ML19341C072

Trip Rept of 801104 Visit to Facility Re Seismic Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys & Supporting Subsystems.Licensee Will Add Two Addl Pumps to Sys.List of Attendees & Draft Revised Procedure Encl

ML19341C072
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	12/09/1980
From:	Caruso R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8102280581
Download: ML19341C072 (21)

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UNITED STATES E

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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December 9,1980 Docket No. 50-29 FOR:

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5, DL FROM:

Ralph Caruso, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #5, DL

SUBJECT:

TRIP REPORT - SEISMIC EVALUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW), YANKEE-ROWE PLANT (NOVEMBER 4, 1980)

Background

By letter dated October 21, 1980 we identified several generic concerns related to the seismic design capabilities of AFW systems in operating PWRs and described a program which we intended to undertake in order to review the capability of operation PWRs to remove decay heat following an earthquake. As part of this program we proposed that members of the staff visit several plant sites to better define the scope and depth of the review. On November 4,1980, a number of staff members and a repre-sentative of one of our consultants visited Yankee-Rowe and conducted a wal k-down of the AFW system and supporting sub-systems. Entrance and exit meetings were held with representatives of the licensee.

A list of attendees is enclosed.

Discussion After initial entrance processing, members of the NRC team met with the licensee to discuss the purpose of the visit and the breadth of the in-spection to be performed. The Yankee representatives had been briefed before the visit and had prepared copies of the system drawings (fig. 4) so that members of the NRC team could more readily understand the Yankee-Rowe design. The licensee explained the operation of the AFW system and the ties into the Main Feed system. Several other systems which can also be used as a backup source of feedwater, such as the high pressure safety injection system, the charging system and the low pressure safety injection system, were also described. ;01scussions of other additional paths for feed flow besides the main feed line were presented (Fig 5). The NRC team was provided with copies of the procedure for loss-of-feedwater (Enclosure 2) and was told that the plant had not once had to rely on the AFW system in an emergency in the 19 years of plant operation.

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. The inspection team started at the condensate storage tank and walked along all piping to qualitatively evaluate the ability of both the piping and equipment to withstand postulated seismic loads. The team was also shown the main steam line which supplies the AFW pump turbine and the AFW system instrumentation in the control room, including the support given to equipment mounted in the main control panel. The other systems which could be used to inject feedwater into the steam generator were reviewed a similar manner.

Based on this effort, the staff suggested the following actions the licensee should promptly take to improve the seismic capability:

1.

The hold down bolts on tanks TK-1 and TX-39 which can supply emergency feedwater to the steam generators should be tightened so that no vertical gap exists between the nut and the bolt sleeve attached to the tank. The team appreciated that the gaps may be there to permit bending of the bolt to allow for radial thermal expansion of the tank. This could be much better accomplished by the use of radially slotted holes for the bolts. (see Figs.1 & 2).

2.

Two additional lateral restraints should be added to the long horizontal straight run (approx. 60') of 2 inch emergency feedwater pipe between the pump and the leveler for all four steam generators. The lateral restraints perpendicular to the pipe run should be located between the one existing lateral restraint and the elbow up to the header, each spaced at approximately 20 feet starting at the existing restraint. In addition a lateral restraint in the axial direction of this pipe run also should be provided (see Fig. 3).

At the completion of the tour, an exit meeting with the licensee was held, l

and the NRC team discussed its findings with senior members of the plant i

management. The team explained that it had been looking for obvious areas where quick improvements could be made and that detailed analyses of the piping might_ show that other modifications may be necessary. The licensee indicated a willingness to resolve the problems expeditiously and requested t

that the team summarize its findings in a formal letter. They also discussed their plans for' adding two additional AFW pumps and presented the team with prints of the modified AFW system (Fig 6). These modifications are expected to be completed by the summer of 1981.

s 3-I The inspection team recommended that Yankee continue its efforts to upgrade its AFW system and also recommended that they also perform detailed walk-downs and evaluations by qualified individuals of these and other systems essential to decay heat removal in order for them to identify components which are in need of additional upgrading and to decide on any appropriate corrective actions.

The results of this visit will be used in future correspondence with the licensee on this subject.

Y l VAf&

Ralp Caruso, Project Manager i

Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing Enclosures :

As stated cc w/ enclosures:

See next page l

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Mr. Janes A. Kay cc Mr. James E. Tribble, P resident Yankee Atomic Electric Company 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01 581 Greenfield Connanity College 1 College Drive 5

Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301 l

Chairman Scard of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting Council 14th Floor One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Director, Criteria and Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460) l U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D. C.

20460 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC Post Office Box 28 Monroe Bridge, Massachusetts 01350 1

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s ATTENDEES I

Yankee l

H. Autto Plant Manager

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J. Kay Senior Engineer-Licensing S. Fournier.

Engineer J. Staab Engineer t

i NRC D. Crutchfield G. Houlahan R. Caruso i

T. Cheng T. Foley l

Consultant 3

J. Stevenson - SMA I

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nclosure 2 Dept. Supv.459 /$ 7??D Proc. No.

OP-3203 PORC 3se;7

,Rev. No.

9 ()hjor)

Plant Supt.

N/M Review Date 2/82 LOSS OF FEEDWATER SCOPE i

To prescribe the action to be taken in the event of a loss of steam generator feedwater or a leak that may occur in the feedwater system at any point between the condensate pumps and the feed line check i

valves in the Vapor Container which may not be contained or isolated.

ENCLOSURES OP-3203 - Pgs. 1-5 & 7 Rev. 9 OP-3203 - Pg. 6 - Rev. 8 OPF-3203.1 - Rev. 8 DISCUSSION Loss of feedwater may be caused by the inabiliity to restart boiler feed pumps after a plant trip. The immediate action requires re-establishing steam generator feedwater with the emergency boiler feed pump and restarting No. 2 and 3 main coolant pumps.

Feed line breaks on the steam generator side of a feed line check valve are not covered in this procedure, since in all probability it would be impossible to distinguish a break of this type from a main steam line break inside the vapor container. Feed line breaks of this category should be considered as steam line breaks inside

.the vapor container and are covered in OP-3201, " Loss of Secondary Coolant".

It is with a feed line break inside the VC on the steam generator side of the feedline check valve that safety injection could be initiated by the rapid cooling and depressurizing effect on the Main Coolant System at 1700 PSIG or by increasing Vapor Container pressure at 5 PSIG. If the safety injection system initiates it should only be cutback or secured when the shutdown criteria of'OP-3106, " Loss of Main Coolant" is satisfied.

If loss of feedwater and small main coolant system break occur simultan-eously the following would apply. The formation of voids in the reactor core is possible if feedwater is not restored in approximately one half hour to provide an adequate heat sink for the main coolant system.

If 40*F subcooling is maintained on the MC system with an adequate heat sink, the possibility of forming voids will. be minimized.

If the break is small enough to preclude, a safety injection system initiation the charging pumps and pressurizer heaters should adequately maintain the required main coolant system overpressurization.

If the charging pumps cannot maintain main coolant system overpressurize, the safety injection system shall-be manually initiated. If for some highly unlikely reason feedwater cannot be re-established to provide a main coolant system heat. sink it will be necessary to establish a ECCS flow path via the pressurizer power operated relief valve, PR-S0V-90, to provide for core cooling.

+

For indications of core cooling and main coolant overpressneization.

Monitor the the Main Coolant System saturation monitor; ana also the incore thermocouple temperature and Tc and Th temperature. Pressurizer level may provide erronous indication if the break is in the pressurizer

. steam space, i

. -. _ - _ _ =

, OP-3203 Rev. 9 SYMPTOMS 1.

Hot water and/or steam escaping from the break.

2.

Low boiler feed pump suction and discharge pressures.

3.

Low steam generator level indication and alarm.

NOTE:

The following symptoms during a feed line break are possible if the break is inside the VC downstream of the check valve.

It is considered a steamline break.

Follow OP-3201, " Main Steam Line Rupture".

4.

Increasing Vapor Container atmospheric temperature and pressure indication.

5.

Increasing Vapor Container humidity indication.

6.

Increased sound level of the Vapor Container intercom system.

7.

Vapor Container high pressure alarm @ 2.5 PSIG.

AUTOMATIC ACTION 1.

Auto start of standby condensate and boiler feed pumps (BFP) with associated panel alarms.

2.

Reactor, turbine and boiler feed pump trip.

IMMEDIATE OPF.RATOR ACTION 1.

Reaffirm reactor scram, turbine trip. all B.F.P.'s off and initiate OP-3000, " Emergency Shutdown From Power".

2.

Upon indication and verification of a loss of feed water the dedicated operator assigned to emergency boiler feed pump operation shall start the E.B.F.P. and commence feeding the steam generators by:

a)

Opening the EBFP steam throttle valve and then i

establishing sealing water.

(Control Room should secure the Bus Room fans.)

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b)

Close the small Bailey bypass regulator downstream isolation valves (4).

(Control Room will close the four motor operated feed valves.)

.c)

Open the emergency feed supply valves to all unaffected steam generator feed lines.

i d)

Close the emergency boiler feed pump recirculation valve to obtain 1000 psig to 1050 psig discharge pressure. Notify the Control Room and maintain communications for the necessary information as to steam generator levels and pressures.

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NOTE:

Feed the steam generators with the lowest l

indicated level first, verify flow as-indi-cated on the Emergency Boiler Feedwater Flow Meters.

. OP-3203 Rev. 9

, 3.

Connect the No. 2 and No. 3 Main Coolant Loop TC valve electrical leads (MC-MOV-302, MC-MOV-310) and energize the power supply to them.

4.

Restart No. 2 and 3 MCP's one at a time by closing its Tc valve, (checking its bypass valve open) and energizing the pump.

If both No. 2 and 3 MCP's can't be restarted in approximately ten (10) minutes, secure all four (4) main coolant pumps and commence NATURAL CIRCULATION.

5.

As soon as possible, cut in No. 2 and No. 3 MC loops to the reactor vessel. Close associated loop bypass valves.

6.

Initiate " Local Emergency", OP-3300.

SUBSEQUENT OPEhATOR ACTION NOTE:

If at any time TK-1 and TK-39 are not available when required then CASE D is to be utilized.

The following subsequent operations outline operator action under four separate cases.

In Case A it is assumed that the normal boiler feed system can not be operated and emergency boiler feed will have to be implemented; Case B assumes that the normal boiler feed system can be used; Case C assumes that neither Case A nor B can provide the necessary feedwater - then case C provides feedwater with S.I. pumps via charging pumps pool piece to normal feed lines.

Case 3 assumes Case A, B or C cannot be used - then emergency feed is supplied with charging pumps or S.I. pumps via steam generator blowdown lines.

CASE A.

A break in the feed water piping between the condensate pumps and the feed line motor operated isolation valves has occurred.

NOTE:

If at any time TK-1 is no longer operable (lost integrity, low level alarm or indi-cated, etc.) then TK-39 can be valved in as the secondary demineralized water source as follows:

a) Close DW-V-609 l

b) Open DW-V-793 c) Open DW-V-777 1.

If possible maintain the main condenser vacuum. Check tripped the boiler feed and heater drain pumps.

If main condenser vacuum is lost secure steam to the air ejector and gland seals.

2.

Leave all four MC-pumps running as long as possible to provide a heat sink for the MC system via the steam generators.

If main coolant pumps are not in service monitor the main coolant Th, Tc and core thermocouples as indications of continued natural recirculation flow. THERMOCOUPLE READINGS AB0VE 550*F OR TH-TC = a T 2 40 F INDICATE LOSS OF NATURAL CIRCULATION and is an indication of possible VOID forma-tion..

. OP-3203 Rev. 9 3.

Establish maximum main coolant system feed and bleed flows.

4.

Initiate low pressure surge tank cooling at the maximum rate required.

5.

Line up the atmospheric dump for use as required.

6.

Isolate the break if possible by closing isolation valves, de-energize boiler feed pump breakers and tag out.

i 7.

Place the auxiliary boilers in service as per DP-2278, " Operation of the Auxiliary Boilers".

8.

The maximum main coolant system cooldown rate shall not exceed 50*F/hr.

(Technical Specification 3.4.8.1.b.2.)

9.

Do NOT feed water to a steam generator that has boiled dry.

10. Notify higher supervision.

11.

If additional feed to the steam generators is required and the feed line between the outlet of the feedwater heater and the feed line M0V's is intact, then the charging system emergency cross tie spool piece feed line to the normal feed line may be used (dependent upon pressurizer level, it will most likely require the removal of the F-8 fuses to allow manual control of the charging pumps).

(a) Check that the charging line emergency feed line spool piece is installed, if not, then install.

(b) Close the emergency feed line drain valves.

Primary Side - CH-V-643 Secondary Side - CH-V-689 (c) Place all charging pumps control switches in trip pullout position.

(d) Check closed the strong boric acid, safety injection suction from L.P.S.T. and purification line valves to the charging pump suction header and secure bleed.

Trip LCV-222 CS-MOV-529 Closed CS-MOV-540 Closed PU-V-631 Closed CH-MOV-521' Closed

. OP-3203 Rev. 9 (e) Close No. I feedwater heater outlet feed line isolation valve BF-V-614.

NOTE:

If No. I feedwater heater is bypassed it may be necessary to close the BFP discharge valves to prevent back leakage.

(f) Open each available feedwater line Motor Operated stop valve.

WCBD MOV 1003 - 1006 (open)

(g) Open the emergency feed line valves.

i CH-V-641 (secondary side) open CH-V-642 (secondary side) open CH-V-692 (primary side) open CH-V-751 (primary side) open 1

(h) Open demineralized water supply to charging pump suction DW-MOV-655 (open).

(i) Start one or more charging pumps and commence feeding to desired level the selected steam generators by

. operation of Bailey Feed Valves.

(j) Check for leakage at spool piece flanges and demineralized valves.

12.

If at any time steam generator feed requirements are reduced and the charging pumps are needed to restore pressurizer level.

(a) Stop the charging pumps, place control switches in trip pull and close CH-V-692 or CH-V-751.

1 (b) Close DW-MOV-655.

l (c) Restore L.P.S.T. or safety injection suction to the charging pumps by opening CH-MOV-521, or CS-MOV-540.

(d) Start the charging pumps and ' restore pressurizer level.

l (e) Open the bleed line trip valve LCV-222.

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. OP-3203 Rev. 8 CASE B.

A break (s) in the feedwater piping between the motor operated feed stop valves and the steam generators outside the Vapor Container has occurred and at least TWO steam generator feed lines remain operational.

NOTE:

If at any time TK-1 is no longer operable (lost integrity, low level alarm or indicated, etc.)

then TK-39 can be valved in as follows:

a) Close DWV-609 b) Open DW-V-793 c) Open DW-V-777 1.

Close the feed line motor operated stop valve (s) and bypass valves on the defective feed line(s). Check mezzanine feed line pressure gauges for indication of line break (s).

2.

Trip the main coolant pump (s) on the affected loop (s),

close the affected loop (s) TC valve (s).

l NOTE: The valve electrical leads must be reconnected for valve operations.

3.

Establish adequate hot well level.

4.

Restart a boiler feed pump and resume feed to the unaffected feedwater lines.

5.

Maintaining a water level in at least 2 steam generators is IMPORTANT in providing a heat sink for the M.C. system.

6.

Do NOT. feed water to a steam generator that has boiled dry.

CASE C.

If Case A or B cannot be used, the Safety Injection Pumps may be used for feeding the steam generators via the hot leg injection piping, through the charging system emergency crosstie spool piece to the normal feedwater lines provided:

(1) The Safety Injection system is not needed for MC over-pressurization or core cooling.

(2) The No. 3 charging pumps is available to provide MC system overpressurization via the loop fill header or to control normal level and overpressurization is being provided by the pressurizer steam bubbles.

Line up the charging cross tie spool piece and normal feed lines as follows:

Check closed the Hot Leg Injection Valves SI-MOV-514 (closed)

SI-MOV-515 (closed)

Check closed charging'line emergency feed CH-V-741 (closed Close CH-MOV-524 Open CH-MOV-523

. OP-3203 Rev. 9 NOTE:

Double breakers in the Bus Room will have to be closed to energize CH-MOV-523 and CH-MOV-524.

Close charging system discharge header division valve CH-V-607 Place # 1 & 2 charging pumps in trip pullout.

The # 3 charging pump providing normal pressurizer level via loop fill valve CH-MOV-522 through one or more loop fill valves to MC system.

(Loops cut in to the reactor vessel)

Close the charging system emergency feed crosstie spool piece drain valves.

Primary side CH-V-643 (closed)

Secondary side CH-V-689 (closed) f Open the cross tie spool piece feed valves Primary side CH-V-692 (open)

Primary side CH-V-751 (open)

Secondary Side CH-V-641 (open)

Secondary Side CH-V-642 (open)

Close the # 1 feedwater heater outlet feed valve BF-V-614 NOTE:

If #1 F.W. heater is bypassed it may be necessary to close the B.F.P. discharge valves to prevent back leakage.

Start one LPSI and one HPSI pump.

Open either SI-MOV-514 or 515 (Hot Leg Inj. Valves)

Control steam generator levels with the Bailey feed valves from the Control Room.

CASE D.

If for some reason the normal feed system to any two (2) of the steam ~ generators (Case B) or emergency boiler feed pump lines or charging system emergency feed via spool piece and normal feed lines to all four (4) steam generators cannot.be used (Case A),

emergency feed to steam generators may be established via the steam generator blowdown lines using the S.I. pumps Part A or charging pumps Part B as follows:

CASE D:

PART A - EMERGENCY FEED VIA THE BLOWDOWN LINE USING THE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS 1.

Main coolant overpressurization (above Sat. Temp.) is being maintained via the charging system, or pressurizer steam bubble and normal level control.

'2.

Ensure that-the SI pumps are not:needed for M.C. pressurization

, and the charging pumps are meeting this need then proceed with Step 3.

3.

lLine up the safety injection emergency feed line to the

. steam generators via the steam generator blowdown lines.

Check closed hot leg injection valves SI-MOV-514 (closed) i

- SI-MOV-515 - (closed)

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. OP-3203 Rev. 9 Check closed charging line emergency feed CH-V-741 (closed Close emergency feed line vent valve SI-V-702 (closed)

Open safety injection emergency feed valve SI-V-700 (open)

Trip the steam generator blowdown trip valves TV-401A, B, C and D Check open 2" blowdown valves VD-V-602 VD-V-607 VD-V-612 VD-V-617 Open emergency feed header isolation valve SI-V-701 The emergency feed system is now lined up as far as each steam generator emergency feed valve.

4.

Start a L.P.S.I. pump and a l!.P.S.I. pump.

5.

Open emergency feed valves VD-V-1093 through VD-V-1096 (open) for all available steam generators.

NOTE:

With any two (2) steam generator emergency feed valves open steam generator levels will equalize.

6.

Feed steam generators to desired level.

CASE D:

P_ ART B - EMERGENCY FEED VIA THE BLOWDOWN LINE USING THE CHARGING PUMPS 1.

Trip all charging pumps.

2.

Perform the following lineup.

Close strong boric acid feed CS-MOV-529 (closed)

Close safety injection feed CS-MOV-540 (closed)

Close safety L.P.S.T. feed to charging pumps CH-MOV-521 (closed)

Close purification to charging pumps PU-V-631 (closed)

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Open the demineralized water supply to the charging pumps DW-MOV-655 (open)

Closed S.I. emergency feed valve SI-V-700 Check open or open SI-V-701 l

Open charging system emergency feed valve CH-V-741 l

Open emergency feed valves as required VD-V-1093

'#1 S/G VD-V-1094

1. 2 S/G l

VD-V-1095

1. 3 S/G VD-V-1096

1. 4 S/G l

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' OP-3203 d

Rev. 9 l

t 3.

Start one or more charging pumps and feed steam gene rators.

Monitor charging header pressure and steam generator pressures.

n FINAL CONDITIONS i

The plant is shutdown.

The feedwater requirements of the steam generators are being provided by either the emergency boiler feed pump, normal feed-water equipment, or via the charging pump spool piece to normal feed header.

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Higher supervision has been notified and repairs are either in progress or being planned.

All pertinent data related to the plant trip has been recorded.

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