ML19344B126

Forwards Review of Facility Containment Integrity Analysis for SEP Containment Analysis Support,To Satisfy Requirements of Subtasks 1,2 & 5.Requests Review of Rept

ML19344B126
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/31/1980
From:	Vreeland D LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-FIN-A-0241, CON-FIN-A-241, TASK-03-07.B, TASK-03-07.D, TASK-06-03, TASK-3-7.B, TASK-3-7.D, TASK-6-3, TASK-RR TF-80-193, NUDOCS 8008250613
Download: ML19344B126 (5)

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! : ~l LAWi:ENCE LNERA!CRE LA2CFATORY i _J NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SAFETY PROGRAM TF80-193 July 31, 1980 Dennis M. Crutchfield Systematic Evaluation Program Branch Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Review of Palisades Containment Integrity Analysis for the Containment Analysis Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program, FIN #A0241 Caar Mr. Crutchfield:

I am enclosing our review of the Palisades Containment Integrity Analysis as part of the Containment Analysis Support for the SEP. This letter report is intended to satisfy the requirements of Subtasks 1, 2 and 5 which are concerned with the review of existing analyses for each SEP facility. This report will then become part of a more complete report en the integrity of Palisades' containment which would include subsequent a ulyses as required.

Please review this report to see if it satisfactorily reviews the existing analyses and is presented in an appropriate manner.

Sincerely, ,

i WO-l i. w .tu ._: (

l David G. Vreeland Thermo Fluid Mechanics Group Nuclear Test Engineering Division DGV:lgd 8007.31/1020u cc: (w/ enc 1) (w/o encl)

C. Tinkler F. Tokarz/G. Cummings E. Adensam B. Bowman L

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J Revies of Palisades Containment 2 Integrity Analysis i

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Prepared by:

David G. Vreeland Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory l

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m Introduction This report is a review of the existing docketed containment integrity analyses submitted by Consumers Power Co. to the U.S. NRC. The purpose of this review is to help enable the U.S. NRC staff to resolve containment safety issues addressed in SEP Safety Topics VI-2.0 and VI-3. These safety topics are conccened with the ability of the containment to withstand the increase in containment atmosphere pressure and temperature due to a postulated break of a high energy line inside the containment.

There are two possible high energy line breaks for Palisades. These are a primary system pipe break and a secondary system pipe break. The containment integrity analysis for these two break types are reviewed in this report. In addition, a brief plant description related to the containment analysis is presented.

Plant Descriotion Palisades is a Combustion Engineering PWR licensed to operate at 2200 MWt and 722 MWe (gross). The primary coolant system is a 2 loop system consisting of 2 steam generators with 2 primary coolant pumps per steam generator. The containment systems include the containment structure and associated systems.

These systems include containment heat removal systems, containment isolation systems and a containment combustible gas control system.

The containment is a steel-lined, pre-stressed, post-tension concrete structure with a net free volume of about 1,640,000 cebic feet. The containment structure houses the nuclear steam supply system, including the reactor, steam generators, reactor coolant pumps and pressurizer, as well as certain components of the engineered safety feature systems. The containment 0

is designed for an internal pressure of 55 psig, temperature of 2S3 F and a

'eak rate of 0.2% per day.

Containment Functional Design The licensee has described in the FSAR (Docxet 50-255, 12/15/71) the results and methods used to analyze the containment pressure resoonse for a number of design basis loss-of-coolant accidents. There have been more recent loss-of-coolant analyses (i.e., Final Acceptance Criteria, ECCS Analysis for the Palisades Plant of Onsumar Puer Company Decket 50-255 102, 12/16/74) but these analyses were not used to evaluate the containment integrity but rather peak cladding temperature prediction. Therefore, this review is based on the containment analysis presented in the Palisades 'Jpdated FSAR, Docket 50-755, 12/15/71.

Pr imary System Breaks The licensee has analyzed the contaircent pressure response from postulated loss-of-coolant accidents. Mass and energy release rates for reactor coolant system blowdown were calculated using the CE FLASH-4 computer program. The available energy sources considered in determining the mass and energy release rates censisted of NSSS stored heat release during blowdown only, reactor core decay heat, metal-water reaction, and hydrogen combustion.

Various hot leg break sizes were evaluated resulting in the double-ended rupture producing the highest containment pressure. The containment analysis was done assuming loss of cff site power and the use of only one emergency diesel generator. The mass and energy blowdown calculation included the effects of three out of four safety injection tanks.

The mass and energy release rates were then used as input to COPATTA which is the licensee's computer program used to calculate the containment pressure and temoerature response. The licensee assumed as a result of loss-of-offsite power and the use of one diesel generator the operation of either three out of four air coolers or two out of three spray coolers. The peak calculated

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containment pressure of 51 psig was calculated on the basis of all indicated energy sources and also~ assuming partial operation of the containment spray and f an cooler system and for a hot leg double-ended piping rupture (equivalent area of 9.62 ft 2),

Conclusion Based on our review of the licensee's containment integrity analysis for primary systems breaks to date there are many areas where the analyses do not conform with current U.S. NRC criteria. Specifically, the major discrepancy is in the methodology used in developing the mass and energy release rates for containment response calculations. The mass and energy release rates used were the sane ones; developed for peak cladding temperature prediction calculations. The assumptions in the models, break sizes, and locations that are conservative for the peak cladding temperature analysis are in general not conservative for containment integrity analysis. In addition, only the energy release during the blowdown phase was considered and not the energy release during the reflood or post-reflood periods.

Secondary System Pipe Break The licensee has not analyzed the containment pressure response to a postulated main steam line or feedwater line f ailure. An analysis was done on the resulting effects of a main steam line break on reactor power. However, no mass and energy release rates were generated and the analysis is not applicable to containment integrity.

Conclusion Since the licensee has not analyzed secondary system pipe breaks as they pertain to containment integrity, the U.S. NRC criteria for secondary system pipe break analyses has not been met.

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