ML19345C891
| ML19345C891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1980 |
| From: | TENNESSEE, STATE OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345C888 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012080556 | |
| Download: ML19345C891 (45) | |
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l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY EXERCISE i
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16-17 3UNE 1980 1
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PREPARED BY DIVISION OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS d
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BACKGROUND The Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan which was tested by this Exercise was written during the past inree (3) months. When new criterta were publisheti in NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REF-1, the plan whien was ested by Tennessee /TVA last October (October 1979) was no Approval and exercising of the plan was required prior to longer adequate.
TVA receivtng an Operating 1.icense kom NRC for the Sequoyan Facility.
Od Altnough this was the first Exercise of the Tennessee Plan for Sequoyah unc'ei tne criteria specified in NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REF-i, three (3) previous test exerc ses had been conducted involving the Sequoyah Facility. They were on Maren 30,1977, July 6,1978, and October 28-29, 1979.
Planrung sessions between the State and TVA officials were held to prepare the Scenario and the plan for conducting the Sequoyah "10" Exercise.
The details of tne Scenario and Exercise were discussed on May 6, in Chattanooga and May 15, at Watts Bar. On June 6 in Nasnville, the Exercise Plan was finalized. An observer's briefing was conducted in Chananooga on June 10,1980. Observers from the Tennessee Valley Authority, State Civil Defense, Feceral Emergency Management Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission anended the briefing.
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SCENARIO ABSTRACT The exercise was initiated from the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Facility at 0715 COT, June 16, 1980, by simulating severe weather damage to the SQH On-site A-C switchyard whicn caused loss of off-site A-C power suoply.
power was lost due to diesel generator malfunction. At 0920 a leak developed in a subsystem of a reactor coolant system loop. An obstruction in the loop caused reduced coolant flow anc elevated fuel rod temperatures.
The temperature increase caused fuel cladding camage and release of the fuel element gap radioactivity into the primary coolant and subsequently into ne containment building. Containment radiation continued to increase and by 1335 EDT, the projected oose rates were 1 Rem /Hr (wnole body) and 3 Rem /Hr (thyroid) based on containment activity. Declaration of a General Emergency was incicated. At 1400 EDT a earth-moving pan was pulled away from the reactor containment revealing a containment building crack. A Health Physics survey indicated a gamma radiation level of 100 R/Hr. at 200 meters from the containment building.
Containment activity was released in a short time.
The exercise continued until 1630 EDT when evacuation of the risk counties was completed.
The exercise was halted until 0800 EDT/17 June when sampling in the Ingestion Pathway was resumed until 1200 EDT, when the Exercise was terminated.
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OBJECTIVES The objectives of the Exercise are covered in the Scenario and are listed as functions of the Scenario. Each response organization had pre-planned specific cojectives which they wanted to acnieve. The following objectives were proviced in accordance with Para N.3.a of NUREG-0654.
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Ensure activation of State of Tennessee Emergency Operations Center (EOC), local EOC's, State Control Center and TVA - Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
2.
Activate alerting, notification and warning procedures for State, TVA, Hamilton, and Bradley Counties.
3.
Include events that will activate the site Radiological Emergency Plan (REP).
4.
Ensure that communication links are exerc: sed. These include TVA ECC's, State EOC, Hamilton and Bradley County EOCs', and au Command Posts.
5.
Test the emergency response capabilities of TVA, State Organizations, local support agencies, and appropriate Feder:d Agencies.
6.
Require certain pr;tective actions be taken for the plume exposure and ingest 2on pathways.
This includes evacuation (simulated or actual) of off-site areas. -
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Ensure periodic public information releases.
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Acquire the use of designated off-site emergency medical facilities and ambulance services.
9.
Test recovery procedures.
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OBSERVER PROCEDURES Staff planners from the Division of Civil Defense, Tennessee Department of Agriculture, and Tennessee Department of Public Health were designated as Exercise Observers with the following general responsibilities.
Observers planned to be in-place at their designated locations prior to oeclaration of the unusual event. They were instructed to keep a record of directions given, wnen and by whom, so that operat2on and control of the emergency could be evaluated. Observers were also furnished situations and proolems which were pre-numbered to be introduced at a specific time. These situations were intended to " add to the problems", which would occur in an Evaluation of the adequacy of Planning, Manning, Training, emerdency.
Commurucations, Facilities, Operations, and Logistics were to be provided by tne observers.
Observers were also instructed to evaluate the planning wnich was done to provide coverage over an extenced period of time if that became necessary.
Since the Exercise was planned to be no-notice, observers were directed to keep Inc date and tirne confidential and not let participants know when the exercise would be conducted.
Self-evaluatien is an important part of any Exere:se, and participants were requested to provide commenu on the exercise. Written comments from participants and State Ooservers are available at the Tennessee Civil Defense j
Division.
Specific Findings and Recommendations are included in this report.
- An oral critique was conducted at 1330 on 17 June 1980 at the State Control Center, Lovell Field, Chattanooga Tennessee. A transcript of the oral critique is available at tne Tennessee Civil Defense Division. Highlights of tne critique are incluced in Findings and Recommendations.
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I' PARTICIPATING STATE AGENCIES OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE DEP ARTMENT OF CONSERVATION DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION TENNESSEE WILDLIFE RESOURCES AGENCY
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DlVISION OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAR I
HAMILTON AND BRADLEY COUNTIES PARTICIPATING FEDERAL AGENCIES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY U. S. CO AST GUARD NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE PARTICIPATING FRNATESEMI-PRIVATE AGENCIES AMERICAN RED CROSS TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ADVISORS 4
SAMUEL E. SEALL, JR.
Consultant to tne Governor 5
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SEQUOY AH "80" CRITIQUE Tuesday,17 June 1930 1330 State Control Center AGENDA H. H. Bixler Invocation Gilbert Smith Opening Remarks Acknowledgements Scenario Preparation Team State Observers FEMA Support TVA Cooperation State Emergency Operations Center Lacy Suiter/
David Inman 4
John Keese State Control Center Bill DeBrocke Hamilton County Don Gardner Bradley County John Lobdell/
TVA Ed Webb State Observer Comments Ray Bird - SC EOC Harold Fuque - HC EOC Jake Brooks - BC CP Don Dallenbach - SEOC Charles Edwards - Mobile Charles West -Rad. Health Gil Smith - SCC Jimmy Cagle - Agr.-SCC Bill Graham Radiological Health Jack Ricnatoson/
FEMA Bob Trojanowski John Sears /
NRC Don Cameron /
Joe Neudecker Samuel Beall Tripartite Comments Closing Remarks Col. Eugene P. Tanner NOTE: Complete tape of Critique availamle at Tennessee State Division of Civil Defense.
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LISTING OF COMMENTS FROM SEQUOY AH "80" EXERCISE Tennessee Valley Authority U. S. Department of Energy State of Georgia State Emergency Operations Center Operations Puelic Information Department of Puolic Health Water Quality Control Department of Agriculture Hamilton County EOC Bradley County EOC State Lianon Officer (Hamilton, Bradley, TVA)
Department of Transportation Depa.tment of Military State Control Center (2)
Information Department of Safety Communications State EO C State Control Center State Observers State ECC (CD, RAD Health, AGR.)
State Control Center (CD, AGR.)
Hamilton County EOC Bradley County EOC Command Post Mobile Transcript of Critique Feriarsi f.*..ergency Management Agency l
NOTE: Findings and recommendations are included in this j
Report. Complete file of commenu is available at Tennessee Division of Civil Defense.
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FINDINGS BY SUBSECT AREA 1.
Arrangement.ind Procecures in EOC's 2.
Standardize Display Boards 3.
Message Handling within EOC's 4
"Get Ready" Warmng Messages 5.
Update Briefings in EOC 6.
Requiremenu for State Control Center Recommended EOC Layout for Counties 7.
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Keeping all Informed 9.
TVA Representation at SECC & SCC 10.
Adequacy of Warning System 11.
Hard Copy Information on Facility Status 12.
Requirement for "as of" Time of Events 13.
Timing of Meteorological Data 14.
Using Assistance Available 15.
Timely Dose Projections 16.
Control of Radiological Monitoring Teams 17.
Sample Size Information in Plan 13.
Public Information 19.
Agriculture Extension Agent & TDA Agenu 20.
Chattanooga Water Storage Capacity 21.
Communications Equipment Requirements 22.
Traming Radio Communicators 23.
Requirement for No-Notice 24.
Planning for FAA Support 25.
Risk Counties Coordinating Assisance 26.
Test Recovery and Restoration Procedures 1
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i FINDING No.1 The Emergency Operations Center (ECC) arrangements did not provide optimum corditions for utilization of personnel.
DISCUSSION
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Congestion around status maps, tables, and controller's telephones caused some problems because of interference from noise and the crowced conditions. EOC staff personnel were not located adjacent to other personnel witn whom they needed to coordinate various actions. For example, Rad riealth. Air Pc!!ution Control (Metro), Agriculture, TVA Radiation Specialists, and Water Quality Control all are involved in the same kinds of activity. They t
snould be physically located near each other. Other agencies have the same requirement.
t RECOMMENDATJON Review ne job to be done by each member of ne EOC staff and locate tnose within a specific area of respcosibility adjacent to one another insof ar as possaole. Review EOC arrangement and procecures and enange to increase efficiency.
Act2on Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: 1.acy Suiter Completion Date: 1 October 1930 9
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FINDING NO. 2 Visual display boar:s did not provide sufficient information in some of tne Emergency Operanons Centers (EOC's).
DISCUSSION As much of the area situation, both static and active, as can be displayed, needs to be shown on situation maps and status display boards. This information is aosolutely essential in a real emergency because personnel must be able to grasp the status changes readily especially when a personnel enange takes place. Such information as location of Traffic Assist Teams, Command Posts, Shelter Information Points, Road Blocks, Mass Care Shelters, and Radiological Laboratories should be displayed for all to see. Sector designa-tions and the status of evacuation from each area, plume location, weather information (wind direction and velocity, and amespheric stability), and current Emergency Classification are essential items of information for several agencies in the EOC to have available to them. A tone alert system may oc necessary to indicate that a change in status is being posted. Status of some items may oe indicated by a magnede miniature of one (1) color for the plannec location and another color when it is activated. Eacn Department can provice information on status boards affecting them.
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Require input from all personnel who have any EOC responsibility and oetermine what display information will be available in eacn Operations and Control Center. Standardine displayed information.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense.
Action Official: Jonn White Completion Date: 1 October 1980 10
FINDING NO. 3 Message handling anc distribution wittun the Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's) were not entirely satisfactory. A message-nandling system wnicn will keep all people in the EOC informed is required.
DISCUSSION Message traffic involved many agencies. Some were operational and others were of a technical nature.
Personnel who are unfamiliar with technical terms have difficulty copying the information if it is given over telephone circuits. Accuracy of technical information can be very critical in the decision process.
Hamilton County Civil Defense has developed 3 message-handling system which worked extremely well during the Exercise.
Well informed participants are better prepared to handle problems effectively.
RECOMMENDATX)N Review the Hamilton County Civil Defense EOC message-handling system, and adapt it as necessary for use in all EOC's.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: Gilbert Smith Completion Date: 1 September 1980 l
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l FINDING NO. 4 Get-reacy warnings were provided by the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to subordinate units. This helped them be prepared to execute directions more expeditiously.
DISCUSSION The Plan does not require that "get readya messages be sent to the State Control Center (SCC) and County EOC's prior to a change in Emergency Classification.
When the system provides hard copy inzormation to all EOC's and the SCC, they will be aware of a stable, improving, or deterierating condition at the facility and can prepare accordingly.
RECOMMENDATION Discuss tne advantages as well as the problems in providing "get ready for messages, anc if it is determined they are helpful, establisn procedures.
a Acuon Agency: Tennessee Division of Civil Def ense Acton Official: Lacy Sutter Completion Date: 1 October 1980 l
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FINDING 1
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s Procedures for providing information to be included in up-cate briefings snould de reviewed.
i DISCUSSION
.i various procedures were us'd at the Emergency Operations Centers / State 4
Control Center (EOC's/ SCC) to keep personnel informed of status changes periodically In some cases, the person in cnarge attempted to bring everyone up to date while in others, a microphone was passed around for each agency to report updated information.
RECOMMENDATION A standard method of receiving and giving updated information to all personnel in the EOC/ SCC snould be developed. Develop a Standard Format.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense.
Action Official: Cilbert Smith Completion Date: 1 September 1980 13
FINDING NO. 6 The functions of the State Control Center (SCC) as currently planned at Lovell Field was questioned by a number of observers.
DISCUSSON Personnel at the SCC were highly motivated. The SCC is envisioned as a commana and control agency near the site. The current facility cannot provide It is sucn capability due to physical layout and communications limitations.
generally agreed that there is a requirement for media handling in the Sequoyah area. The SCC, as currently set up, cannot perfsrm that function. A near-site facility to coorcinate utilization of various State resources is considered Plant information available to the SCC was late and inaccurate necessary.
which made it impossible to be in a position to control activity.
RECOMMENDATION Determine tne requiremenu for a State near-site facility and its func-tions. Consider a location adjacent to the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) where media information can be provided and essential functions in the near-site area can be coordinated.
Tennesee State Civil Defense and TVA Action Agency:
Action Official: Elgan Usrey Completion Date: 1 October 1980 i
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i FINDING NO. 7 Some counties have inadequate facilities to manage an emergency which can occur from a Nuclear Power Facility.
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lt was reported that some facilities lacked water, sanitation, adequate room and comfort for extended operations.
RECOMMENDATION Prepare a document which lists the recommended Emergency Operations Center (EOC) layout and requirements for those counties involved in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPI) of Nuclear Power Facilities.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and Risk Counties Action Official: John Keese Completion Date: 1 April 1981 d
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FINDING NO. 8 The Bradley County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not kept fully informed of plans conditions until late in the Exercise.
DISCUSS 3ON Since information on a radiation release from Sequoyah was slow arriving the State Emerge.ny Operations Center (SEOC), wind information from at Muscle Shoals did not arrive when it should to coincide with the radiation
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release information. This caused a problem in plotting the direction in whicn tne plume traveled initially. Since the plume was not plotted to travel toward Bradley County, they were not involved. Subsequent action in the form of a
" puff" did get them involved. Radiological Monitoring crews did not send mformation which verified where the simulated radiation was located.
RECOMMENDATION All EOC's should receive a hard copy of what's happening at the facility.
RAD Health should provide simulated radiation readings for monitoring. crews to send to the SEOC.
Action.8 'ency: Tennessee State Civil Defense, TVA, and RAD Health Actior' '
Elgan Usrey Completion Date: 1 October 1980
FINDING NO. 9 Validity of need for TVA representation at the State Emergency Opera 6cns Center (EOC) and State Control Center requires review.
DISCUSSION A TVA representatave was not assigned to the State Control Center when specified in the Pian.
Although TVA stated that a representative would be assigned in an actual emergency, it is important to have one during an Exercise to work out procecures which will be tsed during an actual emergency.
The State neecs to know the significance of problems which are reported concerning the facility. Dec:sion makers should also be advised whether the problem is stable, ceteriorating, or improving.
RECOMMENDATION State Civil Defense and TVA discuss the need for TV A representation at the SECC and SCC. If the need is valid, a representative knowledgeable with the plant operation should be in place at Site Emergency or General Emergency.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civi: Defense and TVA Action Official: John Keese Completion Date: 1 October 1980 17
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FINDING NO.10 1
Tne warning system is not adequate to alert all people within the ten-mile (10) Emergency Planning Zone (EP'.) within fitteen (15) minutes.
DISCUSSON The primary warning system is the use of emergency vehicle sirens. If the counties are given adequate warning so that the vehicles can be prepositionec at tne start of their warning route, they can cover the area witnin fifteen (15)
Without prior notification, it will take 30-45 minutes to alert the minutes.
populat2on-at-risk. This does not meet the warning criteria.
The design objective in NUREG 0634 soecifies notification of all people wtrrun five (5) miles of the facility and runery percent (90%) of these located between five anc ten miles (5-10) within fifteen (15) minutes. The remaining ten percent (10%) must be notified within 45 minutes.
The expected frequency of incidents / accidents at a nuclear power facility are as fo!!ows according to NUREG-0610.
Unusual event - Once or twice per year per unit.
Alert - Once in 10 to 100 years pes unit.
Site Emergency - Once in 100 to once in 5,000 years per unit.
General Emergency - Less than once in about 5,000 years per unit.
Life-threatening coses off-site (witnin 10 miles) once in about 100,000 years per unit.
RECOMMENDATION Question the validity of the requirement for all people living within five (3) miles and ninety percent (90%) of tnose witnin 5 - 10 miles to be not2fied 18
witnin 15 minutes. When the cost of notification within 13 minutes, compared to the cost in 30-45 minutes is considerec, according to the risk, the shorter f
- time appears unjustifiable.
Action Agencies: Tennessee State Civil Defense, Tennessee Valley Authority, Feoeral' Emergency Management Agency, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission u
Action Official: Truett Frazier Completion Date: Open J
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FINDING NO.11 A report of the conditions at the Sequoyah Facility was not forwarced to 1
all activities wno needed the information on a timely basis.
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DISCUSSION l
l If timely decisions are to be made to handle an emergency situation and to protect the puolic, decision makers must have information accurately and as soon after the condition occurt as possible. Dedicated telephone circuits I
were available to provide this information.
Simulated conditions were l
introduced by a TVA Observer at the Sequoyah Facility starting at 0715 EDT on 16 June 1980. Delays from several minutes to over an hour were common in getting the information to some Emergency Operations Centers. Although tne plant information may not be essential for decision making at the county level, it does help keep the county officials informed so that they are more l
nearly ready to respond when directed by the State EOC.
l RECOMMENDATION l
A system should oe provided whicn will transmit plant condition inf orma-f tion anc other entical data to the State EOC, County EOC4, and State Control Center simultaneously with the flow of data to TVA. This information i
should De in "hard copy *' form so that the chance for error is minimum.
l Action Agency: Tennessee Division of Civil Defense and Tennessee Valley l
i Autnority.
Action Official: Elgan Usrey/ David inman Completion Date: 1 October 1980 l
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FINDING No.12
~ The "as of" time or evenu at the facility could not be determined.
DISCUSSION in tne Exercise, simulated conditions and evenu were introduced at tne Sequoyah Facility at tunes specified by the Scenario. This information was passed by voice over a dedicated circuit to the TVA - Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) in Chattanooga where it was then passed to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It was not possible to determine when the event took place at the facilty. In a real emergency, this information would be critical.
RECOMMENDAT10N Include message number and time of event in a hard copy of information concerning facility conditions.
Action Agency: TVA and Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: Elgan Usrey/ David Inman Completion Date: 1 October 1980 21
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FINDING NO.13 Meteorological data did not arrive at the Agencies where it was needed in a timely manner.
DISCUSSION i
The Metro Tower near the facility normally sends weather informat2on j
directly to Muscle Shoals. This wez,ther information is fumished to Healtn Physics personnel for them to ca culate projected dose rates to be forwarced to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Since tne Exercise Plan called for weather data to be introduced as specified (not current actual weather) it was important that the timing of weather condition coinc2de with reported conditions at the plant for that same time. Delays in furnishing plant information to the State EOC caused decisions to be made from out-of-phase weather data. In some cases, the weather data was introduced from the TVA-Centra! Emergency Control Center (CECC) at Chattanooga, fur her compli-cating the problem.
1 RECOMMENDATION TVA Metro at Muscle Shoals sh%1d use the simulated weather cata for their report to State Rad Health and to TVA Health Physic. in an exercise. In an actual emergency, use tte weather data from the Metro Tower at Sequoyan to Metro-Muscle Snoals, then to all concerned agencies.
Action Agency: TVA.
Action Official: Elgan Usrey Completion Date i October 1980 22 l
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FINDING NO.14 Some Agencies coordinated extremely well witn their counterparts, while others triec to handle every problem themselves and failed in some cases.
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DISCUSSION The Division of Water Quality Control ersonnel at the State Control Center (SCC) worked closely with their counterparts at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and recommended timely action to prevent simulated radiation of the water systems downstream from Sequoyah. A situadon was given to the Hamilton County EOC and the SCC requesting information on the extent of radiation five (5) miles from Sequoyah. Hamilton County co'ntacted tne SCC. This question was never answered. In an actual emergency situation, many people can call requesting information on the emergency.
Timely response to queries is necessary. If the answer is not available at one level, it snould be passed on to the next Agency for reply.
RECOMMENDATION Each response organization indoctrinate its personnel to handle problems expecitiously and not hesitate to contact other individuals for assistance.
Action Agency: All participating agencies Action Official: David Inman/ Anne Stringham Completion Date: 1 September 1980 l
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1 FINDING No.15 Accurate and rapid calculation of projected dose exposure was not provicec.
DISCUSSION in order for the Tripartite Committee and other decision makers to make accurate, timely decisions, they must have accurate, timely information on the radiation dose projection involving the populanon-at-risk. TVA has tne capacility at the facility and at Muscle Shoals to make these calculations. The cose rates can be validated by Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (TDRH). If an emergency develops at Sequoyah, and the problem deteriorates to a General Emergency Emergency Classification - 4 (EC-4), prompt action must de taken to protect the people. There may not be time to discuss the calculations when the public is endangered. Action is necessary.
RECOMMENDATlON TVA provides the State EOC projected dose information. The TDRM snould calculate cose projections to confirm the TVA figures.
The State E.:nergency Operations Center (EOC) and TDRH should present the informat:on Ine Triparute for their rehmmendations to the Governor concerning to evacuation.
Action Agencies: TVA, TDRM, Tennessee State Civil Defense Action Official: Anne Stringham - TDPH Completion Date: 1 September 1930 i
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en-FINDING NO.16 Coordination of Raciological Monitoring Team Activities was not conducted by Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (TDRH) personnel.
DISCUSSION Some Divisions of Public Health were not aware of support availaole from TVA, Department of Energy (DOE), Southern Mutual Radiat2on Assistance Plan (SMRAP), and other State Agencies in monitoring teams and Control of teams available was not coordinated so that Rad laboratories.
Monitoring Team 'ocation in tne field was known at all times or so that sample collectors could be directed to the nearest laboratory with field samples.
Location of laboratories is necessary so that any agency which collects samples can be cirected quickly and safely to the lab.
The primary is to provide radiation responsibility of Radiological Monitoring Teams information from various pre-selected locations to verify projected dose calculations.
RECOMMENDATION The appropriate Division of Public Health should establish a grid system with easily located lancmarks or crossroads for Rad monitoring teams to de directed to for sampling, primarily within the ten-mile (10) Emergency Planning ~_one (EP~.).
Rad Health predetermines where mobile and fixed laboratories should be located for expediteo analysis of samples. Identify these locations on a map for ease in locating them. Several suitable locations for mobile labs should be selected so that the safest can be utilized depending upon the wind conditions.
Action Agency: TDRM.
Action Official:
Anne Stringnam-TDPH Completion Date:
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FINDING NO.17 Sample size requirements were not provided Tennessee Department of Agriculture (TDA) personnel by RAD Health.
DISCUSSION Agriculture Department personnel were ordered to the Ingestion Pathway area to collect samples to be checked for radiation. When they returned witn tne samples of milk, produce, and grain; they were told that the samples should nave been larger.
RECOMMENDATION Tennessee Divtsion of Radiological Health (TDRH) provide the TDA specific information to be included in Part III of the Plan on sample require-ments.
Action Agency: TDRH and TDA Acton Official: Anne Stringham - TDPH Completion Date: 1 September 1980 26
FINDING NO.18 Release of Public Information appeared to be handled very effectively.
DISCUSSION The Plan does not require a Public 1.iformation representative at the State Control Center (SCC) in Chattanooga. One was assigned there during the Exercise. News Media will arrive at various places to obtain information on the emergency. The Plan is spec:fic in the guidance on who may release off-site information. The release of off-site information by the Emergency Broaccast System (ESS) (WDOO) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Radio was very effective for Hamilton County. However, Bradley County was not covered with evacuation announcements by their ESS Radio Station (WBAC). A primary function of the State near-site location is to hancie news media representatives in the area. Most of this function was assumed by Hamilton County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It was hancied very eff ectively. However, tne Plan does not specify that method.
RECOMMENDATION The Emergency information Officer should review the procedures specified in the Plan, the procedures used durmg the Exercise, and in coordina-tion with other information personnel determine what changes to the Plan are appropetate.
Action Agency: Emergency Information Officer Action Officiah Keel Hunt Completion Date: i September 1980 27
9 FINDING NO.19 Responsibilities of the University of Tennessee Agriculture Extension Service personnel is not generally uno-stocc by Non-Agriculture Department personnel. Tennessee Department or r.griculture (TDA) agents are difficult to contact in the field.
DISCUSSION Extension Service personnel are not employees of the Tennessee Department of Agriculture. They have, however, been very helpful in surveying farms to ootain information which is included in the Plan.
With prior coorcination, they would be available to assist, if required, during an emergency. The TDA agent in the area could not be contacted until over five (5) nours af ter the Exercise started. Although this was soon enough to handle Ingestion Patnway matters, it did not satisfy coordination requirements for Adriculture sampling in the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Overall, the responsibilities of the TD A were carried our exceptionally well.
RECOMMENDATION TDA provide information to all county Civil Defense Directors in tne 50-mile radius around the Nuclear Power Facilities concerning the functions and responsibilities of Extension Agents. Also, that TDA take action to establisn a system to get in touch with TDA personnel in the EPZ within a reasonable period of time.
Action Agency: Tennessee Department of Agriculture Action Official: Jim Thomas Completion Date: 1 Septemoer 19*0 23 i
FINDING NO. 20 Water storage capacity for the City of Chattanooga is sufficient for less than one (1) cay at normal consumption rate.
DISCUSSION Downtown Chattanooga is supplied with finished water directly from the hign service pumps operatec by Tennessee Water Company without benefit of storage capacity in addition to the clear well which supplies the high service If a radiation release from Sequoyah made it necessary to close tne pumps.
intakes from the Tennessee River, the water supply to the city would be critical.
RECOMMENDATION Determine whether the risk is so great that additional water storage capacity for the City of Chattanooga is essential for the safety anc well being of its citizens.
Action Agency: Tennessee Department of Public Health.
Action Official: Terry Cothern Completion Date: 1 September 1980 29
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1 FINDING No.21 Telephone lines failed and were not immediately repairec.
Communications requiremenu should be reviewed.
DISCUSSION The person who normally expedites resolution of telephone proolems for the State Emergency Operation:; Center (SECC) was on vacation wnen the Exerc:se started. Two (2) critical (TVA Chairman and RAD Health) ringdown ctreuits failed at the SECC. The circuit to Signal Mountain from the State Control Center (SCC) was also inoperative. Some of these circuits were out
- or over six (6) hours. One (1) member of the Tripartite Committee was located at the TVA - Central Emergency Control Center (CECC). He utilized the dedicated circuit to SEOC to discuss Tripartite matters with the committee members there. This was necessary and important for the job, b ct it prevented the State Liaison official at the CECC from talking over the tint to his counterpart at the SEOC.
RECOMMENDATION Analyze total communications requirements. Schecule system and line enanges based upon the analysis. Indoctrir. ate all concerned personnel with cnanges and puolish enange to Annex G of the Plan.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense and TVA.
Action Official: Truett Frazier Completion Date: 1 September 1980 30
FINDING NO. 22
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Some personnel who needed to receive and transmit information via radio hac little or no training in radio procedures.
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DISCtJSSION 1
The Civil Defense radio net was set up witn network control at tne State Control Center. The individual wno handled tne base station was well qualified and maintained control of radio traffic. The two (2) channels planW for the exercise were inoperative until about six (6) hours after the exercue started.
The TMP radio net was med during this time. RAD Hea!!h should have had a person near the radio net controller to talk to the Radiological Monitoring Teams and to guice and coordinate their efforts. Any personnel wno operate radio equipment need some training in proper procedures.
RECOMMENDATION All response organizations should arrange to receive training in radio procecures froe Tivil Defense personnel unless they nave qualified radio operators to.>rovide their own training.
Action Aracy: Tennessee State Civil Defense Action C dic2al: David Inman Completion Date: ! June 1981 l
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FINDING NO.23 Some participants were aware of the date of the Exercise a;thougn it was no-notice.
O!SCUSSION When many Agencies take part in an Exercise of this nature and tne puDlic needs to be notified, it is difficult to conduct it on a no-notice basis.
Altnough every effort was made by the Exercise Planners to keep the care conficential, some participants knew anead of time when it would occur. It is understandable that ad response organizations want to do an outstancing joo.
In an exercise, several individuals who would take an active part in an emergency are not available because they are observers of the exere:se.
Several agencies had to be ready if they were to participate. These included tne Governor's Office, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as well as State and local organiza-tions, TVA, and the news media. The period of 7-21 June was published as the liability period for the Exercise. Although the State was not criticiaed for some people knowing ahead of time and being " set on go" when the Exercise started, rf distically in an actual emergency, there would De no acvance warning.
RECOMMENDATION All agencies which "need to know", select a person to be contacted by tne Exercise Planner. This person will be given the specific cate, t:me, anc j
scope of tne Exercise. FEMA, NRC, and TVA appomt a " trusted agent" who will be contacted by the State Exercise Plann er. The liability period should cover a thirty (30) cay time span.
Action Agencies: All puticipating organi:ations Action Official: Gilbert Smitt.
Completion Date: 1 September 1980 i
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FINDING
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No. 24 Federal Aviation Acministration (FAA) support was not pre-planned altnougn it was handled effectively when the requirement was presented.
DISCUSSION If an emergency occurred at the Secuoyah Nuclear Power Facility, general aviation aircraft could be a proctem if not restricted from tne area.
Passengers of commercial aircraft landing at Lovell Field could also be endangered if flown through the Plume Exposure Pathway.
A simulated proolem was introduced at the SCC and was handled well by local FAA control personnel when contacted.
RECOMMENDATION Include appropriate FAA Agencies as Task Organir.ations to handle air traffic matters during an emergency at Sequoyah.
Action Agency: Tennessee State Civil Defense.
Action Official: Gilber: Smith Completion Date: L 5eptemoer 1980 4
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FINDING NO. 25 to the The pir. requires various State Agencies to provide support counties.
It does not specify how the counties and State Agencies will coorcinate requirements.
DISCUSSION Departments of Safety, Transportation (TDOT), Agriculture (TDA),
Military, etc., will be required to furnish some resources to the risk counties, especially if the emergency is prolonged. All requirements may not be known until the actuaj emergency arises. Some Departments have coordinated with the counties, and specific requirements have been identified. Others expect to provide assistance but contact was not made with them during the exercise.
For example, TDOT was never contacted to help the counties bior roads after Ine evacuation was ordered.
RECOMMENDATION Risk counties determine, so far as posstate, what various departments will oe called on to furnish. Appropriate parts of tne county procedures shoula be coordinated with the applicante department.
Action Agency: Risk Counties and State Departments as applicable.
Action Official: Lacy Suiter Completion Date: 1 Octeoer 1980 4
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FINDING
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NO. 26 P
Recovery and restoration procedures were not exercised.
DISCUSSION After an area has been evacuated, the emergency terminated and radiation release stopped, the evacuated area must be checked so that people may return to their homes safeiy. Procedures for recovery and restoration are included in Part !Y of the Sequoyah Plan. However, no recovery actions were exercised.
RECOMMENDAT10N Review procedures outlined in Part IV of the Sequoyah P!an and determine tneir acequacy.
Insure that recovery procedures are testec in all future exerc:ses.
Act:on Agency:
Tennessee State Civd Defense anc aennessee Divtsion of
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Racioloccal Healtn Action Otficial: Gilbert Smith Compienon Date: L Decemoer 1980
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g 7g u) tg Y,..3 MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER asas soco oniva NAsnviu.12no4 PetONE 6414 7415881 01 August 1950 To: See Distribution Below FK: Eugene P. Tanner Director, Civil Defense d]:
Follow-Up Action on Sequoyan Exercise The Exercise Report for Sequoyah dated 7 July 1980 has been forwarded to your Department.
In order to correct tnose ceficiencies whicn were identitieo in the exercise, I apoointed Col. Gilbert '.xnith to follow up with tne responsible agency.
/ts a part ct the follow-up action, a schedule has been prepared whicn incics.tes tne individual, by name, responsible for tne follow-up action and a meneculec completion date when the deficiency should be resolved. Attached here'o is a copy of the schedule and a Report Form on which progress in corre:cting each deficiency may be recorded.
Please keep Col. intth informed of the status of the finding for which you are re;oonsible. His phone number is 74L-5111.
/ luc xpc: Mr. Lacy Suiter Mr. Jahrt White
. Mr. E'.gan Usrey Mr. John Keese Mr. Truet: Frazier Mt. David Inman
' Mt. Gilbert Smitn Ms. Anne titnngham, Tenn. Dept. of Public Health Mr. Terry Ccthern, Mr. ):m Thomas, Tenn. Dept. cf Agnculture W
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I D 3h 3 D kh JIu 15.d1 hw ACTION OFFICIAL FOR COMPLETION OF DEFICIENCIES COMPLET!ON DATES COMPLET!ON DATE FINDtNG ACTION N O.
OFFICIAL i
i October 1980 Lacy Suiter 1 October 1980 2
Jonn White 3
Gilber: Smith 1 Septemoer 1980 i Octooer 1980 4
Lacy Sutter Giloert sen rn L September 1980
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i October 1980 6
Elgan Usre.e
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Joint Neese.
1 April 1981 i October 1980 3
Elgan Usrey 1 Octeoer 1980 9
John Keese to Truett Framer Open L October 1980 1L.
Elgan Usrey/ David Inman 1 Octooer 1980 12 Elgan Usrey/ David intman i October 1980 13 Elgan Usrey 14 David Inm.n/ Anne stringham t September 1980 t5 Anne Stringham - TDPH 1 September 1980 t6 Anne strmgnam - TDPH 1 September 1980 17 Anne 5trmgnam - TDPM L 5eptemcer 1980 t September 1930 t3 Keel Hunt t Septemcer 1930 L9 Jim Thome 20 Terry Cothern t Septemcer 1980 21 Truett Framer 1 Septemoer 1980 1 June 1981 d
David laun.sn i Septeinoer 1980 23-Gilbert Smith 24 G4toert Smith t Septemcer 1930 i Or.cooer 1980 l
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Lacy suiter
. December 1980 26 Gilbert sm:In
.t TENNESSEE MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN DEFICIENCY CORRECTION REPORT _
FINDING NO.
FIXED NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY
SUBJECT:
ACTION AGENCY:
ACTION OFFICF.LR:
TELEPHONE NO.
COORDINATING AGENCY:
PLANNED COMPLETION DATE:
STATUS E PROGRESS O
APPENDIX 22. ANNEX F RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAM UTIL1-'ATION 1.
PURPOSE This Appendix provides the procedures to be used to control
.4 direct the efforts of all radiological monitoring teams (RADMONT) to be used in off-site monitoring.
II.
SCOPE The Radiological Monitoring Teams are the mobile sensors for the agencies wnich determine the radiation risk to people located in the Emergency Plannmg 'one. Control of the teams assigned and made available to the State is a responsibility of the TDRH.
III.
EXECUTION When an Unusual Event occurs at a nuclear power facility, RADMONT control personnel from TDRH will prepare to proceed to the TVA Environmental Data Station (EDS).
When the A art Emergency Classification (EC-2) is declared, the personnel will proceed to the.DS.
8 The EDS is located at the TVA Met Tower near the Sequoyah NPF.
Facilities are available at the EDS for t.am control personnel from TDRM to work alongside TVA personnel during an exercise or an emergency. The EDS is equipped with radio equipment to maintain contact with and control eacn team's movements. The EDS also has ringcown telephones for contact with the MSECC and the SEOC.
RADMON teams will be provided by Agencies listed in ~.'ab A. With the exception of TVA teams who are dispatched from the Nuclear Powe Facility, all RADMON teams will report to the Field Team Control
. Center (FTCC) at Lovell Field. The teams will be issued maps of the area which shows the specific monitoring points, radio proc.edures and frequencies, data forms, and anyother materials needed for tnem to function in that area. Equipment anc trauung for the field teams is a responsibdity of their parent organi: anon.
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DATA TRANSMISSION Radiation cata will be sent by radio from eacn field team to the EDS.
J From the EDS, it will be passed to the nuclear power facility and to Muscle Shoals. Fidd data wd1 de consolidated with data generstec at tne facility and dose projections calculated at Muscle Shoals The TDRM will validate TVA calculations and advise the Tripartite Committee of their concurrence in the TVA findings.
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TAS A, APPENDIX 22, ANNEX F SOURCE OF RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAMS L
PJ'RPOSE This Tab lists the Radiological Monitoring Teams to be provided by all Agencies to support Tennessee in case of an accident at a Nuclear Power Facility.
11.
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TEAMS (RADMONT)
SOURCE RESPONSE TIME TVA (Facility)
.5 HR.
Stat:
4.0 HR.
SMRAP
&-24HR.
Universities 12 - 24 HR.
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MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY OPERATCNS CENTER
. asst soco omys
-l inaswviu.s srsos Pteosis feie 7414181 01 August 1980 1
Mr. Frank Newton Regional Director Fecerai Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1375 peacntree Street NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Dear Mr. Newton:
We in the State of Tennessee have reviewed the findings of the RAC and tne caservations which they have mr,de on the Sequoyah Exercise which we concucted witn TVA on June 16-17, 1980.
In addition to the RAC observations (Inclosure No.1) we have reviewed the comments of the State coservers and the observations made by participants in the exercise.
. Observations of the exercise from all sources have been analyzed and specific action taken to correct deficiencies. The Exercise Report (Inclosure No. 2) contains background information on the exercise, a Scenario Abstract, Objectives, Summary of Observer Procecures, a list of participating agencies, the Critique Agenda, a listing of comment sources and twenty-six (26) specific findings. Each finding includes brief discussion of the problem and a recommendation for resolving the deficiency.
Responsibility and a completion date have been assigned to each one, and we will follow up on these until they have been resolved. (inclosure No. 3)
The deficiency in the Tennessee procedures for utnization of Radological Monitoring Teams which was identified by Mr. Ed Williams and rcners has been given special attention.
We have concluded that an additional Appendix to Annex F of the Plan is necessary to estaclish and maintain direction and control of these teams. I have at. ached a craft copy of the Radiciogical Monitoring Team Utilization Appendix for your information. (Inclosure No. 4) This outlilnes tne procedures which we will use in any future exercise or emergency.
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Mr. Frank Newton Page 2 01 August 1980 Let me assure you that we will follow up on all deficiencies which the RAC and we ioentified in tne Exercise. I will keep you advised of progress in their resolution.
Sincerely,
>>J ne P. Tanner te Director
/lue Inclosures (4)
RAC Observations Exercise Report Completion Date and responsibility Draft of Radiological Monitoring Team Utilization Appendix e
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-m FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY Region IV 1375 Peacntree Street. NE Attanta, Georgia 30309 August 4, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR:
ASSOCIAE DIRE R FOR PLANS AND PREP /itEDNISS 7O FROM:
Frank Ne on, egional Director
SUBJECT:
Tennessee REP Plan In accordance with the provisiens of 44 CFR Part 350, FEMA's Proposed Rule, titled, " Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness," I have forwarded uncer separate cover, the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdic-tional Site Specific REP Plan for Plant Sequoyah for FEMA National review and approval.
Attacned you will find my detailed evaluation of the Plan together with my evaluation of the adequacy of State and local plans and preparedness based on criteria. set forth in NURIG 0654/ FEMA-RIP-1.
I feel sure that Governor Alexander wishes to know as soon as possible regarding the results of the N National review.
A::achmen:
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