ML19339E719
| ML19339E719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| Issue date: | 12/04/2019 |
| From: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339E714 | List: |
| References | |
| 2019-SMT-0135 | |
| Download: ML19339E719 (44) | |
Text
43 pages follow ENCLOSURE 6 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC MEETING SLIDES FOR THE DECEMBER 4 AND 5, 2019 PUBLIC MEETING BETWEEN SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC AND THE NRC SHINE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OVERVIEW PUBLIC VERSION
SHINE Accident Analysis Methodology John Olvera, Safety Analysis Manager
SHINE Medical Technologies l 2 SHINE Safety Analysis Overview Relationship between Maximum Hypothetical Accident and Design Basis Accidents Approach to Criticality Safety Topics Covered
SHINE Safety Analysis Overview
SHINE Medical Technologies l 4 Guidance documents:
Final Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) Augmenting NUREG-1537, Parts 1 & 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors
NUREG-1537, Parts 1 & 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors
NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Document
NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility
NUREG/CR-6410, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook Final Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-1537:
Primary guidance for performing the safety analysis for the irradiation facility (IF) and the radioisotope production facility (RPF) in Chapter 13 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Identifies the categories of accident scenarios applicable to the IF and to the RPF
Provides the content guidance for the Chapter 13 accident analysis Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l 5 Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology Final ISG Augmenting NUREG-1537 Integrated safety analysis (ISA)
Accident Catagories FSAR Chapter 13 Format & Content Process safety information ISA Summary Report Hazard Identification Radiological hazards Chemical hazards Other facility hazards Hazard Evaluations Process Hazards Analysis Accident sequences Likelihood & consequence Safety-Related SSCs Administrative controls FSAR Chapter 13 Accident Sequences FSAR Chapter 13 Engineered &
Administrative Controls Technical Specifications Material hazards Process technology Process equipment Dose Consequence Analysis
SHINE Medical Technologies l 6 The Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) methodology is identified in the interim staff guidance as an acceptable way of demonstrating adequate safety
Provides a structured method to identify and assess the relative risk of postulated accident scenarios
Provides a means to identify candidate controls for prevention and/or mitigation of postulated scenarios
Characterizes the consequences that require more detailed analysis (e.g., radiological dose, chemical dose)
The ISA methodology is applied to the entire SHINE facility, IF and RPF, for consistency Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l 7 Results from the ISA are directly mapped into the Chapter 13 accident analysis, as outlined in the ISG
Postulated accident scenarios identified in the ISA that have potential uncontrolled consequences are included in Chapter 13 of the FSAR
Controls that are identified as credited for prevention or mitigation in the ISA are also included in Chapter 13 of the FSAR
Consequence analyses results demonstrate that the SHINE accident dose criteria and hazardous chemical consequence limits are met Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l 8 Irradiation facility (IF) accident categories:
Maximum hypothetical accident
Insertion of excess reactivity
Reduction in cooling
Mishandling or malfunction of fuel (target solution)
Loss of normal electric power
External events
Mishandling or malfunction of equipment
Large undamped power oscillations
Detonation and deflagration in the primary system boundary
Unintended exothermic reaction other than detonation
Facility system interactions
Facility specific events (e.g., NDAS, TPS, heavy load drop)
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l 9 Radioisotope production facility (RPF) accident categories:
Malfunction or mishandling of equipment
Facility specific events (e.g., heavy load drops)
Inadvertent nuclear criticality in the RPF
Hazardous chemicals (e.g., uranium uptake)
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l10 External event accident categories:
Seismic event
Severe weather (e.g., Tornado, high winds, heavy snow, lightning)
External flooding events (i.e., probable maximum precipitation)
External fire events (e.g., vegetation, natural gas, vehicle fires)
Transportation accidents (e.g., aircraft impact, chemical truck accident)
Flooding events internal to the IF and RPF
On-site chemical/gas releases (e.g., spills)
Fire events internal to the IF and RPF are evaluated on a fire area basis Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l11 Hazard identification and evaluations Accident sequence development Discussion of safety-related controls Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l12 Hazard identification and evaluations
The hazard evaluation methods were selected based on the type of system, and in consultation with NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document, Appendix A
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) - applied to process oriented systems
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) - applied to complex mechanical systems
The hazard evaluation methods are performed in accordance with the Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l13 Hazard identification
Hazard categories are initially defined based on the process descriptions
Hazards specific to the process being analyzed are identified prior to the hazard evaluation
Additional hazards or interactions that are identified during the hazard evaluation are added
Example: Subcritical Assembly System (SCAS) hazard identification table from SCAS HAZOP report Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
SHINE Medical Technologies l14 Consequences of interest
Consequence categories are defined to characterize the type of consequence that may result from a process deviation or equipment failure
Consequence categories may include safety or operational outcomes
A process deviation or equipment failure may have more than one consequence
Example: SCAS consequence table from SCAS HAZOP report Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
SHINE Medical Technologies l15 Hazard evaluation tables
The hazard evaluation team discussions (HAZOP or FMEA) are documented in a set of tables that include:
Process deviations and/or equipment failures and their causes
Resulting consequences and associated category
Possible engineered (passive or active) and administrative controls
Recommendations for additional investigation, analysis, or design changes Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l16 Hazard evaluation results
The results are summarized for each system in a SHINE technical report
The results provide a basis for potential accident sequences to be developed in the next analysis phase, the process hazards analysis (PHA)
Potential candidates for preventive and/or mitigative controls
Recommendations for design improvements
Hazard evaluations will be reviewed and updated for final design Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology
SHINE Medical Technologies l17
Nuclear Systems
SCAS - Subcritical assembly system
TOGS - Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system
NDAS - Neutron driver assembly system
TPS - Tritium purification system
Process Systems
TSPS - Target solution preparation system
TSSS - Target solution staging system
VTS - Vacuum transfer system
PVVS - Process vessel vent system
RLWS - Radioactive liquid waste storage
RLWI - Radioactive liquid waste immobilization
RDS - Radioactive drain system
MEPS - Molybdenum (Mo) extraction and purification system
IXP - Iodine and xenon purification and packaging
URSS - Uranium receipt and storage system Hazard Evaluations Conducted
SHINE Medical Technologies l18
Auxiliary Systems
RVZ1 - Radiologically controlled area ventilation zone 1
RVZ2 - Radiologically controlled area ventilation zone 2
RVZ3 - Radiologically controlled area ventilation zone 3
N2PS - Nitrogen purge system Hazard Evaluations Conducted
SHINE Medical Technologies l19
Shielding and Confinement Systems
ICBS - Irradiation cell biological shield
PFBS - Production facility biological shield
Auxiliary Systems
PCLS - Primary closed loop cooling system
LWPS - Light water pool system
RPCS - Radioisotope process facility cooling system
FSTR - Facility structure
Electrical and I&C Systems
TRPS - TSV reactivity protection system
NFDS - Neutron flux detection system
ESFAS - Engineered safety features actuation system
CAAS - Criticality accident alarm system
UPSS - Uninterruptible electrical power supply system Supporting Systems Evaluated During Hazard Evaluations
SHINE Medical Technologies l20 PHA for internal and external events
Identify accident sequences based on the hazard evaluation results and the ISG to NUREG-1537 guidance
Estimate a risk index for each potential unmitigated accident sequence (likelihood x consequences)
Identify engineered and administrative controls for those sequences which have an unacceptable risk
Evaluate controlled risk indices crediting risk reduction from controls
Develop list of safety-related controls Accident Sequence Development
SHINE Medical Technologies l21 Accident Sequence Development
SHINE Medical Technologies l22 Example: Process Hazard Analysis Accident Sequence Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
SHINE Medical Technologies l23 Selection of engineered controls from accident sequences
Reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the accident sequence
Mitigate the consequences of the accident sequence Administrative controls in place
Management measures: Ensure that the safety-related SSCs continue to perform their safety-related functions (e.g., surveillance and testing, periodic maintenance)
Specific administrative controls to perform some safety-related actions (e.g., operating procedures, sampling)
Nonsafety-related defense-in-depth controls also identified in the ISA Summary Report Safety-related controls are included in the Technical Specifications Discussion of Safety-Related Controls
SHINE Medical Technologies l24 Types of Controls - Safety-Related
Active engineered controls (AEC)
Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Specific administrative controls (SAC)
Types of Controls - Nonsafety-Related
Defense-in-depth (DID)
Discussion of Safety-Related Controls
SHINE Medical Technologies l25 Example: Safety-Related Control Selection Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
SHINE Medical Technologies l26 Example: Safety-Related Control Selection (from ISA)
Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
SHINE Medical Technologies l27 Accident sequences identified in the ISA and the ISG augmenting NUREG-1537
Postulated accident sequences that can result in unacceptable risk are candidates for inclusion in Chapter 13 of the FSAR
Initialing events, scenarios, and determination of consequences are detailed
Controls that are credited with preventive or mitigative safety functions are identified
Engineered and administrative controls (AEC, PEC, and SAC) are included in the Technical Specifications A maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) is also defined for the IF and the RPF Integration into the Chapter 13 Accident Analysis
SHINE Medical Technologies l28 Radiological dose consequences are summarized for the bounding case of each accident scenario type that has a potential consequence for the public or workers Radiological dose consequence acceptance criteria:
Public: 0.5 rem
Worker: 5.0 rem Chemical dose consequence acceptance criteria based on Protective Action Criteria (PAC)
Analysis results indicate that no PAC limits are exceeded for SHINE Integration into the Chapter 13 Accident Analysis
SHINE Medical Technologies l29 Integration into the Chapter 13 Accident Analysis
Relationship between Maximum Hypothetical Accident and Design Basis Accidents
SHINE Medical Technologies l31 A Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) is an accident that would release fission products and would have consequences greater than any credible accident
An MHA does not need to be a credible accident
The MHA serves as a bounding accident analysis for a non-power reactor MHA accidents are postulated for SHINE in accordance with the ISG guidance For SHINE, one MHA is defined for the IF and one MHA is defined for the RPF Maximum Hypothetical Accident
SHINE Medical Technologies l32 MHA for the IF:
The postulated MHA for the IF is a failure of the TSV off-gas system (TOGS) pressure boundary leading to a release of TSV radioactive gases into the TOGS confinement cell.
The N2PS actuates, but the PVVS flow path is assumed to be completely blocked, causing a maximum pressurization of the TOGS cell MHA for the RPF:
The MHA in the RPF is a fire in a carbon guard bed with degraded performance of the downstream carbon delay beds
The carbon guard bed releases its inventory to the downstream carbon delay beds which are normally credited with adsorbing 99 percent of the released iodine.
For the MHA, the carbon delay beds are assumed to be operating at a reduced efficiency of 95 percent Maximum Hypothetical Accident
SHINE Medical Technologies l33 Dose Comparison Between MHA and Design Basis Accident Accident Scenario Public Dose (mrem)
Worker Dose (mrem)
SHINE Radiological Dose Limits (TEDE) 500 5000 Irradiation Facility MHA 366 4800 Mishandling or Malfunction of Equipment (Release into the TOGS cell) 234 4760 Radioisotope Production Facility MHA 403 N/A PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Fire 81 N/A
SHINE Medical Technologies l34 An accident dose criterion of 5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to workers SHINE has proposed an accident dose criterion of 500 mrem TEDE to an individual member of the public
This criterion is within the accident dose criterion of 1 rem TEDE to a member of the public proposed by NRC Staff in the ongoing non-power production and utilization facility (NPUF) rulemaking
The accident dose criterion is also within the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protection Action Guides (PAGs) (ref: EPA 400-R-92-001), which would trigger protective actions resulting from a radiological incident SHINE Radiological Dose Limits
SHINE Medical Technologies l35 Consequence categories used in the ISA
High consequence: Public > 25 rem, Worker > 100 rem
Intermediate consequence: Public 5 rem < RD 25 rem, Worker 25 rem < RD 100 rem
Low consequence: RD less than the above categories The ISA consequence category limits are used to assess risk only during the process hazards analysis The accident dose limits must still be met to demonstrate safety SHINE Radiological Dose Limits
SHINE Medical Technologies l36 Safety Basis Source Term Assumptions:
Fission power: 137.5 kWth (licensed limit +10%)
Irradiation cycle time: 30 days (nominal is 5.5 days)
Time interval between irradiation cycles: [ ]PROP/ECI
No extraction assumed between irradiation cycles
Target solution service time: [ ]PROP/ECI
Noble gas partitioning fractions for solution that moves into the RPF:
Helium: [ ]PROP/ECI
Neon: [ ]PROP/ECI
Argon: [ ]PROP/ECI
Krypton: [ ]PROP/ECI
Xenon: [ ]PROP/ECI
Radon: [ ]PROP/ECI SHINE Source Term Description Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
Approach to Criticality Safety
SHINE Medical Technologies l38 SHINE maintains a nuclear criticality safety program (CSP) that complies with applicable American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standards as endorsed by RG-3.71, Revision 3
The CSP intends to meet the applicable criticality safety requirements of 10 CFR Part 70
Nuclear criticality safety in the RPF is discussed in detail in the Section 6b.3 of the FSAR Nuclear criticality safety evaluations (NCSEs) are conducted for each fissile material operation within the RPF to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes remain subcritical with an approved margin of subcriticality
A fissionable material operation is any process or system that has the potential to contain more than 250 g of non-exempt fissile material In systems where the equipment is not safe-by-design, the double contingency principle is used ensuring at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions are required before a criticality accident is possible Approach to Criticality Safety in the RPF
SHINE Medical Technologies l39 The preferred hierarchy of nuclear criticality safety controls is:
1.
Passive engineered 2.
Active engineered 3.
Enhanced administrative 4.
Administrative Control on two independent criticality parameters is preferred over multiple controls on a single parameter If redundant controls on a single parameter are used, a preference is given to diverse means of control on that parameter Approach to Criticality Safety in the RPF
SHINE Medical Technologies l40 Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) calculations NCSEs
What-if checklist to identify process upsets that may challenge typical criticality safety parameters
Credible process upsets evaluated if it is Safe-by-Design
Further evaluation using event tree analysis to identify process changes that must occur to result in criticality
Controls are identified as needed to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of occurrence to highly unlikely Results of the NCSEs are summarized in the ISA and in the FSAR Approach to Criticality Safety in the RPF
SHINE Medical Technologies l41 Normal and credible abnormal conditions
Normal or inadvertent draining of target solution from the TSV to the TSV dump tank
The TSV dump tank maintains target solution in a favorable geometry with natural cooling to the light water pool Subcriticality Assurance in the IF
SHINE Medical Technologies l42 Abnormal or Accident Conditions
Primary system boundary leakage that results in target solution migration into the light water pool (LWP)
The LWP provides a very large volume of water that dilutes the target solution to less than the single parameter limit on concentration
Settling or stratification of target solution would result in a thin plane of solution with a large surface area with significant neutron leakage
Primary system boundary leakage that results in water leakage into the primary system and target solution flood up into the TOGS
The TOGS condenser/demister pads inhibit the flow of entrained target solution into the TOGS skid
TOGS skid design has been analyzed for favorable geometry
TOGS skid components are located above the light water pool elevation Subcriticality Assurance in the IF
SHINE Medical Technologies l43 Abnormal or Accident Conditions
Primary system cooling system (PCLS) leakage that results in target solution migration into the PCLS
The PCLS operates at a higher pressure and a higher static head than the primary system, inhibiting target solution migration into the PCLS
Leakage of PCLS water into the TSV results in flow through the redundant overflow tubes into the TSV dump tank, initiating an IU Cell Safety Actuation Signal and isolation of the PCLS from the IU cell
Redundant PCLS isolation valves can stop any migration of target solution into the PCLS before a significant concentration can build-up Subcriticality Assurance in the IF