ML16215A409
| ML16215A409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| Issue date: | 05/26/2016 |
| From: | Lane H NRC/NRR/DPR/PRLB |
| To: | |
| Lynch S, NRR/DPR, 301-415-1524 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16215A398 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML16215A409 (19) | |
Text
Implementation of IAEA Safeguards within the United States Hilary Lane International Safeguards Analyst U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Hilary.lane@nrc.gov 1
History The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to accept IAEA safeguards on all source and special nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities
- The United States, as one of five nuclear-weapon states (NWS), or P5, was not obligated to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA Since the early 1960s the U.S. has permitted the application of IAEA safeguards on a variety of nuclear facilities 2
NPT Signing, 1968 NPT RevCon, 2010
Overview of U.S. Agreements U.S. - IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288)
The U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement EIF 1980 Protocol to the U.S. - IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288)
The Reporting Protocol EIF 1980 Protocol Additional to the U.S. - IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288 Add.1)
The Additional Protocol EIF 2009 U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/366)
Includes a Small Quantities Protocol EIF 1989 3
Safeguards in the U.S. - Why Do It?
- Objectives of IAEA safeguards in the U.S.:
- Meet legal obligations from safeguards agreements
- Demonstrate willingness to accept burden of IAEA safeguards on U.S. nuclear industry
- IAEA gains experience in implementing new safeguards approaches or technologies
- Enhance efficiency of IAEA safeguards by verifying nuclear material before export, or after import 4
Eligible Facilities List (EFL)
The concept of selection-based safeguards is unique to NWS
- IAEA has the right, not an obligation, to apply safeguards in the United States The United States shall,,provide the [IAEA] with a list of facilities within the United States not associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States and may,, add facilities to or remove facilities from that list as it deems appropriate.
Additions to the EFL are submitted for a mandatory 60-day Congressional review before the new list is submitted to the IAEA The [IAEA] shall, from time to time, identify to the United States those facilities, selected from the then current list provided by the United States in accordance with Article 1(b) in which the [IAEA] wishes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.
The United States submits design information to the IAEA only for those facilities that have been selected by the IAEA; the EFL contains all U.S. nuclear facilities eligible for selection by the IAEA 5
Snapshot of the EFL 6
Eligible Facilities List (EFL)
Two portions of the U.S. EFL
- DOE locations (non-public)
- NRC licensees (public) http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/intl-safeguards.html
~300 facilities on EFL
- Facility is formally defined by the IAEA
- Facilities removed when decommissioned (per IAEAs definition)
Updated annually Updates are vetted through the U.S.
Government
- Security evaluation to remove anything of direct national security significance 7
SISUS Committee
U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) -
Full Scope Safeguards
- Based on INFCIRC/153
- Selection-based approach to safeguards
- Eligible Facilities List (EFL)
- National Security Exclusion (Article 1.b)
- Includes all typical safeguards activities including inspections, completion of Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), Design Information Verification (DIV), reporting, technical visits, etc
- Allows for the application of safeguards in a manner similar to that of NNWS 8
U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) -
Reporting Protocol
- Allows for limited safeguards activities to be performed at facilities with minimal cost to the IAEA
- Unique to the United States
- Includes activities such as completion of DIQs and DIVs
- Monthly and annual material accountancy reports (e.g.,
PILS, ICRs, etc)
- 4 facilities (all NRC licensees) currently selected under this Protocol
- NO INSPECTIONS 9
First Steps If Selected.
- NRC will notify the facility of its selection
- Series of meetings will ensue
- NRC will assist the facility in completing a DIQ
- IAEA will perform a DIV
- NRC will be present
- (Possible) Inspections
- NRC will be present
- Can utilize the national security exclusion 10
Current IAEA Safeguards Selection Continue providing the IAEA with opportunities to develop and test new safeguards approaches and technologies; minimize impact to IAEAs limited resources Minimal IAEA safeguards activities currently in the U.S.
- K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) at Savannah River Site (SRS)
Only facility currently under routine inspections by the IAEA Incorporates remote monitoring Allow for installation of IAEA equipment Reporting
- Westinghouse Fuel Fab. Facility (Columbia, SC)
- AREVA Inc. Fuel Fab. Facility (Richland, WA)
- Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas Fuel Fab. Facility (Wilmington, NC)
- URENCO USA Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (Eunice, NM) 11 Reporting Only, NO INSPECTIONS
12 Examples of IAEA Safeguards Technologies
Who Implements in the U.S.?
Who are the Players?
13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- chair Department of Commerce Department of State Department of Defense Department of Energy SISUS Committee
Flow of Information 14 U.S.
Department of State U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S.
Department of Energy U.S.
Department of Commerce Facilities NMMSS Industry
Reports under the U.S. AP www.AP.gov Annual reporting requirements
- (2.a.i) Nuclear fuel cycle research and development Not involving nuclear materials With USG involvement Approximately 75% of the total number of U.S. declarations are 2.a.i. declarations
- (2.a.iii) Site declaration including description of activities For facilities that have ever submitted a DIQ to the IAEA and were on the EFL as of January 2009
- (2.a.iv) Nuclear fuel cycle related manufacturing and assembly
- (2.a.v) Uranium and thorium mines, mills, and concentration plants
- (2.a.vi) Possession of large quantities of impure source material E.g., Yellowcake
- (2.a.x) Ten year plan No legal obligations or rights; provides a heads up to the IAEA regarding a States future plans
- (2.b.i) Nuclear fuel cycle research and development Not involving nuclear materials Without USG involvement Quarterly reporting requirements
- (2.a.ix) Exports of equipment and components (Annex II items) 15
Snapshot of Licensees Who Report Under the U.S. APand many more!
16 Additional Protocol
Complementary Access (CA)
Complementary access is an essential aspect of the IAEAs expanded authorities Complementary access allows the IAEA to:
Verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities Resolve a question or inconsistency Access for IAEA with 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> advance notice 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if IAEA is already onsite C.A.s rare in the U.S.
Only 2 CAs have been conducted in the U.S. (2010)
AREVA Inc., Fuel Fabrication Facility (Lynchburg, VA)
Global Advanced Metals (Boyertown, PA) 17
Where are the Requirements?
- NRC: Regulations
- Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 75 Safeguards on Nuclear Material - Implementation of US/IAEA Agreement
- References elsewhere in 10 CFR
- DOE: Orders
- DOE Order 142.2A
- DOC: Regulations
- 15 CFR Parts 781-786
- Only incorporates AP requirements 18
19 Questions?