E.3 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
Hose Station, Section 3.1.2(c) l In the SER, it was our concern that the manual fire suppression capability l
may not be adequate in all areas of the plant. We recommended that the existing hose stations be fitted with additional hose lengths, or new hose stations be installed, such that hose from an interior hose station would reach all the following areas:
(1) Protected and unprotected cable tray rooms (2)
Primary auxiliary building (3) Containment penetration areas (4) ruel building and radioactive control area (5) Turbine. building l
(6) Containment spray pump building (7) Ventilation equipment and personnel airlock area l
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- (8) Unprotected switchgear room (9) Energency feedwater pump area (10) Steam and feedwater valve area By letter dated December 5, 1980, the licensee verified that additonal hose stations have been installed to provide manual fire suppression capability in all of the above areas.
All hose stations are installed to meet the capacity recomendations of fiFPA 14, " Standpipe and Hose Stations." This standard recommends that the minimum water supply at the hydraulically most remote hose connection should be sufficient to provide a residual pressure of 65 psi at the outlet with 100 gpm flowing from the outlet. This meets our guidelines. The maximum length of hose attached to the interior hose stations which protect the above areas is 100 feet. This length is within the recommendations of Section 4-2.1 of r;FPA 14 and meets our guidelines.
Based on our review, we conclude that the hose stations installed to protect the ten subject areas meet Section E.2(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and, therefore, are acceptable.
Gas Sucoression System, Section 3.1.5 IntheFireProtectionSafetyEhaluationReport,theconcernwasthatadequate fire suppression in the control room cable chase had not been provided.
By letter dated October 16, 1979, the licensee proposed to install ao automatic Halon fire suppression system for the control room cable chase, activated by cross-zoned ionization detection.
Theadequacyofredundantsafeshutdowncableseparationisbeingrehiewed separately. We conclude that the automatic Halon system meets the guidelines of Section E.4 of /,ppendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
l Fire Doors, Section 3.1.7 l
In the Fire Protection Safety Ehaluation Report, it was our concern that the door at tne northeast corner of the turbine building was not reinforced and curbed or the doorway sealed to resist the effects of an explosion or fire at the unit station service transformers.
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By letter dated October 16, 1979 the licensee stated that the door at the northeast corner of the turbine building has been removed and the opening l
filled with concrete block to match the wall.
O 3-Based on our review we conclude that the blocklng up of the door openin provides an adequate fire stop, meets the guidelines of Section D.1.(h)g(1) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, and, therefore, is acceptable.
Fire Mains, Section 3.2.4 In the Fire Protection Safety Ehaluation Report, it was our concern that the fire water supp.ly mains were laid in close proximity to each other and that a single failure could affect both mains, thereby cutting off the supply of water to the plant for firefighting.
By letter dated May 31, 1979 the licensee prohided additional information, to show that no modifications are necessary.
Based on our rehiew, we find that we agree with the licensee's conclusion, because the fire main loop design meets the guidelines of Section E.2 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and is, therefore acceptable.
Protected Cable vailt Penetrations. Section 3.2.6 In the SER, it was our concern that a fire could spread to the control room from the protected cable vault through the unsealed conduit cable penetrations.
By letter dated August 16, 1979, thelicenseeprohidedfirebarrierpenetration seal test data which described the results of fire tests of conduit cable penetrations. The cor.duit cable penetrations were subjected to a standard ASTM E-119 fire test.
Based on the licensee's test resulte, we conclude that the conduit cable pene-tration seals are adequate and meet Section D.l(j) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and, therefore, are acceptable.
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