ML19345D083

Forwards Evaluation of SEP Topic VIII-3 Re Electrical Instrumentation & Control Features of Sys Required for Safe Shutdown.Evaluation Will Be Basic Input to Integrated Safety Assessment for Facility

ML19345D083
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	11/21/1980
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Counsil W CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
References
TASK-03-03.A, TASK-03-03.B, TASK-03-03.C, TASK-3-3.A, TASK-3-3.B, TASK-3-3.C, TASK-RR LS5-80-11-30, LSO5-80-11-030, LSO5-80-11-30, NUDOCS 8012090041
Download: ML19345D083 (15)

Text

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o UNITED STATES

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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

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• s November 21, 1980 j

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Docket No. 50-213 o

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CEI Mr. W. G. Counsil, Senior Vice President

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p, Connecticut Yanke Atomic Pow'er Company R

o

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Post Office Box 270

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Hartford, Conracticut 06101

Dear Mr Counsil:

RE: SEP TOPIC VII-3, ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL FEATURE OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN (HADDAM NECK)

Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic VII-3, Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Features of Systems Required for Safe Shutdown. This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-213, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for licensing new facilities.

Please inform us if your as-built facility differs from the licensing basis assumed in our assessment within 60 days of receipt of this letter.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assess-l ment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic is modified before the integrated l

assessment is completed.

i Sincerely,

.y nnis M. Crutchfield, ief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

Compieted SEP Topic VII-3 cc w/ enclosure:

See next page r

'80 % 0 u 0 6 11

9 Mr. W. G. Counsil November 21, 1980 cc w/ enclosure:

Day, Berry & Howard U. S. Environmental Protection Counselors at Law Agency One Constitution Plaza Region 1 Office Hartford, Connecticut 06103 ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Superintendent Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Haddam Neck Plant RFD #1 Resident Inspector Post Office Box 127E Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 c/o U. S. NRC East Haddam Post Office Mr. James R. Himmelwright East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Northeast Utilities Service Cocpany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 R. E. Schaffstall, Executive Director for SEP Owners Group Russell Library 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 119 Broad Street Washington, D.C.

20006 Middletown, Connecticut 06437 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 Connecticut Energy Agency ATTN: Assistant Director Research and Policy Development Department of Planning and Energy Policy 20 Grand Street l

Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Director, Criteria and Standards Division Office of Radiation Prograns (ANR-460) l U. S. Environmental Protection l

Agency Washington, D. C.

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4 SE? *ECHNICAL E7ALCATION 8

TOPIC VII-3 ELECTRICAL, INSTRIDfENTATION AND CONTROL TEATCRES OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED FCR SAFE SHU DOWN LCDAM NECK NUCLEAR STA!!0N Connec:icut Yaskee Atomi: ?over Company f

August 1980 l

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8-11-80 1

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CONTENTS 1.0

!YIRODUCTION..

1 2.0 RIVIEW CRITERIA 2

3.0 RELATED SAFITY TOPICS AND INTF.RFACES.

2 4.0 RIVIEW GUIDELINES 3

5.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 4

5.1 Ins::umenta ion.

A

5.1.1 Evalua

ion.

6 5.2 Safe Shu:down Sys: ems 6

5.2.1 Onsi:e ?over Unavailable'.

7 5.2.1.1 Evalua -ion S

5.2.2 offsi:e Power Unavailable 3

5.2.2.1 Eval.: ion 3

5.3 Shu:down and Cooldown capabili:y Ou: side the Control Room 9

5.3.1 Evalua

ion.

9 6.0

SUMMARY

9 7.0 SAFE SE'TDOWN IISC FIATURES FOR CONSIDERATION 3Y SEP TOPIC III-1 10 11

3.0 REFERENCES

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SEP TECHNICAL EVALUATION TOPIC VII-3 ELEC*RICAL, INS!RUMENTATION AND CONTROL FEATURES OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHU*DOW HALDAM NICI NUCLEAR STA!!CN

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report is par: of :he Systema:i: Evaluation ?:ogram (SE?) review of Topi VII-3, "Sys:e=s Required for Safe Shu:dewn". The objec:ive of

his review is :o de:er=ine whether :he electrical, ins::umen:acion, and con:rol (E!&C) fea:ures of :he systems required for safe shu:down, including supper: sys: ems, =ee: curren: licensing requiremen:s.

The systa=s required for safe shu:down have been iden:ified by :he NRC 3E? s:aff. The syste=s were reviewed :o ensure :he following safety obje -

ives are se::

1.

Assure :he design adr4quacy of the safe shutddwn system

s au :matically ini:iate opera: ion of appropria:e systems, including reactivi:y control sys: ems, such

ha: fuel design limi:s are no exceeded as a result of operacional occurrences and pos:ulated acciden=s, and

o au:ematically ini:ia:e sys: ems required to bring :he plan: :o a safe shu:down 2.

Assure :ha: required sys: ems, equipment, and control to maintain :he uni: in a safe condi: ion during hot shut-down are appropriately located ou: side the control room, and have :he capabili:y for subsequent cold shut-down of :he reactor using sui:able procedures 3.

Assure only safety grade 4quipment 7, required :o bring primary coolant sys:ess from a high pressure :o low pressure cooling condition.

The scope of :his review specifically includes an evalua: ion of the electrical, ins::umentacion, and control (EI&C) features necessary for opera: ion of :he iden:ified safe shutdown systems.

The review evaluates :he systems for operabili:7 with and wi:hout offsi:e power mad the ability to operate wi:h any single failure. The E!5C 1

review of safe shutdown systems only includes : hose features not covered under other SE? Topics. Specific items which will be covered under other Si? reports are identified in Section 4.0, Review Guidelines.

2.0 REVII'4 CRITERIA Curren: licensing cri:eria for safe shutdown is contained in :he following:

1.

IEEE S:andard 279-1971, "Cri:eria for ? otec: ion Sys: ems

!ct Nuclea: Pcwer Genera:ing Staticas" 2.

ODC-5, " Sharing of Strue:ures, Systems, and Componen:s" 3.

GDC-13, "Instrumen:a: ion and Control" 4.

COC-17, "Elec::ic ? ver Sys: ems" 5.

GDC-19, " Control Room" 6.

ODC-25, "Reac:ivi:y Con::o1 Sys:em Redundancy and Capabili:y" 7.

GDC-34, " Residual Hea: Removal" 3.

GDC-35, " Emergency Core C: cling" 9.

GOC-44, " Cooling 'Ja:ar."

3.0 RRTED SAFETY TOP!CS AND INTERFACES 1

The following list of SEP topics are related to che safe shu:down l

being specificall'y reviewed copic wi:h respect to EI&C features, but are no:

under th!.a topic:

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SE? III-10. A, " Thermal overload ?:o:ec: ion for Mo: ors l

of Mo:or-Operated Valves" l

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SE? VI-7A3, "ECCS Actuation System" t

3.

SEP VI-7Cl, " Independence of Onsi:e ?cwer" j

4.

SE? VI-10A, " Testing of RTS and ISF Including Respense Time Testing" l

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5.

SE? VI-103 " Shared ESF, onsite Emergency ?ower, and Service Sv: tess for Mul:iple Uni: Facili:ies" 5.

SE? v'.I-1, " Reactor Trip System" 7.

SEP VII-2, "ESF Control Logic and Design" 3.

SEP 7III-2, "Onsi:e E=ergency ?cwar Systems-Diesel Generators" 9.

SEP ?!II-3, "E=ergency DC ?cwer Sys:e=s" 10.

SEP IX-3, " Station Service and Cooling ~4a:er Systems" 11.

SE? II-6, " Fire ?:otection."

~4here safe shutdown sys:es I!ic :ssponse is affected by :he above-senzioned :cpics, that particular SI? review has been consulted for deter-sination of overall safe shutdown system performance.

'@.ere :he SE? :opic review is not available, :he affec: on safe shutdown sys:es performance has been identified as be:.ng based on an assumed operating condi: ice of the affec:ing sys:e=, The safe shutdown review vill be considered preliminary until resolutica of :he affecting :cpic is completed and found :o be in accordance with assumptions sade in :his review.

The ec=ple:ica of :his review impacts upon :he following SEP :opics, since capabili:ies relating to safe shu:down is required in the topic:

1.

SZ? VIII-1A, "Potencial Equipmen: Failures Associated wi:h a Degraded Grid Voltage" 2.

SEP VIII-2, "Onsi:e Emergency Power Systems-Diesel Generators."

4.0 REVII'4 CUIDELINES he capability to attain a safe shutdown has been reviewed by evalu-ating :he systems used for normal shu down (onsi:e power not available) and emergency shutdown (offsite power not available). SRP 7.4 was applied to each systes to ensure the following 3M delines were set:

1.

They have the required redundancy (SRP 7).

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They meet the single failure crit 2 ion (RG 1.53, ICS3 3T? 13) 3.

They have the required capacity and reliability to perform in: ended safety functions on demand (SRP ?).

Addi:ionatly, SR? 5.4 requirements con:ained in 3, ? 153 5-1 were reviewed to determine if :he systems required for residual hea: removal =et the following cri:eria:

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The systems are capable of being opera:ed from the con:rol roem wi:5 only offsi:e or only casi:e power available I.

The systens are capable of bringing :he rese:or :o cold shu:down wi:h only of fsi:e or only onsi:e power avail-aole wi:hin a reasonable period, assusing the mos:

limi:ing single failure The elec: ical equipmen: environmen:21 qualifica::v: and physical separation are being reviewed under other :opics, as is :he seismia equipment qualifi-ca: ion, and are not reviewed in :his repor:. See: ion 7.0 consists of a list of safety rela:ed EI&C equipment necessary for safe shu:down to be used in resolving SEP Topic III-1, "Classifica: ion of 3::uctures, Cespo-nenca, and Systems."

5.0 DISCUSSION AND EVAI.UATION 5.1 Ins: umentazion. The NRC SE? Staff Review of Safe Shutdown Sys-l l

ems iden:ified :he instrumentation available in the control ecom necessary l

o bring :he reactor f:cm :he hot shutdown :o cold shutdown condi: ion.

i This review evaluates :he nuclear instrumentation, since this parameter sus: be moni:ored to ensure the reactor achieves rad maintains shutdown condi: ions. Various system parameters, such as pump running or valve posi-tion indications, are not included in the list of safe shutdown instruments of :he SEP Review of Safe Shu:down Systems. This is due to the fac: : hat indication is provided by :he control /oper( 1 circuitry. Availabili:y of control / operate circuitry to run the syst :s also means availability of the required indication. Sinita ly, if the cone ol/ operate circuitry is anavailable such : hat system operation is not possible, then system indi-cation is not mandatory.

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The nuclear instrumentation is powered from four vital buses providing redundant indication of eact range of power level. The buses are powered by static inverters from the avo 125V DC buses and have no single failures that would result in failure of all nuclear instrumentation. Each vital O

bus is powered from o,ne of :so breakers which are mechanically interlocked to prevent powering :he bus frem redundan sources 4: :he same ti=e. "How-ever, there are no Technical Specifications prohibiting powering all four vi:21 buses frem one source. However, the semi-vital bus, which is powered from F.CC-5, provides rod bot:om indica: ions which indicate that the reactor has been shut dcwn.

The reactor parameter indicators (level, pressure, and temperature) available in the control room are powered from t' four vital buses. Also

he ;emi-vt:al buses provides reactor pressure and temperature indications.

Therefore, no single failure will result in :ne loss of reac:ct pressure, tempersture, and pressurizer level indication.

The instruments in the control roem providing indication of reactor pressure, temperature, and pressurizer level, as well as those providing indication of various systems, flow, temperature, pressure, valve position, etc., art designed such that a single failure of any of these instruments will no: preven: proper operation of the.RPS and ESF actuation systems.

The indications for power to the various AC and DC buses is supplied by lights, meters, or alarma powered frem :he bus being monitored. Loss of power to the bus would be indicated in the control room, and no single failures of indications would effect the ability to monitor any other bus.

I Indication of CVCS, IHR, Component Cooling Water, Service Water, and HPSI sys:em parameters such as flow, ca.mperature, level, and pressure available in the control room, are powered by the semi-vital bus. While loss of :he semi-vital bus would cause a loss of this indication, indica: ors available in the control room such as pressurizer level, reactor pressure /

temperature and steam generator level can be used to determine if the sys-tems are performing properly. Also, pump running / valve open indicators can be used to infer flow for these systems.

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5.1.1 Ivaluation. The ins::umentation necessary for reaching and maintaining cold shu:down at Haddam Neck meets current licensing

i:eria since :here are no potential single EISC, failures tha: could render vi:al indica: ions necessary for main:aining plant control inoperable.

5.2 Safe Shutdown Svs:ess. The SEF scaff re' view of Safe Shutdown Systems iden:ified the sys: ens required for shor:-:ers cooling (immedia:ely af:e reae:or shutdown) and long-:ers cooling (when the reae:o is cooled

o :he RKK design pressure limic) wi:h only offsi:e or only ansi:e power available.

Normal shor:-:erm cooling is provided by dumping steam from :he steam genera or :o :he main condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The circu-la:ing wa:e pumps provide :coling to remove heat by condensing :he steam.

The feedwa:e system : hen re: urns :he water ;c :he s:aam genera:or. This cooling method is caly available when offsi:

power is available. Failure of the feedwater con:rol system, :urbine bypass valves, or loss of circu-la:ing wa:e flew :s the cendenser can render this me: hod of cooling ino pera:ive. The systems in this me: hod are no: : lass II bu: are being considered as an available means to remove decay heat.

The emergency or al:erna:e short-term cooling requires operation of i~

he Auxiliary Feed System (AFS) and :he Main S:eam Safe:y Valves (MSSV).

The safe:7 valves have no elec: ical con::als and operate au:ematically :o relieve pressure frem :he S/Gs thereby cooling the reae:or. A means of makeup to the S/Gs is necessary to con:inue :his method of cooling. The AFS is capable not only of providing :his water inven:ory, bu: can also relieve S/G pressure :hrough the :vo steam driven auxiliary feed pumps.

There is one elec::i: auxiliary feed pump. The AFS is not automatically ini:ia:ed. However, :he AFS is no: required until approxima:ely e 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> The valve providing steam :o the AFS pumps are air-opera:ed aft : a scram.

and fail shu: on loss of power or loss of air, but can be manually opened.

The ATS pumps dis:harge to the S/Gs either :hrough a normally closed MOV or

hrough :he four main feed regulating valve bypass valves. The bypass valves fail open on a loss of power or loss of air. They can be manually operated in :he even: of a control circui: failure..

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Makeup water to maintain primary wa:er inven:ory and necessary boration levels is provided either by the CVCS system or the HPSI system. The C7CS system will au:cmatically provide water when pressurizer level is low.

The HPSI sys:e= sus: be manually star:ed :o provide :his function unless the primary pressure has dropped to :h'e HPSI initia: ion point. There are no II&C single f ailures which would disable bo:h systems.

The C7CS sys:en provides water from :he Volu=e Con:rol Tank (VCT) or

he Rafueling Wa:er S:orage Tank (RWST) :o :he reactor via : Le loop four ho: leg or loop :vo cold leg. 3o:an is added :o :he sue:ior of the charging pu=ps fers the 3cri Acid Tank (3AT). The RWST con:ains bo 5:ed wa:er.

The HPSI system provides water form :he RWST to the reactor via :he cid leg of each loop. The H?SI sys:em will autrma:ically ini:ia:e on low reae:or pressure or can be manually s:arted :s provide :he necessary nakeup va:er.

Long-term cooling is provided by the RER sys:en which :akes sue: ion on

he loop one hoe leg and discharges to :he loop two cold leg. Two 507.

cap.. ;y pumps and hea ex hangers provide :he coling. Ii:her :he Compo-Cooling *Ja er Sys:en (CCWS) or SWS can provide cooling to :he hea:

nen:

ex: hangers.

t 5.2.1 Onsi:e ?cwer "navailable Coffsi:e Power cniv). Haddam Neck normally opera:es wi:h the sca:ica :urbine generator providing half i:s 4150V buses and off si:e power providing :he c:her buses. Loss of :he main genera:or during power operation will resul: in a reactor scram and

urbine : rip. The two off si:e powered ::ansformers are capable of supplying

he lost 41607 buses.

Single failures of IISC fea:ures, such as a loss of the feedwater control system, could render :he normal shor -term cooling me: hod ino perable. However, no II&C single f ailure disabling :he normal cooldown method would also render the AFS and MSSVs inoperable.

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I Lung-ters cooling is provided only by :he RER system. Single II&C failures such as failure of so ive or control power to any sue: ion or dis-charge MOV renders the sys:es inoperable. This does not =ce: the require-men:s of 3T? RS3-5-1.

5.2.1.1 Evalua: ion. The syste=s required for short-:ers cooling s: Haddam Neck are capable of providing :he required cooling assu=ing to ensi:e power is available and a single I &C failure. The only l

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long-:ars cooling sys:em (RHR) is suscep:ible :s single failures of II&C l

f ea:ures and does so: =ee: :he requiresen:s of 3 ? 153-5-1.

i 5.2.2 offsi:e power Unavailable. During normal opera: ion, a l

loss of offsi:e power will resul: in a reac:o seras, :urbine : rip, and

=o=en:ary loss of power :o :he AC distribu: ion system. Subsequen:ly, the diesel generators v:11 be su:acarically star:ed :o supply power a: buses 1-3 and 1-9.

l The nor=al shor:-:ers cooling =e: hod (use of :he =ais condenser) is no: available due :o :he loss of power :o the circula:ing wa:e pumps pro-viding cooling :o :he ais condenser. The AFS and MSSVs are availabl. :o t

l cool the reac:o to :he point of RER initia: ion. There are no II&C single

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failures which would preven: :he AFS from opera:ing :o supply wa:e :o the S/Gs usi=g ei:her :he s:eas driven pumps or :he elec::ic pump.

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The long-:ers cooli=g :apabili:ies of :he RER system have been previ-ously discussed.

l There are no single I!&c failurs : hat would preven: ei: hor the CVCS or i

a?SI system from providing :he necessary primary sake-up.

l 5.2.2.1 Evalua: ion. The short-:ers cooling se: hods a:

Haddam Ncek are capable of providing :he required cooling assuming no off-site power is available and a single I!SC failure. The long-:ers cooli=g system is succeptible to single II&C failures and does not see: the require-l 2en:s of STP RS3-5-1.

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5.3 Shutdown and cooldown Cspabili:v cu side the cen:rol Room. The capability to maintain the plant in ho: shu:down frem outside the control room exis:s a: Haddas Neck. Rea::or parameters such as level, pressure, and temperature can be soni:ored at local stations outside the control room. Reactor pressure, :emperature and pressurizer level :an be deter-sined using portable battery powered moni: ors connec:ed :s instrumen: leads ou: side :he con::al roes. Local cone:ol stations exist for :he pe=ps and valves of :he sys: ems required for safe shutdown described in See: ion 5.I.

? ocedures for :aking :he plant from hot :o cold shutdown from ou: side :he

en:rol room exis: and the EIsc features of the safe shu:down systens are capable of suppor:ing :his ;;ocedure.

5.3.1 Evalua

ion. Adequate capabili:y exists :o maintain the reae:or at hot shu:down from ou: side the con:rol room and to take the reactor fres ho: :o cold shu:down from ou: side :he control com.

5.0

SUMMARY

The sys:ess required :o :ake :he reac:or from hot shu:down :o cold shutdevn, assu=ing only of fsi:e power is available or only ensi:e power is l

l available sad a single failure, are capable of ini:iacion :o bring :he l

plan: to a safe shutdown and are in c =piiance vi:h curren: licensing cri-l taria and :he safety objectives of SE? Topic VII-3 ex:ept : hat long-:erm cooling (RHR) is susceptible to single E15C failures which render long-ters cooling inoperable.

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The instrumentation available :o control room operators to place and saintain :he reactor in cold shutdevn condi: ions meets current licensing cri:eria since no single II&C failures render vi:al parameters such as reactor pressure, :emperature, etc. inoperable.

The capabili:7 :o maintain the reactor in bot shutdown from outside

he control :cem exists and is in compliance vi:h the safety objec:ives of SE? Topic VII-3.

?:ocedures :o take the plant f cm hot to cold shutdown l

frem outside :he control ro(m satisfy :he safety objec:ives of SE?

Topic VII..

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7.0 SAFE SHUTDORI EI&C FEATURES FOR CONSIDERATION 3Y SEP TOPIC III-l ELICTRICAL DISTRIBU*!ON (including support structure, but not indiridual loads) 1.

AC 3CSES 1-1A, 13, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5, 7, 3, and :he MCC's powered from these buses-including all feeders, incosing or ou: going, control circui:s, indicating

ircui:s, bus work and support structures 2.

ALL DC 30 SIS--includi g ba::eries, chargers, breakers, bus work, and supp',r: s:ructures 3.

DIISEL CINERA*CR A and 3-including control and indi-ca:ing :ircuitry, and con:rol and indica: ion of rical DG auxiliaries such as lube oil, fuel, and cooling INSTRUMENTATION (including support struc:urss) 1.

PRESSURIZER LIVIL 2.

REAC*CR ?RESSURE 3.

RIAC~0R W.RA*URE 4.

REAC~CR PROTIC*ICN SYSTEM 5.

NEU RCN '.!CNITCRING (including in-core soni:oring) 5.

ARIA AND SYS~IM RADIA!!ON MON!!CRING l

SYS*IMS (inc.udes pumps, valves, con:rol, indication, and suppor:

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structures) l l

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RIS OUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTIM l

2.

COMPCNE r C0 CLING ~4ATER 3.

SERVICE ~4ATER SYS'"EM t

4 AUI!LIARY FIFF 5.

CONTAINMEZ COOLING SERV!CZ '4A!ZR l

5.

MAIN STIAM SAFETY VALVES i

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HPSI l

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CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL 9.

MAIN CONDENSER AND FEEDWAIER 8.0 REF:.RENCES 1.

Final Safety Analysis Report, Haddam Neck Nuclear S:ation.

2.

Code of Federal Regulations, ld CFR $0, Appendix A, " General Design Cri:eria for Nuclear Power ?lancs."

3.

IIIE scandard 179-1971, "Cri:eria for ? o:ec: ion Systems for Nuclear Power Genera:ing 5:a: ions."

4.

NUREG 75/087, Nuclear Regula:ory Ccamission 5:andard Reviev Plan 7.4, "Sys: ems lequired for Safe Shu:down" and 5.4, " Residual Hea: Removal."

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