ML19343C892
| ML19343C892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2019 |
| From: | Chuck Zoia NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | Exelon Generation Co |
| Zoia C | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17164A346 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML19343C892 (12) | |
Text
1 Facility: Byron_____________ Scenario No.: N19-1________
Op-Test No.: 2019-301_
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: IC-171; 54.0% power (due to a grid issue), 644 MW, BOL, steady state, 946 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, 1A FW Pump Out of Service Turnover: The fuel is preconditioned to 100% power. Online risk is green. 1A FW pump is OOS for an alignment and vibration problem; it is expected back in service in one week. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager directs continuation of 1B Diesel Generator loading per 1BOSR 8.1.2-2 step F.7.b. Ten minutes of operation at 2750KW is complete. It is expected that Power Team will order a ramp to 880 MWe at 1.6 MWe/min when 1B Diesel Generator is fully loaded.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description Preload IOR ZDI1FW01PA PTL IOR ZDI1FW01PAB PTL IOR ZDI1FW012A CLS IOR ZLO1FW012A1 OFF IOR ZLO1FW002A1 OFF MRF ED091C OPEN IMF CC02B 200 1A FW Pump OOS 1A FW Pump AOP OOS 1FW012 OOS 1FW002A OOS CCW Pump Discharge Press Switch Failure 1
Continue Loading 1B Diesel Generator per 1BOSR 8.1.2-2 step F.7.b 2
TS (SRO)
Turbine impulse pressure channel 1PT-505 fails high.
Tech Spec 3.3.1 will be entered.
N (BOP)
Raise power at 1.6 Mw/min.
4 MRF EG20 TRIP TS (SRO)
Report from local Equipment Operator that he has depressed the 1B Diesel Generator Emergency Stop pushbutton due to a large fuel oil leak. Tech Spec 3.8.1 will be entered.
Letdown line pressure controller failure causes 1CV131 to fail closed. The RO will establish manual control of 1CV131.
TS (SRO) 1A CC pump trips, requiring a manual start of the 1B CC pump. Tech Spec 3.7.7 will be entered.
Air Side Seal Oil Pump Trip. The BOP will respond to start a Seal Oil Backup pump
2 8
IMF ED15D IMF ED15G IMF ED15I IMF EG08A M (ALL)
C (ALL)
Dual Unit Loss of All AC Power 1A Diesel Generator seizure.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
3 SCENARIO N19-1 OVERVIEW 54.0% power (due to a grid issue), 644 MW, BOL, steady state, 946 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon. The fuel is preconditioned to 100% power. Online risk is green. 1A FW pump is OOS for an alignment and vibration problem; it is expected back in service in one week. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager directs continuation of 1B Diesel Generator loading per 1BOSR 8.1.2-2 step F.7.b. Ten minutes of operation at 2750KW is complete. It is expected that Power Team will order a ramp to 880 MWe at 1.6 MWe/min when 1B Diesel Generator is fully loaded.
After completing shift turnover and relief; the BOP will continue the loading of 1B Diesel Generator per 1 BOSR 8.1.2-2, 1B DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE, at step F.7.b. The BOP will raise load to 4100 KW while maintaining KVARs between 0 and 1000. After 10 minutes elapsed time load will be raised to> 4950 KW and < 5500 KW.
After initial 1B Diesel Generator load increase; turbine impulse pressure channel 1PT-505 will fail to 450 psig over a 30 second period. Control rods will begin automatically withdrawing. The RO will implement BHC 1-RD, UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION, check turbine power stable, and place rod control in manual to stop the outward rod motion. The crew may implement 1BOA ROD-1 UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION to diagnose the reason for the control rod motion. After recognizing the instrument failure (1PT-505 is about 50 psig higher than 1PT-506) 1BOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment D, will be implemented. The crew will defeat the failed instrument and the RO will restore Tave - Tref deviation. Technical specification 3.3.1, conditions A and P apply.
After 1PT505 failure is addressed and the 1B Diesel Generator has attained full load; Power Team will request Unit 1 raise power to 880 MWe at 1.6 MWe/min due to grid demand.
After a measurable change in power; the local Equipment Operator will contact the Control Room and report that there is a large fuel oil leak on the 1B Diesel Generator, he has depressed the Emergency Stop pushbutton and he has exited the room. Tech Spec 3.8.1, condition B applies. The 1B DG will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
On-line risk will rise to yellow.
After the 1B DG failure is addressed, letdown line pressure controller 1CV131 will close. The letdown PCV will close and letdown pressure will rise, potentially lifting the letdown line relief valve. The RO will implement BHC 1-LD, LETDOWN MALFUNCTION, establish manual control of 1CV131, and subsequently isolate letdown if the letdown relief valve lifts. Letdown will be re-established per 1BOA ESP-2, RE-ESTABLISHING CV LETDOWN, if it had been isolated.
After the 1CV131 failure is addressed; the 1A CC pump will trip. The 1B CC pump will NOT automatically start on low pressure however a manual start will work. This may cause entry into 1BOA PRI-6, COMPONENT COOLING MALFUNCTION. The US will enter Tech. Spec. 3.7.7. Condition B for the failed 1A CC pump. Also, IF THE Unit 0 Component Cooling Pump has not been aligned for standby, Required Action 3.8.1.B.3 applies to Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable (1B Component Cooling Pump).
After the 1A CC pump failure is addressed; the Air Side Seal Oil Pump will trip. The BOP will respond to start a Seal Oil Backup pump per BAR 1-18-B2, GEN AIR SIDE SEAL OIL PUMP TRIP.
After the Air Side Seal Oil Pump failure is addressed; a loss of all offsite power will occur for both Units. When the 1A DG engine attempts to start, the engine will seize, resulting in a loss of all AC power to Unit 1. Transition will be made to 1BCA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER. A limited crosstie to Unit 2 will be required due to the reported failure of the 2B DG to energize bus 242. The crew must restore power to Unit 1 within 10 minutes.
The scenario is complete when the crew has cross-tied power from Unit 2 to Unit 1, and isolated RCP seal injection by closing seal injection filter inlet valve(s) prior to starting a CV pump.
Critical Tasks TCA#3: Align alternate a-c power source within 10 minutes of onset of SBO.
(UFSAR 8.3.1.1.2.2 pg. 8.3-10, R14) (K/A number - 000055EA2.03 importance 3.9/4.7)
CT-27: Isolate RCP seal injection before a CV pump is started in 1BCA-0.0.
(K/A number - 000003A4.01 importance 3.3/3.2)
1 Facility: Byron____________ Scenario No.: N19-2________
Op-Test No.: 2019-301_
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: IC-172; 100% power 1246 MW, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon Turnover: Online risk is green. 1BOSR 5.5.8.RH.5-1a GROUP A INSERVICE TESTING (IST) REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1RH01PA at step F.10. Following turnover, Shift Manager directs the shutdown of the 1A RH pump and the restoration of the 1A RH system per BOP RH-2. An AND request for a 100MWe load reduction at 4MWe/min is anticipated during the shift.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
TS (SRO)
Shutdown the 1A RH pump per 1BOSR 5.5.8.RH.5-1a and restore the 1A RH system from recirculation per BOP RH-
- 2. Tech Spec 3.6.3 will be entered.
2 IOR ZDI1CV181 CLS IOR PN0618 ON C (ATC, SRO) 1A RCP #3 Seal Standpipe level low. ATC responds per BAR 1-7-A7 to restore level.
N (BOP)
AND requests load reduction of 100 MWe to be performed at 4 MW/min.
TS (SRO)
SX Pump 1A trips. SX Pump 1B will be manually started per BHC 1-2-A1. Tech Spec 3.7.8 will be entered.
CRDM Exhaust Fan 1D trips. An additional CRDM Exhaust Fan will be started per BOP VP-9.
TS (SRO)
Pressurizer Level Transmitter 1LT459 fails low. ATC operator will take manual control of charging, and restore pressurizer level control to automatic. Tech Specs 3.3.1 will be entered.
7 IMF SI05A 500 IMF SI03A 500 IMF RH10A 5000 IMF RM06V -4.5 30 M (ALL)
RCS leak in RH Pump 1A Cubicle.
8 IMF RP30A (preload)
IMF RP30B (preload)
IOR ZDISIA1 (preload)
C (ALL))
Train A Automatic SI failure Train B Automatic SI failure 1PM05J SI Actuate failure (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
2 SCENARIO N19-2 OVERVIEW 100% power 1246 MW, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon. Online risk is green. 1BOSR 5.5.8.RH.5-1a GROUP A INSERVICE TESTING (IST) REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1RH01PA at step F.10. Following turnover, Shift Manager directs the shutdown of the 1A RH pump and the restoration of the 1A RH system per BOP RH-2. An AND request for a 100MWe at 4MWe/min load reduction is anticipated during the shift.
After completing shift turnover and relief; the BOP will shut down the 1A RH pump per step F.10 of 1BOSR 5.5.8.RH.5-1a, GROUP A INSERVICE TESTING (IST) REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1RH01PA, restore the 1A RH system from recirculation per BOP RH-2, SECURING THE RH SYSTEM FROM RECIRCULATION, requiring the piping be vented per BOP RH-12, DEPRESSURISSING THE RH DISCHARGE PIPING.
Installing fuses is entry condition TS 3.6.3 Condition A.
After the RH system has been vented and secured; 1-7-A7 RCP 1A Standpipe Level Low will be received. The ATC will respond per the Bar to open 1CV181 to fill the standpipe and clear the alarm. The crew may implement 1BOA RCP-1, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL FAILURE.
After RCP 1A Standpipe Level Low has been addressed; Gen Dispatch will contact the Main Control Room to perform an AND load reduction of 100MWe at the rate of 4MWe/min. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction per 1BGP 100-4T3, LOAD CHANGE INSTRUCTION SHEET FOR POWER REDUCTION < 15% IN ONE HOUR, while the ATC will perform reactivity calculation and the perform boration and rod insertion as determined by ReMA and using BOP CV-6T1, RCMS OPERATION IN BORATE CHECKLIST.
Following the boration; SX Pump 1A will trip. The BOP will respond by starting SX Pump 1B per BHC 1-2-A1. Tech Spec 3.7.8 condition A will be entered.
After the SX Pump 1A has been addressed, CRDM Exhaust Fan 1D will trip. BOP will refer to BAR 0-33-A5 and start an additional CDRM Fan per BOP VP-9 After an additional CRDM Exhaust Fan has been started; Pressurizer Level Transmitter 1LT459 will fail low. Letdown will automatically isolate and the ATC operator will take manual control of charging flow. 1BOA INST 2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment C, will be implemented. The ATC operator will restore pressurizer level control to automatic after letdown is reestablished and pressurizer level is restored to normal. Tech Spec 3.3.1 conditions A and K will be entered.
After the 1LT1459 failure has been addressed; An RCS leak will develop in the RH Pump 1A Cubicle due to check valve failure following surveillance performance. The crew will Trip the reactor, enter 1BEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. Automatic Safety Injection will fail to occur and the crew manually will initiate a Safety Injection.
Manual Safety Injection initiation will fail at 1PM05J. The manual Safety Injection initiation will only be successful from panel 1PM06J. The crew will proceed to 1BCA-1.2, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, when it is determined that Auxiliary Building Radiation Levels are Not normal. The break into the auxiliary building will be isolated and the crew will transition to 1BEP-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
The scenario is complete when the crew has isolated the LOCA per 1BCA-1.
Critical Tasks CT-2: Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards before transition to 1BEP-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
(K/A number - 006-A2.12 importance 4.5/4.8)
CT-32: Isolate the LOCA outside containment, as evidenced by rising RCS pressure, before transition out of ECA-1.2.
(K/A number - EPE 011-EA1.09 importance 4.3/4.3)
1 Facility: Byron_____________ Scenario No.: N19-3________
Op-Test No.: 2019-301_
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: IC-176; 100% power, 1246 MW, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, CBD at 221 steps.
Turnover: Following completion of turnover, the shift manager directs the performance of 1BOSR EH-M2, EH PUMP OPERABILITY MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred method of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operator has briefed and is standing by at the Unit 1 EH skid. Chemistry sampling of SI Accumulators is in progress. Online risk is green.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description Preload simN2acc(2) = 1200 Set SI Accumulator 1B N2 pressure 1
Perform 1BOSR EH-M2 2
TS (SRO)
ACB 1445BC, Bus 144 to PZR Htr, trips. Pressurizer pressure lowers. ATC establishes manual control of PZR pressure and energizes additional heaters. Tech Spec 3.4.9 will be entered.
3 ramp simacc(2) 59480 59300 300 C (BOP, SRO)
TS (SRO) 1B SI Accumulator level/pressure lowers. BOP re-pressurizes utilizing BOP-SI-8. Tech Spec 3.5.1 will be entered.
TE-CV130 (LTDN HX Temp) fails low. 1TCV-130 will modulate close. The ATC operator will establish manual control of 1CC130 and return LD to normal.
Turbine Servo GV#4 fails closed. Control Rods Step in.
In response, the ATC operator develops a reactivity plan and to recover I control 6
IMF FW16 1500 30 I (BOP, SRO) 1PT-508 FW Header Pressure fails high. The BOP will take manual control of the FW pump controller.
7 IMF MS07D 4 IMF MS01A 100 (preload)
IMF MS01D 100 (preload)
M (ALL) 1D Main Steamline break in Containment 1A MSIV fails to close 1D MSIV fails to close 8
IMF CS01A (preload)
MRF RP 63 OUT (preload)
C (ALL) 1A CS Pump fails to start Slave relay K643 CS ACT TRN B; 1A CS Pump fails to automatically start (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
2 SCENARIO C19-3 OVERVIEW 100% power, 1246 MW, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, CBD at 221 steps. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager directs the performance of 1BOSR EH-M2, EH PUMP OPERABILITY MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred method of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operator has briefed and is standing by at the Unit 1 EH skid. Chemistry sampling of SI Accumulators is in progress. Online risk is green.
After completing shift turnover and relief;. The BOP performs 1BOSR EH-M2, EH PUMP OPERABILITY MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred method of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton to start the standby EH pump.
After the standby EH pump has been started; ACB 1445BC, Bus 144 to PZR Htr, trips. Pressurizer pressure lowers.
The ATC operator establishes manual control of PZR pressure and energizes additional heaters. Tech Spec 3.4.9 condition B will be entered.
After Pressurizer Pressure is re-established; 1B SI Accumulator level and pressure lower. The BOP will take actions to re-pressurize SI Accumulator 1B per BOP-SI-8, INCREASING SI ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. Tech Spec 3.5.1 condition B will be entered.
After 1B SI Accumulator is re-pressurized; TE-CV130 (LTDN HX Temp) fails low. 1TCV-130 will modulate close, letdown line temperature will rise, VCT temperature will rise. When actual line temperature rises to > 133oF, Annunciator 1-9-E2, LTDWN TEMP HIGH, will actuate and divert valve 1TCV-129 will open diverting letdown line flow to the VCT and bypassing the demineralizers. The ATC operator will establish manual control of 1CC130, return LD Hx temperature to normal by balancing charging and letdown, and return letdown flow to the demineralizers.
After the LTDN HX Temp element failure is addressed; the Turbine GV#4 servo will fail and the valve closes. Turbine load will lower approximately 70MW. As a result, Control Rods will step in. In response, the ATC operator develops a reactivity plan to borate the RCS and withdraw control rods to recover I control.
After the Turbine Servo GV#4 failure is addressed; feedwater line pressure detector 1PT-508 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main feedwater pumps speed will lower, reducing feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin lowering. The BOP will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the FW pump controller per BHC-1-SG, STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL. 1BOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment J, will be implemented. 1PT-508 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
After the 1PT-508 FW Header Pressure failure is addressed; a large fault will occur on the 1D MS line. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. 1MS001A and 1MS001D MSIVs fail to close automatically or via manual actuation of Main Steamline Isolation. 1MS001A will be able to be closed via its control switch. When containment pressure reaches 20 psig, Phase B actuates but the Containment Spray pumps do not start. The crew should manually realign train B CS valves per 1BEP-0 Attachment C, which will start the 1B CS pump. Operators should transition to 1BEP-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, to isolate the faulted 1D Steam Generator including the performance of step 4.h RNO.
The scenario is complete when the crew has transitioned from 1BEP-2 at completion of step 7.
Critical Tasks:
CT-3: Manually actuate at least one train of containment spray before an extreme (RED path) challenge develops to the containment CSF.
(K/A number - 026-A3.01importance 4.3/4.5)
CT-17: Isolate the faulted 1D SG before transition out of 1BEP-2 (K/A number - APE 040-AA1.04 importance 4.3/4.3)
1 Facility: Byron_____________ Scenario No.: N19-4________
Op-Test No.: 2019-301_
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: IC-22; 100% power, 1246 MW, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, PZR PORV 1RY455A Out of Service Turnover: PZR PORV 1RY455A is Out of Service. 1RY8000A is closed with power removed and tagged. Currently in LCOAR 3.4.11 Condition B and are 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> required action time to Restore the PORV to OPERABLE. The OCC is developing a shutdown schedule. Following turnover the Shift Manager directs the performance of 1BOSR MS-Q1, STEAM DUMP VALVE OPERABILITY QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE, subsections F.1, F.2 and F.4. Online risk is yellow.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description Preload IOR ZLO1RY455A1 ON IOR ZLO1RY455A2 ON IOR ZDI1RY455A CLS IOR ZDI1RY8000A CLS MRF ED058C OPEN PZR PORV 1RY455A Out of Service PZR PORV Block Valve 1RY8000A Closed PZR PORV Block Valve 1RY8000A Power Removed 1
BOP performs subsections F.1, F.2 and F.4 of 1BOSR MS-Q1.
2 IMF RX13A 100 30 I (ATC, SRO)
TS (SRO)
Pressurizer Level Transmitter 1LT459 fails high. The ATC operator will determine which channel has failed and select an operable channel. Tech Spec 3.3.1 will be entered.
3 IMF MS04C 100 60 C (BOP, SRO)
TS (SRO) 1C SG PORV will spuriously open in AUTO, requiring manual closure. Tech Spec 3.7.4 will be entered.
N (BOP)
Generation Dispatch contacts the Unit 1 Main Control Room to perform a 150 MW emergency load reduction.
5 IMF CV07 65 120 C (ATC, SRO)
Seal Injection Filter plugs requiring ATC to throttle 1CV121 and 1CV182 to maintain seal injection flows between 8 and 13 gpm. A swap of in-service filters will then be initiated.
6 IOR ZDI1CDSEL OFF1 IMF FW22B C (BOP, SRO) 1B Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump trips. The standby Cd/Cb pump fails to automatically start. The standby pump will be manually started per BHC 1-17-A9.
7 IMF TH03B 450 0 M (ALL) 1B SGTR (450gpm) 8 IOR ZDI1RY456 (preload)
IORZDI1IA065 CLS (preload)
C (ALL)
PZR PORV 1RY456 fails to Open Instrument Air to Containment cannot be reestablished following Phase A Isolation.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
2 SCENARIO N19-4 OVERVIEW 100% power, 1246 MW, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon. PZR PORV 1RY455A is Out of Service.
1RY800A is closed with power removed and tagged. Currently in LCOAR 3.4.11 Condition B and are 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> required action time to Restore the PORV to OPERABLE. The OCC is developing a shutdown schedule. Following turnover the Shift Manager directs the performance of 1BOSR MS-Q1, STEAM DUMP VALVE OPERABILITY QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE, subsections F.1, F.2 and F.4. Online risk is yellow.
After completing shift turnover and relief; the BOP will perform 1BOSR MS-Q1, STEAM DUMP VALVE OPERABILITY QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE, subsections F.1, F.2 and F.4.
After the performance of 1BOSR MS-Q1; Pressurizer Level Transmitter 1LT459 will fail high. Charging flow will lower causing additional alarms associated with charging and seal injection flows. The ATC operator will determine which channel has failed and select an operable channel per BAR 1-12-B3 PZR LEVEL HIGH. The crew will then implement 1BOA INST 2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment C. Tech Spec 3.3.1 conditions A and K will be entered.
After 1PT459 failure is addressed; 1C SG PORV will spuriously open in AUTO, the rising steam flow and lowering Steam Generator pressure will require manual closure of 1MS018C. Tech Spec 3.4.4 condition A will be entered.
After the 1C SG PORV failure is addressed; Generation Dispatch contacts the Unit 1 Main Control Room to perform a 150 MW emergency load reduction. The ATC will perform a Transient Reactivity brief using the placard and then perform boration and rod insertion. THE BOP will initiate a turbine prompt action ramp per 1BGP 100-4T3, LOAD CHANGE INSTRUCTION SHEET FOR POWER REDUCTION <15% IN ONE HOUR.
As the Emergency Load Reduction is nearing completion; the ATC operator will respond per BAR 1-7-D2 RCP SEAL INJ FILTER HIGH DP to throttle 1CV121 and 1CV182 to maintain seal injection flows between 8 and 13 gpm. BOP CV-10, CV FILTER OPERATIONS will then be utilized to swap Seal Injection Filters.
After the Seal Injection Filters have been re-aligned; 1B Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump will trip. The standby pump will fail to automatically start. The BOP will utilize BHC 1-17-A9, CD/CB PUMP TRIP, to start the aux oil pump and then start the standby Cd/Cb pump. The crew will then implement 1BOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP.
After the Standby Cd/Cb Pump has been started; a SGTR will occur in the 1B SG. The crew will Trip the reactor, enter 1BEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, and manually initiate a Safety Injection. The crew will proceed to 1BEP-3, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT. When it is determined that PZR pressure control is NOT available, the crew will transition to 1BCA-3.3, SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL. Instrument Air will be re-established to Containment, the crew will transition back to 1BEP-3 and use Normal Pressurizer Spray to Depressurize RCS to Minimize Break Flow and Refill PZR.
The scenario is complete when the crew has Terminated High Head ECCS, Established Charging Flow, and is controlling Charging Flow to maintain PZR level stable per 1BEP-3 step 24.
Critical Tasks CT-18: Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.
(K/A number - EPE 038-EA1.32 importance 4.6/4.7)
CT-21: Terminate SI and control RCS pressure and makeup flow so that primary and secondary inventory are stable before the end of the scenario (K/A number - EPE 038-EA1.30 importance 4.0/3.8)
1 Facility: Byron_____________ Scenario No.: N19-5________
Op-Test No.: 2019-301_
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators:
Initial Conditions: IC-175; 75.0% power 912 MW, MOL, steady state, 919 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, CBD at 171 steps.
Turnover: 1B CW pump is OOS for an intake bay inspection; it is expected back in service in two days. Following turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP to swap GC pumps in preparation for an OOS on 1GC01PB next shift. A power ascension to 1120 MWe at 0.6 MWe/min will be initiated when the GC pump swap is completed. Online risk is green.
Event No.
Malf. No.
Event Type*
Event Description Preload IOR ZDI1CW01PB PTL IOR ZDI1CW001B CLS MRF ED093B OPEN CW Pp 1B Out of Service CW Pp 1B discharge valve closed 1
BOP performs swap of operating Stator Cooling Water Pumps per BOP-GC-5 2
IMF RX18B 570 120 I (ATC, SRO)
TS (SRO)
Primary RTD NR TC, 1TE421B, fails high. The crew will implement 1BOA INST-2, Attachment A. Tech Spec 3.3.1 will be entered.
N (BOP)
Raise power at 0.6 MW/min per 1BGP 100-3T5.
4 IMF PN1100 ON TS (SRO)
CNMT Hatch Door Seal Supply Air Press. Tech Spec 3.6.2 will be entered.
5 MRF ZDI1PK455A MAN IOR ZDI1PK455A I (ATC, SRO)
Master PZR Pressure Controller 1PK455A fails low. ATC operator will place the controller to manual per BHC 1-RY-P 6
IOR ZDI1WO01PA TRIP IOR ZLO1WO01PA2 ON IMF PN1427 ON C (BOP, SRO)
Containment Chilled WTR Pp 1A Trips. The BOP will start the standby Chilled Water pump and chiller per BOP VP-1.
7 IMF RX05 1500 30 C (BOP, SRO)
Steam Line Press Detector 1PT-507 Fails High. BOP will take manual control of the FW pump controller per BHC SG. Steam Dump pressure controller will be placed to Manual.
8 IMF ED07C IMF RP02A (preload)
IMF RP02B (preload)
M (ALL)
Loss Of 4160v Bus 4160v Bus 143 Reactor Trip Breaker Fails To Open RTA Reactor Trip Breaker Fails To Open RTB
2 9
ZDI1HSTG010 NORM (preload)
IMF TC03 (preload)
IMF TC14A 41 MRF RP34 OUT MRF RP35 OUT MRF RP60 OUT MRF RP61 OUT IMF RD09 0 C (ALL)
Turbine Trip (20-1/AST)
Turbine Auto Trip Failure GV1 Servo Failure (#1 GV remains open)
MS Isolation Train A relay failure MS Isolation Train A relay fail MS Isolation Train B relay fail MS Isolation Train B relay fail Control Rods fail to insert in automatic.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
3 SCENARIO C19-5 OVERVIEW 75.0% power 912 MW, MOL, steady state, 919 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, CBD at 171 steps. 1B CW pump is OOS for an intake bay inspection; it is expected back in service in two days. Following turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP to swap GC pumps in preparation for an OOS on 1GC01PB next shift. A power ascension to 1120 MWe at 0.6 Mwe/min will be initiated when the GC pump swap is completed. Online risk is green.
After completing shift turnover and relief; the BOP will start the standby stator cooling water pump and secure the operating stator cooling water pump per BOP GC-5.
After swap of Stator Cooling Water Pumps; Primary NR TC RTD, 1TE421B, fails to 570oF. Tave 1B rises, Loop 1B T lowers. Control Rods begin to step in. The ATC operator will place control rods to Manual per BHC 1-RD UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION. The crew will implement 1BOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL Attachment A. Tech Spec 3.3.1 conditions A and E will be entered.
After Tc RTD failure is addressed; The BOP will initiate a turbine load ascension per 1BGP 100-3T5, LOAD CHANGE INSTRUCTION SHEET FOR RAISING POWER < 15% IN ONE HOUR, while the ATC will perform reactivity calculation and the perform dilutions and rod withdrawal as determined by ReMA and using BOP CV-5T1, RCMS OPERATION IN DILUTE/ALT DILUTE CHECKLIST.
After a measurable change in power; Annunciator 1-1-B2 CNMT HATCH DOOR SEAL TROUBLE will be received.
The crew will dispatch an operator to investigate. Air lock supply air pressure will be reported low and, if asked, will take actions to return supply air pressure to normal range. Tech Spec 3.6.2 condition A will be entered After the CNMT Hatch Door Seal Supply Air Press failure is addressed, Master PZR Pressure Controller 1PK455A fails low. Demand lowers, PZR spray valves close and PZR heaters energize. Actual PZR pressure begins to rise. The ATC operator will place the controller to manual per BHC 1-RY-P PRESURIZER PRESSURE MALFUNCTION.
After the Master PZR Pressure Controller 1PK455A failure is addressed; the 1 A Containment Chilled Water pump will trip, resulting in the1A Containment Chiller tripping. The BOP will start the standby Chilled Water pump and chiller per BOP VP-1, RCFC REFRIGERATION UNIT AND CHILLED WATER SYSTEM STARTUP, after receiving a report that the 1 A Chilled Water pump motor appears damaged. Containment pressure and temperature will slowly rise as a result of the loss of Containment Cooling.
After the Chilled WTR Pp failure is addressed; steam line pressure detector 1PT-507 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main feedwater pumps speed will rise, rising feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin rise. The BOP will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the FW pump controller per BHC-1-SG, STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL. 1BOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment J, will be implemented AND Steam Dump pressure controller will be placed to Manual. 1PT-507 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
After the 1PT-507 failure is addressed; bus 143 is lost causing the loss of 1A and 1C CW pumps. Condenser vacuum will degrade. An automatic Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip signal, if generated, will fail and a manual Reactor Trip and Manual Turbine Trip will be required. The Reactor will NOT Trip and the crew will implement 1BFR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS. The control rods will fail to move in automatic requiring manual insertion.
The Turbine will NOT Trip and when the governor valves are run back, GV1 will remain partially open. Main Steamline Isolation will then be actuated. The local operator, when dispatched, will locally Trip the Reactor Trip Breakers after Emergency Boration flow of greater than 30 gallons has been verified. The crew will then return to 1BEP-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
The scenario is complete when the crew has transitioned from 1BEP-0 to 1BEP ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION.
Critical Tasks:
CT-52: Insert negative reactivity into the core by manually inserting the Control Rods prior to dispatching operators to locally trip the reactor.
(K/A number - EPE 029-EA2.08; importance 3.4/3.5)
CT-50: Isolate main turbine from SGs during ATWS prior to re-entering 1BEP-0 (K/A: EPE 029EA1.13; importance - 4.1/3.9)