ML19343D461
| ML19343D461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1980 |
| From: | Kunder G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040542 | |
| Download: ML19343D461 (77) | |
Text
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I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
x 3
In the :atter of:
Docket No. None 4
METROPOLITAN-EDISON (TMI II) 5
____________________x g
e.
.A 6
a R
Room D-4 7
Iloward Johnson flotor Inn M
473 Eisenhower Boulevard 8
8 Ilarrisburg, Pennsylvania dd 9
Wednesday, September 3, 1930 io G
10 Interview of George A. Kur. der began, pu rsuant to notice, g
11 at 3:30 p.m.
g 12 5
PRESENT:
3 TERRY ll ARPSTER, Of fi ce of Inspection and Enforcenent h
14 iluclear Regulatory Commission
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15 JOllU W.
CRAIG, Of' ice of Insiiection and Enforcement tinalear Regulettory Connission 16
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NORMAN C.
!10S ELEY, Office of Inspection and Enforcement 17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission m
M 18 DAVID II. GAMBLE, Of fice of Inspector and Auditor y
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 19 8"
RICIIARD K. IlOEFLING, Office of the Executive Legal Director i
20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission badhw Fi s h,, cd C h. J 9sev4G~ A REck+ #4,us n% '
2I MICIIAEL F.
McBRIDE, ESO.
i EUGENE R.
FIDELL, ESQ.
22 SMITH GEPIIART, ESO.
O MOttY s. 80^sr. sso-l 23 On behalf of George A. Kunder 24 0
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I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. GAMBLE:
This interview is being conducted as part 3
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation into the
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exchange of information between the Metropolitan Edison Company e
5 and the NRC on March 28, 1979.
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6; Mr. Kunder, would you please give us your full name, it 2
7 for the record?
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THE UITNESS:
George Anthony Kunder.
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MR. GAMBLE:
Counsel present, would you please identify j
E 10 yourselves?
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11 MR. McBRIDE:
Michael S. McBride, counsel for Mr.
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MR. FIDELL:
Eugene R. Fidell, v:g 14 MS. BOAST:
Molly S. Boast.
15 MR. GAMBLE:
Mr. Gephart is out right now, and will be E
j 16 returning to us later.
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I will enter an appearance for Smith B.
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18 Gephart.
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E 19 MR. GAMBLE:
Mr. Kunder, would you please raise your b
20 right hand, and I will administer an oath at this time.
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't ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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Whereupon,
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2 GEORGE A. KUNDER 3'
was called for interview and, having first been duly sworn, was g)
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EXAMINATION 6
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BY MR. IIARPSTER:
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George, a review of your testimony before the Special s
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Inquiry Group has indicated that shortly af ter your arrival in dc 9
the control room on the morning of March 28, 1979, it was your
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10 perception that following the reactor and turbine trip high Z-=
11 pressure injection had been secured, and let down had been B
f I2 increased in an attempt to restore the pressurizer level to I
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at approximately 6:00 a.m.
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I don't recall specifically what parameters I discussed E
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"g 19 the pressurizer level indication was high, that stands out in n
20 my mind, and that the pressure was low.
Beyond that, I cannot l
2I recollect for sure any more.
I 22 O
Did you at any time on March 28, 1979, discuss the
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24 8:30 a.m.,
that is the high pressure injection secured, and the
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25 let down increased?
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4 A
Uould you repeat that again?
/~T Q
Did you at any time on the day of the accident discuss 3
the status of the high pressure injection system, and the let
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4 down system as they existed prior to 8:30 a.m., that morning with s-e 5
g Messrs Miller, Rogers, Zewe, lierbein, Mehler, Chwastyk?
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A It is possible, but I cannot remember.
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To the best of your knowledge, was this information N
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A Do you mean specifically that the high pressure oH 10 injection was secure, and that the let down was increased?
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Q Yes.
d 12 A
I don't recall, nor do I recall in the communication ad 13 g
I had with the NRC from reviewing the taped conversations with s
p Region I, that that was in there either.
That communication is
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certain one where the record could be reviewed to see if I said z
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anything relative to those two parameters.
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0 In your opinion, should this information have been x
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passed to the NRC on that morning, tha t is, the high pressere 19 l
injection was secured, and the let down flow increased?
20 A
Do you mean, what was my opinion at that tine?
O What is your opinion today.
22 A
Obviously, all that information should have been given 23 i to the NRC 24 I
BY MR. MOSELEY:
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O What would you have said then?
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A At that tim o I think I could characterize my 7
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2 communications and perceptions of what I should give to die NRC 3
as everthing I thought was relative at that time.
I recall pretty
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4 much spilling my guts to primarily Don Haverkamp cn the phone to 5
provide him the basic plant conditions, and our general perception 6
as to how we got to that plant condition, as best I knew it to be.
7 Looking back on the testimony, and all the Rogovin K
l 8 Report, the Kemmeny Commission Report, there are some parameters d
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that I was probably not aware of, and only because I can only be zo h
10 in one place at a particular time.
The control room is big, and
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N I2 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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Q But that morning you attempted to characterize the
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A Yes.
Plus, I answered to the best of my ability any i.
I I7 questions that NRC people posed to me in the control room over the
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Q To your knowledge, were these particulars?
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No.
21 Q
To your knowledge, was this information withheld from i
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!the NRC on March 28, 19797 (h
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23 l MR. FIDELL:
Which information?
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
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I am sorry, the information with regard to the status ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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No, not to my knowledge.
3 Q
A review of your testimony, and this is O"fice of
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4 Inspection report of July 1979, has indicated that on the morning 5
g of March 28, 1979, it was your perception that the reactor 9{
6 coolant pumps were pumping steam.
Was this discussed in the R
7 telephone conference call with Messrs. Miller, Rogers, and A
8 IIerbein at approximately 6:00 a.m.
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To the best of my recollection, that would not have ze th h
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f I2 perception later on, after that phone call was terminated.
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Q Uhat would you have discussed or what do you recall m
5 I4 discussing with regard to the reactor coolant pumps that morning,
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Do you nean during the phone conversation?
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Yes.
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I don't really recall.
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Q What discussions were subsequently held on March 28, 20 197k, regarding the inability of the reactor coolant pumps to s
2I pamhwaterwithanyonethatyouwereinvolvedwith?
22 A
Do you mean days and weeks after the accident?
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No, just on March 28 in trying to analyze why the 1
lreactorcoolantpumpscouldnotpumpwater?
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I would estimate that within about an hour or two after p
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the phone conversation, it was eviden'c to myself as well as
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2 generally to the management team, I will call it, that the 3-coolant pumps were unsuccessf ul in establishing any kind of g
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We reached the conclusion that we were steam-bound.
5 I think that that is the terminology that I used.
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7 with that perception.
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I cannot remember any specific conversation with any-G d
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10 Q
Let me ask you if you can expand on that just a little E
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When you say that the reactor coolant pumps were steam-a N
12 bound, are you saying that you envisioned them as the hot loops
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being void down to the pump section itself?
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14 Can you explain what you mean by steam-bound?
$f 15 A
Yes.
I had the perception that we had steam in the E
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system.
I don ' t think -- I don' t remer~ 2r quantifying, or being 7:
d 17 I able to quartify how much steam and just where, but that the pumps E
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So by implication, I guess you could say that that was M
20 my perception.
21 O
In testimony before the special inquiry group on 22 September 18, 1979, you participated in the following exchange 23 with regard to the status of the electromagnetic relief valve.
I 24 [ Let me quote to you.
O' 25 ;f The question was, "I have been focusing those questions f
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The question, when subsequent to that 3
time, if at all, did you become involved in any discussions of m
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I believe what was meant there was a relief 5
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"That would be af ter the general R
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emergency was declared, and it was recognized that voiding had E
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At that thne, I presumed someone had determined that d
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the relief valve had, in fact, opened, and that is how we lost
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It pretty much became common knowledge
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stuck open?
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I don't really remember if anyone specifically told.me.
g is i03y10,J1y, someone c3y1ous1y to1a me, 1 connot remem3cr mucn, 1
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g Could I read that?
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Sure.
If you don't mind my notebock, I have put t
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They are indexed, and if you will go l
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19 to IE, but maybe I can find it much faster for you.
n 20 A
All right.
2I (Document was handed to the witness.)
22 A
That testimony, I did not have any specific time frame.
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23 l It was sometime af ter the general emergency, and I can' t tell 24 whether it was minutes, hours, or just when that I gained the A
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25 perception or the knowledge that the relief valve had been stuck ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I open.
I cannot remember any specific conversations, or how I n
2 became aware that specifically we had a problem with the valve.
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Can you recall exactly what it is that became common
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4 knowledge, is it the fact that it.became common knowledge in the 5.
g control room that the relief valve had been stuck open for some 0
period of time?
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7 A
When I say that it became common knowledge, I th' ink I O
was referring to the fact that when bits and pieces of the d
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of information and disseminating that to the staff, it just became
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But I cannot tell you for sure if that was in the 9
morning, in the afternoon, or later.
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m I4 Q
Do you recall that you at any time that day discussed
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the fact that the electromagnetic relief valve had been stuck
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6 open with Messrs. Miller, Rogers, Herbein, Zewe, Mehler, or I7 Chwastyk?
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18 A
I don't recall any specific conversations, but it is I9 8
certainly possible that later in the morning, or later that day, e
20 whenever I became aware of the fact that the relief valve was 21, stuck open, or was believed to have been stuck open, we 1
22 lcertainly could have had conversations.
23 l I do know that I was not really aware of t' it in the l
24 morning, and it was a piece of information diat I would have learned IT 25,lfrota someone else.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q Are you certain. that you did not at any time on March 2
28, 1979, discuss this information with Mr. Mehler?
3 A
To the best of my recollection, I cannot remember any o(,)
4 discussions with Mr. Mehler.
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0 Do you recall if this infcrmation was passed on to the K
6 NRC on March 28, 1979, that is the fact that the electromatic R
7 relief valve had been stuck open for a period of time?
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A I cannot recall that either.
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You don't recall if you passed on that information i%g 10 in your conversations with the NRC?
E 11 A
No.
If I would have, it probably would be on that
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O Let me ask this again, and I think that we have O
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15 type be passed on to the NRC?
5 16 A
Certainly, today I would immediately initiate igh k
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5.
M 18 MR. FIDELL:
For the record, you have the same or
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20 important to bear in mind that it is very easy with the benefit 21 of 20-20 hindsight to say that something could or should have been i
22 done differently in the past.
O 23 I think that i is important to spread that point on the 24 record because we all, everyone, I think the Commission included,
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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situation.
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sort of Monday morning quarterbacking with the perfect vision that c'_)
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we all have af ter an event.
5 MR. HARPSTER:
I think one thing you should understand, h
6 and one of the reason that we repeat this question and asks these R
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gentlemen for their opinion, is that we are tasked with the s
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So it is necessary z
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He find it necessary to ask
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I2 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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George, you have previously testified that on the z
5 I4 morning of March 28, 1979, after the reactor coolant pumps were h
15
' shut off, the hot-leg temperatures sreamed up.
You were impressed
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18 That is, you were considerably in excess of the saturation P
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e 20 And, you never disbelieved the hot-leg temperatures 21 because you had more than one RTD telling you the same I
22 information.
23 l Did you at any time on Mar-h 28, 1979, discuss this 24 information or its i~' ice.tions with Messrs. Miller, Rogers, Flint,
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A I would have been engaged in various strategy discus-(,
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2 sions with Mr. Miller, and Mr. Rogers, throughout the morning, and 3
that information was a parameter that was a factor in those
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But I don' t remanbe i-any specific discussions.
I 5
g just remember that at various times we assembled in the shif t 9
6 supervisor's office, and perhaps out in the control room, and R
7 discussed what we were going to do next because we recognized that E[
8 we did have a need to establish cooling that we could identify 0
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with, and conclusively say was a situation that was under control.
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10 I really cannot remember any specifics, though.
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Was a record kept of the data indicated by the extended 9
N 12 scale read-out device connected to the hot-leg RTD?
=3 13 A
I can't remember any specific records, but there could 73 5
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5 14 be records of that information.
If it is available, it would have
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On March 28, 1979, what was your evaluation of the 5
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18 hot-leg tenperatures when they sharply increased af ter the reactor C
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19 coolant pumps were shut down?
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20 l A
My general recollection is that they indicated that we 21 had an abnormal situation in the plant.
I think that those i
22 conditions were beyond the bounds of plant conditions that I was f-w k-t 23 ; used to dealing with.
24 l My general perception of the reactor coolant system
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recall specifically when I reached that general feeling, or that
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It was sometime, of c mrse, after the temperatures 3
went up, and after many discussions with different people.
You 1
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gradually reached that perception.
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6 draw that conclusion.
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7 Q
John Flint of B&U testified that he advised several N
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people, including Lee Rogers and Gary Miller, that the magnitude d
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of the temperature of the super-heated steam would preclude the zC y
10 ability to collapse the bubble.
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A I can't remember specific discussions, but John was
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He certainly had input.
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Q Do you recall a concern of your inability to pressurize e
20 the plant because of the release set points to a point where you 2I could collpase the bubbles?
22 A
Ue had a lot of concerns that day, b'ut looking at it O
23 from the point of view you have expressed, I rezlly can't remember.
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24 I will have to sly that I just don't recall reviewing it specifically
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25 the way you have mentioned it.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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0 You previously testified that on March 28, 1979, your
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2 interpretation of the super-heated temperatures indicates that 3
the core had been uncovered and that it was being cooled by the 4
super-heated steam.
Was this information discussed at any tire e
5 on March 28, 1979, with Messrs. Miller, Rogers, Plint, IIerbein,
29 6
Zewe, Mahler, or Chuastyk?
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7 A
Again, I diink the perception I had was similar or the Kl 8
same as the general-parception of the rest of the management team.
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9 A large part of our discussions was directed toward what strategy E,
10 we would take to try and assure that the core was covered.
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15 9had the core covered, at least I did.
But there was not enough 5
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Thus, we continued to E
5 18 define our goals, and I am speaking of general goals, and come up
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with a strategy that got ourselves in a condition where we could M
20 say for sure that the plant was back under total control.
21 Q
George, let me ask you s question which is similar.
I 22 As I have reviewed your previous testimony, and your conversations
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23 with Don Haverkamp on that morning, I had the impression that you l.
24 l were very seriously concerned that the core was uncovered at some
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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heated steam mechanism.
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Did you express these concerns in this think tank 3
meeting, or meetings, as they were held throughout the n:)rning?
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g to cooling of the core, and that relates to the fact that if we e
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! were getting water into the core and it was evaporating, and that R
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is the mechanism I was thinking of, removing heat through the s
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Then, of course, as that steam would do 9
contact other hot material, it would become super-heated, that j6F 10 would achieve some cooling.
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12 of boron, and by this time, by the way, it would have been sometime 0,
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.ny conversation with Don Haverkamp.
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to what terminated that conversation, but that thought and concern z
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was in t*e back of my mind.
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that was not going to be a real problem, and I had no way of w
I' knowing whether that was going to be an eventual problem or not, n
20 but the only way of avoiding that problem was to keep water 21 chugging into the core, and keep it there.
22 We did have high pressure injection established at that
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23 point, and it seemed to me to be about the only thing that we could 24 4
ido.
There were no other alternatives that were obvious to us, or f)
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action, a different strategy.
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0 Let me ask you, did you discuss these concerns on how i
As 3 ! you perceived the core as being cold with the other members of
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the management team?
5 A
We had discussions throughout the morning.
I am fairly 0 Lcertain I verbalized that specific concern, and everybody else R
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verbalized the concerns they had.
We all came to reach an M
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course of action to take at that point.
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C Do you feel that people were in agreement with your
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12 A
My perception was that we all shared the same general
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understanding, although I would have to say that it was more of a
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16 "in the core.
He did not know how much water we had in the system.
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I7 We believed we had enough, but at least, I think on my part, it e
7 18 was more of an intuitive feel for the conditions in the system.
8 0
Did you discuss or did you overhear or learn of any e
20 II conversations with regard to the implications of this super-21 heated temperatures that morning?
22 A
I don't recall any specific conversations relative to
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Most of the time we were focusing on how to get to the E
24 l basic plant in a control mode of cooling, one that we understood
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forth, and that was either to try and achieve decay heat renoval i _j 2
operation, using the decay heat removal pumps.
Ultimately it was,
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as I recall, our goal, and we tried a number of strategies toward
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5 do if those individual strategies would fail, and have some back h
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But I don't recall either taking the opportunity, or s
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being able to really sit back and think, and focus on some of the ad 9
academic aspects, shall we say, of parameters that we were Y
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I think what pretty much motivated me personally was my 5
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g 14 Q
Ilow did you account, or what was your feeling toward 2
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' the continued extremely hot temperatures over the duration of the wz 16 day?
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18 were achieving your objectives, as the temperatures stayed up over
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19 the course of the day?
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20 A
certainly, it was a very frustrating experience to not 21 be able to restore the plant to a status that I was comfortable l
I 22 with.
To the best of my recollection, my belief was that there
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23, was a lot more water loss than could be made up in a very short l
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I Also, if you look at the fact that one of our strategies k,_)
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sane of the contents of the flood tanks in the RCS, and hopefully (5
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get down to a pressure we get on decay heat removal, we had to discharge steam from the pressurizer by the electromatic relief a
3 6
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that would add to the time it would take to fill the system with N
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me to accept the fact that it would take a long time to get the
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s 12 E
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throughout the day because of the extended period of time it was E
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taking you to get the system refilled?
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15 A
I don' t think I was thinking in terms of core damage z
I 16 g
to the extre:ae that it actually occurred at that time.
My general perception was that we did fail some fuel, and I presumed that z
18 some of the fuel pins had developed leaks.
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I don' t remember trying to quantify that in my mind.
n 20 Qualitatively, the f act that we had so much radiation in the 21 l plant due to the escape of the fission products, was evidence to 22 me that we had failed fuel.
O(_)
23l I don' t recall ever characterizing that fuel failure 24 i i as the extreme with the consequences that actually occurred until
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after, or beyond it.
2 (witness conferred with counsel.)
q) 3 BY MR. HARPSTER:
[J'T 4
Q Perhaps I mispoke myself.
Let me rephrase the question 5
and narrow it down a little.
g
?
6 Here you aware of a concern, or did you have a concern 7
throughout the day for a continuing core damage?
s j
8 A
I don' t think that I had the concern in those terms.
d fluY c
9 The concern I had was more in terms of getting the plan into a Y
10 stable condition which it would imply that we would not have any 11 core damage or increased core damage.
But I think that I was k
j 12 thinking more. in terms of operational parameters, and in terms E
13 of response of the instrumentation, and so forth at our disposal.
z 5
14 Q
In your conversations with the NRC on the morning of
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15 March 28, 1979, you did not report the hot-leg temperatures and
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16 e
d 17 A
Yes.
5 M
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Can you tell us why you did not report the hot-leg 5
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20 T-average?
21 A
I suspect that the reason is that my conversations with I
22 l Region I endal before I really recognized that we even had a wide-b) 23 range temperature indication.
s._
l 24 If you will read the previous testimony, I don' t recall
( )L 25 ever being aware that the in-core thermocouples were hooked up to ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
20 I
the computer.
In Unit I we never had those, and that is something g
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2 that I did not even think of.
3 Also, in Unit I we never had the wide range temperature l
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4 which I recollect I learned that day.
But I believe that I 5
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6 was done talking with Don, again sometime in the mid-morning.
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7 When I spoke in terms of the T-average, that was an Ej 8
instrument that I could go up to and I knew the location of, and d
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that is what I was focusing on, just like I would have in Unit I.
z Cg 10 Then, of course, I am pretty sure that at that point in E
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g 13 I cannot be sure, but I presume that I passed that general
-s mj 14 information on, either specifically or in general terms, because 15 I remember trying to give Don the best picture that I could of y
16 the plant as I knew it at that time.
1.
h 17 Q
George, you have testified today and in previous z
M 18 testimony that on March 28, 1978, you were aware that high pressure p
"g 19 injection had been secured, and the let down had been increased.
t 20 It was your perception sometime that morning that the reactor 2I coolant pumps were pumping steam.
You became aware that the 22 !electromatic relief valve had been open for an extended period,
/~(T) 23 l and that you were concerned that the core was uncovered, and was 24 !being cooled by super-heated steam.
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25 on March 28, 1979, did you inf er f rom these plant I
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conditions an indication that a serious inventory problem existed mC 2
in the reactor coolant system?
3 A
No one ever presented that information like that on that
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.e 5
throughout the course of that morning.
5 h
6 No, I did not infer that serious core damage was R
7 occurring other than the general perception that Iknew we had some N
3 failed fuel in qualitative terms.
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9 Q
Let me reask the question in a shortened form, and help 3
10 you out here a littic.
h II Uhat was your perception of inventory given all these is j
12 conditions on that morning?
5 y
13 A
By the time I would have known about all those factors Ig 14 and perceptions, etc., my perception was that we had steam in the
$j 15 system, and we did not have the full inventory, again in
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17 tell you what was going on in the core at that time, except 5
M 18 instrumentation that by inference you can at least determine that P;
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By that time, we knew that, n
20 I don't feel, I don't recall being any more probing 21 or analytical at that point.
Again, I was responding more in i
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at least that was not
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my approach to the matter.
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N9 8
M A
I don't remember any specific calculations done to d
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establish a quantative value for the inventory, if that is what
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you are requesting.
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Q now about a more qualitatively?
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A Qualitatively, I don't recal] any specific calculations, c"
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other than just general perception tnat we had some steam voiding, s
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and the answer to that is to get water into the system, number x
9 15 m
one.
That was pretty much the extent of it.
m Ib Q
George you have stated in previcus testimony, and let h
me quote from your testimony here:
"Ja my own mind, I believe, and e
M 18 lin the minds of almost everybody there, we thought that we were l
H" 8
19 :l pumping steam.
We were pretty well aware that we had at least la half-hour, or maybe a lot sooner than that. We really blew it 20 i
21 I!because, indeed, we had lost coolant.
I guess it was within maybe 22 Ithe nex; 15 minutes or half-hour when I, along with everyone else, 23 ' recognized that w e had significant steam void inside the reactor fcoolantsystem.
He were concerned at that point that we might be 24 r~s j
tj 25 uncovering the core. "
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I These statements seem to indicate that there was
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2 general agreement as to the apparent inventory problems.
Did you 3
at any time on March 23, 1979, discuss, overhear, or become aware
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g A
I think we just covered that area.
We were part of a 5
4 6
command team, and that subject was our main concern.
I cannot G
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8 O
Let me ask you more directly, do you recall specific-O c;
9 ally were the conclusions of core uncovery and the loss of coolant v.og 10 discussed with Gary Miller on March 28, 1979?
E_
II A
I don't remenber any specific discussions.
It was the a
N I2 subject of discussicn that morning.
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0 It was discussed in the management meetings of which l-)
5 I4 he was a part?
15 A
Yes.
We were in the control room as a group for the
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entire morning, and again we were discussing the strategies to 1.
h I7 try and restore the plant to normal operation, and making up for m
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18 lost inventory was very much a part of that discussion.
P h
I9 The method, of course, was using high pressure injection n
20 pumps to inject water into the system.
2I Q
George, was any or all of this information regarding i
22 inventory passed on to NRC on March 28, 1979?
Specifically, do (O)
'~'
23 you recall passing any on in your conversations with the NRC?
24 A
I don't know if I discussed it in precisely those t')
25 l terms, but qualitatively, to the best of my knowledge, I discussed j.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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the plant condition, and the fact that we had this stea m voiding e
V 2
with Don Haverkamp in that conversation.
I have not read the tape 3
for a while now, but that is in there and you can read it.
(,,)
4 O
I have.
5 A
Okay.
g 9
3 6
f Q
A review of your testimony has indicated on the morning GT 7
of March 28, 1979, that it was your perception and concern that s
j 8
shortly following the automatic shut-down of the reactor, the d
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reactor was returning to criticality as indicated by the source z
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10 and the intermediate range nuclear instrumentation.
E II A review of the testimony of nuclear engineers Benson,
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12 Crawford and Wilkerson of the technical support sta#f has indicated
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14 investigated the apparent indications of re-criticality.
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I8 ; reactor core such that excess thermo leakage of neutrons was seen P
I9 by the ex-core detectors.
M 20 l Did at any time on March 28, any of the engineers,
2I Benson, Crawford and Wilkerson, working at your direction, discuss i
22 l their conclusions with you?
O' V
23 ;
A I don't recall any discussions, and I suspect that it 24 is mainly because at some point in time the indications started to (D
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25; decrease.
It as about the same time frame that we had indications l
i, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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that called for site emergency.
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Our gears shifted into responding to the emergency
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6 I Co remember the conversation with John Flint, but G
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were having steam voiding in the system, and his explanation or dd 9
his conclusion as to why we saw the indications we did made sense.
M, 10 They were consistent with what we felt existed in the system.
II We felt that we had steam and then we did not have w
.I 12 the moderation that we normally would have for the neutrons.
E 13 Q
Did you at any time on March 28, 1979, discuss the i!_-
2 5
14 apparent return to criticality with the subsequent inferences of
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16 g
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17 A
I don't remember any discussions.
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To the best of your knowledge, was the count rate C
19 g
behavior or apparent re-criticality reported to the NRC on March n
20 28?
21 A
I don't remember if that was reported or not.
- Again, i
22 it would be in the tape if I did.
If I didn't, it didn't represent b
23 ; a significant item at the time that I had the conversation because toww* vJe 24 the rate-count did come down.
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25 I don't remember if I associated the increase in the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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count rate with the voiding prior to my conversation with the NRC,
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But, the time frame was that it would 3
have been just af ter John Flint came in the control room that I
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In your opinion today, should the information regarding En 6
the count rate behavior have been passed along to the NRC or the R
7 inferences from it?
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A All the information that was available should have.bcen 4
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At the time, I believed that I had i
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10 passed on all the information that was available and pertinent 11 within the time frame that I had to discuss it over the phone.
?
d 12 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Let's go back a little to the discussion of Flint's
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You were asked if you discussed with E
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I don' t remember it being discussed.
I suspect that E
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M 20. It may have been because by that time I had linked the two 21 together in my own mind.
I cannot be sure.
22 BY MR. IIARPSTER:
b) s_,
23,
O Let me ask you some questions about the in-core i
i 24 dins trumentation, George.
(m.
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25 To the best of your knowledge, what are the core exist i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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thermocouples used for during normal operations?
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2 MR. McBRIDE:
At Unit I, at Unit II, or in power plants 3
in general?
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4 BY MR. HARPSTER:
I e
5 0
At Unit II.
En 6
A Now, I am aware that they are used, if anything, for R
7 diagnostic reasons.
M 8
0 I am sorry, prior to the accident.
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10 accident.
E_
11 Q
Hr.d you had any training on in-core thermocouples at a
N 12 all?
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Just the fact that they existed.
I was aware of tuat.
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Are you aware of any other station personnel who would
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Well, when you say, training on in-core thermocouples, I8 f
do you mean were there other people who were aware that they P
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M 20 0
I was thinking more of training in their use, what they 2I might be used lor.
22 A
The instrumentation engineers that I became responsible I, ')
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'V 25 that they were hooked up.
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O I am correct, then, in stating that to your knowledge
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there is no station procedure for their use either during normal 3
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5 0
A review of your testimony in July of 1979 by the Office 6
of Inspection and Enforcement indicated that on the morning of R
7 March 28 you were aware that thermocouple data had been taken by A
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Ivan Porter and technicians, and that this data included a reading dc 9
3, greater than 2000 degrees, and that you discussed this information 10 and its reliability briefly with Ivan Porter, and dismissed it 3
h 11 based on Porter's evaluation.
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I2 Did yourevaluation of this information change after 5a 13 fs 5
your discussions with John Flint, or the nuclear engineers regard-e
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I4 ing the explanation of the apparent re-criticality, and I believe 2
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16 on this subject.
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I7 A
Could ask that again.
It is a lengthy question, and a
M 18 I am not sure what I said before.
19
g O
Let me capsulize it for you.
In essence, you testified e
l previously that you were aware that they took thermocouple 20 21 readings on that morning, and that the data included a reading i
22 greater than 2000 degrees.
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A I may have used that number because after the fact I
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to me. - It was a voltage reading, and Ivan just indicated ---
f ^r s) 2 O
Would it help to change your testimony from IE on 7-11?
3 Let me find that page for you.
(O,)
4 A
I think that it will refresh my memory.
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0 Did your evaluation of this information, that is the 9
information you have just read in the IE transcript, change after l
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your discussions with John Flint regarding the explanation of the E
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A I cannot remember which came first.
I tend to think oy 10 that my conversation with John Flint came first, but to the best 3
II of ray recollection, I am just not sure.
M N'I2 Q
Okay.
5" 13
/
5 MR. MOSELEY:
The question remains the same, did you 6
m m
E I4 tie the two together?
15 THE WITNESS:
I don't think that I tied the two together, 16 g
no matter in which order it came.
w d
17 BY MR. HARPSTER:
18 0
To the best of your knowledge, was the core exi t P"
19 g
thermocouple information reported to the NRC on March 28, 1979?
n 20 A
To the best of my recollection, it was not.
2I Q
Can you recall why?
I 22 A
Well, I am fairly certain that I was not aware of that p-23 when I was talking to Don Haverkamp.
Again, I am not sure in my 24 own mind if I ever really knew that information in terms of
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temperature, or if I knew it in terms of DVM values.
There was a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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number of them that just raced all over the place, and therefore A
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Q At any time on March 28, 1979, did you monitor, or G
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were you aware of anyone else monitoring the 28$th power neutron 7:cg 10 detectors?
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I don't remember anyone taking a look at that.
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12 MR. FISHER:
Would this be an appropriate place to take, E
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g 14 MR. HARPSTER:
Sure.
E 15 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
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MR. GAMBLE:
We will go back on the record now.
2 BY MR. FISHER:
3 Q
George, I have some_ questions regarding the 10'R per l
h 4
hour dose rate projection.
In reviewing your testimony of Apri1~
t i
e 5
25th, 1979, to the IE investigators we find that on the morning 2
ej6 of March 28th, 1979, you were aware of that 10 R per hour dose 1
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rate projection in Goldsbore; is that correct?
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Well, I recall that I was aware of hearing that that i
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1 a:
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We will lead into that.
How and when did you learn m
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Well, since it was a significant figure, I recall being 1
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I was out in the control room or just inside i
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I remember becoming 21 aware of the number.
I can't remember if someone specifically i
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23 were specifically.
l 24 Q
Did you at any time that morning discuss this 10 R per i
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l 25 hour2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> off-site dose rate number with either Mr. Miller or i
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2 3
Q With whom, if anyone, did you actually discuss that i
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A I d n't remember discussing it with anyone.
5 2
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Q Do you know whether this 10 R per hour off-site dose e
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Well, I heard that this additional inquiry was going E
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to be undertaken.
I remember looking to see if I did mention 9
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And based on my review of the tape, I didn't j
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- 'H 39 MR. McBRIDE:
Let me just interject, if I could, t-20 Mr. Fisher.
gj I believe, Mr. Kunder, that you used the phrase "10 MR" l
22 in the answer you just gave.
Did you intend to use the phrase 23 10 MR or 10 R?
l 24 THE WITNESS:
10 R, sorry.
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3 BY MR. FISHER:
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Yes.
4 e
5 Q
Do you know whether this 10 R per hour figure was E
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Passed on to the State of Pennsylvania?
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The calculation
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15 That number didn't alarm me that greatly over the level that I y
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So I knew we couldn't have 21 10 R over in Goldsboro, and that was the end of really the 22 significance of that information. insofar as protection to the 2
l 23 ; public was concerned.
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Who would have decided the validity of that number 24l eed the E M of that O
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Is that you, or Mr. Mmer i
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When you say the validity of that number ---
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Well, the 10 R per hour projectica that was made.
At
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field.
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Q That really existed, right.
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Who dete rmined that it was not a number that really O
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I don't know that any specific determination was made.
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It does not mean that you ignore P
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That is the whole f
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Before you had any valid reason for discounting that I
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e 5
been reportable to the NRC?
l M9 j
6 A
Well, certainly, but the response that we had actual 7
readings on site was very shortly thereafter hearing the calculatec s
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Then someone must have decided that because of those l
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No.
The calls we were making for the plan were the 4
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At that time frame we did not have --
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have been given to him probably by Dick DobIrl.
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regard to information which was to be reported to various agencies, 5,
NRC included?
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Gary wasn't in control when the site emergency j
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At that point in time Joe Logan was the senior licensed l
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My perception was that I was now i
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u 25 g Q
When Gary arrived did he assign -- I think he assigned l
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specific jobs to several people, yourself included.
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Q When you assigned the two engineers to be the telephone i
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Yes.
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Did those instructions concern radiation levels?
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That is the way the plan worked.
P E
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Did any kind of a list exist or was one prepared at the 5
e 20 time showing what kinds of information should be or should not be 21 reported t o anyone ~'
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No. They were told to report to on-site emercency.
The 23 ] time of the phone calls were logged and I am sure that information i
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In fact, it was not cnly 25 ; but at least it was displayed on a log or a feltboard, you know, i;
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we have a site emergency and get on with the calls.
I did do.
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14 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Were the teams dispatched to get the actual readings, i.
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I can't answer that other than to speculate that they 4
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21 Q
Who dispatched the teams?
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like Dick Dubiel or someone working for him because he was i
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l get your monitoring teams out, rely on the operations group to 2
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emergency team and implement the plan in general.
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g times, was it in between wnen the dose rate was calculated or a
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I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
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Q George, you have previously testified that shortle after 4
noon on March 28th, 1979, you gathered information in preparation I
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What instructions 3n N
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Can you recall if the guidance included the potential jg l for turther @gredation of the plant?
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That is pretty general.
No, I don't recall anything in 5c:
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21 Q
Well, in terms of is the accident getti,g better or is l
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A I don't recollect any request, you know, in that vein.
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like that.
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the notes that you prepared?
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I didn't save any of my notes.
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I might add that the information that
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So it wouldn't affect your investigation tiC v.
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
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Q During the trip to Harrisburg was core uncovery or 20 i
lits possibility discussed?
21 22 A
I don't r emember too much of our trip to Harrisburg 23 other than I was looking at the sequence of events report.
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4 Q
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and we never did have that That is the only thing I really b
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want to be there.
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Let me probe your memory just a little more.
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recall if you discussed the inability to establish forced flow
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cooling or natural circulationi 20 A
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23 ;l Q
Do vou recall if the pressure spike was discussed?
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I would have remenbered that.
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Do you recall if you discussed the potential for the i
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Did you give out any guidance specific or general 5
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You had previously testified that you waited in an l
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His testimony regarding the trip back was to the R
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I think w e are only going to be about one l
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I am encouraged.
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What was the desired impression you were n
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Was it the feeling of the people who I
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Governor before I left.
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and I perceive that that was done.
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BY MR. HAPPSTER:
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Q What subsequent actions at the plant were based or the e
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I am not aware of any connection at all.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
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George, in this IE testimony in May, Bob Arnold recalls talking with Lee Rogers and yourself in the control room around 3
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2:00 o' clock, 4
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A And myself?
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Q Yes, sir, m
7 A
All right.
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Let me quote you from his testimony, and if you want a
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It's rather lengthy.
It's z'
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I have George's testimony.
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Mo MR. MOSELEY:
Go ahead and read it, and I'll try to d
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15 BY !!R. CRAIG:
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Let ne read you Mr. Arnold's testimony.
M "I just recall that about 2:00 o' clock or thereabouts, g
37 5
18 I called into the control room again because of some information 5
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19 that Dick had gotten through his circuits, and I belitve at that 20 time I talked with George Kunder and Lee Rogers again.
They 2) were at that time depressurizing to come down on the core flood 22 tanks.
We expressed to them a very strong concern that they did 23 not have a solid system, independent of the pressurizer, that 24 they had the steam bubble.
The steam bubble in the reactor 0%
kJ 25 vessel and the Til-legs potentially.
I think we were really I
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thinking what a hotlegs being void, and the only way that could
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were at least there.
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from the information that we had.
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22 Do you now recall talking with Mr. Arnold prior to 23 departing from the briefing around 2:00 o' clock?
24 A
No, and he infers that I talked to him again, and I O
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AV 2
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3 MR. MC BRIDE:
Let me just state, it may have been a s
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But you said in part, "the A-loop was not solid," and R
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12 MR. CRAIG:
I read they felt the A-loop was not solid; 5
13 is that correct?
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No, it was now solid. You probably 2
15 have a typo in your redraf t of the testinony.
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16 (Pause.)
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17 BY MR. CRAIG:
18 Q
George, you have testified that at the time of the
=
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lieutenant-governor's briefing, you established phone communica-n 20 tion with the plant from an office adjacent to the lieutenant-21 governor's office.
You held the line for 10 to 15 minutes.
Who 22 directed you to establish communications with the plant?
( 'l 23 A
Gary Miller.
24 0
What instructions were you given?
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I was told to establish communications with the plant, x-ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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and if they needed us, or there was any significant change in the (y(-)
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3 Q
Who did you talk with at the plant?
(q_)
4 A
I remember talking with Mike Ross.
I don't recall if I 5
talked to anybody else or not.
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Q Do you recall what specific information or instructions R
7 were discussed over the telephone?
A 8
A Well, I do recall getting another round of data on d
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plant conditions, and : recall that the RCF pressure hadn't zCg 10 changed a whole lot, and that's pretty much all I remember, E
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But that was briefly.
On another line.
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To your knowledge, ware there any other communications
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g' 16 the Governor's office?
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I don't remember any, just that one.
5
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Okay.
You have testified that you and others were P
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20 indefinite time, which might have been an hour or two, that 21 the core was uncovered.
During this time you had established 22 l contact with both the NRC and the State.
However, your concern
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Uhy was this information 24 not reported?
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well, i t was.
I explained before on a number of ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
46 ar3-5 60 I
occasions today that I passed on the fact that this system had a p
2 steam void in it.
You know, as time went on, by the time I was 3
first interviewed by the NRC, which was a month or two after (3_)
4 the incident, core uncovery was a concept that became prevalent, r
5 obviously, and so my. characterization in subsequent depositions 6
and testimony and so forth probably used that language.
R b
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8 8
of the condition of the core was that we had a steam void that d
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morning, and as more was learned, my characterization as to what z
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As I knew it.
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16 On March 28th, 1979, did you make or were you aware of v:
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18 Utilities who made calculations as to the extent of fuel failure E
19 g
based on dhta from the containment done monitor or other e
20 instruments?
2I A
No.
22 MR. FIDELL:
Off the record.
U 23 (Discussion off the record.)
24 BY MR. CRAIG:
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25 Q
on March 28th, 1979, did you monitor containment ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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building temperatures during or after the pressure spike?
,9 J
2 A
Well, I understand -- no, I don't remember really looking 3
at it before or after, because I was not aware on that day that 4
we had a pressure spike.
It's likely that when I came back to 5
the control room, I probably didn't look at it then, either, j
6 because I was focusing again on where we were in the plant, and R
7 about 6:00 or 7:00 o' clock, we were into trying to s tart the M
8 8
reactor coolant pump.
That's where I was spending most of my d
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time, out in the control room.
I thought -- I think I also' zo 10 spent some time offsite, although I think I testified in the past
_E 11 that I didn't, but I'm a little hazy on that issue, because I a
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But I can't recollect that for sure.
m 16 O
Let ne ask you a few questions about missing informa-j w
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The NRC investigation of March 28th identified missing M
18 segments of data.
The reason for these missing segments has not A"
19 g
been identified.
These segments include various sections of e
20 an alarm status printout, the utility typer output, and analog 21 trend recorder No. 2 strip chart.
22 Can you explain or do you have any idea what happened 7_s
(..)
23 to this data?
I l
24 A
No.
Ii'~)
!k' 25 Q
Have you been involved in or overheard conversations l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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concerning this data?
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A No.
3 Q
Are you aware of any ef forts made by Met Ed to locate rh(,)
4 or' explain this or any other data related to the accident?
e 5
A No.
M9 3
6 Q
Data reflecting primary system parameters printed out R
R 7
during the day by John Flint has never been found.
Can you explaia M[
8 or do you have any idea what happened to this data?
d ci 9
a no, ie g
10 Q
Have you been involved in or overheard conversations 11 concerning this data?
E N
12 A
No.
5 (s_3 y
13 Q
Are you aware of any efforts by Met Ed to locate or
/
m m
14 explain this or any other missing data relating to the accident?
2 15 A
No.
5 y
16 Q
Finally, the sheet on which the core exit thermocouple j
M d
17 measurements were recorded on the morning of March 28th was M
18 unaccounted for until May 7th, 1979.
Can you explain or do you
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19 have any idea what happened to this data?
n 20 A
No.
21 O
Have you been involved in or overheard conversations 22 concerning this data?
O 23 A
Yes.
24 Q
Could you relate to us what those conversations were?
25 A
Well, we testified before the Kemeny Commission, and I J
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
~
El' 6 3 I
think that was discussed then, that subject.
I renember we had 3-W 2
a consultant cone into the plant to, you know, look at in-core 3
information, and later, if I remember correctly, it was part of
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4 a group out in California.
It was part of the EPRI and sone of e
5 the same people were part of the industry task force, and the E
n 6
advisory group, and I renenber they were looking for that data, R
7 and I can't remember, you know, how we found it.
sl 8
I think either one of the foremen or someone up in the Q
7: ht o
9 FNe shop found it.
I can't remenbcr the srecifics about that, z,c 10 but I do remember the fact that that information eventually
_3 11 showed up and was very useful information to those groups that B
l 12 were looking into what the condition of the core was, and so E
d 13 forth.
e
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eg 14 But, you know, 1y that time it was of interest, but 2
15 not with respect to the fact that it was missing data.
5 y
16 O
Are you aware of any efforts made by Met Ed to e
b' 17 account for the disappearance of this data, or for it being 5
18 unaccounted for from March 28th to Mny 7th?
P 19 A
No.
5 20 (Pause.)
21 BY MR. CRAIG:
22 O
If you'll bear with me, I'll try to do this off the
)
23 top of my head and make it as short as possible.
24 We hava a wealth of conflicting information about the l-
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i 25 '
concern over deenergizing electrical equipment that took place
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ALDERSON REPORTING COrc.PANY, INC.
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some time on March 28th or subsequent to that.
O\\_J 2
We have had testimony from various people involved in 3
the control room on March 28th, and also on subsequent days,
!o
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which conflicts in that some people recall the order being e
5 given by Gary Miller to deenergize electrical equipment on 2
m 6
March 28th because of a concern on oversparking, which had R
R 7
the potential to cause another explosion or pressure spike in K
8 8
containment.
And others recall that this order was not given d
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on March 28th, but at some later date.
iog 10 As I recall f rom reviewing your testimony, you have E
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g 12 and had asked Mr. Benzel to lock into deenergizing certain 5
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13 equipment.
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14 A
Uh-h uh.
2 15 0
I believe that's also consistent with Mr. Benzel's 5
y 16 recollection of how this occurred.
Can you tell us what your best w
g 17 recollection is as to when that became a concern, and try to put E
18 it in a time sequence for us and basically recollect what gave you h
19 this concern?
g n
20 A
Well, you said it.
I do remember telling Dick to look 21 at and deenergize all circuits that we didn't need in there.
22 O
When was this?
Could you put it in perspective for us O
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23 as regards to '.ine?
24 A
I'm certain it wasn't on the 28th, because I don't O
kJ 25 think I was thinking of hydrogen generation at that point, but ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
SS' r i
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around the 29th, I was starting to think about, you know, where 2
we go from here, long-term effects of what we knew then was a 3
loss-of-coolant accident, even though I didn't think in terms of a r~s i
I
't /
4 LOCA the way I used to from our training.
But we obviously e
5 spilled a lot of water in the containment, and the hydrogen M9 6
generation that I was concerned about was that which is discussed R
7 in the FSAR, which is a long-term hydrogen generation due to N
8 8
the interaction of aluminum and materials in there with sodium d
d 9
thiosulfate and other constituents in the water.
10 And my recollection of the FSAR analysis is that E
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11 in about a 30-day timeframe, give or take some, you can develop B
g 12 an explosive concentration of hydrogen, or it would exceed about 5
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14 with regard to that accident, or that analysis, and knowing that 2
15 there was a potential for generating hydrogen due to that 5
j 16 concern.
And the thing that reinforced that is that I renenber M
d 17 I was assigaed on the 29th to be part of the GPU task force 5
5 18 to investigate the accident, and I remember being extremely
=
19 annoyed by the fact.
I felt that we were still in a terribly g
n 20 uncomfortable position in the plant with, you know, the radiation 21 levels and total impact of the accident, that it was inappropriate 22 for our management to be involving at least myself and probably 73i tq) 23 a lot of other people from GPU that could be helping us in 24 investigating the cauce of the accident, when I didn't think we r~~
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25 were really out of the woods.
l f
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 And I remember in that meeting, when I believe it was
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Dick Wilson was explaining the charter to people like Bill.Lowe 3
and myself and Ron Williams and a number of the other GPU
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g very angry, writing down all my concerns, and one of them was 8
6 i
what do we do abotit long-term hydrogen generation, and how do we n
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handle the levels and the shielding and who's going to get robots n
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and shielding materials, and who's going to do this and that.
a do 9
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spoke up and started to go through these concerns that, you know,
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this is ridiculous to be worrying about investigation of the d
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accident this formally, when we are still not out of the woods, od 13 (m) g and we need some help in the control room, technical advice, E
14 y
so that we have people who can stand back and not be responsive x
2 15 to the instrumentation and, you know, a guy can stand back and wx g
16 see the forest from the trees, basically.
6 17 It was either at that meeting or a little bit later wx M
18
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that somebody showed me the pressure spike, and it was one of 19 8
the GPU engineers that had already gotten some of the charts and 20 data from the control room and was starting to look at that.
21 So that was definitely not before the 24th that I 22 became concerned about that sort of thing.
It might have been
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2 during the day prior to my sitting in, in that meeting.
It 24 might aave been prior to that, and maybe the next day.
I can't f-
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- be sure, but I know it wasn't the 28th.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
85, cr3-12 3
I Q
And as a result of that, did you then ask Mr. Benzel
(,_,)
2 to look into deenergizing electrical equipment?
3 A
And my perception was that he carried out that request.
f-)s 4
Q And that was on Thursday, the 29th?
5 A
To the best of my recollection, it would have been on a
3 6
Thursday at the earliest, and it's likely that other people may o
Rh7 have independently expressed the same concern.
I couldn't be sure Nj 8
of that.
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Q f.
9 Q
Are there any other r-rle who might be aware of this db 10 g
concern being generated on Thursday in your order to deenergize
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B f
I2 A
I don't remember discussing that specific request
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I could have mentioned it at that neeting, m
14 perhaps, but I don't remember.
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15 0
Are you aware of any time prior to your concern an m
E I6 order being given, particularly on March 28th, to deenergize w
j h
I7 electrical equipment?
m M
18 A
I don't remenber any such order.
=s" 19 8
MR. CRAIG:
Thank you, e
BY tm. HOEFLING:
21 Q
George, could you describe for us your understanding of 22 Met Ed's policy with regard to reporting information to the NRC?
23 MR. GEPHART:
On March 28th, 1979?
24 BY MR. HOEFLING:
(/
25 Q
As of March 28th, 1979.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A Well, very sjmply the policy was to follow the 7
I
)
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2 emergency plan and notify all the agencies according to that 3
plan.
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4 Q
Okay.
Let me change the question slightly.
5 THE WI* NESS:
Could I --
h 6
(Re;ess.)
R R
7 BY MR. HOEFLING:
s]
8 Q
Okay, George.
The question does not concern itself d
c 9
with notification of an emergency or implementation of the
,zo 10 emergency plan, but rather the general policy of the company 3=
II with regard to reporting information to the NRC.
5 N
I2 Could you state what that policy is, or what you under-5
/
y 13 stand it to be?
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l 14 MR. MC BRIDE:
One second.
What it was as of 3/28/79.
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15 THE WITNESS:
I can't be sure if the policy was in x.'
16 w ri ting, but the policy, as I perceive, and which I exercise, is j
e 6
17 to be candid and open with the NRC.
W 18 BY MR. HOEFLING:
1 P"
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Q Can you describe in some greater detail what that n
20 policy is, or what you understand it to be?
I'm looking for 2I specifics in the sense of what technical specifications or 22 procedures might require.
)
i 23-A Well, if we have a violation of tech specs or 24 certainly an event as significant as we had, that would
(~/)
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25 certainly be grounds for notifying the NRC immediately.
Had we i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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not been in an emergency s ituation or not operating under the
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guidance of an emergency plan, the policy is to notify the NRC 3
immediately.
That's part of tech specs and part of Reg Guide 1.16,
(_)
4 and give then the details of the event or the condition, and e
5 follow that up with, you know, a written telegram and eventual 3
N 6
report.
R 7
At that time the report was due in 14 days. Something Xl 8
of this magnitude transcends all that.
d d
9 And I think the communications that were established 10 and continue, you know, were evidence of that kind of a situa-E h
11 tion.
W j
12 0
The emergency plan required a notification to be nade 5
13 to the NRC?
h 14 A
Right.
2 15 Q
What would you consider to be the substance of the 5
16 information that was to be communicated to the MRC at that time?
j e
6 17 A
Well, the emergency plan did not specify what informa-E
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18 tion was passed on.
It was really -- it didn' t cover that, it E
19 really didn't go that far into what kind of communications occurred R
20 and what the substance of the communications were, but the --
21 Q
Go ahead.
22 A
You know, I perceived it then that the communications V,s 23 should describe the condition of the plant and the threat and 24 so forth as ue perceived it to the NRC, in the best way that we
(~3 25 could.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
3r3-15 w L,0 i
Q Would you consider that that communication or notifica-
!)
2 tion should be consistent with the company reporting requirements?
A Certainly.
3
/O Q
Was embraced by it?
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4 A
sure.
I don't remember any specific policy statement, e
5 2
et 8
6 though, covering that kind of thing, you know.
It's an unwritten e
7 rule of the game, that you tell the NRC everything you could 8
about a situation like that, and at that time my job was one N
where I interf ace d swith the NRC on a routine basis.
Many times 9
i C
10
-I was the person to call the NRC on reports, for instance.
o lr.[
yj Q
Now, who under the company's policy -- let's take d
12 the nonemergency situation first -- would be responsible for iG 13 rep rting information to the NRC?
A That would have been myself, or the Unit 2 superin-E 14 W
tendent.
In practice, in years past, unit superintendent or 2
15 the station superintendent, as it was years ago, in Unit 1, y
16 rA j7 the fellow who routinely elected to call the NRC.
Back in was h
18 1978, when I was unit superintendent, tech support Unit 1, I
k made many of those phone calls, and in Unit 2, Mr. Loganz wno j9 9n 20 is unit superintendent, delegated that somewhat in a passive fashion to me.
Whenever I had an incident that was declared 21 22 r Portable, I usually rmde the calls, and I called Region I.
/
23 If it was on the back shift, I of course got the answering 24 service and had the inspector call me back, and I gave them 25 the details of the event, the tech spec violated, what we were ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 doing, you know, hat the threat was evolving around the incident, kJ 2
and indicated further details will be coming in a telegram and 3
the report.
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4 0
Okay.
Let's go to the day of March 28th now.
Before e
5 Mr. Miller arrived at the site, who would have been responsible 29 6
for reporting?
R R
7 A
Myself.
Nl 8
Q After Mr. Miller arrived at the site?
Od 9
A Well, since I was at that point in time responsible, io 10 you know, because I took the -- I assumed the responsibility to El 11 communicate, it would hav. oeen myself and, indeed, I was the
's j
12 guy who engaged in some of the communications, particularly the E
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14 and give him a quick rundown of the plant and the general 2
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j M
b' 17 But I did characterize the plant and the condition 5
5 18 with respect to radiological hazards as best I could, and for 5
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19 specific details I turned that over to Dick Dubiel or someone n
20 else.
21 Q
Okay.
Perhaps I'm not being clear.
I'm not talking 22 l about the mechanical responsibility of actually making the 23 communication oracting as the communicator, but the ultimate 24 responsibility at the site for determining when an item was of O
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A Well, it still would have been myse2I or Joe Logan.
3 0
And this would apply both prior to and after Mr.
4 Miller's arrival on that day?
e 5
A Sure.
Joe -- I was the senior person on the site h
6 until Joe Logan arrived, and until he had an opportunity to R
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Ard when he took over, I actually assumed the d
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At the time we thought it went like clockwork, E
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ss h
I4 O
Okay, George.
We have had a similar discussion with
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g' 16 he had the responsibility of reporting to the NRC, and after e
d I7 Mr. Miller arrived on site, that responsibility fell on his E
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E" 19 g
MR. MC BRIDE:
Fell on his, being Mr. Miller?
e 20 BY MR. IlOEFLING:
21 Q
Mr. Miller's shoulders.
j 22 g-)
Do you have any comment on that?
L_)
23,
A No, I can see how he would have that perception.
He i
24 was the senior license guy, and in terms of being responsible
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responsibility.
I also felt that responsibility, and that's why I
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2 answered the way I did, and it sounds like he had a very 3
conservative situation there.
I physically made the calls or 4
had the calls made, and I physically spoke to the NRC and s
5 physically spoke to the state for a period of time.
And so I l
6 con' t think that's anything -- that's not inconsistent, in my R
7 book.
Nl 8
The one thing we didn't do -- and I never recall myself d
c; 9
raising my hand and saying I an the energency director, okay --
xog 10 I didn't recall Joe Logan doi ng that, either.
So it's likely
'II that we each assumed the role that was productive, but perhaps
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12 we both nssumed we had a responsibility.
But two people weren't 5a 13
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making the same phone call.
Okay?
So i t wasn' t redundant.
I
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15 response.
m j
16 So, again, I don't think that's a conflict at all.
e d
17 Q
Okay.
Now can you tell us what parts of this company E
h 18 policy are reduced to e "'.tir.g, if you know?
E" I9 g
MR. MC BRIDE:
Which policy?
n 20 BY MR. HOEFLING:
2I Q
The reporting policy.
Not the energency notification l (~'>
22 portion of it, but the general company policy with regard to ss i
23
- ing items of significance to the NRC.
rep _
24 MR. MC BRIDE:
Okay.
25 MR. FIDELL:
Hasn't that already been answered by 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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reference to the FSAR and the administrative procedures?
,__s
(
)
2 MR. IIOEFLING:
He answered that he was not aware, and 3
it was an ambiguous answer, I thought, of anything beyond the 4
tech specs that codified the policy.
5 I just want to sharpen up what those documents might be, d
6 w
if any.
e R
b THE WITNESS:
There exists in the files -- I think Nl 8
it's a superintendent's operating memo or a piece of correspon-d 9
dence like that, which basically provided the procedure to be o
h 10 used in handling licensee event reports.
k II As a matter of fact, during the course of the eight is f
12 years or so of operating Unit 1 and a little bit of time in Unit 2 c"
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But the PORC us h
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The --
I9 g
again this incident transcended all that.
n 20 In fact, I understand I&E is still asking for -- they 2I just realized they didn't have a copy of the LER for the accident, 22 O
and I must admit that I was somewhat appalled that they would L.)
23 even be worried by something like that.
But, you know, the 24 bureaucracy requires they have a piece of paper for that event, U
25 and I can understand that, so I guess somewhere along the line ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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we're going to have to generate that, and attach it to a couple
-)
2 of truck 1 cads of papers and documents.
3 BY MR. !!OEPLING:
('~T
(-)
4 Q
Okay, George.
I've got a couple of questions for you e
5 on the tone of the company policy.
E 6
Did the company policy tend to stress events in their R
7 best light when reported?
E
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I ' d s ay not.
I considered -- and again I don't think d
c 9
the company policy -- there is no company policy that I'm aware
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11 what depth you explain information, or that kind of thing.
In W
N 12 fact, the NRC's guidance doesn't even do that, to the best of 5
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It's still in general terms.
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Not too conservative, but slightly z
16
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e 17 I explained the situation that existed in the plant E
18 and all the details surrounding the event, and any time an e
19 g
inspector had questions about what was going on, you know, the n
20 records are there, and I can explain anything he needs explained..
21 And if there is a problem area, we tell them about it.
22 3
Q Okay.
Did the company policy stress the volunteering of l
sJ 23 information in a report?
I 24 A
Again there is no written company policy dealing with
(
25 how you report or to what depth you report or, you know, how you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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characterize infornation to the NRC.
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2 0
I understand that.
3 A
So the company policy was really a natter of practice
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y and the superintendent, and we volunteered information.
9 0
0 Was the practice under the company policy to stress a
b 7
the reporting of unverified information, although it could be K
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d 9
z.
A I would say so, yeah.
We stated it as something we're O
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E II O
Uas the practice under the company policy to stress 2
I that when there was doubt about a potentially reportable item, c
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that it should be reported?
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I4 A
Yeah.
Matter of fact, occasionally I would call the
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15 inspector and ask hin whether he thought it was reportable, x
E I0 tell him we can report it or we don't have to report it, but e
h I7 this is the situation.
And Don Haverkamp is one of the fellows
=
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18 I specifically remember doing that with.
Evcn to this day, we E"
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occasionally do that, when it's questionable, e
20 I have been told on occasion that we shouldnt' have 2I reported something, it just clogs the paper chain, you know.
It's 22
(-)
something that I've never had any concern atout.
If it's in
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23 doub t, ' I generally try and report it, because I don't want to 24 O
get second-guessed later on.
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Okay.
Now turning to the role that you assumed of makin g ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 the emergency notifications and coming into contact, if you will, k-)
2 over the phone with the NRC on the morning of 3/28, were you 3
assigned that role?
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(_)
4 A
No.
I indicated I assumed that role.
e 5
Q Now were you given any instructions as to what to do 3n 6
in carrying out that function?
R 7
A Not in carrying out that broad function.
There were Ml 8
specific details such as hey, we've got to arrange for a 1
dd 9
helicopter to -- I can't remember if I asked for the helicopter 10 or recommended it or if somebody else did.
And I remember that g
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(-)
13 asked for just of f the top of my head, knowing we would need
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14 them.
2 15 Q
Now let's narrow the function down to maintaining g'
16 contact with the NRC and being a conduit, if you will, of e
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17 information.
Did you have any instructions as to how to carry 5
18 out that function?
P
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19 A
No.
n 20 Q
Now what judgnent or criteria did you apply that day in 21 passing information along to the NRC over that telephone line?
22 A
I tried to give Don all the information that I could.
23 I characterized the status of the plant and what I perceived 24 occurred.
O 25 Q
Did you give him all the information you knew, or did ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I you select out what you thought to be the more important elements
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I nnd pass then along?
Ilow did that operate?
3 A
I'd say I tried to select the more important elements p) 4
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e 5
g Q
Where questions w'ere asked, --
2 6
e A
Yes.
N 2
7 Q
-- you responded to those?
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A Yes.
You can see that if you read the tape.
,oo 9
j Q
llow did you become aware as the morning progressed 0
10 of plant conditions and plant status that you could keep feeding
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current information over this line?
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m 2
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18
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21 I think the conversation was pretty well broken up at 22
(')
times because I'd be leaving the phone for a moment and coming V
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25 1
I was talking to Don and maybe he suddenly became f ree f or.
t a
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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2 You know, it was that kind of an exchange.
3 But I do remember spending a few moments really giving
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Don the best rundown I could on what had transpired from the 5
g beginning, and in general what the conditions of the plant were.
9 0
0 Okay.
That morning, or any time on 3/28, were you told R
7 by anyone at the site to specifically report certain items to X[
8 the NRC?
O 9
A No, I don't remember being told any -- anything 6
10 speci fic.
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Q Mo one came up to you and said, "Tell them this"?
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that, perhaps.
But I don' t remember anythina.
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What do you mean, in response to a question?
g 15 I'm thinking of people at the site coming up and a
y 16
- saying,
" Pass this piece of information along," or you're W
17 wandering around the control room and someone grabs you and a
M 18 says --
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A Oh, like that?
No, I meant like if Don says, " Hey, n
20 what's your pressurizer level," or something like that, I'd 2I call an operator and he'd come over and tell me.
22 Q
That's not what I mean.
I mean someone from the
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23 site saying, " Send this piece of information."
You don't recall 24 anything like that?
O.
V 25 A
No.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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O Were you ever told to withhold any information from the r s 2
NRC?
3 A
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4 Q
Now on 3/28/79, did you have a feeling that information 5
should not be volunteered to the NRC?
h 0
A No, not at all.
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7 Q
Did you sense any pressure -- scratch that.
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8 Did you have a feeling that simply answering specific d
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questions asked over that line fulfilled the reporting requirement oy 10 to the NRC?
E II A
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5 what we had, trying to give him a good briefing.
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j 16 like that.
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Did anyone influence or pressure you as to your decisions x
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18 as to what items to communicate over that?
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A No. I'll be frank:
I don't think there was too many n
'I 20 people who really had any idea as to what I was even telling
- w El the NRC.
22 g
BY MR. GAMBLE:
()3 23 0
Mr. Kunder, you nentioned before on occasions 24 informally consulting with URC inspectors about the reportability 7_
k~l 25 of certain information.
On March 28th, did any NRC personnel ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
77Gl ar30.26 1
advise you certain information wasn't necessary to be reported?
2 A
No.
3 MR. MC BRIDE:
Recorded or reported?
t 4
MR. GAMBLE:
Reported.
e 5
2 BY MR. GAMBLE:
3 6
O Do you know of HRC personnel advising anyone that N
R 7
certain information is not necessary to be reported?
N 8
8 A
No.
O ci 9
j MR. GAMBLE:
- Okay, o
N 10 MR. MOSELEY:
Thank you very much.
We appreciato E
11 j
your time and your patience.
ci 12 g
(Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m.,
the interview was O
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C 19 8e 20 21 22 23 24 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
2 This is to cdrtify that the attached proceedings before the 3
O 4
in the matter of 5
g Date of Proceeding:
September 4, 1980 6
Docket Number:
None N*"
7 Place of Proceeding:
Harrisburg, Pa.
Nl 8.. vere held as herein appears, and that this is the original d
9 transcript for the file of the Commission t
b 10 s
k II PATRICIA A.
MINSON Official Reporter 3.
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(Signature w
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i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.*EISSION This is to certify that the attached pecceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission in the :: tatter of: Metropolitan Edison-Three Mile Island Unit 2 Date of Proceeding :
9/4/80 Decket Nut:b er :
None
? lace of ?receeding:
Harrisburg, Pa.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the Original transcript thereof for the file of the Ccr.: mission.
ANN RTLEY Official Reperter (Typed) od ce v
Official Reper:er (Signature) 4 W
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N NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.M4ISSION l
This is to certify that the attached ;receedings 'cefers the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the ma",ter ef:
fietropolitan Edison Tf1I II Date of ?roceeding:
September 3, 1980 Decket flu =ber:
rione
? lace of Proceeding:
IIarrisburg, Pa.
were held as herein ap;eers, and that this is the criginal transcrip' therecf for the file of the Cc==ission.
i f M 9Y S T P1710?JS Official Reporter (Typed) e)(
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Cfficial Repcrter ( 51g r.a t ur e )
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CAMERON F. Mac R AE,23 4 8t A N D ALL J. Ls BO EUF, JR.193 9 *1976 LEtesN,w ASMINGYO N. D.C.
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CHARLES N. BURGER JOS EPH F. MURPHY THOM AS E. BURKE TELEPHONE 212*2 8 9-160 0 HARVEY A.NAPIER WIL LI AM A. C AR N AHAN.
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DOGER D. FELDM AN
- 8 LE SWIN, N EW YORK J. MICH AEL PARISH C B A D R w ggag'W.ROSEN LATT ANDREW CANSBERG JOHN A.RUDY 47 sERmELEY souARE GERARD GIORD ANO J AY G. S AF E R DONALD J.GR E ENE PATRICK J. SCOGNAMIGLIO gonoon wax son, ENogamo JAMES A.GREER,E 8 HAROLD M. SElDEL TELWOW m-493-7336 JOHN L. G R O S E
- R AYMON D N. SHIB LEY 'l DOUGLAS W. HAWES HALCYON G. SKIN NER TELEX: 281s t CAP L D. HO BELMAN JOSEPH S. STRAUSS MICHAEL IOVE N MO SAMUEL M. SUGDEN JAPES F. JO H N SO N,4*
- EUGENE 5.T HOM A S. J R.* 6 KONALD D. JONES LEONARD M.TROSTEN *4 JAM ES A.LAPENN M AR RY H.VOIGT 'o GRANT 5. L EWIS H. RICHARD WACHTEL MIMCA WOOD LOVEJOY G ER AR D P. WATSON CAM ERON F. Mac R AE 6 fMOM AS A. ZIERM
- R ESIDENT PARTN ER S WASHINGTON OF FICE
- R ESIDE NT PARTN ER S LONDON OFFICE Ctober 6, 1980 a ADMITTED TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR Mr. Norman C. Mosely Director Division of Reactor Operations (V
Inspection
~T Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
NRC Investigation of March 28, 1979 Accident at Three Mile Island - Unit 2
Dear Mr. Mosely:
In response to your letter of September 15, 1980 the following are transcript corrections to the September 4,
1980 testimony for Mr. George A. Kunder:
PAGE LINE WORD (S) THAT NOW APPEAR CHANGE TO dl 21 Add appearance of "Mr.
William Fisher, Region III, Office of Inspection and (3l Enforcement, Nuclear f
v Regulatory Commission" Y2 11 Michael S.
Change " Michael S."
to " Michael F."
10 i-Change "i " to "in"
a
. PAGE LINE WORD (S) THAT NOW APPEAR CHANGE TO L'19 9
plan Change " plan" to
" plant" x>
'<21 3
programming Change " programming" to " probing" V24 24 rate count Change " rate count" to " count rate' 25 25 exist Change " exist" :o
" exits" L27 12 you Change "you" to "your" v29 9
south Change " south" to
" source" L31 1
Urbine Change "Urbine" to "Herbein" v32
]$
purportability Change "purportability" to "reportability" v34 25 Dobiel Change "Dobiel" to "Dubiel"
-36 7
Pima, Dolphin Change " Pima" to
'PEMA"; change " Dolphin" to " Dauphin" jp6 10 If Change "If" to "It" 37 25 to Change "to" to gg v4'1 23 moving Change " moving" to
" movie" c/$ 1 9
INC Change "INC" to "I&C" Please note that the pagination of the transcript is incorrect beginning with page 20.
In addition to the statutory witness fee of $30 per day to which he is entitled, Mr. Kunder is entitled to $2.40 for a total of 12 miles to and from the inter-view and hereby requests a total of $32.40 for his appearance.
Very truly yours, hh cc:
Mr. George A. Kunder Smith B. Gephart, Esq.