ML19339E719
| ML19339E719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| Issue date: | 12/04/2019 |
| From: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339E714 | List: |
| References | |
| 2019-SMT-0135 | |
| Download: ML19339E719 (44) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 6 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC MEETING SLIDES FOR THE DECEMBER 4 AND 5, 2019 PUBLIC MEETING BETWEEN SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC AND THE NRC SHINE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OVERVIEW PUBLIC VERSION 43 pages follow
SHINE Accident Analysis Methodology John Olvera, Safety Analysis Manager
Topics Covered SHINE Safety Analysis Overview Relationship between Maximum Hypothetical Accident and Design Basis Accidents Approach to Criticality Safety SHINE Medical Technologies l 2
SHINE Safety Analysis Overview Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology Guidance documents:
Final Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) Augmenting NUREG-1537, Parts 1 & 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors NUREG-1537, Parts 1 & 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Document NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility NUREG/CR-6410, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Accident Analysis Handbook Final Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-1537:
Primary guidance for performing the safety analysis for the irradiation facility (IF) and the radioisotope production facility (RPF) in Chapter 13 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Identifies the categories of accident scenarios applicable to the IF and to the RPF Provides the content guidance for the Chapter 13 accident analysis SHINE Medical Technologies l 4
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology Final ISG Augmenting NUREG-1537 Process safety Accident FSAR Chapter 13 information Catagories Format & Content Material hazards Integrated safety Process technology analysis (ISA)
Process equipment (NUREG-1520)
Hazard Identification Radiological hazards FSAR Chapter 13 Chemical hazards Accident Sequences Other facility hazards Dose Hazard Evaluations Consequence Process Hazards Analysis Analysis Accident sequences FSAR Chapter 13 Likelihood & consequence Engineered &
Safety-Related SSCs Administrative Administrative controls Controls ISA Summary Technical Report Specifications SHINE Medical Technologies l 5
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology The Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) methodology is identified in the interim staff guidance as an acceptable way of demonstrating adequate safety Provides a structured method to identify and assess the relative risk of postulated accident scenarios Provides a means to identify candidate controls for prevention and/or mitigation of postulated scenarios Characterizes the consequences that require more detailed analysis (e.g., radiological dose, chemical dose)
The ISA methodology is applied to the entire SHINE facility, IF and RPF, for consistency SHINE Medical Technologies l 6
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology Results from the ISA are directly mapped into the Chapter 13 accident analysis, as outlined in the ISG Postulated accident scenarios identified in the ISA that have potential uncontrolled consequences are included in Chapter 13 of the FSAR Controls that are identified as credited for prevention or mitigation in the ISA are also included in Chapter 13 of the FSAR Consequence analyses results demonstrate that the SHINE accident dose criteria and hazardous chemical consequence limits are met SHINE Medical Technologies l 7
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology Irradiation facility (IF) accident categories:
Maximum hypothetical accident Insertion of excess reactivity Reduction in cooling Mishandling or malfunction of fuel (target solution)
Loss of normal electric power External events Mishandling or malfunction of equipment Large undamped power oscillations Detonation and deflagration in the primary system boundary Unintended exothermic reaction other than detonation Facility system interactions Facility specific events (e.g., NDAS, TPS, heavy load drop)
SHINE Medical Technologies l 8
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology Radioisotope production facility (RPF) accident categories:
Malfunction or mishandling of equipment Facility specific events (e.g., heavy load drops)
Inadvertent nuclear criticality in the RPF Hazardous chemicals (e.g., uranium uptake)
SHINE Medical Technologies l 9
Overview of the SHINE Safety Analysis Methodology External event accident categories:
Seismic event Severe weather (e.g., Tornado, high winds, heavy snow, lightning)
External flooding events (i.e., probable maximum precipitation)
External fire events (e.g., vegetation, natural gas, vehicle fires)
Transportation accidents (e.g., aircraft impact, chemical truck accident)
Flooding events internal to the IF and RPF On-site chemical/gas releases (e.g., spills)
Fire events internal to the IF and RPF are evaluated on a fire area basis SHINE Medical Technologies l10
Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology Hazard identification and evaluations Accident sequence development Discussion of safety-related controls SHINE Medical Technologies l11
Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology Hazard identification and evaluations The hazard evaluation methods were selected based on the type of system, and in consultation with NUREG-1513, Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document, Appendix A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) - applied to process oriented systems Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) - applied to complex mechanical systems The hazard evaluation methods are performed in accordance with the Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures SHINE Medical Technologies l12
Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology SRI Hazard identification Hazard categories are initially defined based on the process descriptions Hazards specific to the process being analyzed are identified prior to the hazard evaluation Additional hazards or interactions that are identified during the hazard evaluation are added Example: Subcritical Assembly System (SCAS) hazard identification table from SCAS HAZOP report SHINE Medical Technologies l13
Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology SRI Consequences of interest Consequence categories are defined to characterize the type of consequence that may result from a process deviation or equipment failure Consequence categories may include safety or operational outcomes A process deviation or equipment failure may have more than one consequence Example: SCAS consequence table from SCAS HAZOP report SHINE Medical Technologies l14
Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology Hazard evaluation tables The hazard evaluation team discussions (HAZOP or FMEA) are documented in a set of tables that include:
Process deviations and/or equipment failures and their causes Resulting consequences and associated category Possible engineered (passive or active) and administrative controls Recommendations for additional investigation, analysis, or design changes SHINE Medical Technologies l15
Application of the Integrated Safety Analysis Methodology Hazard evaluation results The results are summarized for each system in a SHINE technical report The results provide a basis for potential accident sequences to be developed in the next analysis phase, the process hazards analysis (PHA)
Potential candidates for preventive and/or mitigative controls Recommendations for design improvements Hazard evaluations will be reviewed and updated for final design SHINE Medical Technologies l16
Hazard Evaluations Conducted Nuclear Systems SCAS - Subcritical assembly system TOGS - Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system NDAS - Neutron driver assembly system TPS - Tritium purification system Process Systems TSPS - Target solution preparation system TSSS - Target solution staging system VTS - Vacuum transfer system PVVS - Process vessel vent system RLWS - Radioactive liquid waste storage RLWI - Radioactive liquid waste immobilization RDS - Radioactive drain system MEPS - Molybdenum (Mo) extraction and purification system IXP - Iodine and xenon purification and packaging URSS - Uranium receipt and storage system SHINE Medical Technologies l17
Hazard Evaluations Conducted Auxiliary Systems RVZ1 - Radiologically controlled area ventilation zone 1 RVZ2 - Radiologically controlled area ventilation zone 2 RVZ3 - Radiologically controlled area ventilation zone 3 N2PS - Nitrogen purge system SHINE Medical Technologies l18
Supporting Systems Evaluated During Hazard Evaluations Shielding and Confinement Systems ICBS - Irradiation cell biological shield PFBS - Production facility biological shield Auxiliary Systems PCLS - Primary closed loop cooling system LWPS - Light water pool system RPCS - Radioisotope process facility cooling system FSTR - Facility structure Electrical and I&C Systems TRPS - TSV reactivity protection system NFDS - Neutron flux detection system ESFAS - Engineered safety features actuation system CAAS - Criticality accident alarm system UPSS - Uninterruptible electrical power supply system SHINE Medical Technologies l19
Accident Sequence Development PHA for internal and external events Identify accident sequences based on the hazard evaluation results and the ISG to NUREG-1537 guidance Estimate a risk index for each potential unmitigated accident sequence (likelihood x consequences)
Identify engineered and administrative controls for those sequences which have an unacceptable risk Evaluate controlled risk indices crediting risk reduction from controls Develop list of safety-related controls SHINE Medical Technologies l20
Accident Sequence Development SHINE Medical Technologies l21
Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
Example: Process Hazard Analysis Accident Sequence SRI SHINE Medical Technologies l22
Discussion of Safety-Related Controls Selection of engineered controls from accident sequences Reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the accident sequence Mitigate the consequences of the accident sequence Administrative controls in place Management measures: Ensure that the safety-related SSCs continue to perform their safety-related functions (e.g., surveillance and testing, periodic maintenance)
Specific administrative controls to perform some safety-related actions (e.g., operating procedures, sampling)
Nonsafety-related defense-in-depth controls also identified in the ISA Summary Report Safety-related controls are included in the Technical Specifications SHINE Medical Technologies l23
Discussion of Safety-Related Controls Types of Controls - Safety-Related Active engineered controls (AEC)
Passive engineered controls (PEC)
Specific administrative controls (SAC)
Types of Controls - Nonsafety-Related Defense-in-depth (DID)
SHINE Medical Technologies l24
Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
Example: Safety-Related Control Selection SRI SHINE Medical Technologies l25
Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
Security-Related Information - Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
Example: Safety-Related Control Selection (from ISA)
SRI SHINE Medical Technologies l26
Integration into the Chapter 13 Accident Analysis Accident sequences identified in the ISA and the ISG augmenting NUREG-1537 Postulated accident sequences that can result in unacceptable risk are candidates for inclusion in Chapter 13 of the FSAR Initialing events, scenarios, and determination of consequences are detailed Controls that are credited with preventive or mitigative safety functions are identified Engineered and administrative controls (AEC, PEC, and SAC) are included in the Technical Specifications A maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) is also defined for the IF and the RPF SHINE Medical Technologies l27
Integration into the Chapter 13 Accident Analysis Radiological dose consequences are summarized for the bounding case of each accident scenario type that has a potential consequence for the public or workers Radiological dose consequence acceptance criteria:
Public: 0.5 rem Worker: 5.0 rem Chemical dose consequence acceptance criteria based on Protective Action Criteria (PAC)
Analysis results indicate that no PAC limits are exceeded for SHINE SHINE Medical Technologies l28
Integration into the Chapter 13 Accident Analysis SHINE Medical Technologies l29
Relationship between Maximum Hypothetical Accident and Design Basis Accidents
Maximum Hypothetical Accident A Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) is an accident that would release fission products and would have consequences greater than any credible accident An MHA does not need to be a credible accident The MHA serves as a bounding accident analysis for a non-power reactor MHA accidents are postulated for SHINE in accordance with the ISG guidance For SHINE, one MHA is defined for the IF and one MHA is defined for the RPF SHINE Medical Technologies l31
Maximum Hypothetical Accident MHA for the IF:
The postulated MHA for the IF is a failure of the TSV off-gas system (TOGS) pressure boundary leading to a release of TSV radioactive gases into the TOGS confinement cell.
The N2PS actuates, but the PVVS flow path is assumed to be completely blocked, causing a maximum pressurization of the TOGS cell MHA for the RPF:
The MHA in the RPF is a fire in a carbon guard bed with degraded performance of the downstream carbon delay beds The carbon guard bed releases its inventory to the downstream carbon delay beds which are normally credited with adsorbing 99 percent of the released iodine.
For the MHA, the carbon delay beds are assumed to be operating at a reduced efficiency of 95 percent SHINE Medical Technologies l32
Dose Comparison Between MHA and Design Basis Accident Accident Scenario Public Dose Worker Dose (mrem) (mrem)
SHINE Radiological Dose Limits (TEDE) 500 5000 Irradiation Facility MHA 366 4800 Mishandling or Malfunction of Equipment 234 4760 (Release into the TOGS cell)
Radioisotope Production Facility MHA 403 N/A PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Fire 81 N/A SHINE Medical Technologies l33
SHINE Radiological Dose Limits An accident dose criterion of 5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to workers SHINE has proposed an accident dose criterion of 500 mrem TEDE to an individual member of the public This criterion is within the accident dose criterion of 1 rem TEDE to a member of the public proposed by NRC Staff in the ongoing non-power production and utilization facility (NPUF) rulemaking The accident dose criterion is also within the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protection Action Guides (PAGs) (ref: EPA 400-R-92-001), which would trigger protective actions resulting from a radiological incident SHINE Medical Technologies l34
SHINE Radiological Dose Limits Consequence categories used in the ISA High consequence: Public > 25 rem, Worker > 100 rem Intermediate consequence: Public 5 rem < RD 25 rem, Worker 25 rem < RD 100 rem Low consequence: RD less than the above categories The ISA consequence category limits are used to assess risk only during the process hazards analysis The accident dose limits must still be met to demonstrate safety SHINE Medical Technologies l35
Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
SHINE Source Term Description Safety Basis Source Term Assumptions:
Fission power: 137.5 kWth (licensed limit +10%)
Irradiation cycle time: 30 days (nominal is 5.5 days)
Time interval between irradiation cycles: [ ]PROP/ECI No extraction assumed between irradiation cycles Target solution service time: [ ]PROP/ECI Noble gas partitioning fractions for solution that moves into the RPF:
Helium: [ ]PROP/ECI Neon: [ ]PROP/ECI Argon: [ ]PROP/ECI Krypton: [ ]PROP/ECI Xenon: [ ]PROP/ECI Radon: [ ]PROP/ECI SHINE Medical Technologies l36
Approach to Criticality Safety Approach to Criticality Safety in the RPF SHINE maintains a nuclear criticality safety program (CSP) that complies with applicable American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standards as endorsed by RG-3.71, Revision 3 The CSP intends to meet the applicable criticality safety requirements of 10 CFR Part 70 Nuclear criticality safety in the RPF is discussed in detail in the Section 6b.3 of the FSAR Nuclear criticality safety evaluations (NCSEs) are conducted for each fissile material operation within the RPF to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes remain subcritical with an approved margin of subcriticality A fissionable material operation is any process or system that has the potential to contain more than 250 g of non-exempt fissile material In systems where the equipment is not safe-by-design, the double contingency principle is used ensuring at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions are required before a criticality accident is possible SHINE Medical Technologies l38
Approach to Criticality Safety in the RPF The preferred hierarchy of nuclear criticality safety controls is:
- 1. Passive engineered
- 2. Active engineered
- 3. Enhanced administrative
- 4. Administrative Control on two independent criticality parameters is preferred over multiple controls on a single parameter If redundant controls on a single parameter are used, a preference is given to diverse means of control on that parameter SHINE Medical Technologies l39
Approach to Criticality Safety in the RPF Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) calculations NCSEs What-if checklist to identify process upsets that may challenge typical criticality safety parameters Credible process upsets evaluated if it is Safe-by-Design Further evaluation using event tree analysis to identify process changes that must occur to result in criticality Controls are identified as needed to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of occurrence to highly unlikely Results of the NCSEs are summarized in the ISA and in the FSAR SHINE Medical Technologies l40
Subcriticality Assurance in the IF Normal and credible abnormal conditions Normal or inadvertent draining of target solution from the TSV to the TSV dump tank The TSV dump tank maintains target solution in a favorable geometry with natural cooling to the light water pool SHINE Medical Technologies l41
Subcriticality Assurance in the IF Abnormal or Accident Conditions Primary system boundary leakage that results in target solution migration into the light water pool (LWP)
The LWP provides a very large volume of water that dilutes the target solution to less than the single parameter limit on concentration Settling or stratification of target solution would result in a thin plane of solution with a large surface area with significant neutron leakage Primary system boundary leakage that results in water leakage into the primary system and target solution flood up into the TOGS The TOGS condenser/demister pads inhibit the flow of entrained target solution into the TOGS skid TOGS skid design has been analyzed for favorable geometry TOGS skid components are located above the light water pool elevation SHINE Medical Technologies l42
Subcriticality Assurance in the IF Abnormal or Accident Conditions Primary system cooling system (PCLS) leakage that results in target solution migration into the PCLS The PCLS operates at a higher pressure and a higher static head than the primary system, inhibiting target solution migration into the PCLS Leakage of PCLS water into the TSV results in flow through the redundant overflow tubes into the TSV dump tank, initiating an IU Cell Safety Actuation Signal and isolation of the PCLS from the IU cell Redundant PCLS isolation valves can stop any migration of target solution into the PCLS before a significant concentration can build-up SHINE Medical Technologies l43