ML19343D340
| ML19343D340 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1981 |
| From: | Gallina C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040310 | |
| Download: ML19343D340 (61) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
g
-x Q,)
4 In the matter of:
5 g
THREE MILE ISLAND 9
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 3
6 W
2
-x 7
8 8
Fifth Fivor Hearing Room, d
East-West Towers, d
9 4350 East-West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland.
g 10 Monday, January 12, 1981 g
11 a
d 12 Deposition cf:
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y 13 CHARLES GALLINA
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l 14 commenced at 1:55 p.m.,
pursuant to agreement of the m
2 15 parties.
N g
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17 VICTOR STELLO, Director, Office of y
Inspection & Enforcement, U.S.
18 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
19 8n NORMAN MOSELEY, Office of Inspection 20
& Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 21 Washington, D.C.
()
22 JOHN C RA I G, Office of Inspection
& Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear 23,
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
I) 24 w
25 !
I
__ _ _ _ -g ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
2 1
(Appearances, continued:)
2 RICHARD HOEFLING, Esq., Office of the Executive Legal Director, U.S.
3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, O
Washington, D.C.
ROGER FORTUNA, Esq., Office of Inspection & Audit, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 3
6 Washington, D.C.
e E
2 7
WILLIAM FISHER, Office of Inspection D
& Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear
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Regulatory Commission, 4
Washington, D.C.
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u 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY INC.
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P RO C E E D I N G S 2
Whereupon, CHARLES GALLINA 4
was called as a witness on behalf of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, after having been duly sworn, was examined 8
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and testified as follows:
A 8
7
_E _X _A _M _I _N _A _T _I _O _N r*g 8
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BY MR. C RAIG :
dc 9
j Q
Would you state your full name for the record, please?
oH 10 j
A Dr. Charles O.
- Gallina, G-a-1-1-i-n-a.
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k BY MR. MOSELEY:
d 12 z
Q Chic, what this is part of an investigation into f) o sJ d
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the flow of information about the accident at Three Mile E
14 g
Island on March 28th, and we have some questions that we would z
2 15 m
like to ask you regarding that.
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16 like to start with your first knowledge of the g
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17 event.
Were you the duty officer on that day?
az 18 A
No.
The duty officer that day was James Devlin.
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About 8:00 o' clock in the morning, on the morning of March 28th, 20 I was checking to see if Dale Donaldson was in his office.
He 21 was on inspection, and Jim Devlin came up to me and said, "Where
()
22 is Donaldson?"
I said, "I
don't know, he's out."
He said, "All 23 right, I geass you're the emergency planning officer."
I said,
()
24 "That's correct."
And he said, "We have a problem at TMI, and 25 we are activating the Incident Response Center."
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
4 1
So I immediately proceeded upstairs to our Incident O
2 Response Center.
Several people were there already taking out 3
phones out of th-cabinets and logbooks, et cetera, and being 4
the EPO, I made sure they had the phones hooked up properly e
5 and everything was going smoothly.
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6 About that time George Smith came in and designated R
7 who the team members were going to be, and I was told that I N]
8 was to go with the team as the emergency planning officer.
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9 Being that I was an investigator also, I was told not to go
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10 with that hat on, if you will, that Ray Smith would be coming 3
j 11 up a little bit later with someone else, and he would take care 3
y 12 of the investigation.
My job was to see that the emergency (2) g5 13 response was appropriate.
m h 14 Q
Okay.
Where were you when you first received this 2
15 from George that you were to be message from George?
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part of the team?
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A I was in, I believe, the Incident Response Center.
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Q Did you receive this from George personally, or did E
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someone bring the message to you?
n 20 A
I believe it was George personally, but I'm not -- I'm 21 not sure, because George was in and out.
I think the phones 22 had been set up, and I know George va: up there during this time 23 period.
There was some time before we left, because he 24 designated Don Neely as the team laader, and Karl Plumlee was 25 to go, Ron Nimitz, who was an intern at the time.
They -- I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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don't know.whether theynmentionad:.htm by name.
They said, "Let's OV 2
send an intern to sort of help out with the health physics 3
problems."
And from that point I'left to get the emergency 4
vehicle around to the front of the building where we loaded up 5
our equipment.
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6 Q
At about 8:15, according to what others have told us, R
7 there was a briefing or a discussion with George Smith, with n
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people who were going to go to the si.
Did you participate in dd 9
that?
zCg 10 A
I don't believe I participated in the full briefing.
3 11 I think at the time I was getting the vehicle prepared and things 3
y 12 like that.
I don't recall any organized briefing where the y
13 entire team was together at one time and were told what was a
m 14 happening.
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15 I had gotten a message, I think, from one of the YL 16 g
operations people that they had lost ;r bubble in the pressurizer, M
N 17 and that's all I was told at that time, and that there was some 5
18 release of radioactivity.
But I never got a -- how shall I say 19 it -- an organized briefing as to what we were going into, or R
20 what exactly had happened.
21 Q
I'm not sure that any of those people we have talked S
s) 22 to so far recall an organized briefing.
This was a discussion 23 that was held outside George Smith's office where the -- at 24 least some of the team members were present and they were given 25,
information about what was known at that time.
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
6 1
A Then, no, outside of George's office, I do not recall 2
any type of information being --
3 Q
can you tick off on your fingers for me then what it O
4 is you knew about the pla'nt at the time you left?
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A At the time I left, the basic information I had was M9 g
6 that, quotea they had lost a bubble in the pressurizer, and that R
2 7
there was a release of radioactivity in the plant, and possibly 3
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offsite.
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9 I wasn't quite sure what that meant.
I mean I'm not 2
Og 10 reactor-oriented to the point where that immediately clicked in E
h 11 my mind.
And as I was going to get the emergency vehicle, I 3
g 12 asked someone who was.
I said, "What does this mean?"
And he Os-Eg 13 told me, he says, "Well, it usually means they went solid in the m
l 14 pressurizer and they may have a problem with stresses on the 2
15 system," and that was the only information that I received, that g'
16 they had lost the bubble in the pressurizer, release of radio-M g
17 activity onsite, possibly offsite, and I did not participate in 5
h 18 any type of information transfer outside of George Smith's office.
h 19 Q
oo you recall who gave you this information that you R
20 had?
21 A
I believe -- you mean the initial information about
()
22 losing the bubble?
23 Q
Yeah, any and all of the above.
)
24 A
Well, losing the bubble, I believe, was either Eldon 25,
Brunner or one of his inspectors in the Incident Response Center.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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The information as to what" the significance was of that 2
statement, losing the bubble, Thomas Shaub, S-h-a-u-b.
He was 3
at the time a safeguards technician, but he's nuclear Navy, O
4 and he was preparing to become a reactor inspector, and he had
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5 some experience, and I asked him as I was going by with the An h
6 keys, what does that mean, to sort of calibrate myself as to what R
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I was responding to.
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Further information was given en route by Jim Higgins, d
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who was the reactor inspector.
We discussed, in other words, iog 10 what had occurred at the site when we were driving there, but --
3 11 Q
Okay.
Before we get to that, do you recall hearing 3
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12 any discussion of the containment pressure that existed at that 3
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This is prior to getting in the car and going to the site.
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14 A
No.
m 15 Q
oo you recall any discussion of hydrogen content in z
y' I6 the containment?
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17 A
No.
$f 18 Q
None whatsoever?
A; 19 A
None whatsoever.
M 20 BY MR. STELLO:
21 Q
I'm not sure if I'm following something.
The conver-()
22 sations that you were relating, you said took place in your 23 Incident Response center.
)
24 A
Yes.
25 Q
I have been under the impression from what others have i
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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said that the communication link to the site was in George O
2 smith's office.
3 A
Initially it was.
O 4
Q What time did the communication link in George Smith's e
5 office end and get established in the Operations Center?
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6 A
I couldn't give you an exact. time.
In other words, I R
R 7
don't when the information first came to me ahaut a problem Xl 8
at Three Mile Island, it came to me from Jim Devlin, the duty dd 9
officer.
i Cg 10 I went upstairs to help activate the Incident Response E
5 11 Center, and I spent my time, initial time, there.
It was
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12 there in the Incident Response Center that -- I'm not sure of I
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13
?he person, whether it was Eldon Brunner or one of the reactor 5
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14 inspectors informed me of what the problem was.
2 15 From there I went and got the car, drove it around 16 to the front of the building, started loading equipment, and g
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17 went back to the Incident Response Center, at which time I saw N
18 George Smith.
And he had mentioned to me who was on the team
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19 and who would be leading the team.
And then from that point on, R
20 we got in the car and departed.
21 so we are talking about a time period from 8:15 to
()
22 8:45.
My only locations were in the Incident Response Center I
l 23,
or getting the car loaded and ready to depart.
I never went by l
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24 George Smith's office.
25{
Q When you activated the center, was there anyone talking l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I to anyone on the phone?
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A No, because we were just putting the phones in the wall.
3 Q
when is the first time you heard any conversations O
4 between the site and people at the regional office in the center?
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A I cannot recall any specific conversations from the M9{
6 Incident Response Center to the site, As far as I know, up until R
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the time I left, conver:ations or the information flow was from X
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a location other than the Incident Response Center.
It wasn't d
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until -- oh, several days afterwards when we recounted, you know, 2
Cg 10 what went on in the beginning did I find out that the call 3
j 11 actually came to Eldon and George and however it did.
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12 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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13 Q
Maybe this will help.
Sitting at the Incident m
14 Response Center involves getting plug-in te1<3 phones out of the z
2 15 cabinet?
wz 16 A
Right.
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Q Getting what other type of equipment?
What do you do?
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There's a conference phone.
I'm trying to put my mind Eb 19 g
back now, because all the newer stuff is in ny mind, but there's 5
20 just basically handsets that plag in to given jacks.
You've 2I got to compare a number with a jack number.
There's a (o,)
22 conferencing telephone that we were setting up.
There was 23 emergency plans were up there, and some logbooks, paper, pencil, 24 stuff like that.
25 once I made sure that the guys knew where the phones l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
10 1
were and whatever to hook them up, then I left the center, and O
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2 when I came back, it was very briefly, just to say that the 3
vehicle was being loaded and ready to go.
4 At that time I saw George Smith, at that time I was told e
5 who the team members were going to be, and at that time Jim Xe j
6 Devlin came in and said to me that, "We are sending an investigatc r,
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so your primary function is to go in emergency planning role X
8 rather than in investigation."
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10 getting -- you know, what the situation was at the time.
I was E
h II only there briefly and could not tell you, yes, when I came back 3
f 12 before we left, somebody was on the telephone.
I --
O E.
E 13 Q
And you didn't ask anyone for a formal or informal m
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I4 briefing as to what all was known?
You had those bits and pieces az E
15 that you had picked up, and you didn't ask for a briefing?
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I6 A
No, I did not.
I figured I would get it.
I mean I g
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responsibility at that time was to see that we wure ready to M
20 respond and not necessarily know the details of the incident.
21 And it. wasn't until we did in fact respond that I,
22 you know, questioned Jim Higgins and Don Neely as to what we --
23,
you know, what we could expect when we got there.
24 Q
Then yo. subsequently learned that there was an initial 25 -
information available which you had not been provided, but was 1
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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tre -- the reason you weren't available, you were doing other O
2 things?
3 A
Yes, yes.
And the information that we had that I did 4
receive subsequently did not in other words, it wasn't a e
5 surprise.
It was mainly in line or adding to the information I A9 j
6 had already, that they had a -- you know, trouble.
The reactor R
7 tripped, and they had a -- you know, lost the bubble in the X
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8 pressurizer A":
sa subsequent release of radioactivity into d
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9 containment.
They weren't sure if it was from a steam generator.
2 Cg 10 There was a possibility of offsite releases.
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11 It was very, very general at the time we departed for 3
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13 Q
1 suggested that one reason you may not have been told.
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14 Were there other reasons that you may not have received all this
$j 15 information?
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No.
The only reason I could think of is that my M
d 17 primary responsibility at the time was to get ready to respond, 5
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e r.y t h _ g else was secondary.
So I picked up whatever information M
20 1 could in accordance with meeting that primary objective.
21 I didn't feel it was incumbent on me to get a detailed 22 briefing because we had the reactor inspector in charge of that, 23 and we had a health physicist in charge of health physics, and
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24 that's how the plan is supposed to work.
And that was it.
25 Q
Did you have any perception that there was a reluctance i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
12 I
to provide information?
O'u./
2 A
Absolutely not.
The only perception I had was that I'm trying to get the correct 3
information was very -- what's O
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word.
There wasn't too much information.
I think we would e
5 have liked to have had a lot more than we did, but there was 3
6 absolutely n'o reluctance to give me any information or, you know, R
7 anything on that order.
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Q Does that relate to answering your specific questions, d
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or does it relate to volunteering information?
i Cg 10 A
I think that had I been available, that I would have 3
j II been told everything that the NRC knew at the time.
The only 3
y 12 reason why I didn't get the information was that I was not g
13 available and had other responsibilities.
If I asked a question, m
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15 Q
You mentioned a bit earlier that there was some z
I6 discussions among you while you were riding in the car.
Could
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d 17 you describe those, to the best of your recollection?
18 A
well, basically I asked Jim Higgins what he knew h
19 about the operational problems.
I can't recall in detail g
n 20 what he said, word for word, but basically what I mentioned 21 before, that they had a trip and that they lost the pressurizer, 22 they have gone sclid, they may have ruptured some tubes in the 23 steam generator, there was some leakage of radioactivity in
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24 the containment and possibly or actually at that point there 25 I was a release of activity outside of containment.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I don't recall if at t) s t time we knew if it was off-O 2
site or onsite or whatever the situation was.
3 I thenLasked Don Neely, you know, to rua through what O
4 he had been told on a health physics level, and both he and e
5 Karl Plumlee discussed it briefly.
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6 Karl, I think, was the inspector who had the site, R
7 and Don Neely we.s th e inspector who was supposed to get the n]
8 turnoverofkthe site.
So this was in fact almost a turnover d
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inspection, and they both, you know, basically discussed what zo 10 they might be looking for when they got there.
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11 But:_like I said, information was very, very limited at k
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Was there discussion as to what the sariousness of 3
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14 the accident may be?
m 2
15 A
No, no.
As a matter of fact, from that point in time, g
16 we were dead in the water.
We had no way of being updated on M
d 17 the information that, you know, we had received initially.
We
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18 turned on the radio to KYW News Radio to try to find out what i
E" 19 the status was, and they were merely repeating the news bulletin g
O 20 given by Met Ed, which basically said they had an accident, 21 there was a release, the release had been terminated.
O 22 So when we arrived at the site, I guess that -- the
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fe v-23 unavailability of information when we left the site, plus that i
24 news report, sort of -- at least personally -- put my guard down.
25 I didn't feel I was going into &ny, you know, catastrophic event.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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14 1
Ae a matter of fact, it sort of hindered me, because 2
when we heard that the releases had terminated -- if I hadn't 3
heard that, I might have been tempted to stick a GM out the
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4 window as we were driving to the site, which I did not do.
I
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5 figured, well, it's over, we are merely going to find out what 3
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6 happened and how to clean it up.
And, you know, it was sort of R
7 a minor event at that time until we got there.
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8 The first time I became concerned at all on the way d
d 9
to the site was when we physically arrived at the site.
I icg 10 noticed that the cooling tower for Unit 2 had no plume.
I mean
- NoNt-g 11 Unit 1 was sending up a nice plume.
Unit 2,g and in my mind, 3
g 12 that didn't seem right.
I figured if they were at full power 5
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and they had a trip, they must be dumping heat somewhere, and a
h 14 they weren't dumping it to the cooling towers.
And I figured, a
2 15 you knt it just didn't set right.
I figured maybe we have y
16 got a little more than we thought, but it was just a passing 2
6 17 thought at the time.
18 But other than that, we really had no idea as to what E
19 really happened until we got on site and were debriefed by the R
20 Met Ed people.
21 Q
Was there speculation among you as to how bad it 22 might be?
23,
A No, not that I recall.
Not that I recall.
We
)
24 basically decided what you know, h v we would go about 25 doing things when we were there.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
15 1
Don Neely, of course, was going to check out HP, and O
2 Jim Higgins was going to check out you know, ask some 3
questions as to what happened operationally.
And Karl Plumlee 7b 4
and Ron Nimitz were going to look, you know, into the HP aspects.
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And I was going to just establish communications and make sure 3e j
6 that the Licensee had followed its emergency plan and things K
2 7
like that.
X j
8 As a matter of fact, at the time I left for the site, I dd 9
didn't even know that a general emergency had been declared.
I i
Og 10 found that out in the car going to the site.
El 11 Q
You found that out from the radio broadcast?
3 y
12 A
No, no, from the I believe from one of the people in (s-g g
13 tL car.
So in my mind, I was somewhat familiar with the m
l 14 emergency plan from Three Mile Island, so I my mind -- in my n
2 15 mind I was sort of reviewing to see what I'd be looking for, to 5
16 see that they made proper notifications, took the proper actions, g
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17 when I got there.
Figured ;2 anything that's what I would be N
18 looking at.
k 19 Q
Was there any discussion of hydrogen on the in your -
M 20 A
Absolutely not.
I never even heard the word " hydrogen" 21 until Friday, two days after the the accident occurred.
()
22 Q
And under what circumstances did you first hear of 23 !
From whom did you hear it?
4
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24 A
well, about Friday morning -- the time is approximate, _
25l a:oo to 9:00 o' clock -- I was in the Unit 1 control room and an I,
,l I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
16 1
employee of Met Ed came into the control room quite agitated O-2 and said, "What the hell are you guys trying to do?"
He came 3
up to me because I had my NRC hat on.
I said, "What do you mean?"
4 He said, "I
just heard from my wife that over the radio they e
5 are broadcasting some type of evacuation,:that the NRC has 5l 6
ordered evacuation."
And I
'this caught me totally off guard.
R R
7 I had been over to Unit 2 that morning and I had talked to them Xl 8
about a problem about letdown flow that they were having, d
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a problem establishing a letdown path.
I thought that might i
h 10 have, you know, degraded to some degree, so I called up, using 3
h 11 th e ho t line from Unit 1 control room to Unit 2 control room, 3
g 12 and I said I believe I talked to Don Beckman, NRC inspector.
13 He answered the phone he didn't answer the phone, a Met Ed g
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14 employee did, and asked to talk to the NRC inspector, and it was n
2 15 Don Beckman, I believe.
16 g
And I said, " Hey, Don, a guy just came in here e
d 17 saying that NRC ordered an evacuation.
Has anything happened waf 18 over there that, you know, that we don't know about on this side?"
E 19 And he said, "No."
He said, "The problem we had this morning R
20 w.th letdown took care of itself or was being taken care of."
2I He said, "As a matter of fact," he said, "w? just found out that 22 on Wednesday we had a hydrogen explosion and the containment 23 pressure only went to about 28 pounds."
24 So, you know, it was almost finding out that news, that 25 '
there was an explosion in the containment, it held -- there was ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
17 1
almost a positive air.
In other words, we are not only not n
a 2
concerned about something going wrong, but the fact that we had 3
an explosion, you know, and the containment held it, okay, you 4
know, sort of gives us a little bit more confidence that the e
5 containment will hold if something goes wrong, h
h 6
But thac's the first time I heard about hydrogen R
7 explosion, was Friday morning.
X k
0 Q
Did you hear about hydrogen in concentrations less d
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than an explosion?
10 A
No.
E2 II Q
At any other time?
E C )
f II A
No.
Information on hydrogen didn't start coming in Hg 13 until after the Forest Service people had their radios hooked up.
m h
I4 I can't -- I can't remember the exact time, but then we started a
g 15 monitoring conversations from licensing people and Met Ed a
youheanhit routinely.
g' 16 people about measuring hydrogen, and then 2
N II Hydrogen pressure doing this, or you're going to get a hydrogen aa
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18 recombiner, et cetera, et cetera.
Then the word hydrogen was --
E 19 you know, when the bubble was born, then hydrogen was born.
20 Q
This was all Friday some time?
21 A
or after.
D8 k-22 Q
Not before?
23 A
Not before.
O.
k-24 Q
What shift were you working on Thursday and Friday?
25 A
Let's see.
Wednesday, I was there all day until ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
18 1
after 8:00 o' clock, when we were requested to go to the 2
governor's office.
I worked all day Wednesday.
3 Thursday I reported on site in the morning around 4
8:00 o' clock.
We were delayed a little bit because Jim Higgins e
5 had to be dropped off at a motel to talk to Dick vollmer and g
6 licensing people who had come up on Thursday.
So I worked R
R 7
Thursday morning until about 1:30 or 2:00 o' clock, when I got a Z
j 8
call from the region stating that the governor wanted Jim Higgins dd 9
and I to again go to Harrisburg to brief them on what had gone on.
i h
10 BY MR. STELLO:
E g
11 Q
I'm sorry, Thursday 8:00 a.m.
you started?
3 y
12 A
Yeah.
g 13 g
until when?
a h
14 A
I believe we left the site at 2:00 o' clock in th e i
n 2
15 afternoon.
U j
16 Q
2:00 p.m.7 d
6 17 A
2:00 p.m.
in the afternoon.
We got a call that the 5
18 governor wanted to talk to the same people that had talked to E
19 him the night before, to get an update, and that was Jim Higgins X
20 and myself.
I called Jim Higgins and told him about it, and he 21 was a little bit reluctant because he said, " Gee, you know, I
(
22 didn't get onsite until late, so any" because he was meeting 23 with Dick vollmer, "so any information I've got, I'm getting it l
)
24 from the Licensee."
And he was a little bit worried about that, l
25 i that it wasn't firsthand knowledge.
So -- so he wasn't onsite ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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19 1
too long before he got called off, and I was onsite liko 8:00
,_s 2
o' clock until about 2:00 in the afternoon.
3 On Friday, I was on the entire day, going onsite maybe
~
4 7:00 or 8:00 o' clock and leaving around 5:00 to 6:00, I'm not e
5 sure of the exact time.
29l 6
Then I worked days constantly from that point on.
R R
7 BY MR. MOSELEY:
l 8
Q So you were mostly working days during the entire d
d 9
period?
i 10 A
Yeah, right.
j 11 Q
Coming out about 8:00 or eightish --
B y
12 A
Eightish until what is it, Bill, 5:00 or 6:00 o' clock, rm k_)
bg 13 the day shift, the day tour?
It was more than eight hours a
l 14 because we had two hour turnaround at both ends.
l t
2 15 Q
And Thursday you didn't return back to the site after l
j 16 you left at 2:00 o' clock?
d 17 A
No, we went to the governor's office.
We had a news E
k 18 conference in the afternoon.
I don't remember the exact time.
h 19 It was 4:00 or 5:00, fiveish, sixish, something like that.
M l
20 Then from there, we left and went back to the motel, l
21 at which time we were first informed that they had gotten the
(
22 results of a primary coolant sample and that the results indicated 23,
that, you know, there was quite a bit of fuel damage, and Jim 24 Higgins called the governor back to let him know that, because 25 '
we had left him with a different picture before we left him on l
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
20 1
Thursday, because we didn't know the results of that sample until O
2 we got back to th e motel.
3 BY MR. STELLO:
4 Q
When did you know the primary coolant sample?
e 5
A Thursday, late afternoon, evening.
When we got back 5l 6
to the motel, I believe Jim called -- called the site and kei m.
R Rick rixxi,s.
So R
7 talked to it was late Thursday.
Rick relayed Kl 8
the information that they had taken a sample and it was dd 9
reading: severalhundredhhperhour.
z, h
10 BY MR. MOSELEY:
E h
11 Q
There were samples taken on Wednesday, two samples.
B Were you aware 3f those samples?
y 12 5g 13 A
No.
No.
Not the -- the first time we started hearing a
l 14 about samples were -- was when the Licensee wanted some type of 2
15 waiver of Part 20 to go take them.
They said, "Look, we want y
16 to take some primary coolant samples.
It's a hot area.
Can we 2
b' 17 waive the 3 rem per quarter?"
And I remember George Smith 18
- saying, "No, we're going by the. book."
In other words, you're
=
19 not just going to run in and grab a sample.
20 And it wasn't until Thursday that we heard that a 21 sample had finally been pulled and was reading several hundred
()
22
-- I can't remember the exact number.
The number that comes in 23 my mind is 700 -- jet per hour.
But I -- that would be strictly a
)
24 guess, but it was a hot sample, and it was a small volume, so i
25 j Jim Higgins said, you know, "It sure sounds like there is a heck
- l l
s ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
21 I
of a lot more than just failed fuel involved, and we should O
2 let the governor know.
I don't want to leave him thinking 3
everything is fine."
And he called the governor's office at O
4 that time.
That was around sixish, 7:00 o' clock on Thursday.
5 O
So you were not aware of the sample results from 0
the ones that were pulled on Wednesday?
R b
7 A
No.
N]
8 Q
And the sample result that you are aware of on d
Thursday was the one that was pulled on Thursday?
o h
10 A
Yeah.
As a matter of fact, this is -- I don't know
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12 we went back and, you know, you're. interested, you read the O:
is g
chronology of what happened, and what Met Ed people were doing E
14 g
on Wednesday.
And I remember saying if I had known Wednesday z
15 what had happened on Wednesday -- I mean the details of iE I0 radiologically -- I probably would have looked upon the
- d h
I7 entire incident in a totally different light.
Where I felt z
18 very strongly that an evacuation was a mistake on Friday, if I
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had known what type of readings they were getting on Wednesday 20 when I got there, I might have even recommended to the region 21 that we consider a precautionary evacuation.
But we were O
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22 23 was going on in plant.
We were told what the offsite readings were and 25 !
everything seemed to concentrate on terminating that offsite ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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release, and finding out where it was coming from.
We couldn't 2
even find out where it was coming from on Wednesday, but nobody 3
gave us any information as to what had happened radiologically O
4 in plant in the early hours of March 28th.
At least to me, 5
g anyway.
9!
0 BY MR. STELLO:
R R
7 Q
Do you know if we asked?
Didn't we have people in k
0 Unit 2 control room from Wednesday morning?
d
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9 A
I cannot -- I don't know what was asked of the Unit CH 10 g
2 control room people.
When we got on the site, we asked
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12 E
who is in charge of the unit -- well, actually I guess he is
()
b 13 g
the emergency director directing the offsite teams -- gave us a E
14 g
briefing as to what had occurred.
But he did not give us a Mr 15 g
briefing in a detail that would have led us to indicate there
=
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Like he did M
i, tell us, you know, monitors were offscale, et cetera, et 17
=
18 cetera, but nothing about samples and sample results and h
j things like that.
We never got that information when we first 20 arrived at site.
21 Q
Excuse me, there is a confusion.
The primary
()
coolant sample, as I recall, was drawn some time Wednesday 23 l night.
()
MR. MOSELEY:
The first one was drawn -- well, I'm 25 I
not sure, let me check.
f ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY INC.
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BY MR. STELLO:
O 2
O he numbers that read, oh, in the neighborhood of 3
-- on an ord?r of a hundred R per hour.
4 A
Well, like I said the first time I heard about it, 5
j or Jim and I heard about it, was Thursday, late af*.ernoon, e
j 6
early evening.
R b
BY MR. FISHER:
X]
8 Q
Heard about what, chi ?
The radiation level from 9
~.
the sample or the concentration of the sample?
ze h
10 A
The radiation level of the sample.
=
k II Q
I don't think they were able to analyze until about 3
fI Friday, because they -- their counting rooms had been knocked 13 out, and it was not until the NRC mobile lab got on the scene E
14 g
that they had any analytical capability.
z bI A
To the best of my recollection, we had no concentra-m j
16 tion.
It was, you know, several hundred R per hour dose rate w
h I7 that we received, you know, from the coolant sample, and we 18 knew that we had more than failed fuel up to that point.
? c ' rc-E I'
g talking about one hell of a lot of failed fuel, but we never 20 in our mind, anyway, to my mind, conceptually never pictured a 21 damaged core until somebody said that they pulled a, you know,
()
small sample, in the milliliter, hundred mill type sample 23 reading 100 R per hour, or a high -- many R per hour.
I don't
()
remember the exact number.
But Jim called me right up and he 25 l'
- says, "I'm calling the governor back, because we left him with l
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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a different impression," and that was Thursday afternoon.
O 2
BY MR. MOSELEY:
3 Q
About six hours and 14 minutes, which would have 4
been a little after 8:00 o' clock, Licensee reported to Region e
5 I 140 microcuries per CC gross beta gamma activity in the h]
R 7
A What time was that?
8:30?
K[
8 Q
8:14, before 8:15.
d 9
A I had never heard that information, but at that 2og 10 point I think -- I don't know whether it was a tenfold increase.
E II It was still al-h.
But still to my mind, indicative of, you is g
12 know, failed fuel rather than any gross --
13 MR. STELLO:
I don't believe he is referring to
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That's the one that was on the order of
.j 15 100 microcuries per CC.
x i[
I6 MR. MOSELEY:
And there's another one on -- during
- d
.h I7 the day where the numbers are higher.
It's -- I'm just x
5 18 T.2 trying to find it.
E II 9
BY MR. STELLO:
M Q
Well, while he's looking for it, there was a primary 2I coolant sample which was ultimately sent to Bettis, wri.ch was O
22 es,,,,p1,,s,,,,,,,,1,,1c,,1,,
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a lot of concern on how to package it, shield it, you know, O
2 putting it on a plane.
I think Ron Nimitz had to go with it 3
to the airport to certify it before they put it on helicopter.
O 4
That's the sample I'm talking about. It was a hot sample, 5
j They couldn't give any microcurie per mill type readings.
It 9
6 was only in the R per hour, several R per hour.
C b
7 MR. MOSELEY:
That's not -- I'm not sure this is X[
8 the same sample or two different samples, two different entries d
ci 9
in our 0600.
h 10 THS WITNESS:
We did, you know, recalling back, E
II refer to what happened.
Yes, there were samples in the morning 5
f I2 that indicated that they were at a very low cooling activity l
pd 3
g 13 level that jumped by one or two orders of magnitude, but still 14 they were the Wednesday morning readings and they were low is h
15 compared to the one I'm talking about.
This is definitely z
ij 16 Thursday afternoon.
as MR. STELLO:
Did you find it?
z MR. MOSELEY:
Yes.
P 19 MR. STELLO:
What is that reading?
g MR. MOSELEY:
There are two entries.
One at six 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> and 14 minutes, a report, 140 microcuries gross beta O
22
,,,,,1,,,,,,,c,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,..
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1s 23 minutes, they report 100 milliliters sample reads about 200 MR O
24 pe,,,,,.
,,,,,1,,,,
1,,,
,,,,,72 microcuries per hour.
THE WITNESS:
Still low, relatively.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. STELLO:
The hot sample was taken, I think, O
2 Wednesday evening.
If I recall, it's something like 1000 R 3
per hour.
O 4
MR. MOSELELY:
That was a number in that range, yes.
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BY MR. STELLO:
c' 6
Q And that's the sample you referred to?
K d
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A I remember 700 R a foot, you know, which we're b
X
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d c;
9 BY MR. MOSELEY:
z e
l 10 Q
Do you recall getting any information about contain-
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3 g
12 hydrogen and other constauents?
3a 5
5 13 A
No, sir.
m.
l 14 Q
At all?
Let's say through Friday?
g 15 l
A I honestly don't remember any type of containment x
j 16 samples being taken.
I mean at least the information didn't
- d h
17 come through me.
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18 Q
Do you recall a conversation with Plumlee maybe on i:"
19 Friday and maybe some other day on reporting a conversation he g
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20 had had with Seelinger during which there was a discussion 21 of containment air samples, specifically hydrogen in contain-O 22
- ment, 23 l A
No, sir.
24 BY MR. S TELLO:
25f i
Q Did you talk to Plumlee?
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A Barely.
The first day he was out most of the time.
O 2
George had him doing -- George Smith had him doing confirmatory 3
measurements with the onsite and offsite team, so he was out O
4 of the plant, would come in, give me a piece of paper, give 5
g Ron Nimitz a piece of paper with the information, you know, 6
reading that he had confirmed, and then he'd leave again.
R 7
So I'd see him, but we never sat down and had any conversation X
k 8
on Wednesday.
0 9
I think he stayed all through Wednesday, so when I 2.
Ol 10 came on Thursday, he had worked the night and was getting ready
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I'm not really sure, but my contact 3
Oa5 13 with Karl was very limited during the entire incident, z
l 14 BY MR. MOSELEY:
15 0
He was working basically the 4:00 to 12:00 shift, z
d 16 so there would have been some overflow -- or overlap between as
.h I7 you and him on Friday.
There wouldn't have been on Thursday, z
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C I9 A
No, because I was gone.
Right.
I know he was g
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ok,y.
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23 he had with you on hydrogen in the samples, but you have no Q
24 recall of any such conversation?
25 l A
No, sir.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q on any day?
2 A
On any day, no, sir.
3 O
Do you recall any -- discussing sample analyses with
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4 anyone else, hydrogen sample analyses from containment?
e 5
g A
No.
8 6
Q Friday or Saturday?
m 8
7 A
I can't recall any conversations about any type of --
X 8
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In other a
dd 9
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10 least the first three or four days.
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Like I said, the first time we considered hydrogen as i
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a problem was when I heard about the hydrogen explosion on
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Friday, and from that point on there was a lot of conversation.
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I guess it was Saturday, there might have been some conversationn
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about it, because we're talking about this hydrogen bubble
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16 and the potential for explosion.
But I recall absolutely no 17 conversation during the first three days on any type of air az 18 sample that wasn't for the purpose of determining, you know,
=
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radiological releases.
20 Q
Through Friday, what was your duty station onsite?
21 A
I was the, for want of a better word, principal O
communicator from Unit 1.
22 23 Q
Is that all you did?
()
A That, and when I was relieved, when I had time ---
25 once we got on the situation where we weren't talking ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
29 I
constantly, then I was out in the control room looking at the 2
offsite radiological isopleths and the information coming in 3
there.
But it was basically I was stationed inside the Unit 1 4
control room / shift supervisor's office, that area, and either 5
3 relaying information to the region at headquarters or e
3 6
evaluating whatever information was being radioed in to that e
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location at the time.
n 8
8 a
Q On Wednesday, after the -- Neely and Higgins went d"
9
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to the Unit 2 control room for some period of time, and I can't 10 j
put an exact time on it, maybe a couple of hours, you were
=
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12 z
headquarters; is that right?
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A On Wednesday, I don't believe I ever relayed informa-E 14 tion back from Neely or Higgins.
When they left -- when we W
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I mean the five of us:
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17 myself.
Ee 18 Don Neely decided that he and Higgins were to go to
=
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Unit 2.
They were told to take respirators because there was 20 a potential airborne problem between units.
They were given 21 bagged respirators.
They departed.
Until except maybe for
()
some minor conversations, I don't believe I talked to Jim 23 l Higgins at any length until later on that night, when I called O
24 him and told him that we had beenrequested to -- to go to 25 the governor's office.
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Now I must a6 nit I'm going back almost two years, s
2 but most of the information that I was talking to the region 3
about was coming from the control room in Unit 2 and later on 4
when we walked down or came, he was also providing some informa-5 3
tion back to the region.
But I believe my contact with
<?
3 6
i Neely, I believe I didn't talk to him.
If anybody, I might n
R 7
have talked to Higgins occasionally during that first day.
But n
8 8
it woul'd have been a very minimal pericd of time.
a d
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g Q
Was there -- to the best of your knowledge, was 0
10 y
there a telephone communication stablished from Unit 2 back
=
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to Region I immediately upon Higgins and Neely arriving at
'i 12 E
Unit 2?
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A No.
I 14 y
Q No, there was no; or no, you don't recall?
z 9
15 G
A No, there was not, as far as I can recol'.ect.
The z
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main phone communications between TMI and the site -- I mean G
17 and the region was through the Unit 1 shift supervisor's ax 18 office, that when Neely and Higgins first left for Unit 2,
=
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they were talking to the region perhaps from there, but I 20 wouldn't know that.
I believe that they were.
Headquarters 21 was only talking to the region, and Unit 1.
Headquarters
()
could not talk directly to Unit 2.
23 '
So whenever we wanted to get a message to Unit 2,
()
it had to be through Unit 2, if headquarters had something they 25 '
wanted to do.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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For exampla, I think when Vic called, he talked to 2
Hitz in Unit 1, and I remember that conversation distinctly.
3 It was some time later in the afternoon that headquarters O
4 established their own link with Unit 2.
e 5
BY MR. STELLO:
bl 6
A you were the communicator, at least on Friday, Q
Chic a
b 7
between Unit 1 and the region?
3 8
8 I
A Friday, yes.
d I
Q When Don Beckman told you about a hydrogen explosion, 10 did you relate that conversation back to the region?
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I'm not sure.
I believe I did.
I know I got on the is g
12 phone with George Smith.
I am not sure whether I mentioned
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j that specific incident.
I do know I told them that I had been 14 in contact with Unit 2 and that they saw no reason to order 2
15 an evacuation.
I don't know if I specifically r elayed the a
id I0 hydrogen explosion -
I'm not -- my mind is not clear on that us h
II right now.
=
!ii 18 Q
Is it possible that you engaged in anydabriefings
=
8 with people coming on the next shift, or was that done by some-n 20 one else?
Did you normally do this?
I A
Well, we had joint meetings.
In other words, I think as of Friday, the shift that was on would have a meeting 23 for about an hour with the shift, you know, coming on; and j
the same thing when we went offshift.
There was about an 25 I hour overlap there where we talked about whatever problems ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
32 I
were going on.
O 2
Q Okay.
If Plumlee was coming on shift, then, at 3
about 2:00 or 3:00 o' clock, would it have been normal for him O
4 to be debriefed in the Unit 1 control room?
5 g
A on what day would this be?
Would this be after 9
6 we started with --
R b
7 Q
Let's start with Friday and work backward, if we X
g 8
can.
ti c;
9 A
If Friday was the first day that we started this zeg 10 overlap, and I believe Friday was the first day, because that's E
bu2 5
II the day that all the back-up inspectors arrived on site, he wott1d.
g 12 have been part of any debriefing that tne 8:00 to 4:0'0 shift 13 would have given to the 4:00 to 12:00 shift.
If he were on l
14 the 4:00 to 12:00, as you stated earlier.
$j 15 Q
And likewise, if you were on the day shift, you z
j 16 would have debriefed him as he was coming on?
t h
I7 A
That's what I meant, yes.
x
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18 Q
Yes.
i:
19 e
A And likewise the 12:00 to 8:00 would have debriefed n
20 my shift as we were coming on.
2I Q
Can you recall any debriefing on Friday?
O 22 so, sec,,,, z,,,,mse,we 1,, __ tse,,
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no 23 formal shift set up on Friday.
I remember we left the site O
24 on rridar end went over to the observation center where we 25 had been going to check out, you know, or be deconned, and ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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that's the day the NRC arrived en masse. ' Friday afternoon 2
everybody was in that little green house, and it was the next 3
day -- that's the afternoon where all the shifts were set up,
(
4 so it starting Saturday, we were on rotating shifts, and all 3
j this briefing, debriefing occurred.
0 So what I'm trying to say is there would be no S
7 formal debriefing between shifts until Saturday.
n 8
8 a
Q And you recall a debriefing Saturday?
dd 9
A I think Saturday was the day that everybody was jog 10 there, and we went to a formal three-shift operation, so z=
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12 z
Q Do you recall any?
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g-13 A
I can recall several debriefings.
I couldn't in E
14 l
y my mind say, yes, I remember one on Saturday, March 31st, I guesa m
9 15 Q
that would have been.
z 16 Q
Going back to Friday again, and Beckman called you --
d 17 A
I called him.
a=
18
=
Q You called him.
You found out about the hydrogen 19
)
explosion?
20 A
Right.
21 Q
You talked to the region, but you are not sure O
22 l
V whether you told them or not?
l l
A I might have in passing said to George something I
24 like, "Look, I called Unit 2.
I asked them if there was any I
25 problem.
They said everything is stable there.
As a matter l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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of fact, improving."
I might have said, you know, they even O
2 had a hydrogen explosion on Wednesday and nothing happened.
3 It would be very brief.
So why are we -- you know, why are 4
we ordering evacuation.
And George said to me, "I agree, I
{
don't know exactly what's going on," but that, you know, he 8
6 was trying to call back the evacuation order at the time.
=
BY MR. MOSELEY:
Xl 8
K Q
Chic when you say you called George, would that 6
9 j
have been the phone other than che open line that was --
o h
10 A
No,' that was the open line, because I remember I
=hII went from the shift control room where this occurred, the d
12 z
employee came in, informed us of the evacuation in the O:
i3 g
control room.
I asked to use the hot line between the units.
E 14 W
I did.
I got a Met Ed employee on the other end, asked to 2
15 talk to an NRC inspector.
To the best of my knowledge, it was wz
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Beckman who told me what he did.
I hung up, went into the d
17 shift supervisor's office where we had the open line to the wz
!E 18 region, asked to talk to George Smith, and then relayed the
=
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information of what had happened with the employee coming on.
20 No reason for evacuation that I had -- before coming in, I 21 looked at the offsite isopleths and saw nothing, so I couldn't figure out why this evacuation was being ordered and,you know 23 l what happened from that point.
But that was the first time anybody mentioned hydrogen or explosion of any type, was 25 !
Friday morning.
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q If this conversation that Plumlee recalls had O
2 occurred on Friday afternoon, would you have likely said, 3
"Everybody already knows about that"?
That is, the hydrogen
- O 4
burn?
5 A
I -- to be honest, the way I recall it, the fact a
.or the concern over the hydrogen burn was almost like a E"
7 momentary occurrence.
Friday morning we found out about it, nl 8
and then it was past history, it was forgotten about.
The d
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concern of hydrogen from Friday afternoon, if you will, on 0
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was the hydrogen that was still accumulating and might explode.
E plo+
l" In other words, the coming incident, the hydrogen spike ---
N BY MR. STELLO:
E O
13 j
Q You mean the primary system in contrast to the E
14 a
containment vessel?
V 15 E
A Yeah, yeah.
At that point in time I had talked to -- I forget who it was, Dornsife, because I know - know h'
him from the state, and we talked about the fact that he z
5 18 didn't feel there would be any hydrogen in the vessel because s"
19 l
of the high pressure and all this stuff.
But we were talking 20 about the hydrogen in containment, and everything from that 21 pcint on was geared toward this potential explosion.
The patt explosion sort of -- the people knew about it Friday and s
23 '
fo got about it.
And I just told -- the only thing I remember saying, yes, you know, I was worried that because we were the 25l first ones there, that George might want to relieve us, and I 9
ALDERSQN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
36 I
remember telling somebody, "Well, tell George that, you know, 2
we want to stay.
We don't want to go; not to worry about 3
that part."
O 4
In other words, I'm not worried about this explosion 5
j type thing.
But as far as the hydrogen spike was concerned, it c'
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I heard about it Friday morning R
7 in the context of nothing is wrong over here, and then it was Xl 8
forgotten about.
Everything then was forward looking, but not d
9 backward looking. As far as the hydrogen, I don't remember i
h 10 discussing that at length with anybody.
=
II Q
When you testified in front of the Subcommittee i
is g
12 on Energy and the Environment -- I have forgotten the dates, O l is you miehe rememeer ehem.
l 14 A
That was the very first thing, I think.
l h
15 Q
Yeah.
It would have been for you on May 10th.
I a:
ij 16 7,11 read your passage relating to pressure spike.
The as f
17 passage starts with:
a:
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20 Open meaning the telephone. system.
21 "Right.
The regional office in Bethesda, 2
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Region I and find out what was going on, and 2
i then shortly after noon there was a three-way 3
tie so we could talk to Bethesda and Region I 4
at the same time.
5 "By Mr. Weaver:
Question:
Were they 5
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R R
7 Your answer:
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spike until Friday morning."
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Is that still your recollection?
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Yes.
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There is two parts to the pressure spike.
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Was any discussion related to any unusual az M
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A No.
20 0
Now as I recall on Wednesday, you were there all 21 the way through 8:00 p.m.?
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A Correct.
Q No discussion of containment sprays, nothing?
Nothing
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if going back and forth in the car, you know, somebody might O
2 have mentioned that the containment sprays came on, but this 3
was all after the fact, way after Friday.
4 Q
Way after Friday?
5 A
Yeah.
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I was told the containment could take
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is 15 Q
Can you recall any discussions on things like d
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- r3 h
II A
Yeah.
x 18 Q
Wednesday?
19 g
A Yeah.
20 Q
When do you recall that we knew about the hotleg II temperatures?
Your earliest recollection.
22 A
Well -- okay, the readings on temperature hotleg, 23 coldleg, TF, all this other stuff, were being relayed i
routinely.
25 Q
Starting when?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A Oh, 10:00 -- almost as soon as -- well, I wouldn't O
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All right?
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not a reactor operator.
It wasn't until you got on the x
15 phone and talked to Hitz -- I was on the phone and you talked ij 16 to me and wanted to talk to somebody from Met Ed.
Hitz got d
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"g 19 before he left, and then he said, "Okay, you're telling me 20 that if my hotleg temperature is this, we've got superheated 21 steam.
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M 8
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Do you know why we never got the answers back on n
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the in-cores, the in-core temperatures?
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T 16 Q
When was that?
l 17 A
Wednesday morning.
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19 A
were printing question marks?
20 A
Yeah.
21 Q
How come that wasn't relayed, do you know?
O 22 A
I thought it was.
23 ;
j MR. MOSELEY:
I don't know what time it was relayed.
24 i I
BY MR. STELLO:
I I
25 !
Q Who was the communicator at that time?
Was it you?
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A I remember talking to somebody.
I don't know, maybe O
2 I'm saying Wednesday morning.
Wednesday, I'm sure of that.
3 Q
Oh, yes, for sure.
In the afternoon, as I recall.
4 MR. MOSELEY:
That's my recollection, but I didn't 5
want to say, because I'm not sure.
I'd have to go back and 6
look.
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7 THE WITNESS:
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8 10:00.
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15 BY MR. STELLO:
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Okay, so you were just getting information from
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Yeah.
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You never heard about the actual measurements of 20 the in-core thermocouples?
21 A
No.
You mean the physical potentiometer readings?
O 22 23 Q
When is the first time you heard about that?
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accident and read the, you know, testimony and transcripts, I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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because I remember -- as a matter of fact, on that point, I O
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transcription of all the tapes in Region I, and it was my --
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thousand degrees, and I remember saying to Jim Allen, I d
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it fI But it wasn't during the time that I was there that 13 I knew about it.
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Did he mention the fact that the EMOV was open?
m E
I0 A
No.
as
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When is the first time you knew about the fact x
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g A
I forget who in Unit 2 was relaying that information, 20 whether it was going from --- it might have been from Jim 21 Higgins to Walk Baunak, who was also a reactor operator in 2
Unit 1, talking to the region.
In other words, I wasn't the 23,
only person.
Q When?
25 !1 A
I wasn't the only person on the telephone.
If ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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43 I
information was coming from Unit 2 of an operational nature, 7
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about to tell somebody who knew what they were talking about O
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Or did you?
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1 Q
I understand that.
O 2
A And then it's also a blending together, and if you 3
ask me did you hear about it Wednesday, it would be difficult O
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5 Q
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was the attempt to get the pressure down so that they can go z
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They thought they had gotten 13 it out of one, but they still had it in the other.
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m ij 16 Q
Did you ever hear anyone discuss about cooling as h
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z 18 A
Not -- it sounds familiar, but I wouldn't say i~
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n 20 Q
You didn't hear about that in the first couple of 2I days?
O 22 A
so.
23 Q
When you went to the briefing with the governor, when 24 was that?
Wednesday night?
25 A
The lieutenant governor on Wednesday night.
l I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I Q
Wednesday night?
- O 2
A Right.
3 Q
You kind of gave the impression that the core was 4
not -- was not damaged.
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13 Q
Your perception that you. discussed some of the b
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You characterized ~
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airector gri=er117 co=cer=ea -ita =e1ee e or =eaiecio -
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they believed to be the source of the release.
They knew 2
they were releasing radiation.
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on samples, for example, what radiological conditions existed a
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would get or I would get later on.
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That was to w
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terminate the release, a
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Q The information you felt you weren't getting was 6
17 radiation levels inside the containment, for example?
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basis accident gives you -- well, they had figured it out, 20 gives you 8 R per hour containment dome monitor.
Hell, if 21 you had 10,000 R per hour or 100 R per hour in that containment C) 22 monitor, and I knew that, all kinds of bells would have gone 23 l off in my mind.
I mean, if your DBA gives you a reading, here
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they had given it to me, would have calibrated me totally
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3 The only information they gave was, you know, we 4
I have a release, this much here, this much there.
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Well, I thought I heard you say earlier you were E
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aware there was a 200 R per hour in the dome.
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MR. MOSELEY:
I think that was George.
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BY MR. STELLO:
6 17 w
Q That information --
x 18 l-
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19 l
was high, way above 8.
20 Q
What do you mean, later on?
21 A
Later Wednesday, 1:00, 2:00 o' clock, okay?
22 Q
Let me -- let's say -- if I've got a frown on my 23 face, it's because the notes we have indicate that before you left for the site, that it was known it was 200 R per hour.
25 A
Well, I wasn't particularly -- I wasn't aware of it ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I personally.
2 Q
Okay.
There were people who were briefed who were 3
aware of that.
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Okay.
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given it in the same as saying we don't believe it, we 3
6 feel the monitor is defective.
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When were you told that?
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as I recall, that the activity levels in the trimry coolant i
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Right.
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What should they have told you that would have helped 23 '
you understand it?
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for example, that thermocouples were printing question marks, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
49 1
and when they measured them, they are given -- they are getting
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You are suggesting that Met Ed was not fully forthcoming I
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21 A
I felt that, yes.
In other words --
(1) 22 Q
But you don't --- let me see --- I want to make sure 23,
I can put this in context.
Do you feel that they intentionally
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25 A
That's a difficult question to answer.
Did they l
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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withhold or minimize information that I would receive or had 2
received?
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so it's clear to me.
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A I do not feel it was not intentional, no.
It's El" sort of like when the cop ---
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Q Did they give you anything you asked for?
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I feel that they did, yes.
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Q Because in that briefing you also characterized a a
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Right.
am 18 Q
At the time of the lieutenant governor's briefing.
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It appeared that they did the right
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The offsite teams were out, the right overlays were 23 being used.
Proper communications were being used.
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25 were doing what they were supposed to be doing.
Okay?
They ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
51 I
were trying to isolate the source of the release.
Once they 2
did that, they tried -- they had planning meetings on how to 3
contain it; how to, you know, close it off.
4 I felt that in the part I was looking at, their 5
response to the emergency,that they were doing an acceptable 6
job.
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20 "the incident did something."
21 It's always qualified and always minimized.
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if they didn't want to believe what they were erf r.g.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q Is it possible they didn't believe it?
O 2
A It's possible.
3 Q
Isn't it clear that the controversy of the do=e O
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monitor even until today remains unanswered?
3 5
A Yes.
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6 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
1 R
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MR. CRAIG:
I have a question for you, Chic.
X 8
BY MR. CRAIG:
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Q If they told you that they had a safety injection;
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E I6 feel that they had minimized the information or hadn't been 35 h
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No.
In other words, if they had told =e that -
P 19 9
Q Yeah.
A 20 A
No, I would have felt that -- that would have been 21 what I would have wanted to hear, if you want to put it rhat O
22 w,y.
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7.ve just read a brief su==ary of so=e of the notes O
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A TL4ca tP.c.t had happened?
O 2
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I didn't read all of it.
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All right, what have you i
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On 3/28 in the morning, if they had told you O-S 5
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Yaah.
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No.
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Q Okay.
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A Because, remember, I. asked thar question, what does 20 that mean?
And the Licensee -- someone said that the Licensee II believed it meant that the thermocouples were damaged.
22 Q
I want to ask you a couple more que<stions about 23 the ride from Region I to the site on the morning of the M
accident.
25 I I think you said that when you heard the -- you i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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thought it was over, that there had been a minor event right 2
before you arrived.
Is that the general feeling that people 3
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Or how did you talk about it?
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terminated, the release had been terminated, and that, in h
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f II responding.
g 13 In other words, losing the bubble in the pressurizer 14 while, I guess, a problem, to me the main thing was it was 15 accompanied by a release of radiation into the containment z
d I0 and offsite, and my mind was geared in that direction.
ed h
I7 Q
Did anybody in the car discuss how serious they x
18 thought it was?
19 8
A No.
n 20 Q
Didn't want to talk about i*
Did you have a feel II for what Higgins or anybody else -- the seriousness of the 22 accident before they got to the site?
Did you have a feel for 23 it?
Or do you think everybody kind of agreed with you, that O
24 1,
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I don't know how they felt.
I thought we were going l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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over there to find out what had happened, and p rimarily to find O
2 out how they were handling the clean-up; that the accident was 3
over.
We were going to find out did they act appropriately O
4 with respect to calling the site emergency, or whatever.
Did 5
j they act appropriately from a radiological standpoint, and in 9
j 6
their clean-up or whatever we were going to see, were they --
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7 you know, following proper health physics procedures.
X]
8 Q
Would you have been interested if somebody in the d
o; 9
car had said, ",How serious do you think it is," do you think ig 10 you'd remember that now?
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Yeah, because -- I would have felt differently going.
h 12 BY MR. STELLO:
13 Q
How fast were you driving?
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7.d estimate about 80 to 85 miles an hour.
m 9
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Q I hope you weren't engaged in too serious a s
y 16 conversation at that speed.
A h
I7 A
That's --
s 18 BY MR. MOSELEY:
P" 19 9
Q You were the driver; right?
a 20 A
I was the driver.
I BY MR. CRAIG:
()
Q Would you be surprised if one of the guys in the 3;
car had felt that the DBA or a DBA-type accident had occurred?
i i ()
A I would have been surprised.
I didn't think that 25 type of accident occurred.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. STELLO:
2 O
Let me pursue this question.
Driving 85 miles an 3
hour, people are engaged in a conversation, are you paying a
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great deal of attention to what they're talking about, driving 5
y 85 miles an hour?
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75, 85, you know, it's straight.
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you know, because once you feel you have gotten the okay --
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12 see, not 85.
80 miles an hour.
That's fast enough.
You j O5 13 l
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car, you don't really think about the fact you are doing 80 l
!e 15 miles an hour.
l i
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are doing 75 and don't even realize it.
I mean, you know, 5*
I8 you pull back because you're worried abou't a ticket.
But when
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
O 24 Q
Once you had heard this radio broadcast and thought
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25 i
the event was over, the accident was over, did it occur to you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1 l
57 l
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to slow down?
2 A
Well, we actually heard that about five minutes --
3 five or 10 minutes before we got to the exit, so having been 4
away from the office for maybe an hour at that time, we just --
5 we didn't, you know, go that fast, perhaps, but we tried to 8
6 get there as fast as we could.
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7 7
You know, one thing I'd like to.say, I wish -- I a
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don't know, these questions have been asked over and over again d
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I wish somebody would have 0
10 y
considered hypnotism.
I would have loved to have been
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hypnotized and say, "This is exactly what happened," because o
12 z
trying to go back now and trying to remember, days run into a
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that is unique, like the hydrogen explosion, that I could z
16 g
swear on a stack of Bibles that was Friday morning, you know, p
17 when I first heard about it, or if it's something out of ax M
18
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place like -- well, mentioning this hydrogen discussion with 19 8
Karl Plumlee.
n 20 If right now I started talking about brain surgery, 21 I think a month or two months or a year from now, you'd remember
()
it, like, "What's this guy talking about brain surgery for?"
23 For me to be talking about a hydrogen concentration with Karl
(])
Plumlee is just out of -- there's no reason to.
That's why it 25 sticks in my mind as being --
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. STELLO:
2 Q
Now let's characterize it a little differently.
3 Supposing Plumlee ca:te up and said to you, "I've just been O
4 ta1 kin, to See11nger, ane he has seen te111ng me about some 5
hydrogen measurements that they made in the containment,* would a
3 6
it have been logica1 for you to respond, "Oh, well, we just e
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clearly hydrogen in the containment -- would you have passed d
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it off?
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A If he brought that conversation up after Friday
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would have been fine.
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14 this was like Wednesday or Thursday.
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Q No, no, no.
Let's ask the question again.
Do not z
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p 17 Is it possible that you could have had a conversation a
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!is 18 with Plumlee, no time specified, that had the general nature C
19 j
of, "I," Plumlee now, "have had a conversation with Seelinger, 20 who mentioned some hydrogen concentrations they measured in 21 the containment,"
and you had heard about the pressure spike and not have paid any particular significance to it, 23 recognizing you already had knowledge of a hydrogen explosion?
Q In that context is the context in which the questionwis 25 intended.
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
59 1
A It's possible, but I honestly can't remember any 2
conversation or anything of that type.
Everything after that 3
Friday morning was geared to looking ahead.
4 In other words, if anything, I think they believed 5
that the hydrogen concentrations were low, very low on --
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6 after Friday, because of the hydrogen being consumed during R
7 the explosion.
A j
8 Q
As a matter of fact, some time in that general d:!
~9 vicinity of Friday night or Saturday morning, there had --
z Og 10 they had measurements, and the measurements were in fact 11 indicating a fairly low concentration, and the discussion went 3
Y 12 to the hydrogen recombiner, if you recall.
O 13 A
Uh-huh.
So like I said, it's possible, but I do l
14 not recall any conversation with Karl Plumlee dealing with 15 hydrogen or anything like that.
g 16 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
e N
17 MR. MOSELEY:
Okay.
Thanks a lot.
E 5
18 (Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m.,
the deposition was c
h 19 adjourned.)
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25 ;
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the I&E TMI Investigators in the matter of:
TMI, Unit 2 Date of Proceeding:
Mondav, January 12, 1981 Docket llumber:
~
Place of Proceeding:
nnewnca,_ y,ry,3nna were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.,
ANN RILEY l
Official Reporter (Typed)
'D a (qt, 1
~
f Official Reporter (Signature)
I O
O
-