ML19345C198
| ML19345C198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1980 |
| From: | Reyes L, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345C189 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-80-23, NUDOCS 8012040115 | |
| Download: ML19345C198 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1980023
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/80-23
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
Toledo,. 0H 43652
Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1
Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH
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Inspection' Conducted: July 14-18, 21-25, 28-31, August 1, 4-8, 11-15, 1980
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Inspector:
L. A. Reyes
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Approved By:
R. F. Warnick, Chief
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Projects Section 3
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on July 14-18, 21-25, 28-31, August 1, 4-8, 11-15, 1980 (Report
No. 50-346/80-23)
pe'-Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of followup on previous
inspections' findings, monthly maintenance observation, monthly _ surveillance
observation, Licensee Event Reports followup, IE Bulletin followup, IE
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Circular followup, review of plant operations, inspection during long-term
shutdown, confirmatory order on' the Crystal River incident, implementation
of IMI lessons learned, office employees union strike, loss of shutdown
-cooling flow on July 24, 1980, NRR technical position on location of load
centers.and radiation protection. The incpection involved a total of 176
inspector-hours-onsite by the Resident Inspector including 48 inspector-
hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the thirteen. areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were
identified in twelve areas; two items of apparent noncompliance were
identified in the other area (Deficiency - Failure to log the unit tours
by the 0perations Engineer - Paragraph 9, Deficiency - Failure to keep
records of. entry and exit to vital areas - Paragraph 9, Attachment A).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- T.' Murray, Station' Superintendent
B. Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent
P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer
- D. Huffman, Administrative Coordinator
- D. Miller, Operations Engineer
D. Briden, Chemist and Health Physicist
J. Hickey, Training Supervisor
L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
C. Daft, Operations QA Manager
- G. Gaime, Nuclear Security Manager
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on July 21, 1980.
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee empl'syees, including
members of- the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and
health physics staff.
2.
Previous Inspections' Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/80-19-01): Facility Change Request
80-181 has been completed and the Emergency Diesel Generators Sequencers
were satisfactorily tested. Portions of the testing were witnessed by
the Resident Inspector.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/80-19-02): The inspector reviewed
the calibration certificate for dewcell serial No. 641.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/80-19-04): 'The inspector reviewed
the local leak rate test results of makeup system, containment pres-
surization system and fuel transfer tubes. The penalties resulting
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from these test results added to lam at the 95% confidence level does
not exceed the maximum allowable leak rate by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and compon-
ents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides
and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical
specifications.
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed frem service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
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work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable;- functional testing and/or calibrations were
. performed. prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were' accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls
were implemented.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Replacement of Steam Generator 1-1 primary side manway gasket and studs.
Following completion of maintenance on the Steam Generator 1-1 primary
side manway, the inspector verified that the applicable systems had been
returned to. service properly.
No items of noncompliance or teviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on the Safety Feature Actuation System sequencers and verified
that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that
- test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for opera-
tion were met, - that removal and restoration of .the affected components
were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifica-
tions and procedure require ents and were reviewed by personnel other
than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies
identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
appropriate management personnel.
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The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
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Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-2 hot aligment test, stroke of Decay Heat
Removal System isolation valves DH-Il and DH-12.
No itea of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Licensee-Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions.with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-
mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence
had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
80-05 - Boric Acid Flowpath Inoperable.
80-08 - CAP on Conduit Penetration Through Fire Wall.
80-40 - Broken Fuel Assembly Holddown Spring.
80-46 - Spent Fuel Pool Level Lower Than Technical Specification
' Requirements.
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80-47 !- Door Locked.Open on Nega;ive Pressure Boundary.
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- 80-49'- Momentary Loss of Decay Heat Flow.
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80-50.- Damage Bearing' Thermocouple on High Pressure Injection Pump 1-1.
80-51 - Inoperable Relays on SFAS Sequencer For. Channels 2 and 4.
No. items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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- 6.
IE Circular Followup -
For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for
applicabilit.y was performed, and that if the circular were applicable
to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were
scheduled ta be taken.
79-2S - Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA 180 Limit Switches
at Elevated Temperatures.
80-05
Vacuum Conditions Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume
Control System (CVCS) Holdup. Tanks.
80-06 - Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls. During the
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review of the licensee's response, the inspector determined
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that the documentation of the testing performed was not
adequate. The licensee committed to submit an additional
response to'the bulletin and to provide adequate documenta-
tion. This is an unresolved item pending review of the
additional licensee's response to the bulletin and the
review of this document by the inspector (50-346/80-23-01).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
IE Circular Followup
For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for
applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable
to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were
scheduled to be-taken.
79-02 - Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies.
79-04 - Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators.
79-05 - Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors.
79-09 - Occurrences of Split or Punctured Regulator Diaphragms
in Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.
79-10 - Pipe Fittings Manufactured from Unacceptable Material.
79-12 - Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem.
79-13 - Replacement of Die el Fire Pump Starting Contactors.
- 79-15_ - Bursting of High Pressure Hose and Malfunction of Relief
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Valve "0" Ring in Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.
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79-19 -- Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps.
79-21 - Prevention'of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity.
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~80-02'- Nuclear: Power Plant Staff' Work Hours-
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80-05' 1 Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and
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' Onsite Supply.
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l80-11 - Emergency Diesel-Generator Lube Oil: Cooler Failures.
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80-13:- Grid Strap Damage.in Westinghouse. Fuel Assemblies.
80-14 - Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water
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System and -Resultant Internal! Contamination of Personnel.
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No items:of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Review of Plant Operations
During the period of July 14'thru August 15, 1980 the inspector re--
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viewed the following activities.
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Training-
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The-inspector attended one of the. licensee's operator requalifica-
. tion lecture series and verified that lesson plan objectives were
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met and that training was in accordance with the approved operator
requalification program schedule and objectives.
The inspector verified by direct questioning of one new, one exist-
ing, and one temporary employee .that administrative controls and
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procedures, radiological health and safety, industrial safety,
controlled access and security procedures, emergency plan, and
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quality assurance training were provided as required by the
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licensee's technical specifications; verified by direct question-
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ing of'one -craftsmen and one technician that on-the-job training,
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formal-technical training commensurate with job classification,
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and fire. fighting training were provided.
b.
Environmental Protection-
The inspector verified the installation and operability of nine
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sampling (monitoring): station (s)'and associated equipment and
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reviewed -records for completeness and accuracy. The inspector
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accompanied a licensee representative during the collection of
vegetable samples.
c.
-Security
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The inspector verified by the review of records that five individ-
.uals1 achieved acceptable scores during the conduct of weapons and
~ physical' fitness tests.
No items of-noncomplianceoor deviations were identified.
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'9.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
period of July 14 through August 15.
The inspector verified surveill-
ance tests required during the shutdown tere accomplished, reviewed
tagout records, and verified applicability of contaicment integrity.
Tours of containment, auxiliary and turbine building accessible areas,
including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments of
equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety,
and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance
requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The
inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including
potential fire hazards, and verifi d implementation of radiation protec-
tion controls. The inspector by coscovation and direct interview verified
that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with
the station security plan. The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper /
bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifica-
tions and verified the implementation of radioactive waste system controls.
The inspector witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls
associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
While reviewing the unit log, the inspector asticed that for the period
of June 11 through June 25, 1980, there were no entries of plant tours
conducted by the Operations Engineer. This is contrary to procedure
AD1839.00 Revision 6, which requires that the Operations Engineer conduct
detailed tours of the plant at a minimum of once per week and that each
of the tours shall be documented by an entry in the unit log. This is
an item of noncompliance.
Subsequent to the inspector findings the licensee implemented corrective
action by modifying procedure AD1839.00 to allow the Operations Engineer
to designate other operations management personnel to conduct the plant
tours. The inspector will verify that operations management personnel
are conducting the plant tours in subsequent inspections. The inspector
has no further questions at this time.
J, other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Confirmatory Order dated April 21, 1980 on the Crystal River Incident
a.
-Background
The Order was issued as a result of the experience gained from the
Crystal River, Unit 3, incident that occurred on February 26, 1980.
During this incident a loss of power to the non-nuclear instrumenta-
tion resulted in a series of unexpected events. The actions required
by the order were mutually agreed upon by the licensee and the NRC
staff in meetings held in Bethesda, Maryland on March 4,17 and 18,
1980.
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Licensee Commitments
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-The'above mentioned meetings resulted in the following commitments:
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(11 Identify actions which will allow the operator to cope with
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various combinations of loss of instrumentation and control
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functions. This includes changes in (a) equipment and control
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systems to give clear indications of functions which are lost
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or unreliable;.(b) procedures and training to assure positive
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and safe manual response by the operator in the event that
competent -instruments are available.
(2) Determination of the effects of various combinations of loss
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of instrumentation and control functions by design review
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_ analysis and. verification by test.
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(3) Correction of electrical deficiencies which may allow the
power operated relief valve and pressurizer spray valve to
open on non-nuclear instrumentation power failures, such
as, the avent which occurred at Crystal River, Unit 3 on
- Februa ry 26, 1980.
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(4) Submittal of the response to IE Bulletin 79-27 by May 6,
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Actions Taken
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(1) .The licensee modified the control circuits for the Pressurizer
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Power Operated Relief Valve to ensure that the valve will not
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stay open on loss of NNI power.
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(2) The licensee modified the control circuits associated with
the pressurizer heaters to prevent the heaters from being
energized on loss of NNI power.
Items 1 and 2 were completed
by the implementation of Facility Change Request 80-058.
(3) The licensee added an additional source of AC power and DC
power to the NNI.24 VDC buses to enhance the reliability of
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the 24 VDC buses. This modification was completed by the
taplementation of Facility Change Request 80-096.
(4)
~he licensee _has initiated Facility Change ~ Request 80-100 .
to provide redundant source of AC power to the startup feed-
water control valves, the main feedwater control valves, the
tu'rbine bypass valves and to instrument strir.gs required for
cold shutdown if only one instrument'is pro iding the informa-
tion for a given parameter. Schedule of implementation for
this modification is the 1981 refueling outage.
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(5) 'The. licensee contracted with two consultants to' review the
effects of ~ loss' of power supplies in the NNI/ICS. . Report-
. SAI-OR-245-010 " Failure' Modes and Effects Analysis of the
NNI/ICS Power Supplies at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station"
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has been. issued.
-(6) 'The licensee performed a test, MC 7500.30 Revision 0, " Response
. to Loss of Power in Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System," to
determine the response of the nonnuclear instrumentation to
- power failures. The results of. this test will be incorporated
in-the training'and procedures for operators to detail-the
actions to be taken for a transition to cold shutdown.
Com-
pletion of this action will hc verified by the inspector prior
to the' unit startup from the current outage.
(50-346/80-23-02)
(7) . The licensee performed a test, MC 7500.30 Revision 0, "ICS
Power Supply Failure Response," to determine the response of
the ICS to power supply failures. The results of this test
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will be incorporated in the training and procedure for operators
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to detail the actions to be taken for a transition to cold shut-
down. Completion of this item will be verified by the inspector
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prior to the unit startup from the current outage.
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(50-346/80-23-03)
-(S) The licensee submitted the response to-IE Bulletin 79- '7 on
May 6, 1980.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Implementation of TMI Lessons Learned
a.
Background
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The 3RR Lesson Learned Task Force conducted a site review of the
licensee's imp.ementation of the items in letters to the licensee
dated September 13, 1970 and October 30, 1979 and.the Show'Cause
Order dated Jan ary. 2, .1980.
The site review was made on
February 25 and 26, 1980. An evaluation report was issued on
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May 6,1980, and I&E was requested to verify final implementation
and the adequacy of procedures for various items.
b.
Action Taken
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Item 2.1.1 Emergency Power Supplies
The current design at. Davis-Besse provides for 126 kilowatts of
pressurizer. heater; capacity to each emergency diesel generator.
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.The heaters will be loaded to the diesels on the first step of
- the sequencer (closing of the diesel breaker after the machine
has reached rated voltage and frequency). The only operator
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action required is to reset the essential pressurizer heaters
control switches (HIS-RC2-A, HIS-RC2-B) in the control room makeuo
panel.
The inspector verified that adequate guidance for energization of
the pressurizer heater during a loss of power was included in the
supplementary actions of Emergency Procedure EP 1202.02.10 " Station
Blackout." The licensee modified procedure SP 1103.05.08 " Pressurizer
Operation System Procedure" to include guidance on operating the
pressurizer heaters on a loss of power. The inspector interviewed
several reactor operators and senior reactor operators and determined
that they were knowledgeable in the actions to take for energization
of the pressurizer heaters during a loss of power.
The licensee implemented Facility Change Request 79-355 which pro-
vides the PORV block valve (RC 71) with control and motive power-
from essential motor control center F12A. The inspector reviewed
the modification package and determined that the design is adequate.
Item 2.1.3.a Direct Indication of PORV and Safety Valve Position
The licensee implemented Facility Change 79-410 which provides for direct
indication of the PORV and Safety Valve position in the control room.
Procedure SP 1105.20 " Power Operated Relief Valve Monitoring System
Operating Procedure" has been prepared to document the operation of this
position indication systen. Final acceptance of the installation and
modifications to associat.ed emergency procedures has not been completed
at this time. The inspector will verify completion of this item before
the unit startup from the current outage.
(50-346/80-23-04)
Item 2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling
Facility Change 79-439 was implemented to provide indication in the con-
trol room of the " Saturation Margin" fcc the existing plant _ conditions.
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A selector switch in the meter allows the operator to display the satura-
tion temperature for the given pressure or saturation pressure for the
given temperature. The revision of emergency procedures to include the
use of the saturation meter is not completed at this time but will be
verified by the inspector before the unit startup from the current outage.
(50-346/80-23-05)
Item 2.1.4 Containment Isolation
The containment isolation signals at Davis-Besse are designcd to prevent
an automatic reopen of containment isolation upon clearing of the initia-
tion signal. Reopening of the isolation valves is accomplished by manual
blocking of the isolation signal followed by further manual actuation of
each valve control switch to the open position. Testing and verification
of this feature was accomplished by Test Procedure MC 7500.34 "SFAS Sequence
Operation Test" which was performed during the current outage.
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During the testing' performed it was determined that if a SFAS is reset
prior to regaining normal power sources, a subsequent SFAS signal could
possibly lead to overloading the Emergency riesel Generator. The con-
tinued loss of. essential 4160/480v power would-then prevent follow-on
a'ctuation of specific containment isolation valves. The interim correction
to this deficiency is by means of procedural controls included in EP .1202.06
" Loss of Reactor Coolant or Reactor Coolant Pressure." The procedure in-
structs the operator not to reset SFAS until offsite power sources are.
-regained., The licensee has initiated Facility Change Request 80-182 to
correct this deficiency.
Item 2.1.5.c H, Dilution Procedures
The inspector reviewr.d procedure SP 1104.55.06 " Containment Hydrogen
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Dilution and Hydrog2n Purge" and determined that the procedure is adequate
to provide guidance'for the operation of the hydrogen purge and hydrogen
dilution systems.
Item 2.1.6.a System Integrity
The licensee has implemented a leak reduction program to reduce the pre-
sent leakage of systems outside containment that would or could contain.
highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident. The
following procedures are used for the implementation of the leak reduction
program:
ST 5042.01
RCS Leakage
ST 5042.02
RCS Water Inventory Balance
_ ST 5051.03
Low Pressure Injection and Containment Spray -
PT 5164.04
-Reactor Sample System Leak Test
PT 5172.00-
Gaseous Radioactive Waste System Leak Rata Test
PT 5164.05
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank System Leak Test
ST 5051.04
ECCS Subsystem Refueling Test
The inspector reviewed the above listed procedures and determined that
they are adequate to implement a permanent leak reduction program. The
inspector.also verified that the program is being implemented at least
once per refueling cycle.
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Item 2.1.8.b High Range Effluent Monitors
The inspector reviewed procedures E? 1202.57 " Steam Generator Tube Leak"
and AD 1850.04 " Post Accident Radiological Sampling and Counting" and
. determined that the procedures are adequate to quantify high-level
effluents from the plant during accident conditions. The licensee has
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initiated Facility Change Request 80-50 to upgrade the existing instru-
mentationcapabilipf1for quantifying noble gases, lirect radiation in
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in the presence of noble gases.
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Item 2.1.8.c Inplant Iodine Instrumentation
The inspector reviewed procedures LI 4768.00 " Laboratory Instrumentation -
Stabilized Assay Meter SAM-2" and AD 1850.04 " Post Accident Radiological
Sampling and Counting" and determined that the procedures were adequate
to analyze air samples for radioiodine concentrations during an accident.
The inspector accompanied the cheuistry and health physicist en a plant
tour and verified that the necessary equipment was in place, calibrated
and properly labeled. The inspector verified by the review of records
and interview of the chemistry and health physics personnel that the
appropriate personnel had received proper training in the procedures for
analizing radioiodine from air samples. The inspector reviewed the
calibration schedule and observed that the Stabilized Assay Meters were
included for calibration every six months.
Item 2.2.1.a Shift Supervisor Responsibilities
The inspector reviewed the below listed procedures and determined that
they are adequate in identifying the shift supervisor responsibilities
during an accident, so that he can provide direct management of on going
safety related operations and not be distre:ted with administrative
assignments.
AD 1839.00
Station Operations
EI 1300.00
Station Response to Emergencies
EI 1300.01
Emergency Plan Activation
EI 1300.02
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure - Unusual Event
EI 1300.03
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure - Alert
EI 1300.04
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure - Site Emergency
'I 1300.05
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure - General Emergency
The inspector attended the Emergency Planning Training on August 1,1980,
and interviewed several shift supervisors and determined that they were
knowledgeable in their responsibilities during an emergency.
Item 2.2.1.b Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
The inspector reviewed procedure AD 1839.04 " Shift Technical Advisor
Administrative Procedure" and determined that the procedure is adequate
to delineate the duties of the shift technical advisor. The inspector
has witnessed on his routine insoections that the STA is present during
turnovers and during events such as reactor trips and loss of safety
systems functions.
Item 2.2.1.c Shif t and Relief Turnover Procedures
The inspector reviewed procedure AD 1839.00 " Station Operations" and
determined that adequate guidance was provided for a complete and system-
atic turnover between the off going and on-coming shift.
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Item 2.2.2.a Control Room Access
Thc licensee has issued Standing 0rder No. 27 which identifies the timas
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when personnel are allowed access'to the Control Room. The Standing Order
has been posted at the entrance door to the Control Room. .The inspector
reviewed Procedure AD 1839.00 " Station Operations" and determined that
adequate guidance is provided to the Shift Supervisor to control the number
of people in the Control Room. Access to the Control Room is maintained
as per the requirements of Procedure AL 1808.00 " Industrial Security Plan."
Item 2.2.2.b OnSite Technical Support Center (TSC)
The inspector reviewed Procedure EI 1300.07 " Technical Support Center
Activation" and determined that adequate guidance is provided for the
activation of the TSC to assist the operating personnel in the evaluation
of an incident. The inspector reviewed Table 5-1 of the Davis-Besse
Emergency Plan and determined that a communicator is assigned to the TSC
when it is' activated.
Item 2.2.2.c Cperational Support Center (OSC)
The inspector reviewed Procedure EI 1300.07 " Technical Support Center
Activation" and determined that adequate guidance is given fct the mann-
ing of the OSC te provide support to the Control Room and TSC.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Office Employees Union Strike
On July 30, 1980, the Office and Professional Employees International
Union, Local No.19, went on strike over contract negotiations. Picketing
was taking place on State Route 2 off the licensee's property.
The picket
was honored by other_ craft unions including company employees.
The licensee modified its shift relief procedure to assure that Operations,
Security and Health Physics manning was sufficient to comply with regulatory
requirements. The union strike ended on August 18, 1980.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Loss of Shutdown Coo!ing Flow
On July 24, 1980, tte licensee reported that a blown fuse ciused a valve
(DH-12) on the suction side of the operating decay heat removal pump to
close. Shutdown cooling flow to the reactor was lost at 9:55 a.m. EDT.
Valves in a bypass-line around DH-12 were opened,-the line was vented
and refilled and flow was re-established at 10:45 a.m. EDT. The Center
incore thermocouple (the hottest one in the core) increased from 104'
to 111*F during the time of no flow.
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At the time of the event,_the unit was in mode 5, the reactor vessel
water level was drained to approximately 16 inches above the center
line of the hot leg (7 feet above the core), the uppe r manway handhole
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was open on the primary (RCS) side of one steam generator, and reactor
coolant system maintenance work was in progress. Had it been required,
alternate sources of coolant were available (core flood tanks and
gravity flow from the horated water storage. tank).
The blown fuse was caused by electricians pulling wire (in the cabinet
containing DH-12 valve control wires) for a design change. They caused
a short while pulling wire for the pressurizer heater DH-11 and DH-12
interlock which is being installed to prevent overpressurizing the reactor
vessel [ license requirement 2.c.3.d).
Because of previous experience with
this valve closing on loss of power, the licensee has requested their
license be amended to permit deactivating the valve in the open position
while in modas 5 and 6 (cold shutdown and refueling).
License Amendment No. 28 was granted on July 25, 1980.
Final closecut of this event will be concluded in the review of Licensee
Event Report 80-58.
14.
N3R Technical Position on Lccation of Load Centers
During the Lay 10, 1980 event at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, it
became nece;sary for a person to enter the containment building to
unlock and close the breaker which provided power to the isolation
valves of the core flood tanks.
.
As a result of this event the following NRR Technical Position was
issued:
Any valve which is required by Technical Specifications to be locked
in a particular position during operation and requires entry into the
containment building to actually unlock the valve locking capability
(such as a locked open breaker) should have its locking capability
located outside the containment building where access can be provided.
The inspector verified that at Davis-Besse there are no Motor Control
Centers (MCC) inside the containment building.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
15.
Radiation Protection
The inspec..e was approached by the Health Physics coordinator for
the maintenance contractor and was questioned about the adequacy of
the monitoring equipment for the contractor personnel exit from RACA.
The inspector conducted various tours of the RACA area including the
contractor personnel exi . and interviewed several members of the
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- Toledo Edison Company Health Physics Personnel. The inspector observed .
that the licensee' experienced a short supply of RM-14 meters .for several:
days but.they were~ repaired and returned to service promptly. The in-
spector discussed the-existing conditions with Region III personnel and
determined that the compensatory actions taken by the licensee satisfied
the regulatory requirements.
No items of' noncompliance or deviations'were identified.
'
16.
Unresolved Items
U1 nresolved . items are matters about which more information is reqa. red
in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-
compliance, or' deviations '
The unresolved items disclosed'during the
.
inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6,10 and 11.
s
17.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
,
1) on July 21-and August 7, 1980, and summar'. zed the scope and findings
'
of the inspection activities.
Attachment: -Attachment A',
contains 2.790(d) Information
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