ML19341A123

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 800401-30
ML19341A123
Person / Time
Site: Peach Bottom  
Issue date: 10/27/1980
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19341A109 List:
References
50-277-80-08, 50-277-80-8, 50-278-80-07, 50-278-80-7, NUDOCS 8101220161
Download: ML19341A123 (2)


Text

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APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Philadelphia Electric Company Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Based on the results of an NRC inspection conducted from April 1 - April 30, 1980, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full compliance with the conditions of your NRC Facility License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 as indicated below.

These items are infractions.

Technical Specification 6.11 requires:

" Procedures for personnel radiation pro-tection shall be prepared consistent with requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving per-sonnel radiation exposure."

A.

Health Physics Procedure HP0/CO-10a Revision 2, " Conduct in Controlled Areas - Minimize Exposure" dated May 10, 1978, states in part..." Eating, smoking, and drinking are not permitted in the ceneral plant areas.

Spe-cific designated eating and smoking areas have teen identifted.

Permanent areas (unless temporary conditions prohibit) are.

a)

Control Room b)

Restrooms c)

Health Physics Field Offices d)

Refuel Floor Change Areas e)

Radwaste Control Room f)

Rx 3 - 195 Fan Room Area g)

R/W 165 h)

T-165 against wall of Control Room i)

APO Field Office T-116 j)

T-116 near Sample Station" Contrary to the above, smoking prohibitions were not observed, in that, on April 14, 21, and 22,1980 the inspector identified crushed, partially s..loked cigarettes, used matches, and partially smoked cigars as well as trash, litter and debris in the following non-designated smoking areas.

1)

Cable Spreading Room 2

Unit Three Electrical Panel 30 C 21 3

Turbine building 165 foot level adjacent to the Unit Two Turbine 4

At Door 343 to the Unit Three Reactor Building 5)

Unit 3 Reactor Building 165 foot level:

9

'l "

9

l 2

a)

Behind safety related cable tray ZB 3M 429 b)

In the Unit 3 Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchanger drains (a radiol-ogically controlled area) c)

In the Vicinity of Ventilation Piping 6)

Grating in the Radwaste Exhaust Fan Room 7)

Unit 3 Control Room Ventilation Supply Radiation Monitor OBC-186 8)

Turbine Building,116 foot level lay down area 9)

In the overhead above the control room where work was being conducted.

B.

Technical Specification 6.11 requires: " Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involv-ing personnel radiation exposure."

Health Physics Procedure HP0/C0-4, " Radiation Work Permits", Revision 14, dated September 24, 1979, states in part..."All personnel who desire to enter the area covered by the RWP shall read and be familiar with the data and instructions on the RWP and sign their own name.

Each person shall provide the following data:

name... data... time in...

dosimeter reading... authorized exposure..."

Contrary to the above, radiation work permit (RWP) requirements were not met on April 8,1980, in that the three individuals working in the Unit 2 Reactor Building 135 foot level at the Control Rod Drive control station, an area covered by RWP #2-03-0298 dated March 28, 1980, had not read the RWP, had not signed in on the RWP, and had not provided the required data on entering the area.

(Recurrentitem)

C.

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action" states in part,

" Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to qua-lity such as failure, malfunctions, deficiencies...are promptly identi-fied and corrected.

Contrary to the above, a safety related cable penetration (. Nomenclature ZB3MV05), located in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 165 foot elevation was found on April 21,

^80 to have a broken seal which compromised the seal and fire protection capability.

Further, there was no evidence to demon-strate that the seal had been inspected nor had measures been taken to identify and correct this penetration inadequacy.

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