ML19345B140
| ML19345B140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345B139 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011260202 | |
| Download: ML19345B140 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES 4
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' SAFETY EVALUATION t IHE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATI0tl
-SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0. 80 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-GEORGIA PONER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER' CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC _ AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-321 I.
INTRODUCTION By telecopied letter dated October 29, 1980, Georgia Power Company (licensee) requested a change to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Opera-Tne ting License No. DPR-57 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1.
change involves the operability requirements for the standby service water pump.
The licensee stated that the current specifications for the standby service water pump were (1) overly restrictive, (2) not consistent with the NRC staff approved specifications for Hatch, Unit No. 2 (Cocket No. 50-366), and (3) did not specifically cover the situation for 'inoperability of both a diesel genera-tor and the standby service water pump. Therefore, we conducted an expedited review of the-licensee's subnittal and authorized, by telephone, an approved change on October 29, 1980. The basis for acceptabili-ty of the change is dis-cussed below.
II.
EVALUATION Only one of the Division 1 Primary Service Water (PSH) pumps and one of the Division 2 PSW pumps are required for cooling diesel generators lA and 1C, respectively, while the standby service water pump provides. adequate cooling water to diesel generator 1B.
In the event that the standby service water pump be is ' inoperable, the HNP-1 Division 1
. Division 2 intertie supply piping can aligned to cool the -1B diesel.
In this condition, one PSW pump is capable of supplying the cooling requirenents for. the reactor building cooling system, the The control room air conditioners, and the l A,1B, and 1C diesel generators.
PSW system can supply all power generation systems at full load and the diese!
generators with redundancy if one PSW pump and/or the standby service water p;rp are inoperable.
A single active failure of a component is required in this condition to cause i,
loss of a diesel generator. This condition is within the envelope of accidents analyzed in the Final Safety Analysis Report. Hence, when the standby service water pump is inoperable and an alternate cooling water source is available for cooling diesel-generator 1B, 'only the limiting conditions for operation due to the loss of the diesel generator need be considered.
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At Hatch diesel 1B has a manual backup water supply available from f.he Unit No.1 Division 1 or Division 2 plant service water subsystems so that~during a loss of the standby service water pump due to breakdown or maintenance either division of the PSW' system can manually be aligned to supply coolir.) water to the 1B diesel.
Based on the above, we find that the licensee's request to revise the opera-bility requirement to reflect the availability of an alternate cooling water source to diesel.qenerator 1B is acceptable. This action also conforms the Unit No. I specifications with those previously reviewed and approved for Unit No. 2.
III.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types *or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
IV.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
November 13, 1980 l
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