ML19209D265
| ML19209D265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1979 |
| From: | Moody D Maine Yankee |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WMY-79-116, NUDOCS 7910220289 | |
| Download: ML19209D265 (6) | |
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ENGINEERING OFFICE WEST 80RO, MASSACHUSETTS 01581 617-366-9011 mJS WMY 79-116.
B.3 2.1 October 16, 1979 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Operating Reactors
References:
(a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
(b) USNRC Letter from R. W. Beid to R. H. Groce dated February 2,1978;
Subject:
Admendment No. 35 to Facility Operating License
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Submittal of Fire Protection Systems Design Information Reference (b) above required Maine Yankee to submit additional design information to your staff on several items listed in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report. That information follows here, referenced to the the appropriate SER section.
SER Section 31.1 - Fire Detection Systems Maine Yankee will install additional fire detection equipment in the fifteen areas numbered under this SER section plus the steam turbine-driven feed pump area and in the area of the safety-related trays in the steam and feedwater valve area.
This new detection equipment will be designed and installed in accordance with the appropriate NFPA code, and will be compatible with the existing Pyrotronics detection and alarm equipment.
The existing fire control panel located in the control room will be modified to provide additional alarm points for the added detection zones.
Ionization type smoke detectors will be added in the following areas:
1.
Main Control Board 2.
Elec';rical Equipment Cabinet 3
Reactor Protection System Cabinet 4.
Under the Raised Floor of the Computer Room at the Ventilation Air Entrance to the Equipment Cabinents 5.
Protected Switchgear Room (3) i I78 556 79102202'87
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 16, 1979 Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 2 6.
EL 45 ft. & 35 ft. Battery Rooms 7.
Circulating Water Pump House 8.
Area of Auxiliary Charging Pump 9
Emergency Shutdown Panel 11 ft. EL PAB 10.
Safety Related Cable Trays at Elevation 11 ft. & 21 ft. PAB 11.
Each Charging Pu=p Cubicle
.v-12.
Containment Spray Pump Motor Cubicles 13 Containment Spray Pump Building, 30 ft. Elevation 14.
Ventilation Equipment and Personnel Air Lock Area 15.
Compactor Area & Fuel Pool Pump Area of Fuel Building 16.
Emergency Feed Pump Area 17 Component Cooling Water & Service Water Pump Cable Area of Turbine Building
- 18. Cable Trays in Annulus of Containment 19 Control Room Cable Chase 20.
Protected Cable Tray Room 21.
Cable Vault 22.
Steam and Feedwater Valve House Safety Related Cable Trays 23 Fire Pump House Duct detectors will be installed in the following areas to provide alarm and control signals to prevent spread of products of combustion.
1.
Air Supply to the Protected Cable Vault 2.
Air Supply to the Control Room 3
Ventilation Ductwork Between Fuel Building and Exhaust Fan in PAB 4.
Air Supply to Protected Cable Tray Room Heat detectors will be installed to detect a fire in the following areas.
1.
Kitchen Area of Control Room 2.
Charcoal Filters (two units) 3 Steam driven emergency feed pump Photo electric detector will be installed over the steam driven emergency feedpump.
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It should be noted that, after further investigation and disucssion with the detection system supplier, it was decided that a more effective method of detecting a fire in the concentrations of cable in the containment would be to install ionization detectors over the cable trays.
This will be done instead of installing detectors on the suction side of the six containment recirculation fans as originally intended.
SER Section 3 1.2 - Hose Stations a.
Modifications to existing hose stations.
This information was sent to you by letter dated October 12, 1978, WMY 78-97.
I178 557
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 16, 1979 Attention:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 3 b.
Containment hose station This commitment as stated in section 3 1.2 of the Safety Evaluation Report is "A hose station connected to the primary water system will be provided in containment with sufficient hose to reach all cable locations and areas where combustible liquids could accumulate. The hose staticn and stored hose will be accessible for fire fighting and not subject to fire damage."
Areas to be reached by this hose station are the reactor coolant pump enclosures via spiral ladders from 46' level, the interior containment cable penetration area and the trench around outside of crane wall-2 feet elevation. To accomplish this, a standpipe will be run from the 2 inch primary water piping in the outer annulus near #1 loops through an existing crane wall penetration into #1 loop area up last #1 steam generator to a location inboard of the pressurizer shed above t'.e 46' elevation at about r
EL 53.A.
One hose outlet will be located at about elevation 50' on the southeast corner of the pressurizer shed.
An additional hose outlet will be located near the front of the ramp on the
-2' elevation connected to the 2" PW 11pe at that point.
It should be noted that, per agreement during discussion with the staff, these hose stations will not be NFPA " code" hose stations.
Fire water is not available in the containment.
These will be a way to use available water for fire suppression if it is needed.
Each hose station will have 150 ft. of 1 1/2 inch hose, will have a design capacity of 100 GPM with a minimum pressure of 65 PSIG at the highest station.
SER Section 3.1.4 - Water Suppression Systems a.
Protected Cable Vault Protection of this area will be a manual deluge system delivering approximately 400 GPM and applied to the top of each tray and directionally at the face of each bank of trays.
The intent of this system is to preclude the spread of fire from one tray or bank of trays to another.
This system is manua) in operation only and does not have an associated early warning system, although the early warning system for the CO-2 system ir.
this same area will serve this purpose.
The sprinkler heads will be located at two elevations to cover all trays adequately.
The calculated density will be.15 GPM per FT2 for both upper and lower levels.
b.
Component Cooling Water Pumpe Protection of these pumps will be provided by a single line of automatic sprinklers approximately eight feet above the floor, with one sprinkler head over each of the four pumps.
Each head will have a heat collector on it, and there will be a water flow switch to indicate operation of the system.
1178 358 t
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 16, 1979 Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 4 c.
Containment Spray Pump Building A pre-action sprinkler system will be installed, with one sprinkler head in each of five pump cubicles.
The spray density 2
will be.25 spm/ft. The deluge valve will be electrically actuated from smoke detectors in the pump cubicles.
SER Section 3 1.5 - Gas Suppression Systems a.
An automatic Halon 1301 fire suppression system will be installed within the Control Room cable chase to automatically detect and extinguish an incipient cable fire before it could become fully developed and disable cables for redundant safe-shutdown systems. The installation will consist of a single 30 lb. Halon 1301 cylinder, with two discharge nozzles in the cable chase. Four ionization detectors in the cable chase will be cross-zoned to activate the system and to alarm at the the central alarm panel. Access panels covering the cable chase will be removed, caulked, and replaced to prevent loss of Halon agent.
SER Section 3 1.7 - Fire Doors The door at the northeast corner of the turbine building has been
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removed, and the opening filled with concrete block to match the wall.
SER Section 3 1.3 - Fire Dampers Three hour fi' e dampers will be provided in the ventilation penetrations Ecr the following areas:
1.
Control Room 2.
Protected switchgear room and battery room 3
Protected cable tray room The ductwork penetrations for the above areas require nine dampers of various sizes. These dampers are self-contained units with fusable leaks causing actuation, and are UL or FM approved for the service.
SER Section 31.9 - Fire Barrier Penetration Seals This information was provided in two letters to you, one dated January 29, 1979, WMY 79-6; and one dated August 16, 1979, WMY 79-81.
SER Section 3 1.12 - Control of Combustibles a.
Duct detectors, as noted in the previous response to Section 3 1.1, will be installed in the air supply to the protected cable vault and to the protected cable tray room. They will be wired to shutdown the supply fans to those areas to prevent the introduction of. products of combustion into the areas from a fire in some other area of the pl'nt.
b.
Information of the fire pump house protection was included in a previous letter to you, WMY 79-6 dated January 29, 1979.
1178 359 i
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 16, 1979 Attention: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 5 SER Section 3 1.16 - Fire Stops in Vertical Cable Runs Fire stops provided for these cable penetrations between floors currently consist of asbestos rope covered with Flamastic.
The report submitted to you with our letter WMY 79-81 dated August 16, 1979 describes the performance ef this are.n penetration seal'.
Maine Yankee feels that this is a sufficient non-combustible stop for use between the floors since no specific fire resistance rating is necessary. Spare conduit penetrations can be adequately sealed using threaded caps. Therefore, Maine Yankee will either seal the remaining openings with the asbestos. cope /Flamastic combination or with a silicon foam stop; using whichever is easiest to install in the opening at the time the sealing is done.
The tray covers will be modified to assure that they can be quickly removed for fire fighting.
SER Section 3 2.1 - Safe Shutdown Capability This item was addressed by Maine Yankee in two letters to you, WMY 78-52 dated May 31, 1978 and WMY 79-98 dated September 20, 1979 This last letter is currently under review by your staff.
SER Section 3 2.2 - Emergency Lighting This item was addressed by Maine Yankee in our letter WMY 78-65, dated July 3, 1978.
SER Section 3 2 3 - Fire Barrier Penetrations Seals This item was addressed in our letter WMY 79-81, dated August 16, 1979.
SER Section 3 2.4 - Fire Mains This items was addressed in our letter WMY 78-52, dated May 31, 1978.
This item is still under review by the staff, which has requested more information on the fire main installation.
We have no further information than that sent in the referenced letter, which details the installation procedure and describes the final installation. We feel that the information supplied backs up our contention that the staff concerns are unwarranted. We re-iterate our position that the piping system is sufficiently well-designed and constructed so that no changes need to be made.
SER Section 3.2.5 - Hydrant Block Valves This item was addressed in our letter WMY 78-47, dated May 10, 1978.
SER Section 3.2.6 - Protected Cable Vault Penetrations This item was addressed in our letter WMY 78-47, dated May 10, 1978, 1i78 360
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 16, 1979 Attention:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 6 SER Section 3.2.7 - Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil This item was addressed in our letter WMY 78-99, dated October 23, 1978.
SER Section 3 2.8 - Fire Pump House Fire Protection This item was addressed in our letter WMY 79-6, dated January 29, 1979.
SER Section 3 2 9 This item was addressed in our letter WMY 79-6, dated January 29, 1979 Maine Yankee wishes to point out at this time that because of an NRC order requiring a plant shutdown early this year, the refueling outage originally scheduled for fall of 1979 has been rescheduled to January of 1980. Therefore, the fire protection system modifications originally scheduled for the end of the fall 1979 refueling ourage are rescheduled to the end of the January 1980 outage. Work is progressing on these modifications at the present time.
However, due to restrictions on what can be done in certain areas with the plant at power, much of the final work will have to be done during the refueling shutdown.
We trust that all the above information meets with your approval. If you have any further questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY D. E. Moo y Manager of Operations EAS/dep 1178 361