ML19344D634

Forwards Addl Info to Support Upgrading of Isolation Condenser

ML19344D634
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/16/1980
From:	Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8004250362
Download: ML19344D634 (22)

Text

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April 16, 1980 Docket No. 50-2h5 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:

Mr. D. L. Ziemann, Cnief Operating Reactors Branch #2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

References:

(1)

W. G. Counsil letter to D. L. Ziemann dated March 19, 1980.

(2)

W. G. Counsil letter to D. L. Ziemann dated February 14, 1980.

(3)

D. C. Switzer (NUSCO) letter to A. Giambusso (AEC) dated August 30, 1973.

(h)

W. G. Counsil letter to D. L. Ziemann dated March 5,1979 (5)

D. L. Ziemann letter to W. G. Counsil dated February 15, 1980.

Gentlemen :

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 Isolation Condenser System This letter supplies additional information to support the upgrading of the Isolation Condenser such that analytical credit can be taken for its performance as an ECCS sy' stem. Reference (1) proposed such a change, and resulted in a number of Staff questions to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) that were transmitted via telephone and telecopy. Those questions and NNECO's responses are attached and formally docketed in this letter.

As committed in Reference (1), the Isolation Condenser initiation logic has been augmented with automatic initiation upon reactor vessel low-low level ECCS signal. However, analytical credit for its performance cannot be taken until NRC approval of the Technical Specification changes.

Since April 1, 1980, the plant Las operated with a 120-second ADS timer delay and 0.80 MAPLHGR multi-plier limit, which was documented as an appropriate limit in Reference (2) for the following bounding scenario:

small break accident, gas turbine failure,

LPCI injection into the broken recirculation pump discharge loop, no Isolation Condenser credit, and 120-second ADS timer. The 0.80 MAPLHGR multiplier currently derates plant electrical output by one-to-two percent, severely delays power ramp-ups, and is expected to result in an electrical derate of five-to-ten percent following a control rod pattern change at the end of April.

NRC Staff review and approval of the Technical Specification changes proposed in Reference (1), supplemented by this letter, are, therefore, still urgently requested.

8004250342

. The attached questions and responses, numbered one through six, address ECCS credit for the Isolation Condenser. Question (7) and our response address the viability of plant operation with a 45-second ADS timer, a 0.86 MAPLHGR multiplier, and no Isolation Condenser credit, for the above scenario. This latter case is judged by us to be an acceptable alterna-tive basis for future operation, although our preferred basis is the credit for the Isolation Condenser. The response to Question (7) is, therefore, provided for additional clarification of the reactor performance fer the small break accident with LPCI injection into the broken loop.

The responses to Questions (3) and (6) involve Technical Specification changes that supplement those proposed in Reference (1) and do not involve any new issues. NNECO has determined that the applicable fee, pursuant to 10CFR170, was remitted with Reference (1), and that no additional fee is required.

Should you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY f

lN W.' G. Counsil Vice President Attachment

4.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

)

as. Berlin jf j9[C COUNTY OF HARTFORD

)

Then personally appeared before me W. G. Counsil, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensees herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

b Notary Public

(

My Commission Expires March 31, 1981 i

e

ISOLATION CONDENSER NRC QUESTIONS AND NNECO'S RESPONSES NRC Question (1)

The descriptions of the postulated injection of LPCI into a broken recirculation loop and the Isolation Condenser heat removal performance need amplification.

Provide a detailed description of this methodology.

Include all formulatiorts for fluid properties and flow rate calculations.

NNECO Response Normal Appendix K assumptions and methods were applied except for the reduction of LPCI flow into the vessel to account for the loss of LPCI flow out the postulated break.

The following assumptions were made to conservatively bound the amount of LPCI flow lost as a function of vessel pressure for a given postulated break size.

The assumptions are followed by the equations used in the calculation, a) The break is located at the point of LPCI injection which maximizes the pressure at the break.

b) The LPCI flow lost out the break is assumed to be subcooled Bernoulli flow with no losses or Vena Contracta assumed (see Equation 1).

This maximizes the flow loss for all possible postulated conditions of the fluid at the break. Any amount of flashing or two phase effects would result in lower mass flow rates out the break. The temperature of the LPCI water is assumed to be 120 F for deternining density of the water.

c) The pressure at the break location used in the Bernoulli flow relationship is calculated as a function of the net LPCI flow into the vessel (using the upper bound of loss coefficients from test data) for forward flow through the recirculation system (see Equation 4). Inputs to Equation 2 were used to give the LPCI flow rate consistent with Appendix K assumptions and minimum technical specification requirements. The pressure at the break exit was assumed to be atmospheric ~to maximize break flow.

d) No LPCI flow into the vessel is assumed to occur for pressure above Pho in Equation 5 which is derived by setting Equation 3 equal to zero and solving Equations 1, 2, and 3 simultaneously.

e) Although the LPCI flow effectively " seals" the break (i.e., no more inventory is lost from the vessel) once the LPCI flow rate exceeds the break flow, this reduction in inventory loss was not taken as a credit. The continued loss of both LPCI flow and of inventory fran the vessel were conservatively assumed.

. In addition, sensitivity studies were performed with the approved SAFE model to show that the effect of " sealing" the break and of varying the LPCI flow rate in the vessel has a negligible effect en the vessel pressure.

Equations used in calculating LPCI flow loss with injection into a broken recirculation loop.

l 3 [ 288g y (F - lb'I)

(1)

W

=A B

B

/(Pyg - F )/(B-Kg/288g y A B)

(2) 2 WL

=

3 WE

=

Wt-WB (3)

P V+bE /

gY A 2 g)

B 3

2%g y N - g/ 9 W

Pyg + (A P

=

g B

1+AZ (288g y B -

/g4 3

where: WB = break flow rate (lbm/sec)

,A3 = break area (ft2)

Py = stagnation pressure at break (psi)

% = initial break stagnation pressure (psi)

Py = vessel stagnation pressure (psi)

Pyg = LPCI shutoff pressure (psi)

WE = effective LPCI flow rate (lbm/sec) 2 AE = LPCI flow area in vessel (ft )

Kr = loss coefficient

~

WL = LPCI flow rate (1bm/sec)

B

= LPCI system characteristic g

= 32.2 (1 h -ft/lbf-sec )

2 y

= vater density (l k /ft3)

In summary, the above equations will yield a realistic upper bound break flow and a realistic lower bound effective LPCI flow into the vessel in the case of LPCI injection into a broken loop.

This is shown to result in maximizing calculated peak cladding temperature in the response to Question 2

The following assumptions were made in modeling the Isolation Condenser heat removal performance with SAFE.

1) Rated heat transfer rate is 2.06 x 108 Btu /hr. at a vessel pressure of 1150 psia.

2) Return condensate flow is calculated from the rated heat transfer i

assuming the condensate is saturated water (1000 psia vessel condition. )

3) Steam and condensate flow rates are calculated for SAFE input at vessel

{

pressures of 1150 and 100 psia.

SAFE linearly interpolated flows at pressures in between. No credit is taken for the isolation condenser i

at pressures below 100 psia.

4) The water in the shell side is saturated liquid at 30 psia.

5) Enthalpy of returning condensate water is constant at 542 Btu /1tm (1000 psia vessel condition).

The following table gives steam and condensate flow rate calculations.

Equations Used In Calculating l

Steam and Condensate Flow Rates 1

Millstone Isolation Condenser Q

~

100 R S 100- S gR fg g100 00 fg kR gR

• f

% 100 g100

• f i

I i

m

4-kOO = heat transfer rate at 100 psia (.514 x 108 Btu /hr) where:

= Rated heat transfer at 1150 psia (2.06 x 108 Btu /hr)

T

= Saturation temperature at 1150 psia (561.8*F)

R T

= Saturation temperature at 30 psia (250*F)

S T

= Saturation temperature at 100 psia (327.8*F) 100 M

= Steam flow at 1150 psia (317,900 lbm/hr) h

= Enthalpy of vaporization at 1000 psia (699 Btu /lbm) fg 5

= Steam mass flow rate at 100 psia (79,2001hn/hr) 8100 3

kR

= Volumetric condensate flow at 1150 psia (6729 ft /hr) 3 kl00 = Volumetric condensate flow at 100 psia (1679 ft /hr) 3 V

= Specific volume of saturat,ed liquid at 1000 psia (.0212 ft /hr) p NRC Question (2)

For the hmiting break size, provide a sensitivity study as a function of LPCI flow rate into the broken loop. Provide all assumptions in this study, e.g., flow rate and corditions. Also, encompass a sufficiently large range of conditions to assure that an appropriate degree of uncertainty, 20 - 50%, is considered.

. t NNECO Response The independent variable in this problem is the flux (lb/sec/ft ) of LPCI 2

flow out of the break. This assumption affects the net LPCI flow into the vessel and the time that LPCI flow enters the vessel for any given break size.

The phenomena that is predicted by the REFLOOD model during small break transients is the momentary collapse of the core water level due to quenching of steam voids when the cold LPCI water is injected into the lower plenum. Any amount of LPCI flow in excess of about 15 pounds mass per second will cause this void collapse and, thus, the occurrence of this phenomena is not a function of LPCI flow rate into the vessel, but a function of whether LPCI is functioning or not.

By contrast, the core spray water is saturated by the time it reaches the lower plenum, and consequently does not quench steam voids and the core spray itself will reflood the core without void collapse.

Therefore, the parameters which affect the core recovery time are:

a) The time of LPCI injection into the lower plenum (at flow rates greater than about 15 lb/sec. ).

b) The time to reflood the core after the water level collapse has occurred.

(Note that the nmaller the LPCI flow rate into the vessel, the longer it takes to reflood after the collapse. )

In the analysis completed, the flux of LPCI flow out the break was maximized (as described in the answer to Question 1) to minimize LPCI flow into vessel.

Then the small break spectrum was analyzed with this flux up to 0.1 ft.

(Note 2

that the loop selection system will always detect breaks larger than 0.1 ft and 2

inject in the unbroken loop. ) The limiting break is the case where the LPCI flow starts entering the vessel and quenching steam voids just before the high powered plane of tha fuel (the hot node) is recovered by the ECCS flow from the core spray system, thus, maximizing the total uncovered time.

A sensitivity study was performed reanalyzing the small breaks spectrum assuming the flux of LPCI water out the break is 0 7 times the Bernoulli flow relationship discussed in the answer to Question 1 which is closer to the expected realistic flux. The results substantiate the fact that maximizing the flux (minimizing the LPCI flow into the vessel) gives the latest reflooding time.

Table 1 shows the results obtained and Figures 1 and 2 are the water level and pressure plots from the REFLOOD code for the two cases (1.0 and 0 7 times the Bernoulli flow relationship).

Therefore, the analysis based on 1.0 times the subcooled Bernoulli flow of LPCI water out the break does minimize LPCI flow into the vessel and does result in the lowest MAPLHGR and highest PCT. This is the analysis that was presented l

to determine new MAPLHGh limits.

I

- TABLE 1 Small Break Analysis Results for Millstone with a Postulated Gas Turbine Failure and l

l l

l the Ads Timer Set at 45 Seconds.

LIMITING UNC0VERY REFLOODING BREAK TIME OF TIME OF CASE SIZE LIMITING BREAK LIMITING BREAK LPCI lost 0.1 FT2 168.4 SEC 488.1 SEC

= 1.0 Times Bernoulli Flow LPCI lost 0.1 FT2 168.4 SEC 446.1 SEC

= 0.7 Times Bernoulli Flow 1

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NRC Question (3)

Table 3.2.2 of your proposed Technical Specifications should include all instrument actuations of ECCS components. Assure that all actuation signals for the Isolation Condenser are included in this table, e.g.,

high-pressure with 15-second time delay.

NNECO Eesponse The attached Technical Specification changes (three pages) are the necessary additional changes to supplement those proposed in Reference (1).

The change to the Technical Specifications is required by the addition of the l

Isolation Condenser to those systems required for the mitigation of the small t

break LOCA. The actual change involves the addition of reactor high-pressure l

initiation to the ECCS instrumentation list. The reactor high pressure serves as a back-up initiation signal to the low-low water level initiation of ECCS components.

This plant modification does not present an unreviewed safety question since it does not:

1) increase the probability or consequences of previously analyzed accidents;

2) create the possibility of a different type of accident than those previously analyzed;

3) reduce the margin of safety previously defined in the Technical Specification bases.

This change is viewed as an overall improvement in the reliability of the plant systems to maintain reactor inventory under off-normal conditions.

This proposed change has been reviewed and approved by the onsite operational review committee and by the offsite safety review board.

NRC Question (h )

Verify that the new low-low water level actuation of the Isolation Condenser is in parallel with the current high pressure and 15-second time delay actuation signal.

NNECO Response The attached control wiring diagram shows the in-series low-low water level and high reactor pressure 15-second time delay actuation, for automatic initiation of the Isolation Condenser. As the actuation circuits are normally energized, the in parallel concept is achieved by use of low-low water level contacts in series with the high reactor pressure time delay relay output contacts.

. NRC Question (5)

Provide schematic diagrams of the new low-low water level actuation logic for the Isolation Condenser.

NNECO Response This is provided in the previous response.

NRC Question (6)

Assure that the Technical Specifications requirements for the Isolation Condenser are consistent with the requirements for ECCS.

NNECO Reskonse In addition to the response to Question (3), which provides the supplemental Technical Specifications, the following addresses the design requirements of the Isolation Condenser to verify its ECCS capabil.4ty.

The Isolation Condenser Vessel Assembly was fabricated in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII and Section III, Class A.

The specification considered the following design conditions:

e Standby e

Operation e

Design Life e

Corrosion Allowances e

Internal Pressure and Mechanical Forces e

Pipe Reactions e

Thermal Effects e

Shock Loadings e

Seismic Considerations The subject specification also delineated internals layout, materials, fabrica-tion, inspection, testing, shipping, and instruction manual requirements.

There are three (3) major piping lines associated with the Isolation Condenser system.

The following list presents some of the design parameters associated with each.

. Isolation Condenser Supply Line (From Reactor Vessel)

Max. Op.

Max. Op.

Design Design Press.

Temp.

Press Temp.

14"-IC-1 S80 1000 546 1250 575 16"-IC-2 S80 1000 546 1250 575 12"-IC-3a S80 1000 546 1250 575 12"-IC-3b S80 1000 546 1250 575

.t psig

• F psig F

t Isolation Condenser Return Line (to Reactor Vessel)

Max. Op.

Max. Op.

Design Design Press.

Temp.

Press Temp.

1 8"-IC-ka S80 1000 546 1250 575 8"-IC-hb S80 1000 54 6 1250 575 I

10"-IC-5 S80 1000 54 6 1250 575 psig F

psig

• F Isolation Condenser Vent Line (to Atmosphere) i Max. Op.

Max. Op.

Design Design l

Press.

Temp.

Press Temp.

28"-IC-Ta Std.

Wt.

150 250 150 250 28"-IC-7b Std.

Wt.

150 250 150 250 28-IC-8 Std.

Wt.

150 250 150 250 psig F

psig F

l h

. All Isolation Condenser piping was designed, fabricated and installed by the architer, vcal firm (EBASCO) responsible for Millstone Unit No.1 construction. The Return and Vent lines were originally analyzed by the architectural engineer for the following conditions:

o Internal Pressure (Design) e Deadweight Thermal (Design) e e

Seismic (SSE)

The supply line was since reanalyzed for the same design conditions in NUSCO calculations in accordance with the applicable FSAR requirements, utilizing information derived from the NRC I&E Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 studies.

These piping systems were also considered as part of the High Energy Pipe Break evaluations done for inside and outside the drywell (Reference (3)).

The results of these studies indicate that the postulated breaks addressed would not have a detrimental effect on the ability of the plant to safely shutdown.

The Isolation Condenser vessel and piping components meet all the applicable FSAR requirements for a Safety Class and Seismic Class I system.

The environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment has also been assessed for the Isolation Condenser (in addition to the mechanical aspects discussed above). The Isolation Condenser steam and supply piping has only four valves which are also containment isolation valves; an inboard and outboard valve exists on both the steam supply and condensate return line. The environ-mental qualification of the inboard isolation valves, orarators, power cabling, and penetrations was docketed in Reference (h) and meeta the temperature, pressure, relative humidity, chemistry, and integrated radiation calculated to exist following the design basis LOCA inside containment. The outboard isolation valves would not be exposed to the LOCA environment. The effects of all high energy line breaks outside containment were evaluated in Reference (3). Containment isolation would terminate any such blowdown and the conclusion of Reference (3) is that there would be no detrimental effect on the ability to safely shutdown.

To provide added measures of assurance, there is a number of ongoing environ-mental qualification assessnents being performed for I&E Bulletin No.79-01B, and the Systematic Evaluation Program (Reference (5)). The scope of the required reassessments encompass the Isolation Condenser system, thus, ensuring any improvements to the original plant design basis deemed necessary, will encompass the Isolation Condenser qualifications.

Further documentation of the Isolation Condenser system design basis, system description, design evaluation, inspection, and testing is provided in FSAR Section IV-5 Existing Technical Specifications for Isolation Condenser operability, action statements, and surveillance are provided in Specifications 3.5.E and 4.5.E and the corresponding Bases sections.

NRC Question (7)

With normal FWCI system operation and a loss of offsite power following a small break LOCA, water level in the downcomer would be expected to drop before it is recovered by FWCI system.

Should level drop below low-low-low water level (and high drywell pressure), the ADS timer would initiate. In such an event, depending on FWCI capacity, startup time delays, break size, etc., low-low-low water level would be expected to clear at some later time, thereby preventing the ADS blowdown and allowing FWCI to mitigate the event.

Setting down the ADS timer from 120 seconds to 45 seconds raises the concern that low-low-low level may not be recovered (if achieved) within 45 seconds even if the FWCI system was adequately performing its intended function up to that time.

In such an event, the FWCI system would be effectively disabled while simultaneously initiating a larger break (ADS blowdown).

In order to assure appropriate snall break protection reliability (redundancy) provide a small break spectrum analysis with FWCI operative with minimum flow capacities and maximum time de. sys to show that FWCI will either preclude the attainment of triple-low water level or will recover the triple-low water level before 45 seconds has elapsed.

The break spectrum should include the worst break in the range of 0.05 square feet to 0.1 square feet.

The analysis should be performed with a model which maximizes the duration of low-low-low level outside the core shroud. Provide the time duration for low-low-low level (if achieved) and describe the break spectrum models employed.

NUECO Response Millstone (and other similar BWR 3's) does not have a low-low-low water level trip which is the common terminology for the ADS water level trip in BWR h and later designs. For Millstone, the FWCI and ADS low water level trips are at the same level (low-low water level). The Millstone Technical Specifixetions require the low-low water level trip to be set at 79 inches above the top of active fuel (TAF). The low-low-low water level trip for BWR h is set at approximately 18 inches above TAF.

The FWCI will initiate on either a high drywell pressure signal (2 psig) or the low water level signal, whichever occurs first, while the ADS timer will initiate after botn signals have occurred. The most limiting assumption is that the high drywell pressure signal does not occur until the low water level signal occurs (high drywell pressure really occurs at approximately 5 seconds after LOCA or sooner for snall recirculation line break).1 Since the maximum delay time (from trip to injection) for the FWCI system with the loss of offsite power is 90 seconds, it is obvious that with a 45 second ADS timer setting the FWCI will not preclude ADS initiation for any recirculation line breaks if the assumption of ceincident drywell pressure and low water level signals is made.

Mark I Torus Definition Report NEDO-24575 l

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- 1h -

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Analysis was performed with normal FWCI and ADS operation and a loss of offsite i

power with the approved SAFE 03 model employing the above assumption (FWCI start on low water level) for both 120 seconds and 45 second ADS timer settings.

This q

analysis verified the water level remains above the TAF with or without ADS i

initiation, and independent of timer setting.

j l

ADS initiation for this range of recirculation line break sizes (< 0.1 t

ft2 ) is of no safety concern for several reasons:

1) The FWCI is not effectively disabled by ADS initiation since it is.

[

an electrically powered system that will continue to provide coolant

[

(at actually increasing rates) for all vessel pressures below normal operating conditions.

2) ADS actuation removes a relatively small amount of inventory and a large f

I amount of energy from the vessel.

This increased inventory loss is in j

reality offset to some degree (perhaps substantially) by J

)

increased FWCI flow rate at lower vessel pressure even though no t

credit was taken for this fact in the analysis.

i i

l

3) ADS initiation enables a 4 or 5 fold increase in coolant injection I

from the low pressure ECC systems.

4) ADS initiation will not cause the core to be uncovered.

{

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5) For postulated breaks at locations other than the recirculation I

line break (e.g., core spray, feedwater, and steam line breaks), the i

inventory removal rate is less and the time between initiation of the FWCI (on high drywell pressure) and the ADS initiation is much

[

greater allowing much more time for FWCI to maintain water level.

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DOCKET NO. 50-245 i

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b MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO.1 i

j ISOLATION CONDENSER SYSTEM

=

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 1

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i APRIL,1980 s

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TABLE 3.2.2 INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES AND CONTROLS THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS Finimum Number of Operable Inst. Channels Tr.ip Function Trip Level Setting Remarks Per Trip System (1) 2 Reactor (ow Low Water 79 (+4-0) inches above 1 - In conjunction with low reactor Level top of active fuel pressure initiates core spray and LPCI.

2 - In conjunction with high dry well pressure, 120 sec. time delay, and LP core cooling pump interlock initiates auto blowoown.

3 - Initiates FWCI.

4 - Initiates starting of diesel genaratnr and gas turbine generator.

2 High Drywell Pressure

< 2 Psig 1 - Initiates core spray, LPCI, and FWCI, and SBGTS.

2 - In conjunction with low low water level, 120 sec. time delay, and LP core cooling pump interlock initiates auto blowdown.

3 - Initiates starting of diesel and gas turbine generator.

1 Reactor Low Pressure 300 Psig < P < 350 Psig 1 - Permissive for opening core spray and Permissive LPCI admission valve,.

2 - In conjunction with low inw reactor water level initiates core spray and LPCI.

1 High Reactor Pressure

< 1085 Psig 1 - In conjunction with 15 second time delay, initiates Isolation Condenser.

1 Timer, Isolation

< 15 seconds 1 - In conjunction with high reactor Condenser pressure, initiates Isolation Condenser.

m TABLL A.2.1 December 4,1-/8 MINIMUM TEST AND CALIBRATION FREQUENCY FOR CORE COOLING INSTRUMENTATION R00 DLOCKS AND ISOLATIONS, Instrument Channel Instrument Functional Test (2)

Calibration (2)

Instrument Check (2)

ECCS Instrumentation 1.

Reactor Low-Low Water Level (1)

Once/3 Months 2.

Drywell High Pressure (1

Once/3 Months 3.

ReactorLowPressure(PumpStart)

(1 Once/3 Months 4.

Reactor Low Pressure (Valve (1

Once/3 Months Permissive) 5.

APR LP Core Cooling Pump Interlock (1)

Once/3 Months 6.

Containment Spray Interlock (1)

Once/3 Months 7.

Loss of Normal Power Relays Refueling Outage None 8.

Power Available Relays (1) (5)

None 9.

Reactor High Pressure Once/3 Months l

Rod Blocks 1.

APRM Downscale (1)(3)

Once/3 Months f,1) 2.

APRM Flow Variable (1) (3)

Once/3 Months (1

3.

IRM Upscale (6)

(6)

(6 1

4.

IRM Downscale (6)

(6)

(6 l3a (1

1 5.

RDM Upscale (1)(3)

Once/3 Hopths

(

6.

RDM Downscale (1) (3)

Once/3 Months 7.

SRM Upscale (6)

(6)

(6

'8l.

SRM Detector not in Startup Position (6)

(6)

(6 38 Main Steam Line Isolation 1.

Steam Tunnel High Temperature Refueling Outage Refueling Outage 2.

Steam Line High Flow (1)

Once/3 Months Once/ Day 3.

Steam Line Low Pressure (1) (3)

Refeuling Outage None 4.

Steam Line High Radiation (1) (3)

Once/3 Months (4)

Once/ Day 3/4 2-6 Amendment 34 - Corr 3ctior. - December 4,1978

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High pressure actuation of the Isolation Condenser (IC) will be a backup to direct activation on Low-Low level; similar to other ECCS systems. Activation is based on the high pressure signal (1085 PSIG for 15 seconds) which occurs af ter MSIV closure on Low-Low water level and subsequent depressurization. The activa-tion of the IC requires only the opening of normally closed valve IC-3 in the condensate return line.

This valve is powered by the safety-grade DC battery. All valves in the system are powered by safety-grade AC or DC power and are also used for containnent isolation. All are normally in the open position (other than IC-3). The IC system is safety Class 2 and is seismically qualified. The shell side water volume is sufficient for approximately 30 minutes of operation at rated conditions without makeup. Two sources of makeup are available. For small break mitigation, less than 10 minutes of operation is required, and generally at less than rated conditions.

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