05000219/LER-1980-057, Forwards LER 80-057/03L-0

Forwards LER 80-057/03L-0

ML19340D716
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/23/1980
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19340D717	List: 05000219/LER-1980-057, Forwards LER 80-057/03L-0 05000219/LER-1980-057-03, /03L-0:on 801205,containment Spray High Drywell Pressure Switches IP15A,B,C & D Tripped Above Tech Spec Levels During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Instrument Repeatability.Switches Adjusted
References
NUDOCS 8101050211
Download: ML19340D716 (3)

LER-1980-057, Forwards LER 80-057/03L-0

Event date:
Report date:
2191980057R00 - NRC Website

text

-

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION l4[e3,2:s L]

cTgTQZ g,C (609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388

• FORKED RIVER

• NEW JERSEY

• 08731 5

c M L. uiu.s u.4, Decenber 23, 1980 3

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director 0

Office of Inspection and Enforcanent G

Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnssion W

641 Park Avenue Wa r

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

)/"

[j [j,

M

? :7-

Dear Mr. Grier:

O 5

ha G

SUBJECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-57/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Feport to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-57/3L in ccrcpliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b. (1) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

/Maud/

van R. Finfrock, J.

Vice President Gen ation i

IRF:dh l

Enclosures cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Acting Director (40 copies) l Office of Inspection and Enforcenent United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmussion Washington, D.C.

20555 Mr. William G. Mcdonald, Director (3 copies)

Office of Management InforIration and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission l

Washington, D.C.

20555 i

l l

l l:

1rIO l o 50#I/r4

.3-

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GEEPATING STATICU Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Peport Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/80-57/3L Report Date December 23, 1980 Occurrence Date Decmber 5, 1980 1

l Identification of Occurrence Contair ent Spray Systen high drywell pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C and IP-15D tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications Table 3.1.1, iten E.1.

This event is considered to be a retrrtable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b. (1).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power. Major plant parameters at the time of occu.crence were:

i Power:

Core 1930 MWt Electrical 665 Mia 4

Flow:

Recirculation 15.7 x 10 y

}

Feedwater 7.1 x 106 lb/hr l

Description of Occurrence:

On Friday, Decarber 5,1980, while perfoming the " Containment Spray Systen Autanatic Actuation Test", the IP-15A, IP-158, IP-15C and IP-15D trip points were found to be less conservative than those specified in the Technical Speci-fications. Surveillance testing on the High Drywell pressure switches for the Containment Spray Systen revealed the following data:

Pressure Switch Designation Desired Setpoint As Found As Left IP-15A

<2 psig 2.20 1.92 IP-15B 72 psig 2.24 1.95 IP-15C 72 psig 2.14 1.94 IP-15D [2psig 2.06 1.93 I

1

Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/80-57/3L Apoarent Cause of Occurrence

'Ihe cause of the occurrence was attributed,tg instrument repaatability. The high alam switch setpoints are set at 2.0 _o,1 psig and the long term repeatability of the instruments is approximately 2-3% (.2.3 psig) of full range. Therefore, although the instruments will be operating within design accuracy, the technical specification limit of 2.0 psig can be exceeded during surveillance testing.

Analysis of Occurrence The Contammnt Spray System consists of two independent cooling loops, each capable of reoving fission product decay heat frm the prinury containment after a postulated loss of cooling accident. 'Ihe containment spray systcm autmatically initiates upon receipt of two high drywell pressure and two reactor low-low water level signals in either of two trip systms.

The safety significance of this event is considered nunimal since the high drywell pressure switches would have actuated but at a slightly higher pressure than the required setpoint. 'Ihis function would have been delayed by only a small fraction of a second (approxirately 0.1 seconds frm the start of the design basis loss of coolant accident). Since the reactor low-low water level setpoint is not expected to be reached until approximately 4 seconds from the start of the design basis accident, the delay in actuating the high drywell pressure switches would have had no effect on initiating the containment spray systs.

Corrective Action

Pressure switches IP-15A, IP-15B, IP-15C and IP-15D were adjusted to trip within the Technical Specification limit of < 2 psig. It is recognized that there is a 4

drift probl m associated with the new snap-action switches which were recently installed during the 1980 Outage to upgrade the seismic qualifications. After consideration of the frequercy of occurrence of set point drift associated with ITT Barton differential pressure indicating switches with snap-action switches, the PORC recmmended replaccrent of these devices with a more suitable qualified model.

Failure Data Manufacturer - ITT Barton Model - 228A Indicating Pressure Switch Range: 0-10 psig i

5 i

i