ML19344D367
| ML19344D367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1980 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Burstein S WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003120196 | |
| Download: ML19344D367 (1) | |
Text
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UNITE 3 STATES
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occu sttyn. ittinois sois7 FEB 1 1980 Docket No. 50-266 Docket No. 50-301 Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN:
Mr. Sol Burstein Executive Vice President Power Plants 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-02 is forwarded to you for information.
If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely, g
James C. Keppler Director
Enclosure:
IE Circular No. 80-02 cc w/ encl:
Mr. G. A. Reed, Plant Manager Central Files Director, NRR/DPM
-Director, NRR/ DOR C. M. Trammell, ORB /NRR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC
-Sandra A. Bast, Lakeshore Citizens for Safe Energy Mr. John J. Duffy, Chief J
Boiler Inspector, Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations j
8003120 %
2 -
1
9 SSINS No.: 6830 Y
Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190657 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 February 1, 1980 IE Circular No. 80-02 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT STAFF WORK HOURS Description of Circumstances:
Studies indicate that with fatigue, especially because of loss of sleep, an individual's detection of visual signals deteriorates markedly, the time it takes for a person to make a decision increases and more errors are made, and reading rates decrease.
Other studies show that fatigue results in personnel ignoring some signals because they develop their own subjective standards as to what is important, and as they become more fatigued they ignore more signals.
Inspections of personnel performance and training since the accident at Three Mile Island, have shown that in certain situations facility personnel are either required or allowed to remain on duty for extended periods of time.
Also, complaints have been received from some licensed nuclear power plant operators concerning the number of continuous hours they have been on duty.
Licensee management is responsible for providing a sufficient number of trained personnel who are in the proper physical condition to operate and maintain the plant.
Licensee management should review their administrative procedures covering the working hours of nuclear power plant staff.
These procedures should establish a sound policy covering working hours for plant staff who perform safety related functions (e.g., senior reactor operators, reactor operators, health physicists, auxiliary operators, I&C technicians, key maintenance personnel, etc.)
Subcommittee ANS-3 is currently developing criteri6 to address the subject of operator work hours. These guidelines will become a part of ANSI N18.7.
The NRC is also considering issuing requirements for administrative procedures that would control staff overtime.
Until either the ANSI Standard is issued and endorsed by NRC (via a Regulatory Guide) or separate requirements are issued by NRC, it is recommended that the following guidance be used.
The guidance should be applied to all personnel performing a safety related function:
1.
Scheduled work should be limited to the following maximum work hours:
a.
An individual should not be permitted to work more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> straight.
IE Circular N3. 80-02 Fcbruary 1, 1980 Fage 2 of 2
- 1 I
b.
There should be at least a 12-hour break between all work periods.
c.
An individual should not work more than 72-hours in any 7-day period.
d.
An individual should not work more than 14 consecutive days without having 2 consecutive days off.
2.
In the event that special circumstances arise that require deviation from the above, such deviations should be authorized by the Station Manager with appropriate documentation of the cause.
Plants should be staffed and schedules developed to op.
te such that exceptions are not required.
3.
If an operator is required to work in excess of 12 continuous hours, his duties should be carefully selected.
It is preferable that he not be assigned any task that affects core reactivity or could possibly endanger the safe operation of the plant.
No written response to this Circular is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
I
IE Circular No. 80-02 Enclosure
,g February 1, 1980
- e RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.
Issue 80-01 Service Advice for GE 1/17/80 All licensees of Induction Disc Relays nuclear power reactor operating facilities and holders of nuclear power reactor cps 79-25 Shcok Arrestor Strut 12/20/79 All licensees and Assembly Interference holders of power reactor cps 79-24 Proper Installation and 11/26/79 All Holders of a Calibration of Core Spray Power Reactor OL or Pipe Break Detection CP Equipment on BWRs.
79-23 Motor Starters and 11/26/79 All Power Reactor and Contactors Failed Operating Facilities to Operate and Holders of Reactor cps 79-22 Stroke Times for Power 11/16/79 All Power Reactor Operated Relief Valves Operating Facilities and all Utilities having a CP 79-21 Frevention of Unplanned 10/19/79 All holders of Power Releases of Radioactivity Reactor OLs and cps 79-20 Failure of GTE Sylvania 9/24/79 All holders of Power Relay, Type PM Bulletin Reactor OLs and cps 7305, Catalog SU12-11-AC with a 12V AC Coil 79-19 Loose Locking Devices 9/13/79 All Holders of Power
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on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps Reactor OLs and cps L
79-18 Proper Installation of 9/10/79 All Holders of Power Target Rock Safety-Relief Reactor OLs and cps 79-17 Contact Problem in SB-12 8/14/79 All Power Reactor Switches on General Electric Licensees with a CP Company Metalclad Circuit and/or OL Breakers
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