ML19343D335
| ML19343D335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1981 |
| From: | Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040299 | |
| Download: ML19343D335 (99) | |
Text
AR I
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x 4
In the matter of:
5 y
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY n
0 (Three Mile Island, Unit 2)
Ra7 1.
8 8
n 4
Fifth Floor Hearing Room, 9
4350 East-West Tower, East-West Highway, h
10 Bethesda, Maryland.
=
II Monday, January 12, 1981.
is j
12 13 o
Deposition of:
JAMES HIGGINS z
g 15 commenced at 4:10 p.m.,
pursuant to agreement of the l
z parties.
APPEARANCES:
m
!il 18 VICTOR STELLO, Director, Office of Inspection E. Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory j9 8
Commission, Washington, D.C.
n 20 NORMAN MOSELEY, Office of Inspection &
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory g
Commission, Washington, D.C.
JOHN CRAIG, Office of Inspection &
nf r ement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 23 l Commission, Washington, D.C.
24 25 l
l ggg ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
_ _ ~, _ _ - _
~
2 1
(Appearances, continued:)
O 2
arcaxao roarUsa, sse., ottice or Inspection & Audit, U.S.
3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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3 I
PROCEEDINGS 2
Whereupon, 3
JAMES HIGGINS O
4 was called as a witness on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory 5
Commission and, having been first duly sworn, was examined l
6 and testified as follows:
A 8
7 EEAMIEAIIRE a
k BY MR. CRAIG:
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Q Would you state your full name for the record.
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A James Charles Higgins.
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II BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q Jim, this is the investigation that has to do with the transfer of information on the day of the accident in E
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y relation to Three Mile Island.
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2 15 We have interviewed you on one occasion previously, aa
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and we will try to minimize the duplication between this 6
17 interview and that one.
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18 A
- Okay, h
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Q But let's start by going back to the day of the 20 accident and begin with when you first learned of the incident 21 or accident that had occurred at Three Mile Island, and from 2
O hc= vou heerd te, end hen.
23 l A
Okay.
I normally get in the office in Region I O
ehoue 7:30 in the morning, and as c1ose ee I rememher, thae s 25 about when I got in that morning.
And I was working in my ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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office from then until about 8:00 o' clock, and Don Capeton, who O
2 was my section chief, came into my office very close to 8:00 3
,. clock, within a couple of minutes, and told me that something O
4 had happened at TMI, and they were setting up the Incident 5
Response Center, and he asked me to help.
And then he went off 0
down the hall to get more people, and I went down and started R
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bringing some chairs in and helping set up the Incident M[
8 Response Center.
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And shortly after that, I don't remember who was on H
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the phones exactly at first, but I know Eldon Brunner was on.
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II the phones.
I think Don Havercamp was in there talking on the 3
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12 phones, that is phones from our Incident Response Center to i
c 13 TMI, and I believe it was to the Unit 2 control room at that E
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- a time.
It might have been Unit 1 also, and I was there for the l
g 15 next probably half hour or so setting it up, and participating x
to some extent in the discussions that were going on.
I wasn't on the phone myself at this time.
It l
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was either Don Capeton or Eldon Brunner or Don Havercamp, as I
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recall.
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The information that they got was -- and I don't 21 remember exactly what they were getting back.
I know there 22 O
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The things that I do remember was that there had O
been a site end. I be11 eve, e senera1 emersency dec1ered, and 25 I remember the 50 rem reading in containment.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q 50 rem?
Is that the number you remember?
2 A
That's what I remember.
3 0
I believe the notes indicate 200 rem about 8:00 0
4 o' clock.
Is this the dome monitor you are talking about?
5 g
A Yeah, it was the dome monitor.
Okay.
And there e
6 was -- I know once we got in the car and were leaving, there R
7 was discussion about shielded and unshielded readings, what a
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it would be shielded and what it would be unshielded.
And I dy 9
don't remember new what the factors were, and people weren't z
10 really sure at chat time, either, because I remember in the car
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I2 wrong now, 200 rem, 50 rem, whether that was the real reading, a
y 13 or if you had extrapolated or cut it back because of the m
l 14 shielding or whatever.
Nobody was really sure at that time.
E 15 And I --
m if 16 Q
Okay.
Let's hold the car conversation aside for a as h
I7 minute and pursue the -- we'll get to that.
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That's about all I remember from the office.
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19 Q
Okay.
Well, we have some specific questions for n
20 you.
II A
Okay.
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x,,did not go to 23 George Smith's office.
That was my understanding of the initial 24 call, was into George Smith's office.
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I was not involved.
George is not -- is in a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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different branch so I wouldn't have gone down there.
And, as O
2 a matter of fact, my office is just across the hall from the 3
Incident Response Center, so when Don Capeton came and told me O
4 to help set it up, I just went across the hall and started --
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Q So you were not in George Smith's office at all e*
3 6
during that period of time?
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7 A
True.
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8 Q
Did you get a briefing from someone as to the d
9 information that had been supplied by the communications from og 10 George's office?
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II A
No.
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Q So you just sort of picked up in the middle whenever c
13 the conversation -- whenever the call was established from E
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the incident center, you were there and heard what transpired z
15 from then until the time you left; is that correct?
if 16 A
Probably for about a half hour, and I'm guessing now
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II to some extent, but I was probably in the Incident Response z
II Center from about 8:00 to maybe 8:30 or 8:25, something like U
g that, and then at that time the decision was made that I would 0
be part of the team that was going to go to the site.
21 Q
About 8:30 is when you heard of that decision?
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23 l after the decision was made, I got together a few things to O
take with me, a notebook -- es e metter of fact, this one 2'
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right here -- and whatever else I brought with me; my coat, I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I guess, and this sort of thing, and then tried to get some O
2 orders.
We were told to try and pick up some orders to go 3
also, and I know there was some delay in getting the orders, O
4 and that held us up for about 15 minutes or so.
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So that's why I say it was some time, quarter after, a
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8:30, when the decision was made that t.he team would go and R
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that I would be --- from the Operations Branch would go.
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Q Who informed you of that decision?
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A As best I recall, it was Rick Kimmig, h10 Q
And as soon as you got that decision, you then
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II went to pick up this material and get your orders and. so on?
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Or did you do something else other than that?
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A No, I -- nothing specific.
Just tried to get 3
14 together with on.aer people on the team that were going, to find u
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g out who else was going, and talked to them very briefly.
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16 Q
What did you talk to them about?
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Wno was going, what we were going to do.
I'm not E
- n 18 really -- I don't recall very clearly what we were talking 5
g about, because it was -- it was all very hurried and it was --
20 I guess just nothing really very significant.
21 Q
Do you recall a gathering outside George Smith's O
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A No, I never did go down to George Smith's office.
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ALDERSO A' " ORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
2 Q
You weren't part of a discussion in the hall outside 3
of George Smith's office with George Smith and anybody else, 4
where they discussed -
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A I'm sure I never was down by his office because his 3n 6
office is on the first floor away from mine, and away from the R
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where we had to go to get our orders and get out to the car.
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So I'm certain I was never down there.
afo 10 I guess part of the things I discussed with the 3
I 11 people was to find out where we were going to meet, which r5 12 turned out to be by the front door, in the emergency vehicle, E
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13 so it was just a question of running arcr..;d c.rying to get
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l 14 the few things that I needed, trying to get orders.
Usually 2
15 we can do it pretty quickly in the region, but usually it's U
g 16 limited to about an hour or so to get the orders processed and as d
17 signed, and they ar,tually did go through and cut us a set of 5
!E 18 orders.
And there was some delay on those.
k 19 BY MR. MOSELEY:
R 20 Q
Would you characterize them, the discussions you 21 had, as logistics rather than substantive about the accident?
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22 A
Yes.
23 I Q
To the exclusion of the substantiveness of the
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24 accident?
25 ;
A We really didn't know much about the accident at that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
9 1
time.
There were, I think, probably a few pieces of information
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2 that we picked up in the Incident Response Center between 3
8:00 and a quarter after, or 8:30, and at that time it was 4
get everything together and get out there as quick as you can.
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6 were doing, trying to get our orders and get in the car and go.
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7 Q
Do you recall knowing what the containment pressure n]
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g departed for the site?
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A No, I don't.
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Do you recall a discussion about hydrogen in the d
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containment in the regional office prior to departing?
S 13 A
'iednesday?
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Q Yes.
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A No.
T 16 Q
You recall no discussion on Wednesday in the office d
17 before departing?
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A No.
19 Q
Did you have the perception when you were in the 20 regional office that there was information about the event --
21 well, let me put it this way:
22 O
Do you recall subsequently, based on what you know 23 now, that there was information known in the regional office 24 O
that you didn't know, that on Wednesday morning, prior to your 25 leaving?
Do you follow that question?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
10 I
A No.
O 2
Q Okay.
I'm asking you, was ther'e information that 3
other people had in the regional office on that' morning which 4
you did not have?
5 A
I really don't know, because I guess I'm not sure a
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office at 8:30 or so when we were getting ready to leave, and n
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I'm not sure at this time what I knew at 8:30 when I was d
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leaving, so it's hard to say.
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10 Q
Do you feel like yo u were given all the informaticn
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that you needed. prior to departing?
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A It certainly would have been nice to have had more, 3
j but I'm not -- we had very little information when we left, and
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it would have been much better to have had more.
But'I'm not a
2 15 sure that that was available.
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Q Now let me try it another way:
d 17 Of the information which was available, do you feel wx 18 that all that you were given -- that you were given all that C"
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you should have received, of all that was available?
20 A
I'm really not sure at this time if prior to --
21 BY MR. STELLO:
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22 Q
Could I suggest you tell us what it is you'did know, i
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as best you can recall, or if you can refer to your notes?
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A The only thing I really remember that I knew when we 25 l j
were leaving was that, as I said, that they had had a problem ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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at the site.
They had had a trip.
There was a site and a O
2 general emergency declared, and they had high radiation readings 3
in containment, and at this time I can't remember or recall O
4 there being any more information that we had at the regional 5
j office before we left.
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0 BY MR. CRAIG:
R 7
Q Let me ask, and you just tell me yes or no, if you 8
knew it before you left:
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Did you know the site had been -- the reactor had 10 a
been at 100 percent power before trip?
II A
I don't recall.
in Q
Did you know whether or not the site believed they o
13 had a primary or secondary leak in one of the steam generators?
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A Before we left, I don't really recall that.
I think b
you'll probably read off a lot that I'm aware of, and I don't z
id I0 remember now that I knew it back then.
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BY MR. STELLO:
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Q John was just reading from notes about what was l
19 8
known at 8:00 o' clock.
n 20 A
Okay.
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I don't recall.
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A I don't really recall.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q That they had failed fuel?
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A I am not sure.
3 Q
That they believed or that there probably was a 4
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bubble in the vessel, reactor vessel?
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A I am not sure.
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6 Q
You said you were aware that they had high radiation m
8 7
in the reactor building.
Were you aware that the dome monitor n
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was reading 200 R per hour?
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Yeah, that I believe I was, and I think probably CH 10 the reason that I was more aware of that, at least at this time,
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was became we had discussions, as I mentioned, in the car 6
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going out to the site about that.
The other things were kind I
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Q Did you know that there was a pressure inside m
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containment?
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A I don't really remember.
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Q Were you aware that all containment monitors were m
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in the hign alarm?
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A I don't remember.
20 0
Were you aware of any pressure or temperature 21 parameters in the reactor coolant system?
O 22 A
I'm not sure.
23 j
Q Okay.
All of the things, including the site and
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the general emergency, were known -- these are notes prepared 24
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25 by Rick Kizmig -- at approximately 8:00 o' clock in the region.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A Okay.
In that case, I would guess that I was 2
probably aware of some of those, because Rick Kimmig
-- I 3
had some discussions with Rick Kimmig prior to leaving.
But O
4 I'm not sure exactly what type of briefing I got, or exactly 5
g what I knew when I left at this time.
n 3
6 Q
The notes that you gave us before when we interviewed R
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you, I have a copy here from your spiral notebook.
K 8
8 A
Yeah, I brought it with me.
dd 9
Q Did you take any of these notes before you left?
Eg 10 A
The only one that I would have taken before I left, E
5 II and I'm not sure when that was written down, is the initial 3
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one sentence, "Left King of Prussia 8:47 a.m."
I think that OEI was written in the car or ie miehe heve been written -- ie wes
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$j 15 to when we left.
d 30 When I started to write things that I had -- that as h
I7 I obtained at.the site in the control room.
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18 Q
Are these the only notes that you prepared on 3/28?
E 19 8
A Yes.
n 20 BY MR. MOSELEY:
2I Q
Again you don't specifically recall any discussion O
with George Smith on M rch 28th, before departing?
A
'I feel certain Ididn't talk to George Smith on
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M tch 28th because he's not my supervisor.
I would have had no occasion to.
That would have stuck out in my mind, had I l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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talked to him.
2 Q
Let's go to the trip in the car, and I interrupted 3
you and didn't let you finish what you wanted to -- what you 4
were telling me before.
Let's pick up'there and tell us wh'at 5
you discussed in the car.
8 6
e A
Okay.
Maybe if I just review this -- this is a --
n 8
7 7
which I gave to Roger, I believe, is a synopsis that I wrote N
for myself about a month -- when I came back some time the dd 9
month after the accident, and after I came back from my first go h
about 14 days or so at TMI, and so it's a little stale, but
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f" certainly a lot fresher than today.
This was on the trip to TMI.
It says, " Wednesday, left King of Prussia.8:45 in emergency vehicle with three
'E 14 health physicists, Plumlee, Nimitz and Neely; one investigator, w
2 15 Gallina; and myself from Ops; Baunak from Ops and Smith, wz
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Investigator, in their own car, left at about 9:00 a.m.
d 17 There was about a 15-minute delay for orders and cash for us wx 5
18
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let.ving.
We drove about 75 miles an hour on the Pennsylvania 19 l
Turnpike and arrived on site about 10:05 a.m.
Didn't see l
20 l
l police at all.
Used red flasher and siren intermittently.
21 Heard cryptic news reports on the way. "
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2 23l remember we got some reports from, I believe it was KYW, O
movbe e Herrieburg news steeien e1so, end eher were very 25 cryptic.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I remember things about some cooling water pump.
They 2
were saying that the plant had had problems with a cooling 3
water pump, and it had caused subsequent problems, and I think O
4 we found out later that they appeared to be talking about the S
5 trip,that the feedwater pumps had caused the reactor trip.
N 6
There was also some discussion about the police R
b 7
blockading the road in front of the site.
I remember that, M
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and I remember us discussing 50, 200 rem,.whatever it was on d
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the containment dome monitor in containment, and trying-to 2og 10 decide what that meant, what the significa.'ce of that was, 3m II and nobody -- we weren't really able to come to a conclusion, 3
y 12 and I guess our basic general state of knowledge in the car 3
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j 13 going up was that we had some idea that they had a problem m
I4 there, or a trip and some problems with their systems, but we n
g 15 weren't really sure what it was.
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I0 We had some conflicting information.
We had some W
sdetchy information from the region, and at this time I'm not x
M 18 really sure what that was.
It was sketchy information that we E
19 had, and we pretty much decided that the best thing to do was 20 to find out for ourselves when we got to the site and that was II
-- when we did get to the site, that was my first attempt, and 2
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these first couple of things I have in my notes are the first briefings that I got from the shift supervisor, and then an
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operator in the Unit 1 control room who had come from Unit 2.
25 Q
When you were discussing the containment dome ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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-monitor reading, you said that you discussed whether or not 2
the correction factor for shielding was there was some 3
discussion about this.
What else were the emphases of this 4
reading discussed?
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A Yes.
Yes, I'm sure we did.
I don't remember exactly E9 3
6 what the discussion was at this time, but_I know we discussed R
7 what could cause it and what would be, you know, really what El.
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reading, and if it was, what could have caused it; this type of z
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And I guess we at that point really again came to the 3
h 11 conclusion that we had to wait until we got to the site to get 3
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13 Q
Is it your recollection that you knew the dome a
m 14 monitor reading before you got into the car, or did you get g
15 this from somebody who was in the car?
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A I'm not sure.
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17 Q
well, even assuming that a correction factor should
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18 have been added, which would have made the reading higher, if E
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19 you assumed that the reading which was given was the shielded n
20 reading, what conclusions did you reach from that?
2I A
Well, it was very, very abnormally high.
22
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Q And you then concluded what about the status of the 23 plant?
24
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if there was a true reading, that there A
There was 25 was some problem there, serious problem; but again it was, as I l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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recall now, we just didn't have the information to find out what
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2 that was, or what was really going on until we got to the site and got some more details.
4 Q
Did you conclude that_there must be core damage based 5
g on this reading?
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A I believe we did not at that time.
I don't remember R
8 7
coming to a conclusion of core damage at that time.
3 k
0 Q
Maybe core damage is a bad word to use.
Some damage d
to the core which would be anywhere from perforation of the oH 10 g
clad to something worse.
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I A
I don't remember what our conclusions were on core B
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damage.
Fuel failures, whatever.
I don't really remember if I~\\_)' g 13 we discussed that in the car.
It doesn't stick out clearly in E
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my mind that we did discuss core damage or fuel failures, but we 2
15 w
may have.
m 16 E
Q okay.
Was there anything else that you can recall e
d 17 discussed during that discussion during the trip?
3z 18 A
I believe that and this was probably based on my
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knowing some of the information that John read off earlier, that 20 I discussed with the other people in the car who were primarily 21 health physicists some of the operational aspects of what had
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happened; that is, I believe I discussed something about the 23l systems, how the systems worked, but I don't remember exactly
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what I was describing and whether it was just in fact how 25l our pressurizer worked on the reactor coolant system and the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, uNC.
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secondary versus the primary and the feedwater, the reactor (D
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2 feed pumps, or -- excuse me now. I'm thinking Shoreham BWR, but 3
just whether I was explaining the feed pumps and the steam 4
generator and the primary or the -- or just what, I don't e
5 really recall what we discussed at this time.
h b
Q Do you recall anyone asking the question, "How bad R
b I
do you think it is"?
K]
8 A
No, but that certainly could have been asked.
That d
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wouldn't have surprised me if that conversation went on.
I 2og 10 don't really recall it, though.
3 II BY MR. C RAIG :
a g
12 Q
Before you got to the site and after you heard the 3
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13 news on the rsdio concerning the accident, how bad did you think I4 the accident was?
2 15 g
re.s hard to put myself back in my frame of mind at m
E I0 that time.
M Q
Did you think it was ongoing?
z II A
Probably the best thing to describe to give an answer i
I E
I9 the thing I can remember pretty clearly g
to that would be n
20 was my impression when I got to the site, when I first arrived, 2I and before I ever got to the control room, That is the physical 22 process of arriving at the gate going through the security which
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you normally do, getting onto the site was so much different than
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24
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it normally is.
That is, just to describe it quickly, when we 25 got to the site, the outer gate was chained shut.
The guards ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
19 I
were now at the outer gate, and that was chained shut.
It was your security control.
I Once you got through those at the outer gate, just 4
to get onto the island, the north gate, now, there was nothing.
5 g
You got into the site and there was no security on the island.
6 There were no people in at the inner control point -- well, there R
R 7
were a couple of people sort of milling around, but there was 7
nobody there to give you bags, nobody to give you a security d
6 9
badge or a film badge.
I never got a film badge from Met Ed j
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10 j
that first day.
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k There was just nothing going on onsite, and it was k
d 12 z
kind of spooky, and I can remember walking toward the Unit 1
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turbine building.
It was very quiet and we were talking E
14 g
through without our dosimeters or film badges, except for NRC, z
9 15 g
and two guys came walking past us in. respirators, and it was x
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16 3
kind of a spooky thing, and at that time, with the health 2
6 17 physics controls all gone, the security gone, I remembered that
,x 18 time thinking that it was -- in my mind -- that this was very
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serious, that there was something quite serious that was n
20 going on.
And it was kind of jarring me out of the mood I had 21 been in, in the car, which was we were going to respond to an 22
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incident which was very significant, because we had never done
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I certainly hadn't, and to my knowledge, S
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spur of the moment.
So just because it happened, it was I
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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20 1
fairly significant.
()
2 But once I got there and went through my initial 3
entry into the site, I was then sensitized even more that it
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4 was a lot more serious than I had thought going in the car.
e 5
g That's sort of a long answer to your question, but 3
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that maybe gives you a feel for how we felt.
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7 BY MR. STELLO:
n 8
8 a
Q Your perception of the seriousness was more by just dd 9
j generally what was going on at the site, and I think I got a og 10 z
picture of that in my mind.
I 11 j
Did you have any notion of the seriousness of the d
12 Z
accident based on the briefing you had either before you went O @S 13 or right after you got on the site?
E 14 W
A No.
2 15 g
Q What I'm trying to get you to do is give me an impres-T 16 g
sion of the seriousness based on --
G 17 w
A Facts.
18
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-- facts.
19 l
A No, I didn't.
The only fact 20 Q
Did you have an impression?
21 A
I did have an impression, but the facts didn't seem 22 O
to jibe with what I was seeing in terms of just general 23 impressions at the site, as compared to normal.
I.had been to 24 O
TMI -- I guess the time previous to that was about three or 25 four months before that, and then about eight months before ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
21 I
that, but I had been there enough times on three or four-day 2
inspections just to know what the normal pulse of the site was, 3
and that things were so much different in terms of the way 4
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people were acting and the way business was being conducted on 5
g the site, that it was appeared very serious.
9 h
0 From the facts that'I got which would have been in R
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the Unit 1 control room when ve first got there, I didn't get A2 8
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It d
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appeared --
Z C
g 10 Q
More or less serious?
What's this new impression 3_
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3 A
Well, the fact -- the fact that I guess appeared the
()
most serious was still this 50 or 200 rem reading in the containment dome monitor.
x h
BY MR. MOSELEY:
z h
Q Which by now had gone even higher; is that right?
e A
Just to look at what facts I had first was they z
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Okay?
That H"
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was the first thing, and that they felt they had that isolated 20 at this time.
21 Then I got a very brief description of the sequence,
()
that they had a problem with the polisher, the condensate, 23 l and then the booster in the feed pumps had tripped, and that i
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had resulted in a reactor trip, and SFAS, they call it, or 25 engineered safety features actuation system; that the auxiliary I
j ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
22 building was isolated.
()
2 So, based on that, it seemed fairly serious, but it 3
didn't quite seem -- I guess to jibe with my impression of the 4
way things looked on site, that it was a lot of those things had happened before, any one of them.
Certainly plants have 3
6 trips all the time,'and other plants have had some primary e
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7 7
or seccndary tube leaks and this type of thing, certainly n
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radiation reading and the fact that the people were all j
C6 10 j
evacuated from the site.
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And then I guess it was brought home even more, the d
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next thing that happened in Unit 1 was that all the people a:
13
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evacuated because of additional airborne problems in Unit 2.
z 2
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Now at that point I guess the facts started again x
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to bring themselves home, that it was fairly serious, and that i
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52 18
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then about a half hour getting respirators to get over -- just 20 i
to get over to Unit 2 because of the airborne radioactivity 21 problem.
e, 22
(
)
BY MR. STELLO:
23 '
Q You say the impression from the facts did not jibe
()
with the impression you got coming into the site.
Not jibe, does 25 l that mean that you had a less serious feeling of the accident ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
23 I
from the facts than the impression coming on site, or more 2
serious?
?
A Initially -- if I compare it to the facts that I had O
4 before I got on site, more serious, when I got on site.
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BY MR. FORTUNA:
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3 6
e Q
I think you said your initial impression was' it had R
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to be moderately serious because this was the first time in K'
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your memory that the region ever had a response that quickly?
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Yes.
3 E
10 0
Q So along with the reading in the dome, whether it be E
k II 50 or 200, it's something you had never experienced before?
3 12 i
A Right.
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I Q
That put you in the car with the general feeling of I4 significant; how much we'll find out when we get there?
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A Right.
And then when I got there and saw people had a
y 16 been evacuated from the site and saw what was going on onsite, M
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it stepped me up another notch and said, " F.o r e serious than I E
II thought initially."
E" 19 2
Q And you had a debriefing on the way in, and you saw 5
20 facts, you called them -- which each one, different factort 21 in and of themselves, if they had happened at any other sites,
()
was there a tone of reassurement that although this is 22 significant, it's under control, which brought you back down a f'A' little bit again, still serious, but on a lower level of m
25 1
seriousness?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
24 1
A I'd have to say I think probably that's true.
That's 2
probab1y where I was, yes.
3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
4 Q
Okay.
Let's sort of jump for a second.
e 5
When did you first hear of the concern for hydrogen?
5 h
6 f.2 A
Okay.
The first time I recall it was about some R
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II with Gary Miller as to the significance of that, and from there.
E 19 Q
Were you aware prior to that time of the containment 20 atmosphere having been campled for oxygen and hydrogen?
II A
No.
22 Q
You were not aware even that a sample had been taken; 23 '
is enat your recollection?
24 A
I don't 2ecall a sample being taken on Wednssday.
25f Thursday I was in tue control room for about half an hour, and I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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basically my briefing on Thursday, as I recall, was that things
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Wednesday night.
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as of the containment atmosphere, as I can recall now.
dY MR. STELLO:
0 Q
When is the first time you heard of containment gas G
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samples?
2 k
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Let me look in my notes.
I don't recall -- I can dd 9
recall them taking the containment air samples now, but I can't g
h 10 tie it down to time.
Perhaps on Friday.
It will be in my notes.
7
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Probably is.
E d
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Yes, I have a note here, 2:30, Friday afternoon, when S
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14 W
back into the co nta inme r;t, and they were trying to decide -- I 9
15 G
guess there was hydrogen gas waste decay tanks and they were z
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trying to decide how much there was in containment, I guess, d
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And I9ve got a reading, 1-1/2 percent wx 18 increase in hydrogen in containment of both waste gas decay g
N 19 g
tanks were dumped, and that some type of assumption that there 20 was mostly hydrogen in the waste gas decay tanks, I believe, 21 getting ready to run hydrogen recombiners.
r~g 22
(_j Q
Was it 1-1/2 percent increase in the gas decay tank?
23 A
No.
If the gas decay tanks were dumped into
()
containment and they were beth full of hydrogen, then that 25 would cause a 1-1/2 percent increase in the hydrogen in 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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26 1
containment.
2 BY MR. MOSELEY:
3 Q
From whatever it was?
4 A
Right.
A percent and a half increase.
They were doing 3
calculations at this time.
GPU was, I believe, to determine e
hj 6
the worst thing that could happen if they dumped them in.
R 7
Q Isethere an indication there of a sample of them at X
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that time, knowing what the concentration was?
d d
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Let me see.
10 (I aus e. )
Ej 11 No, I don't have anything. I don't see anything 3
p 12 specifically on sampling yet, and that's Friday.
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5 13 Q
As part of your stuff that you looked into, the l
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15 we talked --
5 g
16 A
Right.
M j
17 Q
did you hear any -- of any samples at that time, l
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19 what the hydrogen concentration was?
R 20 A
well, I do have a nota here, one of the other things 21 th 33 going on Friday morning was at that time people were 22 aware of the bubble in the primary and they were trying to do
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ALDERSON REPORTING cot 4PANY, INC.
27 1
noncondensible bubble in the primary was, and the note that I've
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2 got here and this would have been early Friday morning, it's 3
1300 to 1500 cubic foot bubble in the primary, other than the 4
pressurizer.
Noncondensibles, question mark, hydrogen.
Okay.
5 So -- and then it says at STP, the portion of the o
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3 E
11 Q
You're talking now about the primary coolant system?
3 y
12 A
I'm talking about the primary, right.
So certainly 5
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h 14 the PORV had vented quite a bit of time throughout the day a
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But I don't see anything on a P"
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R 20 g
Let me -- we were told by one of th e other inspectors 21 that at the time he heard of the hydrogen -- or he had a 22 conversation with one of the Met Ed people, and during that
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conversation this Met Ed person -- I think it was Seelinger --
24 told him that of three different containment hydrogen 25 '
concentration sample results, three different ones, and when ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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he went to pass that information on to our own people, he at O
2 that time that's the first he had heard -- I'm sorry, let me 3
back up.
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When he went to tell our own people, he was told, "Yes, e
5 we already know about that.
In fact, there's been some specula-0 tion that that was a hydrogen burn."
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indication that there were at least three samples being available, dd 9
so that's what I'm trying to see if you had any knowledge of
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Let me just look a little more carefully here in my k
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II I don't recall any at all on Wednesday, and then m
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Thursday night we had,the primary n
9_
15 coolant sample was taken Thursday night.
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16 (Witness examining document.)
e II I don't have anything in here on the sample.
m 18 Q
Do you -- there were some samples taken on Wednesday h
g in the morning.
Were you aware that those samples had been 0
taken and what they were on Wednesday?
A Of the containment atmosphere?
()
Q No, I'm sorry, this is primary coolant.
23 :
A No, I wasn't.
I remember hearing about those a couple 1
()
of days later, but Wednesday I was not aware of them.
25 (Pause.)
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
29 1
Q Jim, did you feel prior to leaving for the site at 2
Three Mile Island, did you feel that information had been -- or 3
was being withheld or not provided freely te you, information 4
that others may have had?
e 5
A No.
3"
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At the completion of your -- getting back to the site R
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The first one was by Greg Hitz, and then d
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shortly after that Bubba Marshall.
o 10 Q
We touched on this, but I wanted to get you to look at II it again.
it y
12 A
okay.
n 3
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What was your level of concern then?
m I4 A
If I could ask Roger to phrase it f r me again, g
15 Q
Was it about what it had been befora you arrived?
m h
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No, certainly not.
Certainly more serious than before us
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b 18 Q
When you -- we touched on this in our last one, but n
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g we'll go at it again.
When you were in the Unit 2 control room E
at about 1:50, 2:00 o' clock --
l 21 3
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Q Were you aware of any of the symptoms of the pressure 23 l spike?
I 24 '
3 30, 25 '
Q Knowing of the things that occurred and the alarms ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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that went off and the equipment had changed status, and what s
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I don't think that that was really the way things R
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other bustle of activities that went throughout the whole 2
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15 t
wasn't aware of containment pressure going up to 28 pounds M
Ib either on that afternoon.
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18 off that recorder certainly at different times during the E
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2I Q
You didn't overhear any conversations from anyone?
22
()
It's been described to us by some others that it was general 23 knowledge, not only in Unit 2,
but in unit 1 control room, that I")
24 there had been this activity.
You overheard none of this V
25 conversation?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
31 I
A No, that doesn't seem accurate, either, because as I 2
said before, I was involved with most of the general management 3
type discussions that went on that day in the shift supervisor's
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and the other supervisors that were there.
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as I remember now, that didn't come up.
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3 I
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when we had our discussion.
h Q
When were you aware of the extended scale hotleg n
d temperature reading, when they were taking hotleg temperatures?
d A
I don't recall exactly.
I believe that on Wednesday z
M 18 someone told me that they were getting some readings from the U
19 g
back panel off of their bridge device, I believe.
20 Q
S o m e o r.e told you that readings were being obtained 21 from there?
Were those readings available to you, provided to
()
you?
Did you overhear them?
23 '
A Let me take a look through my notes here and see what
()
I.have on hotleg temperatures.
It's been quite a while since 25 -
I thought about them.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I 32 1
11:30, I have 500 plus in the hotleg.
2 Q
You were in Unit 2 at that time?
At 11:30 you were; 3
right?
4 A
Probably, yes.
Yes, I was.
500 degrees plus in the e
5 hotleg.
h h
6 Then I've got a reading at 11:30 of reactor coolant R
R 7
outlet TH 620 degrees.
Xl 8
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high.
10 And these these would be the readings that I 3=q 11 either took myself off of the panel or got from an operator, it g
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13 or headquarters, whoever I was talking to at the time.
h 14 Q
You didn't take any readings off the bridge instrument uj 15 or the multi-point recorder which has a wider range, wider x
10 scale than the console readings?
j us N
II A
No, I didn't.
18 Q
You didn't either?
E 19 A
That's correct.
I know I did take some readings at 20 some time during the day off of the panel and I know I looked 2I at the temperature recorders, TH, TF, TC. All these I didn't take 22 myself.
Some of them I did get from the operators, but some of 23 them I did get -- and as the day progressed, I was able to locate 24 all the readings better and take more myself.
l 25 (witness examining document.)
l ALDERSON REPORYING COMPANY, INC.
- _ _ _ ~ _ _
33 I
Then 2:30, we have got temperacure dropping rapidly in 2
the hotlegs, and this was when they were charging in with safety 3
injection flow.
Bubble collapsed, but then regained.
2:40, 4
temperature increases again.
Hotlegs around 600 degrees.
5 g
collapsed at -- now we're at 2:45.
collapsed A loop bubble et j
6 again.
Temperature decreases from 620 to 544.
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7 Now I'm starting to get in -- and this must have been 2
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time between 2:45 and 3:10 which says originally about 700 degree 3
II bubbles in both loops, and in A loop, TH 540 and decreasing.
B St 12 loop, TH out of sight high around 700 degrees.
13 So that's got to be the time that I go t.that informa-I4 tion, and that would have been from an operator or shift super-h:
g 15 visor or somebody, because I didn't actually go back and look z
d I0 at the device they had or take readings of the device in the v5 I7 back panel.
E II Q
Then that would have been about 2-- what time did you P
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A Between 2:45 and 3:10, by my time ticks.
2I Q
That's, according to my understanding of what you read to me, that's the first time any reading is recorded above 620; 2
l 1s that right?
24 A
Yes.
D Q
And 620 is the max reading on the console instrument; ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
34 I
is that right?
()
2 A
On my notes, yes.
3 Q
You participated in some of the think tank meetings 4
prior to Miller having left.
In fact, if you arrived in Unit 5
- 2. control room about 11:00 o' clock, that was shortly before or 8
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around about the time they were beginning the depressurization R
schemer is that right?
E A
Before they did, yes.
d d
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Q And you participated then in some meetings during O
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S 6
12 Z
Q At that time what was the thrust of the discussion?
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concern?
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15 Q
A Okay, let me see if I can reconstruct that.
x
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16 3
(Witness examining document.)
e d,
17 Well, it's a little sketchy here, but I'll try and x
18 recall it as best I can.
I know I have testified on this before,
=
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and I haven' t reviewed my testimony, so I hope I don't contradict 20 myself.
21 As I recall, they were having -- they were up at
()
fairly high temperature and pressure and let's see, this is 23 1
about 11:30, I've got a note saying control in the primary
()
pressure at about 2000 pounds, and they were doing that by 25 !
opening the block valve for the PORV.
I've got open three i
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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35 1
minutes every five to eight minutes.
So they were cycling it O
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2 quite a bit.
3 Pressurizer level at this time was greater than 400 4
inches.
It was fully solid pressurizer.
Temperature was 350 e
5 degrees.
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6 only natural circulation flow.
And they had some, th ey i:though t,
R d
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8 Had the high TH and the low TC recorded.
I have 622, 2:10, for dd 9
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j 12 would be stuck with a leak there that they weren't able to stop, (w) h 13 i
g and they didn't want that to happen.
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14 The other thought was that if they could depressurize, a
2 15 they could get to a normal -- towards a normal shutdown cooling g
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That is get on decay heat removal and try to somehow l
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18 They were in a situation where the plant was really h"
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They wanted to restore the bubble to the
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36 1
on the relationshipibetween lowering pressure and drawing a 2
bubble in the pressurizer.
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also.
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removal system, and also there was a discussion about core R
8 7
coverage and the added benefit, as they reduced pressure, that 3
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10 Q
Do you believe at that time they thought the core d
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18 A
No, as a matter of fact, there were discussions on tha'.
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19 periodically throughout the day as to "does anybody think that 20 the core is not receiving adequate cooling or adequate coverage,"
21 and the consensus was it is.
II
()
Q Based on?
23 A
I don't know if I could give you specific parameters,
24
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but just based on -- I guess it was more of a -- after each 25 l of the individual problems would be discussed, and then Gary l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Miller -- they would mr.y out a particular strategy and say this
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direction as far as providing protection for the core.
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A N
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Q How many of these meetings did you participate in or R
7 sit in on before Gary Miller _left?
K l
8 A
I.tcan't give you a number.
d d
9 Q
was it one or two or five or six or just what's your g
10 impression?
E=g 11 A
You're saying now the early morning?
5 7:00 y
12 Q
You were there until about 11:00 o' clock; right?
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13 A
Right.
m h
14 Q
So I'm asking from your --
a w
2 15 A
From 11:00 until the afternoon when he left.
j 16 Q
Yeah.
W 6
17 A
Whenever that was.
M 18 g
Yeah.
1
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19 A
A few to several.
I really don't know.
R 20 Q
Is that more than five?
2I A
No, I don't think so, no.
22 Q
You think it's less than five?
I'm not trying to put
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24 A
I understand, but I really can't give you a number.
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25 Q
And according to your notes, a temperature above l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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38 I
i 620 degrees was not -- you were not aware of until somewhere (Z) 2 around 2:45 to 3:00 o' clock?
3 A
Right.
4 Q
And so this temperature, the actual temperature in the e
5 hotleg, was not discussed in either of the ueetings that you j
6 attended prior to'that time?
E b
7 A
I can't say that for sure.
It migh e have been discussecl, N
k I
but I didn't write it down.
I certainly didn't write down d
q 9
everything that I heats.
I wish now that I had written down more.
2o g
10 but I guess it was a combination of trying to get the informa-2 4
II tion and participate as much as I can and pass what information I 12 could back over the phones.
And yet it seemed like I never did I
have enough time to write down what I wanted to, and that's m
E 14 most of what's here is very sketchy, and I really don't have gz h
much in terms of say a good synopsis of such and such a meeting, m
d 0
or even we sat down and caucused at this time, and this was a e
synopsis of that meeting, because it was more as soon as that z
18 was done, I was trying to get back on the phone and pass back
=
g to whoever I was talking to at either the region or Washington, 20 and that shifted several times during the day, what the overall 21 game plan was at the site.
And that's what I felt was the most
()
important thing is for me to understand what was going on, 23 where they were heading, as far as the big picture, pass that j
()
type of information and get the parameters also and pass that.
25 And then maybe third down on my list would be to arswer the j
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
39 I
various miscellaneous questions that I was getting back.
I 2
Q When did you have the first perception of superheat or 3
perception that the temperatures that were prevailing were 4
higher than saturation or the pressure?
5 A
After the -- my first recollection of the fact that 6
they were saturated -- not going to superheat yet, but saturated - -
R b
7 was when they tried to depressurize and then got stopped and X
h they couldn't get down below a certain temperature and pressure.
d k
I They were certainly -- and that was because they were at zog 10 saturation conditions when they were low on pressure there.
3=
Supersaturated, superheated.
I'm not -- I don' t believe that I 3
was really aware of that on Wednesday at all.
()
Q Even if the term didn't occur to you, did the mis-E 14 w
match of conditions occur to you as overheating indication?
2 15 A
As I can place it now, no.
And I guess one of the wm 3-16 things that I some time during the afternoon I remember W
6 17 l
trying to do, was to sit down for a minute and try to piece gz 18 th ?.t together.
There were a lot of temperature s and a.let of
=
U 19 g
pressures and just going through and looking at the various 20 primary temperatures that I've got.
I've got them 700, 620, 21 pegged high.
Then we've got them going up and down on the
()
Lotleg down to 520, and down even lower, and then back up again, 23 l and the -- I remember wanting to piece that together some time
()
in the afternoon, and I remember asking somebody for a set of 25 !
steam tables so I could maybe take a couple of minutes myself ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
40 I
and do that.
I couldn't get a set.
I didn't have a set with me,
\\-
2 and -- I didn' t press the issue.
It was sort of in passing.
I 3
thought a minute or two here I'm going to see if I can sort this O
4 out.
There was none readily available at that tite in the e
5 shift supervisor's office or the control room, ane then I left 5
6 it and something else came up and I went on from there and R
b I
didn't ever sit down and do that.
N T.3 k
0 Q
During the time period after you arrived, did you d
c; 9
observe anyone referring to isometic darawings, looking at 20 10 elevations?
s E
II A
No.
Of the reactor building?
3 12 Q
No, of the reactor coolant system.
() a 13 A
I don't recall that.
I can't say that I didn' t see m
I4 tha t.
I don't feel comfortable saying no, that definitely m
g 15 didn't happens but I don't recall that at this time.
m j
6 Q
So you yourself never reached a conclusion on March w
l 28th that superheat conditions existed?
l z
l M
18 i
A That's, to the best of my recollection, true.
h 19 F
Q Did you have questions of your own about whether the n
0 core was covered?
You s aid :that they discussed it amongst I
themselves.
Did it occur to you that it was not covered?
l l ()
A Based on my participation in the discussions and the facts that I had, I didn't have reason to suspect that it wasn't,
()
so I --
Q That it was not?
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
41 1
A Right.
I didn't have any reason to suspect that it
()
2 wasn't.
As it turns out now, the information was there that I 3
could have drawn that conclusion, but I didn't at that time.
4 Q
Why do you suppose you didn't?
5 A
well, a combination of a lot of things, and I've 6
thought about that since that time.
I think probably, number R
7 one, I wasn' t really familiar enough with their systems,othat X
k 8
is specific to TMI, what the temperature was that they normally d
q 9
ran at in the reactor coolant system.
I knew approximately 500, zog 10 600, something in there, but I didn't really know precisely what E=
II their normal temperature was.
I didn't know precisely what 3
g 12 their normal pressure was, and the same thing for the pressurizer, 5
(]) y 13 what the normal pressurizer temperature was corresponding to m
h I4 whatever pressure they were at.
I wasn't really that familiar n
g 15 with the details of their system in terms of where they could i
1 E
I6 monitor, what particular tempcratures and availability of the d
II di.fferent numbers and so on, like the extended range and this z
{
18 type of thing.
E 19 So but even hearing that, knowing that hearing that 20 number, knowing it was offscale, knowing where to get the other 21 ones and to put it together quickly, not having yet the 22
' (}
availability and that knowledge at that time; and then on top of 23l it with so much else going on that I was trying to track and i
24
()
follow, didn't really have the time or take the time that I 25 '
should have taken to sit back and try and piece it all together.
i l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i L
42 I
Because it was a very hectic afternoon in terms of trying to get O
2 the information, trying to piece together what was going on,-
3 and pass that information on and tying that all in together O
4 with, as I said, my own to some extent unfamiliarity with the e
5 details of the plant.
5 0
I tended to probably more lean on their conclusions R
b 7
rather than drawing my own.
X k
I Q
Do you think that the fact that your notes don't indicate d
ci 9
that you were aware of temperatures in the 7-800 degree range Z
10 until 2:45 or 3:00 o' clock, do you think that Met Ed was with-E II holding that information from you?
II A
I didn't get the impression at all on Wednesday that I
a 13 people were withholding information from me.
It was more the m
I4 case that there was so much information to get and people were a
l g
15 so busy arid there were was so much going on that it was a struggle.
x d
I0 for me to physically get as much as1.I.could from as many people r4 II as I could, without impacting on them.
x 5
18 As I think I have discussed before, I had different E
II g
types of information that I had to get.
I had to get detailed 0
information on parameters, I had to get -- assimilate system i
I information to learn just what systems, what components they had, and I also had to try and get the management philosophy direction as to what was going on and why they were going the direction they were going.
And in getting those different types of 25 information, I got it from a lot of different people, different ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
43 I
types of people, frcm operators, myself, the panels and Gary 2
Miller, and it was difficult to -- a lot of the management people 3
and the operators -- at other times I didn't want to impact too m
4 severely on their time, because I could sense that they were 5
g serving an important function at particular times, and I didn't e'
3 6
want to -- for needless questions that I could get from somebody R
7 else or get -- I didn't want to impact on their time which X
k 8
might worsen the situation in the primary by pulling Gary Miller d
ci 9
and saying, " Talk to me, the NRC, right now and explain to me Z
IO how many reactor coolant pumps you have and where your temperatures h
II are," this type of thing, when he really had an important functiori it l
II that he was serving right at that time.
So I tried to get it 1
13 as best.as I could throughout the afternoon, while still letting a
h I4 them perform their job, because they were actively working with l
m l
g 15 the accident.
m ii[
I6 So I don't feel that they were withholding it from me as II at all.
It was a case of a very difficult situation and trying m:
lii 18 to get all of the information that I could and to know what i~"
19 information to get, and for them to give me what they thought was g
E important.
Okay?
21 I guess the types of information that I -- probably 22 that I thought were the most important, the most important 23 were what were discussed at the management meetings, and I 24 didn't really detect any effort on their part to hold back on D
those meetings.
But that type of thing, a discussion of the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
44 1
superheat or the temperatures really never came up as a crucial 2
point at those meetings, and then I didn't recognize myself that 3
it was as significant as it was and go out and search out the 4
information and assess it and get it passed back either.
e 5
Does that answer your question to some extent?
I h
h 0
guess I'm rambling a little bit, but I'm trying to recall it R
b 7
as best I can.
K j
8 Q
Okay.
d ci 9
BY MR. STELLO:
z 10 g
r.ve got a number of questions I want to go through.
Ez II You're not through yourself yet, Norman.
y 12 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, I thought maybe we ought to take 13 at least a couple of minutes, break, m
I4 MR. STELLO:
That's what I was going to suggest.
I g
15 thought before we did that, we could find out, do you have an z
af I0 airplane schedule you've got to meet?
d II THE WITNESS:
I've got a 7:30 flight, but if I don't m
II make it, I don't make it.
E II MR. CRAIG:
That means you've got about 45 minutes g
left.
II MR. STELLO:
Why don't we take a break and we'll see 22 which way the chips fall.
That's right at the peak of traffic.
23 !
7.d like to finish rather than have to do this again.
So why 24 don't we take a break and see if we can't feel a little more 25 comfortable.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i l
45 1
(Recess.)
O 2
R.
oSeteY:
tet s ee eack en the rece=e and, vie. I 3
would defer to you for questioning.
4 BY MR. STeLLO:
4 Q
Okay.
There's a couple of areas I want to get back to.
e 5
h 6
I want to make sure that I've got some facts straight in my a
7 mind before we do.
X l
8 You said that the first time you heas:d of hydrogen dd 9
was about 8:00 a.m.
Friday?
,2 h
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
And do you recall who it was that told you about hydroga.n is 12 for the first time?
O !
'3
^
e e c=17, e== wiewi de==
- te ae==
ece te a
h I4 from the people who were doing calculations on the bubble in the a
g 15 primary and from the people that were doing the accident sequence a:
- [
16 of events reconstruction and the pressure recorder.
So I got al i
N I7 it from two sources really within the same timeframe.
l h
IO Q
And about when did you report in to work that E
l 19 morning?
20 A
Shortly before 8:00.
And I got all of this in my 21 turnover from the mid-shift, you might call it.
22 Q
Who turned it over to you?
U A
Well, now, see, the way we were doing the turnovers 24 there, we really weren't able to get it all from one person.
25 ;
sill Raymond was the inspector who had it previously, but I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I 46 1
don't believe I got it directly from Bill.
I may have gotten
()
2 some of it from Bill, I may have gotten the information about 3
the primary bubble from Bill Raymond; that is the calculations
_)
4 that were being done on the noncondensible bubbles, and the e
5 fact that some of it was hydrogen.
I may have gotten that from 2
N h
6 him, but I also know that I talked to the GPU people that were R
7 doing the special tests to determine that, and then also people 3
j l
8 that were doing the reconstruction.
I don't know whether at this d
q 9
time those were GPU or B&W people.
2 10 Q
The test you referred te was to measure the amount E=
II of noncondensibles in the primary system?
3 y
12 A
yes.
5
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13 Q
Now at that time were you aware of whether or not that h
14 was reported to the region or to headquarters?
m g
15 A
I believe it was.
I believe it was.
3 d
16 Q
Did you report it?
d d
17 A
I
.dn't report it as this is the first time, I don't 18 th&nk this has ever been reported, but it was an ongoing discus-E 19 sion about that test over the phone.
20 Q
So you did mention it shortly after you learned of it.
2I either to the region or to headquarters or both?
22
{}
A Yes.
23 Q
You do not know if the shift before you reported it?
24 A
The hydrogen nowy you're talking about, or the tes?
25 l Q
Both.
a l
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
47 1
A I don't know for sure.
I believe my belief is that O
2 the shift before kne. aboue ane hae communicatee about the test, 3
too.
4 Q
Okay.
That would be Raymond and who else?
e 5
A I think it was just Raymond at that time, by himself.
]
6 Q
Raymond alone?
R 7
A I think so.
Xl 0
Q Was on that shift?
dd 9
A I think so.
g 10 Q
No other NRC people that you are awa.re of?
E 11 A
I don't remember at this time.
it f
12 Q
Aware of, or not remember, the same thing to me.
13 A
Right.
m h
I4 Q
Raymond, you remember.
Others there could have been, u
g 15 but you don't remember?
a:
- [
16 A
Right.
as 6
17 Q
If it was reported, then it would be Raymond whom we h
IO should look to, to have it reported?
E 19 A
Right.
20 BY MR. CRAIG:
21 Q
Do you remember who you talked to on the phone?
22 A
No, the people on the phone changed too frequently to 23 tie it in.
And the hydrogen -- the pressure spike and the bubb] e, M
I believe, at that time, that that hadn't been reported at that 25 l
time. I thought it hadn't been reported when I reported it in.
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
48 1
After the fact now, I'm of the impression that it was probably 2
reported -- I've been told it was reported by E.
B.
McCabe, perhaps 3
around the same time or maybe a little bit earlier.
4 BY MR. STELLO:
e 5
Q E.
B.
McCabe?
5 h
6 A
Right.
But when I reported it shortly after my turnover R
7 Friday morning, I thought that was new information.
X 8
Q All right.
Whers you reported it, you thought it was ti d
9 new?
g 10 A
Yes.
2=
a cc II Q
And you think McCabe.hes-a f te r-the-f act knowledge?
1 it j
12 A
Right.
3 Q j 13 Q
on the issue of hydrogen, there is a passage in your a
I4 testimony on May 10th before the Subcommittee on Energy and a
r 15 the Environment, it's a passage that just stands out.
I don't a
d 10 understand it, and maybe it would be easiest if you read it.
al b^
17 And what I'm interested in is on a line I have marked with a IO pencil or a pen that has a passage on the hydrogen, nothing else.
E 19 A
okay.
20 MR. CRAIG:
That's page 97.
2I (W it ne s s examining document.)
22 '
THE WITNESS:
I'11 start >atLthe top of the page, I D
guess, and just read down.
BY MR. STELLO:
25l Q
Anywhere you wish.
It l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
49 1
A (Witness examining document.)
2 I'm on my way towards your question.
Just a moment.
3 (Witness examining document.)
4 If you go back a couple of pages, I think what e
5 happened here was Mr. Weaver was asking about who was in the 5
6 control room.
He says were they told about the pressure spike.
R 7
You were there Wednesday morning -- and I'm jumping, these are X
k I
some of his questions.
d
- s 9
The pressure spike occurred at 1:58 Wednesday.
Gallina 2
h 10 says that was discovered in retrospect on Friday afternoon.
3=
II Mr. Weaver:
But we had NRC people in that control room.
it j
12 Mr. Higgins, you were in that control room.
I say yes, I was.
5 5
13 He says what happened.
And I go on.
And as I recall, he was a
l I4 trying to -- and through the nex t page and a half or so, I was u
g 15 reconstructing for him the situation as to what was going on a
3[
I0 in the control room that afternoon, and why that spike might W
II have been there.
And it might have been a thud and it might z
IO have been on the recorder, and why I never saw it, because he was iE 19 asking that.
E Q
Okay.
Later in the transcript at about page 93 or 99, 21 I think you are talking about the pressure spike.
Did you --
Ul 1
were you using the words "on the hydrogen" co mean pressure 23 !
spike?
24 A
Yes.
Q Why?
l l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
4
50 I
A Well, they were correlated this time.
2 Q
okay.
So it was after-the-fact knowledge?
3 A
Right.
0 4
Q It wasn't an understanding of a hydrogen burn or 5
explosion or anything on the 28th, but after-the-fact correlation 6
o f' hydrogen and the spike was made, and you were making it in R
b 7
the record?
W k
0 A
Right.
d I
2.
Q On the basis of after-the-fact knowledge?
10 A
Right.
E k
II Q
Now let me go on -- we are talking about -- well, you 3
I have that in front of you, and you might want to refer to it.
(
I I don't know if it's necessary.
E 14 w
Taking you back to the afternoon when the spike did h
occur, there are a number of people who have suggested that z
d it was common knowledge that not necessarily 28 psi was W
observed in the containment, but that something unusual happened.
z b
18 The containment sprays went on, you had another ECC signal E
19 g
coincident, because when the spike goes up, it goes through 20 4 psi which activates ECC up to reactivate containment sprays.
21 So there would have been quite a few alarns going on and equip-()
ment changing status.
23 Were you not aware that those things were happening?
()
A There were as I place myself back there that 25 '
afternoon, there was a whole continuum of those types of things ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
51 I
happening throughout the afternoon, and something a little 2
before 2:00 doesn't stand out as any different as any of the 3
other ones.
4 There was continuing alarms all through the afternoon.
5 j
There was a lot of hustle and bustle everywhere, and with the 6
characterization that I'm hearing now and that I've heard 9
7 before about this, that there was all of a sudden this event N
l 8
and the hustle-bustle, alarms associated with it.
That doesn't d
stand out to me in my mind as the way things happened that o
h 10 afternoon at that particular time.
ii!
l II Q
You don't see the sequence of events and new ECC l
g 12 signals - I think this may have been -- somebody help me -- I 13 think a third --
l 14 MR. MOSELEY:
A third.
$i g
15 BY MR. STELLO:
x I0 Q
And the first time the containment sprays went on h
II as being something that should have stood out.
It kind of z
II blended in.
Is that the picture you want me to come away with?
E g
A Yep.
As I recall it.
Now what I'm saying is I O
don't see -- I don't recali any big shift in the number of l
n3 alarms and hustle and bustle at any particular time.
There
~
2 O
were co eiautas e1er enrouv out eue etteraooa, eaa the a
3 boards were lit up with alarms all over them, electric plant, O
the radiation detectors, the secondary plant, the primary plant, they all had alarms on them, and coming in and out, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
52 I
both end and alarming.
And they were for different -- for 2
different reasons.
3 Now I can see where the operators, knowing the 4
plant well, knowing what alarms -- which alarms were of more e
5 significance than others and being at the panel, and this going h
h, 6
on, where that would be to the group of operators at the p r el G
7 particularly significant in terms of another event.
But to K]
8 someone else who was -- I don't know where I was.
I may have d
ci 9
been in the shift supervisor's office, and it didn't stand
$l 10 out to me, and it never did come up'in any of these discussions E*
II with the caucusing, with the shift supervisors, or with the eS l
12 plant, the site superintendent, with Gary Miller.
It never O !
is rea111 etoed out in term or somethine thee came og to m
14 management's attention for discussion.
15 Q
You mean the think tank meetings?
a:
si I0 A
Yes, or the other discussions that I had with the es h
17 shift supervisors that I had - I didn't participate just in 18 the think tank discussions.
I also had discussions with the 12 II g
other level supervisors that were there, like George Kunder 20 and Mike Ross and some of the shift supervisors, and it didn't 21 come out in any of my discussions with them, either.
22 Ih So, for whatever reason, I just never became aware of 23l that, and it seems to me to be a mischaracterization to say O
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,,,,,,,, 1
,,,,,,, s,,1e 24 25 and bustle and commotion and alarms, because there was a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
53 I
tremendous amount of that in various incidents of things O
2 going in the systems that were happening throughout the day.
3 Just -- and I can think of -- I can think of one that stands O
4 out in my mind.
When they lost power.
And they f.ast one of 5
j their buses, and I'm not sure which one.
I wasn't -- didn't 9
3 0
even know then, let alone new, and they lost -- got some R
7 alarms from that, and they lost some other alarms from it.
I Xl 8
remember one time they-lost all of their -- their whole dd I
radiation monitoring panel.
.z 10 Q
That was at 1:30?
Z.i 2-II A
Completely lit up and then went off.
m g
12 Q
That was at about exactly the same time when they l
13 n
lost the bus and the spike occurred.
l 14 A
They both occurred at 1:50.
1 g
15 Q
Yes.
Some people correlate it to the fact that z
ij 16 that bus was lost and suggest that the spike may have been w
h I7 caused by it, spuriously.
That was about the same time.
z f
18 A
Okay.
I remember the alarms going off.
I remember II g
that.
I remember the fact that they did lose -.somebody saying 20
. hat.they lost the bus and they lost all the radiation monitoring l
c 21 panel, but I don't remember -- there was no discussion about O
venine e1se essociaeea with ta e, in terms of cone inmene 22 l
23 spray.
O 24 si,c,y,,,_,,,,,,,, c,,y,,
,1x,,,,,y,,,,,,
"l when the bus was lost?
Were you out in the control room at l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
o 54 I
the time?
2 A
I don't really remember for sure where I was when 3
it happened.
I do remember --
4 Q
Did you see it happening or did you hear about it e
5 happening?
El 6
A I don't remember how long the bus was off, and I E
7 remember looking at one time at the panel with the lights off, X
g 8
say from -- so I don't -- and I really couldn't say where I -
d ci 9
if I saw it happen or not.
z 10 I do remember that -- I remember the discussion about
!!!=
4 II it, because I remember people te111ng me that they lost the is y
12 bus and some time after they got it back and it came back on.
5 O
s i3 I do remember from some g1ece saving thee the 11ehes in fece m
I4 were off on the radiation monitoring panel.
But you can see g
15 those from the back of the control room, or the front, so I'm z
i[
I0 not sure where I was.
And that's the first time I ever hearli a6 h
I7 those two correlated.
I wasn't aware of that.
x 18 Q
If there were a general discussion about the spike, I9 g
would you be fairly confident you would have heard it or over-n 20 heard it?
21 A
Not necessarily, because there were quite a few O
supervisors in the control room, and there were quite a few 23 discussions going on, even at the same time, among operators 24 and shift supervisors and among the -- say Gary Miller with 25 other people, operations superintendent, this type of people.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
55 I
So I certainly wasn't privy to every discussion that 2
they had with managers and operators or shift supervisors 3
and shift supervisors and their managers.
4 Q
So they could have had a discussion or even Gary 5
3 Miller could have had a discussion and you might not have heard a
0 it?
R R
7 A
Sure.
Because he was having discussions out in n
k the control room, as I was, with different people in different d
ci 9
g areas, and he was doing the same thing.
There was a lot of oH 10 j
that going on all throughout the day; that is operators and
=
fII shift supervisors working on a particular problem, B&W people d
12 z
working with George Kunder, Mike Ross and Gary Miller, discussing a
with them, and there were all kinds of differing management E
14 y
levels involved, all kinds of different structures involved.
x 2
15 There wasn't really a clear-cut organized chain of wa 16 l g
command.
It was realized that Gary Miller was overall in d
17' charge, and it was realized what the people's normal positions a=
18 were, but how they were fitting in what they were doing that
=
19 l
particular day was very loosely organized.
20 Q
Let me see if you can help me understand.
21 A
That was my impression.
O o
Gery Mi11er, I he11 eve, indiceted he was out in the control room at about the time this occurred.
O A
oker.
25 Q
Can you recall whether you have a notion that he was ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
56 I
busily preparing himself to leave for the lieutenant governor's O
2 office?
Or was he active in knowing what was going on in the 3
plant at that time?
Was there enough discussion to let you O
4 know either way?
5 A
I wasn't even aware at the time that he was going 0
to the lieutenant governor's office.
I didn't even find that 7
out until afterwards.
Xl 8
Q Till after he left?
c.5 A
I'm not sure when I found out, but I know it wasn't o
h 10 before he was going, and it may have been even until after he
=l II 4
had come back.
is g
12 Q
The think tank meetings, as you look back on them, o
13 did you have the feeling that there was any attempt to trying E
14 to analyze and understand what had happened and where they w
g 15 ought to go and why?
Or were they kind of -- characterize e
f 16 the meeting, is what I'm trying to get you to do for me.
ed h
I7 A
There wasn't too much of "where have we been and a:
!E 18 how have we got where we are."
It was more'of "here we are,
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Based on 20 system parameters that they were in, maybe based on a few of 21 the things that they had tried before that hadn't worked, but 22 O
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23
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because of that, this is where we are now, and this is what 24 O
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
4 57 1
I 1
Q Trying to understand maybe a little bit more of it, 2
let's go back and look at some of the things that happened.
3 You have already talked about hotleg temperatures pegged hot.
O 4
would noe a logical aiscussion be what ao we have l
e 5
to do to stop them from being pegged hot?
6 A
I don't remember that particular discussion.
I do l
7 remember them discussing hotleg temperatures were high, cold-X j
8 leg temperatures were low.
On account of that, they didn't d
9 feel that they had much flow, natural circulation flow, through i
g 10 the primary loop.
It appeared to have stagnated to some t
z ll extent.
in g
12 Q
Stop for a moment.
Natural circulation appears to Q
13 be stagnated was the general feeling?
h I4 A
Yes, there was -- they thought there was perhaps 15 how much they didn't really know, but probably not too some; j
16 much.
That's my recollection on that.
as Q
Does "not too much" mean not enough?
h IO A
I'm noc sure that there was a good understanding of E
19 how much was really needed, or how much would be enough.
20 Q
You used the words "not too much."
I'm trying to --
21 l
A well, they were getting very little, and I guess 22 Q
that's based on a couple of things.
The fact of the big 23 l temperature difference.
It was based to -- when they were 24 steaming the steam generators at the atmospheric relief 25 !
valve, that they were getting from their instrumentation --
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
58 I
and it wasn't really designed for operating at that low range,
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2 that is their pressure instruments on the steam generator.
3 They were getting very little indication of any steam out of
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4 the steam generator.
So they appeared to be getting very little 5
j heat transfer from primary to secondary, and that was another 8
6 thing that was tying it in, that they weren't getting much flow.
e N
R 7
Q Okay.
Very little, then, means not enough?
n k
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Again I don't think that there was a very clear dd 9
j determination in their mind of how much they needed.
They O
10 j
would have liked to have had more.
Okay?
Maybe we could say 5
l' it that way.
They would certainly have liked to have had more, d
12 E
and they were trying to do -- I know they tried earlier to S
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That didn't w6rk.
s E
14 W
Q That was in the morning?
9 15 E
A Right.
x
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Q Earlier?
d 17 A
- Right, wm 18
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Q So they didn't have the pumps on, natural circulation 19 l
-- would it be fair to say there were significant questions 20 raised as towhether they were getting natural circulation?
21 A
Right.
Yes.
()
Q Okay.
They were popping the relief valve about 23 I
three minutes out of every five to eight minutes at some 24 O
point in t he process?
25 A
Some time around 11:30 or 12:00, yeah.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1
59 1
Q At another point in the process they had talked O
2 about depressurizing the system.
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
There was some point in the process where they g
tried to talk about whether they were having a feed-and-bleed 5
e' 3
6 operation?
R R
7 A
Yes.
Xl 8
Q Were those words used, " feed and bleed"?
d ci 9
A I don't recall the words, but that's certainly what
!g 10 they were doing, in terms of -
E 11 Q
You mean they were adding water and they were it g
12 letting water go out via the relief valve.
Is that what you
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14 A
Letting it out the relief valve and the letdown, g
15 and then there was a concern on the amount of letdown flow z
j 16 they had.
There was some question about blockages in the as
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l 18 which they didn't appear to be able to get, and they weren't i:
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Their instrumentation 19 really sure how much they were getting.
l wasn't readi.ng out too well there, and that was an ongoing 20 21 problem, too, the amount of letdown.
22 Q
Let me just review what you just said.
They weren't 23 sure about natural circulation; did not have the pumps on; 24 they had tried at various times depressurization, repressuriza-25 '
tion; tried combinations of letting down, adding some flow, t
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
60 I
letting some flow out the valves?
2 A
And one other significant operation was trying to 3
recover the bubble in the pressurizer, which they went through 4
and spent a lot of time going throughout the afternoon.
5 y
Q That would be after 2:30 or so?
a 6
A Yes.
^n b
7 Q
I want to get it up to 2:30 is all I'm talking about.
M]
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d 9
Would it not be fair, then, to say that they were c.F 10 g
not sure they were getting adequate cooling at tnat time?
~=
II A
That would be fair to say.
is Q
Did we have --- did you have that view?
O l
'8 A
I don't rece11 ehem hevine thee view, or my hevine E
14 that view.
You could make that conclusion -- you should have gz h
15 been able to make that conclusion based on the facts, but I z
16 don't recall that anybody put the facts together and came up h
I7 with that conclusion.
x h
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What conclusion did they come up with, then, or what h
19 g
conclusion did they come up with and what conclusion did you 20 come up with, if they're different?
21 A
In terms of core cooling.
22 Q
Q Adequate core cooling?
T.4 3:
(Pause.)
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after 2:30, necessary for adequate core cooling.
O 2
(Examining document.)
3 Okay.
That -- the only really quantitative O
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in terms of what have we got, what are we doing to provide e
3 6
adequate core cooling, and are we getting that, was not until e
e.
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4:30, and that's when a-report -- calculations came in.
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Q I'm not ready to get to 4:30.
I'm ready to take d
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a snapshot up to about 1:30 is where I'm really interested in j
h 10 at the moment.
z
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Before that, I don't think that it was really 6
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g-13 we got, what ways do we have of getting core cooling, what are E
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we doing with each of those ways, are any of them really z
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15 working, and where do we go from here."
It was more in terms mx T
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of, I think, people were -- weren't quantitatively concerned i
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18 just assuming that they were getting it, because -- and
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19 again, because it wasn't logically laid out, I guess I can't say we have -- that they or I said we have it, because bam, bam, 21 bam, because that wasn't really sorted out and stated.
O z,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,,,,,,,,,,,,,
22 23 we may have some natural circulation; we are providing some i
feeding and bleeding; we are earlier providing some -- well, 25 that would be some atmospheric relief from the steam generators,'
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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but that would have been in conjunction with the natural 2
circulation.
l 3
They were trying at different times throughout the 10 4
morning to go different routes to provide increased capability e
5 to get their core cool.
h 6
Q Why do you think that was?
l R
b 7
A The reason I think it_was because, as I understood Xl 8
it, that the plant was in an abnormal situation, the reactor d
I coolant pumps were off.
They weren't --- they had a full 10 pressurizer and they were trying more in terms of systems iE l
II and knowing what the normal shutdown operation of the plant l
f 12 was, to restore those systems to a normal status, that is 13 reactor coolant pumps running and steaming the secondary and l
14 the pressurizer with the bubble in it, or getting onto decay 15 heat removal system to get the systems to a normal shutdown z
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I7 a reactor plant here, and I've got to provide a certain amount x
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I have a certain amount of decay heat that I E
have to remove and I have certain methods that I can do i' l
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and are any of the methods that I am using in doing it 21 properly?"
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63 I
system should be in a shutdown situation, I know what they 2
normally are, I don't have that. How can I get it," and working 3
towards it in different ways to restore that, rather than O
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g "What have I really got here?
What should I really be trying n
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to do?"
3 6
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I appreciate that, but is it fair to conclude that Q
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is because what they had, they didn't know?
h 10 A
Certainly true.
And they didn't know what they had.
E Q
II The plant was in a very abnormal situation, and they felt very is j
12 uncomfortable with the situation they were in.
5 O
s is a
shco1d they have, in your oginion -- end I don't a
l 14 want you to base this on after-the-fact knowledge -- as best h
15 as you can, based on what they knew then, have recognized that x
ij 16 there were serious questions as to whether they were getting v5 h
17 adequate cooling?
Up till 1:30, I'm talking about.
Let's not z
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E 19 A
I understand what you're asking.
I just have so 20 much after-the-fact knowledge now that it's hard to divorce 21 myself.
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24 They certainly should have realized the situation A
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they were in and should have had some serious questions.
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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agree with that.
O 2
Q
.That's after the tact.
3 A
And I should have, too.
4 Q
Okay, that's after the fact.
Fine.
Now how about 3
based on where you were on the 2Sth?
a 3
6 i
I'm not being fair, Let me try it a different way.
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measures needed to be taken or to be prepared to take them, O
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do you feel that they should have suggested to the state at
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that point, which is where Gary Miller has now gone at 1:30, ri 12 E
that the.more serious questions remain unanswered?
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I'm sorry, he corrected me, he said it was 1:50, E
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Whenever that was.
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don't know when he left.
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MR. MOSELEY:
He didn't leave at that time.
He 17 left later.
am lii 18 BY MR. STELLO:
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19 Q
Whenever he left.
20 A
Whenever he left to see Lt. Gov.. Scranton?
21 Q
Yes.
O (reuse.)
23 Go ahead.
O 24
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25 it's very difficult to say what somebody else's state of mind ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
65 1
was or should have been, or anything.
2 Q
No, no, no, I'm asking if you were going to brief-3 the governor.
4 A
That's the way I'd like to answer it.
5 g
Q Fine.
Answer it that way, then.
6 A
This situation was abnormal, that it was not R
6.
7 completely stable, and that from a systems standpoint, the M]
8 various sytems were c.ot in their normal shutdown line-up, and d
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11 that had been released already, and there really could be no in y
12 guarantee that there would not be further releases.
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14 there wouldn't be further degradation of the core?
g 15 A
At that time since the systems were not reEu ned to r
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10 their normal line-up, they were -- I don't think you could e
d 17 say that, no.
- sx 18 Q
okay.
So that clearly, at least for sure they E
19 didn't have --
20 A
Control of the situation.
21 Q
-- the systems in any configuration for which they l
22 l Q had any "known procedure or process to follow," is that a 23 fair summary?
24 A
Yes.
l 25f Q
All right.
Now let me go on.
And that's only I
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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based on what you knew then?
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2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Now there are a variety of things you didn't know.
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Yes.
5 0
You didn't know about the measurement of the e!
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possibly some that were zero five readings, and some that K
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were in excess of 2000 degrees?
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10 Q
You didn't know that?
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Correct.
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Let me parenthetically ask, did you ever try to
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figure out why they didn't let you know that, or --
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A One of the questions I was asked from headquarters z
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18 tried to get those readings and they weren't -- the core s"
19 g
thermocouples weren't functioning properly for some reason, O
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That's --
21 Q
Did they tell you the computer printout was O
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22 23 A
No, I didn't get any details and that was --
24
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Q Did you personally ever check the computer printout?
25l A
Not on Wednesday.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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Q Not on Wednesday?
O 2
A Not on Wednesday.
3 Q
They didn't tell you they had been requesting of O
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marks?
6 A
No.
And again that was one of many questions that E
7 I sort of asked them and ---
c.l 8
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Q Do you remember.who told you that?
9 14 A
Not at all, no, I don 't.
g 2
15 g
Q Now the fact that the relief valve had been opened,
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17 g
still fixed at the time up till Gary left, whenever that was --
18 g
did you know up until that time that the relief valve had 19 l
been opened for a long time?
20 A
I knew it had been open, and I knew it had been 21 open long enough to rupture the rupture disc in the pressurizer 22 O
- elief tank.
Time beyond that, I didn ' t know how long, didn ' t have any ---
O Q
vou didn't even know whether it was minutes or 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br />?
ALDERSCN REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i 68 I
A No.
O 2
Q No notion?
3 A
No.
O 4
Q Parenthetically again, do you know why?
5 A
Why I didn't know that?
0 Q
Yes.
R b
I BY MR. MOSELEY:
3 g
8 Q
Let' s go back to your other -- I don't have a copy d
f.
of your transcript here, but in your other interview, you told 0
10 g
us that you were aware that it had been.open for some period of E
II time, and that some was longer than it should have been.
is l
A Right.
And certainly -- and the reason I knew that 13 was because of the rupture disc blowing and getting pressure l
14 in containment, and so -- go ahead.
g 15 BY MR. CRAIG:
a id I0 Q
In your notes.on the second page, you have indicated as h
II 2.8 pounds in containment.
Did you associate that with the x
IO fact that the EMOV had been open longer than normal?
U 19 g
A Yes.
20 Q
So that you knew that a lot of steam, enough 2I steam to fill the containment to this pressure, had escaped?
O 22 ye,.
23 Q
Okay.
24 BY MR. STELLO:
D Q
My question, if you recall, was do you have any idea ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1 69 1
why you weren't informed of it?
2 A
of the time that was open for?
3 Q
Yeah.
4 A
No.
Probably I would guess just because they didn't 5
g have that number available, didn't consider it significant, or nl 6
whatever.
R R
7 Q
Did anybody tell you when the block valve was closed, X]
8 what the system did when they closed it?
Did that discussion --
d d
9 A
Initiially, early in the morning?
g 10 Q
No, I want to know if you knew any of this before
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If you knew it later, you can clarify it, y
12 but up until that point.
O l is A
rou mee - hen the b1ock ve1ve was c1osed eer1y im l
14 the morning?
Because they were cycling the block out.
a g
15 Q
Yes, yes, yes.
m j
16 A
No.
as N
I7 Q
No?
h 18 A
And I knew very little except for the sketchy out1ine e
19 of what transpired from 4:00 to 11:00 a.m.,
very little.
All I 20 knew about that was the sketchy outline, and from there, 21 everything that was going on in the control room, the informa-O tion that I got, was a11,resene te,,e and ferware_1ooking.
2 23 So that would be another reason that I didn't get the time 24 on the relief valve, because there were no discussions at all 25 going on as to what happened earlier.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
70 I
Q Now the HPI flow --
2 MR. MOSELEY:
Excuse me, Vic, before you leave it, 3
I'm just afraid that we have something that appears -- and
()
4 Jim is saying two different things, and I want to make sure 5
j that we have it.
4 3
0 BY MR. MOSELEY:
R 7
Q My recollection of your previous testimony to us l
8 was that you had the perception that there had been a LOCA d
l q
9 type event, a loss-of-coolant type event, based on your knowledge,
10 that wan passed on either by Bubba Marshall or Hitz when you 3=
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I want to make sure -- if you want to say the k
j 12 other one is wrong, fine, but I want to not let there be any 5
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5 difference between what you said then and what you are saying 13
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now.
h 15 A
No, I don't think they're inconsistent.
I guess z
d I6 I certainly knew that it had lifted.
It lifted for a long e
h 17 enough time to blow the rupture disc, to put some steam --
z 18 radioactive steam in containment, to raise the radioactivity A
"g 19 levels, to get pressure in containment, and therefore by n
20 definition that's a LOCA.
21 Q
Okay.
22
(])
BY MR. STELLO:
23 O
I might add that that's the thought that I had in 24 my mind.
25 ;
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
71 1
BY MR. CRAIG:
2 Q
Were you concerned --
3 MR. STELLO:
Can I just finish this, because I'm 4
trying to make a point, if I can.
5 BY MR. STELLO:
O 3
6 Q
HPI flow, it was throttled at some points, it was~
R R
7 stopped, letdown flow, as you know, already indicated they A
j 8
didn't know what they had or didn't have, which now suggests d
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z.
the confidence in how.much water is being added into the o
10 e
system was at least questionable.
N 11 Did anyone offer any explanation of that?
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12 A
On the throttling of the HPI flow?
5 O
i
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rirse, did you know te wes throte1ea2 m
l 14 A
(Witness examining document.)
g 15 Let me take a look..
I'm not sure what my knowledge x
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I know that they were us f
17 putting in safety injection, and I don't really recall at this 18 time -- let's see.
I have got -- I guess I got some numbers E
19 in here.
Two pumps, 200 gpm, and I believe one pump, 100 gpm, 20 for injection rate.
This was around noon.
2I So I guess what I knew was that they were putting in 22 Q
these flow rates with the safety injection flow, and I believe 23 I was aware that they were sometimes using two pumps and 24 sometimes using one.
25 '
Q But you would also need to know whether there was any ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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72 I
net flow into the system, was the letdown flow equal to or 2
greater than those rates?
Did you know that?
3 A
We tried, and I tried to find out at different times 4
the amount of the letdown flow and to get a correlation between g5 those, and because of their instrumentation as designed and' h
0 as it was working, it was just unavailable, and I did know that R
b 7
they were having trouble with the letdown.
That is, verifying X
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the flow and getting an adequate letdown flow.
d Q
Okay.
E h
10 A
And they were -- certainly they had the additional
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12 controlling pressure actually that way, because pressure O l wou1d certeinty bo11d ug with insece1on.
E 14 w
Q At some point, as I recall, also in the morning h
15 there was a concern that the borated water storage tank was x
E I0 going to be empty, they were just bypassing the core with the w
HPCI flow.
Were you aware of that concern?
I can't fix the x
'S time.-
C" 19 g
A I believe that was Friday.
20 Q
No, this was Wednesday.
21 MR. STELLO:
Can you fix the time?
You seem to be O
ene xeever or ene enro=o1osic 1 oraer or eveat -
ce= vou 23 suggest when that might have been?
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73 1
out of water, if they charged at a maximum rate into the
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2 primary system. Separate from, but not divorced from, in the 3
morning they were also concerned about the flow path through
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indication that they were getting sufficient core cooling.
8 6
i So --
a R
7 THE WITNESS:
I remember some discussion about the n
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that was part of the discussion that went on when they were 0
10 E
trying to draw the pressurizer bubble also, as to actually
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12 3
if.it was being short-circuited, just where it was going.
And S
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2 15 g
injection inlet and letdown and so on, and I tried to find T
16 that out.
6 17 w
BY MR. STELLO:
x 18
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Q As I recall, Jim, they also had this discussion 19 l
just prior to depressurizing.
That was one of the reasons 20 given, where they decided to try to depressurize.
I recall 21 Gary Miller indicated -- at least that's my recollection --
()
MR. MOSELEY:
I had the perception that it was 23,
preceding that decision, but I don't have the perception it
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was Lumediately prior.
It was some time.
25 '!
MR. STELLO:
No, I'm just talking about it was a ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
74 I
fact before Gary Miller left at 2:00 o' clock, or whenever that
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2 was.
Is that correct?
3 MR. MOSELEY:' Yeah, but whether or not it was when (s
4 Jim was in the control room, I don't --
l MR. STELLO:
I can't fix any of these as to whether a
3 6
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n 8
7 BY MR. STELLO:
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Q But were you aware of a concern?
dd 9
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Certainly later on in the afternoon, but maybe not l
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d 12 3
Q Okay.
Now the reason I have asked all these
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impression of what you thought was a fair representation of x
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what happened before Gary Miller left, Gary Miller at least wx
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knew some of these things, and other supervisors and other 6
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E 19
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Given the collection now of all of that knowledge, 20 if you had had it, what would have been a fair representation?
21 What I'm asking you is do you think that they
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should have come up to Jim Higgins and said, " Jim, here is i
23 !
the assessment of the seriousness of the situation as I see
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l it, based on these kinds of things."
Do you think that they 25 I were being fully forthcoming in telling you how things racked ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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up?
2 A
After the fact, it certainly does not sound that 3
way, but going back to the day right then I didn't get the l
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well come up to me and tell me the significance of them, and --
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I did not want to leave you with the impression d
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withholding information.
I think I -- I got the thrust of that E
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from that response.
T.2at's not the intent.
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No, I'm not suggesting -- the question I asked --
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5 18 same question so it doesn't have the connotation and then give l
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me both the question and the answer.
I don't want a reference 20 to intentional withholding of information to be part of the 21 question I'm asking you.
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I would have to agree, yes, they should have.
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2 I don't think -- is that what you were looking for?
3 Q
Partially.
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4 A
I think that --
5 j
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talked about that you didn't, you indicated you did not know, a
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would your assessment of the seriousness of the situation have X
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I wish I could say yes.
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on that before it happened, I would have had to say that, yeah, I would have picked that out, too.
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due to a combination of a lot of factors, not enough T
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familiarity with the plant, relying too much on their l
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I don't know.
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reasons, and I'm just hypothesizing now, I wasn't able to sit down in a calm, cool, collected way and put it all together 21 and come up with on Wednesday an evaluation of exactly what 1
()
the situation was.
And they didn't do that, either.
23 Q
Well, we know that.
That's clear that that was not 24 O
done, and I'm.not trying to put it in the context of saying 25 we should have super-smart people, as well as to try to get an ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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appreciation for whether or not the seriousness of the accident 2
in light of the knowledge they had, aad the understanding of 3
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4 A
I don't think it did.
I think, as you said, it 5
should have, but I don't think it did.
l 6
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Too busy?
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7 A
For them.
Xl 8
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9 A
I think there has to be no single answer.
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they were, and then try and analyze based on that, very carefully 2
what they had, and then go from there.
3 It was mor2 of just accepting this is what we've 4
got, and how do I treat this problem, and this little one, 5
y and this little one?
a 0
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I'm taking a lot more time than I wanted R
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on this point.
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We know for sure that they did not analyze the E
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that they had on the basis of such analysis.
Is that a fair a
13 statement?
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A Yes.
b Q
They nevertheless, even without doing so, knew z
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basis.
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3 6
even though it didn't work.
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7 Q
Let me go on, if I can, and see if I can summarize 3
j 8
still further the situation that they had.
Up until 2:00 d
o' clock, was not following the known procedure or process i
by which they had experience to know that they had adequately II resolved the problem.
is g
12 A
True.
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ener were soiae to, evea e ent voiae ao, ue to
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get to in a little bit.
Is that true?
i[
I0 A
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Q So that up until 2:00 o' clock, is it fair to x
18 characterize that they had been moving from one attempt at t-"
19 j
trying to bring the reactor to a state they understood, to 0
yet another attempt and yet another attempt, each of which 2I did not produce a set of parameters to allow them to conclude
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firmly they knew they had --
23 i
A True.
Q Q
Okay.
Finally.
25 Now let me get back to some of the things I wanted ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I to explore in a bit more detail.
()
2 Prior to starting depressurization strategy is when 3
the issue of the borated water storage tank might run dry,
()
4 and they might have to go to a recirc mode or to take the 5
j water out of the sump and bring it back in.
Was this discussed 6
in any meetings that you can recall?
8 7
A I don't remember that discussion.
K k
Q You don't remember the discussion?
dd 9
A No.
j oh0 Q
Okay.
When is the first time that you have ever El" heard that they were in any feed-and-bleed mode?
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A Just back to the question I just saw on the one on the BWST level, I did around 12:15 have a question level E
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Okay, now, on the feed-and-bleed question --
20 Q
What were those numbers again'.-
A 55 feet, originally; 31 feet at 12:15.
Then I've
()
got another reading of 30 feet at 1:25.
And the number I was 23 '
given of 8000 gallons per foot.
24
(.s",%)
Q-Just give me a moment to check this.
l l
25 A
Okay.
1 i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
2 Q
While he's looking for that, let me say, do you 3
recall or is there any way from your notes to determine whether 4
that was in response to questions that you had received?
5 A
I believe that was in response to questions I received, a
3 6
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- yes, a
R 7
Q I know we asked some questions along that line.
I n
k don't know the timeframe, so I can't say that was a timeframe.
dd 9
A As a matter of fact, here it is.
Don Havercamp j
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questions at 12:30 aux feed flow rate, temperature of
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So that was in response to questions.
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BY MR. CRAIG:
2 15 g
Q Jim, after your 9:30 notation about your briefing 16 g
by Bubba Marshall, and beforethe 12:00 o' clock entry in the c:
17 d
middle of the page, you have a little "hq" up in the left-x M
18 hand corner, and then you have RCS level inventory.
Would
=
19 you explain, if you can, why that was --
20 A
Well, those were questions -- those were questions.
21 Steam generator parameters, temperature pressure level, RCS O
22 level.
23l Q
And inventory in the primary system?
A Inventory verified.
25 I (Examining document.)
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Yeah, I guess that was probably -- I don't know if 2
that was pressure, probably pressurizer and BWST that they 3
were looking for there.
Probably.
I'm not sure at this time.
4 Q
And it says delta and BWST level to determine 5
amount of water.
6 A
Oh, yeah.
Okay, right.
Change in BWST levelito t.r.2 R
b 7
determine amount of water added to the primary.
X k
0 Q
I guess Region I was asking these questions at this dd I
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point.
h 10 A
No, that sounds like headquarters.
iii 4
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Okay.
So they were asking questions about the t
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Okay.
h 15 A
Yes.
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tj 16 And then I guess the first answer I got back then us h
II was 12 -- whatever I gave you, 12:15, 12:30, I finally got an x
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E I'
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20 Q
Okay, I want to, if I can now, move away from 21 2:00 o' clock.
Somewhere after 2:00 o' clock they started 2
O trying to get the heaters on in the pressurizer and tried to 23 '
draw the bubble, which is yet another strategy that we're going 24 to try.
25 l A
Yes.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I 83 i
I Q
Was this discussed at all?
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
It was?
4 A
Yes.
5 MR. CRAIC:
We'd like to take a break right here.
6 bu4 (Discussion off the record.)
et b
MR. STELLO:
What we just discussed is, I had asked X
k th3 question that wasr,'t exactly representative of the facts d
I and could have misled you, and that's why I want to correct it.
BY MR. STELLO:
=l Q
When I suggested that about 2:00 o' clock the heaters k
had been put on, I should have also made it clear that there were other times prior to 2:00 o' clock that they were also E
14 g
put on.
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T 16 g
Q Okay.
So that there were times that the heaters 6
17 were attempted to be put on, and they were shorting out or wa M
18 whatever, and had difficulty with them.
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A Yes.
2a Q
Okay.
Now let me ask you the question, at about 21 that time, did you perceive that they were going to try some-O
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regained temperature; at.2:40, temperature increases again, 2
and I do recall some time around that time they were -- and I 3
again here wasn't -- didn't completely get the picture on what 4
they were doing, as far as how they were -- what their flow 5
paths were for safety injection in, and where they were getting j
6 it out.
But I know there was some discussions about where R
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- d h
I7 I don't remember exactly.
E I'
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Let me ask you a question here.
Maybe I'll clarify i ;.
20 You equate drawing a bubble in the pressurizer 21 with collapsing the bubble in the A loop in your answer?
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. STELLO:
2 Q
That was the whole thrust of my question, as to ask 3
you finally, was there any discussion about changing the O
4 core cooling approach in the afternoon at about 2:00 or 3:00 5
- a. clock, if you can recall?
b 0
A No.
Not really.
Not really.
And the only --
R b
7 the only --- as I said before, when I started to get to 4:30 N
l 8
or so, then we started to get quantitative.
d Q
I'm not up to the 4:30 yet.
10 Would it have been normal that someone would have E=
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12 being discussed in the think tank?
13 A
Probably not.
E 14 g
Q Probably not?
x A
Probably not.
But I couldn't say that for sure.
0 There was an awful lot going on, and when you say in a reactor, well, perhaps maybe not, as an overall strategy, but
=
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=
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generator, yes.
Maybe with another aspect on letdown or 20 something, yes, and those certainly could affect that, so.
21 Q
Well, from time to time they were trying to get O
ehe he eers on which is obvious 1r for the Purpose of eeteine e 2
l l
bubble in the pressurizer.
O 24
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25 Q
So that was going on from time to time, but these ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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were not issues that were discussed in the think tank prior to O
2 taking action, necessarily?
3 A
Say that again.
O 4
Q Each of these actions that you described weren't 5
j necessarily discussed in the think tank before doing them?
0 A
That's true, they weren't.
Gf7 Q
Okay.
That's the point I was trying to make.
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8 Now did you hear -- and now I'm going to be very d
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broad.
I want to ask the question in the broadest time element 10 we can.
-- any discussion whatsoever of anyone being concerned
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13 A
No.
m E
14 W
Q Did you recall any discussion at all on the 28th b
of anyone going out and confirming containment integrity or x
16 checking containment integrity?
h A
That I'm not sure about, that may have.
I don't
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I don't recall, but s
"g certainly -- the reason I say that is because that's something 19 20 that would have seemed very logical for me -- for them to do nd 21 at that. time, and if they did that, that would stand out in A
O my,1,,.
22 23 Q
Why would it be logical to do that?
24 A
Because they've got pressure in containment.
You 25 don't want it to leak out.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Q Well, they have pressure all day.
2 A
Right.
And therefore I'm saying if somebody had 3
gone out and said, " Hey, let's check and verify contair. ent O
4 integrity," I would have said, " Great idea," and it wouldn!t 5
j have stood out as something that would have highlighted it in N
0 my mind.
BY MR. MOSELEY:
2 k
Q Are you responding specifically to the time after rJ 2:00 o' clock as being a good time to have done it?
o h
10 A
No.
Any time.
Any time.
El II BY MR. STELLO:
ci 12 3
Q To answer my question, so that it was free of time constraints.
E 14 W
MR. MOSELEY:
But his response was "at that time,"
2 15 w
and I wanted to make sure we addressed that.
x f
BY MR. STELLO:
6 17 Q
I want to ask you, in the answer to this question, w=
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19 j
ed you about not starting electrical equipment, you said no.
20 A
Yeah, because that's something that would have 21 stood out as being --
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you would have pursued it, that's the thrust?
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I think so.
3 0
okay.
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all the other actions?
17 A
I think.
I think.
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any certitude what you would or wouldn't do, had you heard it.
20 You only can react on the basis of your knowledge today.
You 21 would believe you would have.
Okay.
22 Now I'm going to take you just a little bit 23,
further in time to try to understand, and that's at about this i
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that was about -- John, correct me -- some time about 4:30?
2 MR. CRAIG:
About 4:30',
3 BY MR. STELLO:
4 Q
What discussion took place prior to this change 5
in the cooling strategy?
Do you recall any?
j 6
A The decision to repressurize, as I recall, came from R
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7
-- offsite from Jack Herbein.
X
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8 Q
You mean via telephone call or something?
dd 9
A Yes.
And my recollection was that the people in 2
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12 was better, and that they, for a couple of reasons, because 13 they were not a hundred percent sure here, but one of them was I4 they were having some success in terms of collapsing the bubbles
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progress in their direction that seemed to go in the other 20 direction, seemed to really, as I recall --- I think one of 21 their comments was that will put us back to where we were at 22 O
12:00 e. clock, by repressurizing.
Ana they certainly knew 23 that they hadn't solved the problem then.
So they had some 24 second thoughts about that.
But that was what Herbein thought 25 '
was the best thing to do in terms of ensuring that there were ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
(
90 1
no bubbles in the core.
()
2 O
Who voiced objection, to your best recollection?
3 Do you have any names?
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4 A
I don't remember specifically, but just from the e
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situation I think I would say Gary Miller and probably Lee N
8 6
Rogers.
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7 Q
How about Ross?
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A I can't say; don't know.
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Q Chwastyk?
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Well, I know those people were there, but I don't g
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know if they were the ones or not.
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Q The only two that you can recall are probably 3
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of their positions, the positions they had been taking throughout l
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I wouldn't think that --
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Q Was there any heated discussion or raised voices 5
18
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over discussing the issue that you recall?
19 l
A No, I don't recall raised voices.
I recall some 20 discussion about it, is all, but not heated or raised voices, 21 no.
22 O-BY MR. MOSELEY:
23 Q
Did you overhear the conversation between 24 O
Herbein and Miller?
Was it on the voice box in the shift 25 I supervisor's office?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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91 I
A I don't remember if it was on the squawk box or if it 2
was only one end of the conversation I was hearing.
I don't 3
remember for sure.
4 BY MR. STELLO:
5 Q
I think I'm getting to the bottom of the list of 0
questions I'm going to ask.
R b
7 In this timeframe, from now to about 4:30, can you Al 8
recall if there were conversations between people in the d
f.
I control room and Bob Arnold and people from his Staff?
o h
10 A
I don't remember Bob Arnold at all.
There were
=
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12 was that he was over in the observation center and had some 13 people over there with him, but I don't know who.
Didn't know E
14 W
who at that time.
E bI Q
Wait a minute.
Herbein was with -- in the x
16 lieutenant governor's briefing from about somewhere past 2:00 h
till probably in the neighborhood of 4:30.
m 18 A
Okay.
So now your question is -- I was thinking of
=
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4:30 on.
20 I wanted to know in between the two.
Q No, no, no.
21 Do you recall whether Bob Arnold was active in the discussions?
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I don't have any more technical details.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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You said you had some?
2 MR. CRAIG:
No, you covered them.
3 MR. STELLO:
I did?
Okay.
4 BY MR. STELLO:
5 Q
I guess what I wanted to do is -- you must have j
6 been asked this question a variety of times, and it's R
b I
probably impossible to ever get the same words to describe it, 3
k 0
I'm sure.
But to the best of your ability, can you give me a d
I feeling as to information as it flowed?
Was it information 10 that had to be asked before you got it, or ms it generally N
II coming even if you didn't ask?
m hI A
It was coming when I didn't ask in that I was 13 present while a lot of their discussions were going on.
That E
14 is while they were discussing among themselves what they wanted w
9 15 ili to do, and what the pros and cons of a particular aspect were.
m 16 Okay?
So that from that aspect, I was getting information h
I7' without asking.
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g 19 coming over to me and saying, "We're going to do XYZ, or such 20 and such just happened," no, not at all.
That type of 21 information I had to go and ask for.
22 O
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Right.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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Q Later that evening they were starting to record 2
them and you were getting numbers, if you recall?
3 A
That was after I left.
I left at 7:30 that night 4
to go see Scranton.
5 Q
That's right.
You were --
0 A
Yeah.
R b
7 Q
Okay.
Well, then, that's probably a bad example.
Xl 8
What I was going to ask was what was the change d
I in in-core thermocouples?
Did anyone come up anci say, "Well, o
10 now, we're bleeding them and later" --
II A
I think the change thsre was Bill Raymond, when he is g
12 came in, having been the former reactor engineer at the site a
13 during the start-up, B&W,went in and started to get them himself, I4 and he was the one that I believe really ferroted that out.
h Q
Is that right?
m I0 A
I don't know for certain, but I believe that's h
II the case.
z Q
I wasn't aware of it.
s-"
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
20 0
I think what he's asking, is that right, is was 21 Raymond a start-up engineer for B&W at TMI earlier?
A Yes.
23 Q
That's something that we weren't --
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25 !
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And I believe he was the one that ferreted that out area.
2 7d went and got them and said, "I went" -- matter of fact, I 3
know the next day when I came in, or Friday, Bill Raymond O
4 was punching them out and geeeing them hims 1f out of the 5
computer, which is something the NRC normally doesn't do.
But j
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he in fact showed me how to do it, and said, "Here's how to get Xl 8
them," and get them.
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BY MR. STELLO:
10 Q
So you think that the bottom of the answer to the lii 4
II thermocouple question lies with Bill Raymond's expertise in it g
12 that area?
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15 MR. STELLO:
Norm, do you know if we ever talked.
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a6 I7 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes, we did, but not in this area.
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18 (Discussion off the record.)
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BY MR. STELLO:
20 0
Okay.
I was trying to get you to help me understand 21 some general impressions.
22 Q
A Okay.
23 l Q
I was only interested in this flow of information, 24 so let me see if I have captured your thought.
I'll say it in 25 my words because I guess this is what I've heard, and I don't ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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know if this is what you have said.
2 There was a great deal of technical information that 3
you now know was there that they didn't come and tell you 4
about, but there was an awful lot of information which even 5
though you didn't ask was available to you, just simply 8
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A And i used those various different sources, too.
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12 Q
As well as the board itself?
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If you were to find -- if you concluded the major 15 problem in terms of finally understanding what had happened, i[
I0 would it be reasonable to conclude that at least a principal w
h I7 and perhaps a major factor, or if I could characterize it x
II another way, the single most important factor was the inability 19 to have synthesized and analyzed what had happened and understood g
that in any shape before deciding where to go from there?
21 A
That's certainly one of the major problems, yes.
22 MR. STELLO:
Okay.
That was the last question I 23 '
had.
24 MR. CRAIG:
I don't have any questions.
25 MR. MOSELEY:
Okay, Jim.
Thank you.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 (Whereupon, at 6:52 p.m.,
the deposition was O
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O ucctr^a arautaroar co +1ssron This is to certify hat the attached proceedings before the 1
I&E Investigation Team in the matter of:
TMI Unit 2 Date of Proceeding:
. Tan. 12, 1981 Docket !!umb er :
Place of Proceeding:
nn anca,_
y,v,,1,na were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Coccission.,
ANN RILEY Official Reporter (Typed)
O Ow_
v Official Reporter (Signature)
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a nou 8['
'9 UNITED STATES
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p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
,E REGION I 431 PARK AVENUE o,
's,
,o',e KING OF PRUSSI A, PENNSYLVANIA 19408 February 13, 1981 Q
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Craig FROM:
J.C.Higgins-l
SUBJECT:
CHANGES IN MY DEPOSITION l
Listed below are the changes to my deposition of January 12, 1981:
4 Page 37 Line 12 change"11:00 o' clock' to 7:00 o' clock" Page 48 Line 11 change "has" to "was" Page 86 Line 21 Add "not" between "would"and " stand" 4
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