ML19344E739
| ML19344E739 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1980 |
| From: | Kahle J, Kenna W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19344E735 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1113-80-10, NUDOCS 8009110150 | |
| Download: ML19344E739 (6) | |
Text
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4 UNITED STATES il y
NUCLEAR REGUi.ATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 E
f 101 MARIETTA ST,, N.W., SUITE 3100 k,
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 J U L l '71880 Report No. 70-1113/80-10 Licensee: General Electric Company P. O. Box 780 Wilmington, NC 28401 Facility N c.:
Wilmington Manufacturing Department License No. SNM-1097 Inspection at: Wilmington, North Carolina Inspector:
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7 Ft' J. B. W hle, afeguards Branch
[ Da(e Approved by:
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o 6 'S W( BJ Kenna,'Safdguards Branch
'/' Date SIR &!ARY Date of Inspection: June 23-27, 1980 Areas Inspected: This routine / unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours on site in the areas of 10 CFR Part 21, safety committees, training, followup on unresolved items, followup on items of noncompliance, followup on IE notices and independent effort.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviation were identified in six areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area. Deficiency - Failure to keep the fuel rod cabinet doors closed when personnel were not in immediate attendance. See paragraph 10.b (80-03-01)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- E. Lees, Quality Assurance Manager
- J. Bergman, Fuel Manufacturing Manager
- B. Bentley, Fuel Chemical Operation Manager
- C. Cliche, Fuel Fabrication Operation Manager
- P. von Herrmann, Fuel Process Technology Manager
- G. Green, Financial Operation Manager
- C. Risley, Fuel Cycle Procurement Manager
- W. Hendry, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- G. McKenzie, Fuel Manufacturing Engineering Manager
- D. Brown, Powder Production Operation Manager
- J. Mohrbacher, Nuclear Safety Engineering Manager
- W. Peters, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- G. Powers, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- J. Bradberry, Emergency Preparedness Ccordinator
- W. Haverty, Compliance Auditor W. Cameron, Fuel Support Foreman J. Ludes, Fuel Bundle and Components Assembly Manager E. Singer, Fuel Quality Control Engineering Manager R. Johnson, Production Control Specialist J. Gardner, Quality Control Foreman W. Williams, Quality Control Foreman J. Owens, Shop Operations Foreman J. Herring,' Shop Operations Foreman R. Yopp, Shipping Clerk C. Bowker. Buyer R. Merrit, Employment Specialist S. Murray, Nuclear Safety Engineer D. Whaley, Nuclear Safety Technician R. Torres, Radiation Protection Supervisor D. Barbot. Radiation Protection Shift Supervisor A. Kaplan, Licensing and Compliance Audits Manager Other licensee employeee contacted included 4 technicians, 15 operators, 4 security force members, and 2 office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 27, 1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 79-19-01: A procedure to provide a record to show that a minimum 24 gauge steel pails were used for the BU-7 package. Procedure
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QCII 2.8.2.2 has been revised to require that quality control inspection personnel check to assure that the pails to be placed in BU-7 packages are a minimum 24 gauge. Discussions with quality control personnel revealed that a traveler document is signed for each BU-7 package as it is prepared showing that the requirements of the procedure are completed. An examination of several documents showed that the records were maintained in accordance with the procedure.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 79-19-05:
A procedure to show that the FU-7 package insulation requirements are met. The Quality Control Plan A-170 "BU-7 Shipping Container" requires that the Receiving Inspection Quality Control Inspection Instruction, Form QCE 3A, be met for the BU-7 package, drawing number 128D5231, Rev.
7.
Items 7, 8 and 9 provide for weight limitations of the plug, the stripped container and the assembly weight which assure that the foam insulation density requirements are met.
(Closed) Noncompliance 80-03-03: Failure to monitor the external surfaces of packages containing radioactive material (cylinder overpacks) upon receipt. Verification was made that procedures outlining responsibilities for notification and surveys of receipt of packages are maintained. An examination of records showed that cylinder overpacks were monitored for external contamination. Discussions with licensee representatives revealed that surveys were accomplished no later than three hours after receipt.
(Closed) Noncompliance 80-03-02: Failure to deliver packages of radioactive material for transport without properly describing the material' in the shipping papers and without proper labels. Examination of the licensee's procedures.and records showed that verification of package contents and label requirements must be made and checked prior to issuance of a shipping notice.
4.
10 CFR Part 21 Procedures and records pertaining to 10 CFR 21 were examined. No evaluations have been made since the previous 10 CFR 21 inspection. Verification was made that the 10 CFR 21 posting requirements were met. An examination of procurement documents and discussions with licensee representatives revealed that the licensee's purchase requisition form contains a check space, yes -
no, for 10 CFR 21 applicability.
If applicable, purchase orders contain words to the effect that 10 CFR 21 regulations apply to the ordered item.
Also a package of information describing 10 CFR 21 regulations is included with each purchase order when 10 CFR 21 regulations are applicable. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5 Safety Committees 4
The Wilmington Technological Safety Council met on June 16, 1980. Those in attendance met the membership, quorum and meeting requirements of the license. Items discussed were current nuclear safety issues. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
6.
Training a.
The inspector reviewed. the licensee's procedure P/P. 40-17, General Nuclear Safety Requirements and Training, which establishes responsi-bilities pertaining to radiation protection and nuclear criticality training for per:onnel who work in the - ntrolled area.
Licensee representatives discussed the system anu procedures for testing, maintaining records and scheduling individuals for retraining. This program is referred to as the " red-dot" training program. Upon comple-tion of the training and successfully passing the examination, a
licensee (security type) badge with a red dot is issued to the individual (s).
Those individuals displaying a badge with a red dot are permitted to enter the fuel manufacturing controlled area without escort.
b.
The inspector questioned the training requirements for individuals who enter through the Emerr,ency Control Center (ECC) and work in the FM0/FM0X complex but not in the controlled area. Licensee representa-tive stated tha+ a less comprehensive training program was given to selected groups of individuals in this category. They further stated that the program was being modified to assure that all individuals who enter through the ECC must display a badge with either a red dot or a blue dot. The blue dot signifies that the individual had received the less comprehensive instructions. If an individual's badge did not contain a red or blue dot, then that individual must receive an automated slide presentation which would take approximately three minutes. The slide presentation would cover the basic radiation and nuclear safety fundamentals and the criticality warning system. Licensee representa-tives stated that this system would be in effect by fiscal unk n.
c.
Interviews with several individuals within the ECC area revealed that they knew the sound of the criticality warning system and the location of the assembly area in the event of an alarm.
d.
Contractor and visitor personnel receive the same type training as licensee employees.
e.
The inspector verified that the training commitments made by the licensee regarc. g IE Bulletin 79-19 were completed by fical week 26.
f.
The inspector had no further questions or comments.
7.
IE Information Notices The inspector verified that the licensee had received IE Information Notices Numbers 80-14, 80-18, 80-24 and 80-25. A review of documentation showed that individuals had been assigned responsibilities for evaluations and appropriate actions in accordance with information contained in the notices.
The inspector had no further questions.
8.
Criticality Warning System The licensee and the criticality warning system vendor are centinuing to j
investigate the system to identify potential causes for the nexplainable false alarms. The vendor spent several man-weeks on site testing equipment components and replacing damaged components believed to be caused by lightning.
The licensee has installed lightning rods near the data acquisition modules.
The chalk board in the ECC was moved to the other end of the room to minimize the chance of chalk dust settling on the console. The licensee has performed several verification tests to assure operability of the system under certain conditions.
The General Electric Automation and Control Laboratory has been employed to perform a failure analysis study. The vendor is making software changes which have been identified as potential sources for false alarms. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
9.
Personnel Exposure History Records A licensee representative explained the program for placing these records 7 microfiche. The hard copy records are accumulated by fiscal week for each year. An individual reviews the data and assembles the records in a prescribed sequence for data retrieval. An index sheet is prepared for each package of data which also contains a secend indivi<'aal*
signature verifying that the microfiche record is a duplicate of the hard copy of the exposure history record.
The licensee rPsentative stated that three microfiche ccpies will be made, one to be placed in the vauit and two working copies. He questioned the inspector if their microfiche program was acceptable for pernsc nt exposure history records.
The inspector stated that' he saw no problem since a licensee.wresentative verified that the microfiche was a duplicate of the hard copy. The inspector had no further questions or comments.
10.
Plant Tours a.
General During tours of FM0/FM0X complex, it appeared that special nuclear material was processed, handled and stored in accordance with nuclear safety requirements. The general housekeeping appeared satisfactory and no industrial safety or fire hazards were observed.
b.
Fuel Rod Storage Cabinets On June 23, 1980, when the inspector passed through the Fuel Bundle Assembly Area, the doors to storage cabinets No. 357, 358 and 361 were observed in an unclosed position.
No personnel were in immediate attendance.
There are signs on the storage cabinets that state in effect that the doors are to be closed. Discussions with supervisory personnel revealed trat because of shift change there were no personnel in the immediate area An examination of the nuclear safety criticality review and discussions with licensee representations revealed that the entire array of rods could not be shown safe if fully moderated. An 1
- administrative procedure was adopted to prevent water from moderating the fuel by keeping the storage cabinet doors closed except when fuel rods are placed in or removed from the storage cabinets. The nuclear safety release (NSE-114-78) dated 5/22/80, for the Rod Storage Cabinets, Unit Nos. 7001-7007,.7020, 7021, requires that all cabinet doors will remain closed except when in immediate attenda. ice. Licensee representa-tives were informed that failure to keep tue doors closed without personnel in immediate attendance was an item af noncompliance (80-10-01)-
and, further, that immediate attendance was interpreted to mean that the doors should only be open when placing rods, trays, etc. in the cabinets or removing from the cabinets. Licensee management acknowledged the finding and stated that they would take corrective actions to alleviate the situation.
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