ML19338F108

LER 80-070/01T-0:on 800922,unplanned Dilution of RCS Occurred.Caused by Boric Acid Blender Procedure Not Accounting for Manual Emergency Boration Flow Path Being in Svc.Procedure Has Been Changed

ML19338F108
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/30/1980
From:	Lacey W DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19338F100	List: ML19338F099 ML19338F108
References
LER-80-070-01T, LER-80-70-1T, NUDOCS 8010070531
Download: ML19338F108 (2)

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. l a 121 l Unplanned dilution of the reactor coolant system *due to procedural error. The

[TTT1 I boric acid blender procedure did not account for the manual emergenev boration flow I I

l IoI41I path being in service. The shutdown marr.in did not co under the administrative l

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I t i l o t l The boric acid blender orocedure did not account for the condition where the manual I g l emergency boration flow path is in service. The procedure has been chanced to l l

p 77ll account for this condition.

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' Attachment To LER 80-70/OlT Beaver Valley Power Station Duquesne Light Company Docket No. 50-334 From 0545 hours0.00631 days <br />0.151 hours <br />9.011243e-4 weeks <br />2.073725e-4 months <br /> to 1240 hours0.0144 days <br />0.344 hours <br />0.00205 weeks <br />4.7182e-4 months <br /> on September 22, 1980, the Reactor Coolant System initial fill and vent was in progress. The reactor coolant sample taken at 1648 hours0.0191 days <br />0.458 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.27064e-4 months <br /> on September 22, 1980 showed a boron concentration of 1701 ppm while the previous day's sample showed 1964 ppm. This dilution resulted in a reactivity insertion of 3% aK/K which is greater than the 0.5% AK/K Technical Specification administrative limit for an unplanned reactivity insertion.

The shutdown margin was calculated to be 6.8% AK/K which is greater than the' administrative minimum of 5% aK/K and the Technical Specification minimum of 1% aK/K. .

This dilution was caused by a procedural deficiency. The manual emergency boration flow path was open for Train "A" priority. This flow path allows the boric acid pump discharge flow to bypass the boric acid blender. The boric acid blender procedure did not account for this condition and the blender's automatic controls raised the primary grade water flow to an amount equal to the missing boric acid flow. This extra primary grade water caused the unplanned dilution.

The total flow setpoint of the blender has been changed to produce the desired water flow for the calculated mix. The blender operating procedure has been changed to require a setpoint change when the manual emergency boration flow path is in service.

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