ML19332G593
| ML19332G593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1989 |
| From: | Jamison J Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION |
| To: | Conklin C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332G590 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-89-430 NUDOCS 8912280189 | |
| Download: ML19332G593 (17) | |
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OBaHeDe Pacific Northwest Laboratories P.O. aca 9M n, chi nd, w.wnpan u.sA,ns2 T W " 37S-3782 Telex 15-2874 Facsimile (509) 37s-2714 August 7, 1989 Mr. Craig J. Conklin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region 1 475 Allendale Rd.
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Craig:
SEABROOK SCENARIO REVIEW We have no coments of any significance on the subject scenario. The package appears to be complete and technically accurate, it should support an i
adequate limited (small scale) demonstration of the licensee's response capability.
If you have any questions, please contact me on FTS (509) 375-3782.
Sincerely, s
am J. D. Jamison Project Manager Operational Health Physics Occupational & Environmental Protection Section HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT JDJ/ chb cc:
WD Travers, w/ enclosure KS West, w/ enclosure O
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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NRC INSPECTION MANUAL enPa 1NSPECT10N PROCEDURE C2301 EVALUATION OF EXERCISES FOR POWER REACTORS R
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:
2515 and 2525 82301-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVES 01.01 To assess the adequacy of the licensee's emergency response program, the implementation of the emergency plan, the emergency implementing procedures, and the training program.
82301-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 02.01 Evaluate the performance of the licensee's emergency response during an exercise, s.
Verify that the emergency preparedness exercise meets the licensee's conunitments and regulatory requirements, b.
Observe the licensee during the exercise for the followirg functional areas and related activities:
1.
Control Room Assess the perfonnance of the staff as it conducts the tasks i
listed below:
(a) facility management and control (b) analysis of plant conditions and corrective actions 1
(c) detection and classification of emergency events (d) protective action decisionmaking (e) notifications and communications (f) implementation of protective actions dose assessment g)) evaluation of post-accident sampling results j
h i) dispatch and coordination of monitoring teams 2.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Assess the performance of the staff as it conducts the tasks listed below:
a) staffing and activation of the TSC b) facility management and control c) accident assessment and classification l
Issue Date: 08/21/89
d) dose assessment i
e) protective action decisionmaking f) notifications and communications
)
g)). implementation of protective actionsassistance and support to control h1) evaluation of post-accident sampling results j) dispatch and ccordination of monitoring teams 3.
Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF)
Assess the perfomance of the staff as it conducts the tasks listed below:
)
(a) staffing and activation of the EOF (b) facility management and control (c). accident assessment and classification (e),offsite dose assessmentprotective. action decisionmaking
.i (d)
(f) notifications and comunications (g) implementation of protective actions (h) interaction with offsite officials. NRC, anu other organizations 4.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
Assess the performance of the staff as it conducts the tasks
~
listed below:
1 (a) staffing and activation of the OSC (b) facility management and control (c) perfomance of support functions S.
Corporate Comand Center (CCC)
Assess the perfomance of the staff as it conducts the tasks f
listed below:
(a) staffing and activation of the CCC (b) perfomance of support functions
.j f
'6.
Offsite Monitoring Assess the perfomance of the staff as it conducts the tasks
)
listed below:
(a) activation and deployment of the monitoring teams (b) surveys, sampling and analysis 7.
Corrective Action / Rescue Teams Assess the perfomance of tfie staff as it conducts the tasks listed below:
(a) in-plant repair actions (b) rescue 8.
Security / Accountability Assess the perfomance of the staff as it conducts the tasks listed below:
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(a) security (b) accountability
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Issue Date: 08/21/89 82301 I
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9.
Emergency News Center (Joint Infomation Center)
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Assess the perfomance of the staff as it conducts the tasks listed below:
(a) staffing, activation, and facility control (b) processing and dissemination of infomation to tM media
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- 10. Emeroency Medical Servic33 Assess the perfomance of the medical response team.
- 11. Post-Accident Samplino Team (PASS)
Asstss the performance of the PASS sample team.
- 12. Critique Assess the licensee's critique.
82301-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE 03.01 General Guidance. -The general practices for a team inspection should be utilized in the planning and conduct of this inspection and the preparation of the ir.spection report.
During the exercise, licensee perfomance in the control room, the TSC, OSC and the-EOF should be observed and evalubted.
However, consistent with Paragraph C.
of Appendix ! to Inspection Manual Chapter 2500, the regions may adjust the extent of S
' observation in each area, as needed, to concentrate on areas where past licensee perfomance was considered marginal -or in need of observation.
The exercise is a training tool to prepare for an emergency.
It is important to remember that there are three aspects-to a successful exercise. The first is the development of a technically accurate and challenging scenario to test the plans, procedures, equipment, and implementation of the exercise.
The i
second part is the implementation of the plans, procedures, and equipment.
The last aspect of the exercise is the critique. following the exercise in which the licensee makes a candid self-evaluation of the exercise in terms of the. scenario; the adequacy of the energency cquipment, facilities, and pro-
.l cedures; the players' responses; and the effective use of the evaluations and the controllers.
The observers or the NRC evaluators should not interfere with-the players or the controllers. The controllers also should not prompt, coach, or otherwise
. interfere with the perfomance of the players.
NRC evaluators may query c.-
seek clarifications or infomation from the controllers regarding the exer-cise and/or the scenario.
In assessing the licensee's performance, scenario-related problems should be noted in the inspection report and discussed in the exit meeting.
03.02 Specific Guidance a.
Inspection Requirement 02.01a_.
The requiremerit for Emergency Preparedness exercises may be found under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.
PartIV.F.Iand10CFR50.47(14).
82301. Issue Date: 08/21/89
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b.
Inspection Requirement 02.01b 1.
Control Room L
(a) Control room operators should be able to correctly interpret p
control room instrument displays.
From these and other sources of available information, they should be * &ble to recognize that events are progressing abnormally, detemine L
plant status and develop appropriate strategies to bring E
the plant to a safe shutdown condition if necessary, i
Control room operators should be able to classify the emergency on the basis of plant conditions end confirm, j
l where
- possible, the emergency classification by dose-j l
calculations or monitoring.
(b) After recognizing and classifying the emergency, control room operators should correctly implement the imediate actions of the emergency plan implementing procedures (EPlPs). The shift supervisor should coordinate and oversee the control room response, redirecting the response as necessary.
Actions should be perfomed in accordance with the applicable procedures and instructions.
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l (c) Control room operators should be able to classify the L
emergency using emergency action levels (EAls) and detemine protective actions for onsite and cffsite personnel without waiting for a dose assessment.
They should recomend protective actions on site and off site, on a timely basis, that are consistent with those in the approved onsite
- lan and the EPIPs.
Guidance on protective R
r-l emergency p
B-actions is provided in NUREG-0654.
i (d) The licensee should consider, to the extent time pemits.
Oe following items in promptly deciding upon appropriate
-(fsite proter.tive actions:
(1) current plant status i
(2) current dose assessment and dose projection L
(3) exMeted duration of release
- 4) evacuation time estimates
- 5) local sheltering efficiencies
- 6) current meteorological parameters (wind speed, wind directions, and stability-class) and projected weather conditions (7) local geography l
(8) time of day (e) For a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency, nonessen-l tial personnel should be evacuated from the site to the offsite locations (s) specified in the emergency plan and appropriate protective measures should' be initiated for those personnel remaining on site (e.g., accountability, protectiveclothing,KI).
y 1ssue Date: 08/21/89 82301 l-
(f) Onsite personriel should be promptly infomed of the following:
(
emergency conditions i
emergency classifications activation of the emergency organization and facilities protective actions
$) radioactivity release status q
- 6) any changes in these conditions (g) Offsite officials, including
- NRC, should be promptly infomed of the following:
) emergency conditions f emergency classificotions
) ectivation of the emergency organfration and facility 4
radioactivity release t,tatus 5
potentially affected populatirn r6 projected population doses O))
recomended protective actions (8
any changes in these cunditions A comunications link should be maintainte betweer the control room, the TSC, the 0$C, and the NRC, if reouested.
A qualified staff member should be available to notify the licensee and Federal, State, and locci tuthcrities of the cmergency and to maintain comunications 15 tainutes after the emergency is declared.
(h) The control room should initiate onsite protective actions until the TSC or the EOF is activated.
For a General Emer-gency with iminent major releases projected, evacuation should be directed without monitoring or decontamiration of the onsite nonessential staff.
For General Emergencies in which major releases cre. nct iminent, evacuation should be initiated following monitoring and decontamination.
The licensee should be able to accomplish the initial account-ability within 30 minutes of the order for the assembly of F1 nonessential personnel and should be able to account for
.il remaining personnel continuously thereafter.
Habit-ability of the control room and assembly areas shovid be assessed periodically.
(1) Personnel should use approved procedures for dose assessment and should-know how to use them.
If a release is antici-1 pated or in progress, contrcs1 room personnel should be able to correctly and rapidly assess and integrate information from the reactor system's status and trends, source-tem i
assumptions, post-accident sampling system (PA$5) samples.
and meteorological information to define the magnitude and location of the onsite and offsite impa'ct.
These assess-ments need not be as sophisticated or as accurate as dose projections made by the TSC or the EOF but should be suffi-ciently accurate for adequate onsitt protective actions and s
offsite protective recornendations as necessary.
If a release 's under way, personnel should promptly initiate 82301 Issue Date: 08/21/09
I 4
onsite sampling and monitoring to confim the composition of i
the releases (i.e., iodine fraction) and to better define the source tem and confirm projected doses.
Dose assess-ment should te perfomed in the TSC or the EOF once these facilities are activ6ted.
(j) If appropriate, the control room may request thata post-accident containment air or primary water sample be obtained to confirm the composition of any release (i.e.
iodine i
fraction).
The results of the samples would be used to redefine or confim the condition of the reactor, the emergency classification, the source term, and projected doses.
Post-accident sampling may be directed from the 150 after this facility has been activated.
(L)
If a release is anticipated or in progress, the Energency Director may deploy teams to perfom environmental rampling at appropriate locations to characterize the site, location, and intensity of the plume.
The teams could bt asked to take measurements of radiation levels, radiciodine or gross beta levels in the air, or to collect samples of water, itgetation and toilk to determine the radioactivity concen-trations in these samples; Onsite and offsite monitoring may be directed from the TSC or the EOF after these facilities have been activated.
2.
Technical Suppert Center (TSC)
(a) For Alerts Site Area Emergencies and General Emergencies, the TSC should be activated and prepared to perfom the fol-lowing functions within about I hour after the emergency is declared:
(1) Manage site activities.
l (2) Provide technical support to reactor operations.
(3) Manage corporate emergency resources.
(Monitoringand dose projections are nomally) transferred to the emer.
1 gency operations facility (EOF afteritisactivated.)
(4) Manage radiological effluent and environs monitoring 1
and dose projections.
(These functions are nomally transferred to the EOF after it is activated.)
1 (5) Provide follow up notification of the emergency to
)
Federal, State, and local emergency response organiza-J tions and make recommendations for public protective actions.
(This function is normally transferred to the EOF after it is activated.)
(6) Establish and maintain a primary communications link with the control room.
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i Issue Date: 08/21/89 82301
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Guidance on the staffing of the TSC can be found in Table 2 j
of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.
The licenset's staffing of the TSC can be found in site emergency plans or implementing 1
procedures.
(b) Accident Assessment / Classification.
Personnel activating the TSC should be able to adequately and accurately perform the following:
(3) Use Eats, as appropriate, to classify the emergency.
(2)
Initially assess and continuously reassess reactor conditions.
(3) Confim the emergency classification or reclassify the energency.
(4) Using technical staff and infomation available from them or from other sources, natntain an onerview of the reactor and plant conditions.
($)
Use the results of post accident sampling or monitor.
ing, as appropriate, to redefine reactor conditions and the emergency classification.
(6)
Provide this infomation to proper personnel (control rocn, EOF, NRC, offsite authorities, corporate manage.
sent,etc.).
(c) Dose Assessment.
If a release is in progress, TSC personnel should promptly initiate ensite and offsite samplin monitoring to confim the composition of the release (g and i.e.,
iodine fraction) and to define the source term and projected i
- doses, if a release is anticipated or in progress TSC I
personnel should correctly assess and integrate infomation from the reactor system's status and trends, radiological monitoring, source-tem assumptions, and meteorological o
infomation to define the magnitude and location of the ensite and offsite impact.
TSC personnel should use the results of post-accident sampling and radiological monitoring to redefine projected doses, as appropriate.
4 Approved procedures should be used for dose assessment and personnel should know how to use them.
(d) Protective Action Decisionmaking.
As appropriate.
TSC l
personnel should use plant conditions to decide on protec-tive actions for onsite and offsite personnel without woiting for a dose assessment.
TSC personnel should promptly recomend protective actions onsite and offsite consistent with the criteria in the approved onsite emer-gency plan.
Within 15 minutes of the classification of i
General Emergency conditions. TSC personnel (or control room personnel if the TSC is not staffed and functional) should recommend appropriate protective actions to offsite r
officials. Guidance is provided in NUREG-0654 L
82301 !ssue Date: 08/21/89
I The licensee should use the following paremeters, to the j
extent time pemits, in deciding upon appropriate protective actions 1
(1) current plant status (2) current dose assessment and dose projection j
- 3) expected duration of release
- 4) evacuation time estimates
- 5) local sheltering efficiencies (6) current meteorologial conditions (wind speed, wind direction, and stability classification) and projected 1
weather conditions (7) local geography (S) time of day (e). Notification.
The licensee should promptly r'otify onsite per:onnel of the following :
(1) emergency conditions (2) emergency classification 31 activation of the emergency orgsnization and facility
() protective actions
- 5) radioactivity release stetus (6) any changes in these conditions (f)
Implerrentati_on of protective Action _s,.
The licensee should perfom the following tasks:
(1) Confim that the onsite protective actions above have been implemented.
(2) Direct that all onsite personnel are accounted for.
(3) Confirm that all personnel are accounted for and, if not accounted for, begin search and rescue for missing personnel (initial accountability should be completed l
within about 30 e.inutes of the declaration of the emergency).
The licensee should also be able to l
account for onsite personnel continuously thereafter.
l (4) Confim and periodically assess the habitability of the TSC, the OSC, and assembly areas. Functions of the TSC should be transferred to habitable areas if necessary.
(5) Confirm that offsite authorities are aware of the licensee's recommendations for protective actions.
(6) Determine from the offsite authorities what, if any, protective actions are being taken.
(7) Infom management and hRC of these actions.
(g) The TSC coordinator (the person in charge) should oversee the analysis and corrective action response. Actions should be performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Perfomance of other functions should.not interfere with direction or detemination of corrective action. Corrective actions should be implemented in an effective and timely manner.
Potential offsite consequences of corrective actions should be considered and discussed with offsite y
officials.
The resources necessary to perfom the required analyses should be available. Those perfoming the analyses i
Issue Date: 08/21/89 82301
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and making decisions should be aware of important trends or changes of status. Job aids such as status boards should be used effectively and shov1d not interfere with the perfor-mance of corrective actions. Those in charge of operations, maintenance, and radiation protection should consult fre-quently and as necessary with each other and with offsite members of licensee emergency response support orgarii'istions (e.g.,
censultants, corporate personnel, and contractor personnel) about corrective actions.
(b) If apprcpriate, the licensee should request that post-accident containment air or primary water samples be obtained to confim the composition of any release (i.e.,
iodine fraction) and use the results of the post-accident sampling to redefint *or conf f m the condition of the
. reactor, the emergency classification, the source term, and projected doses, as appropriate.
(i) If a release is anticipated or is in progress, the licensee should deploy l,n initial environmental sampling teem (s) to the p(lume, direct the appropriate locatf or.t to intercept e.g.,
remain at team (s) rescrding geographics) movement predesignated locations, go to the apptcximate center, begin a traverse from location to location), direct the
~
teams regarding measurements or semples to be taken (e.g.,
gross beta (B), sir, water, vegetation, milk, TLDs), and use o
results of monitoring to redefine the source tem and projected doses, as appropriate.
(j) Approved plant procedures should be current, readily avail-able and used.
TSC personnel should communicate frequently with each other and with other centers, especially with the control room. Congestion and noise levels should be kept to a minimum. All communications systems should be functioning properly.
The EOF should be kept informed of the status of the emergency and proper functions should be transferred to the E0F when that facility becomes operational t all concerned parties should be notified of such a transfer.
Bound or other pemanent-type logs should be kept and all important data, calculations, notifications, and decisions should be recorded as they occur.
Relief personnel should be properly and adequately briefed. Job aids such as status boards, should be accurate and should be kept up to date.
i l
3.
EmergencyOperationsFacility(EOF)
(a) For Site Area Emergencies and General Emergencies, the EOF should be activated and prepared to perform the following functions within about I hour after the emergency is declared:
(1) Manage emergency resources (before activation of the s
EOF, this function may have been initiated at the TSC).
(
(2) Manage overall radiological effluent and environs sonitoring and dose projections.
(Before activation of the EOF, this function may have been perforined at theTSC.)
82302 Issue Date: 08/21/89 l
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(3) Notify Federal, State and local emergency response organizations of the emergency (before activation of the and make recomendations for public protective action EOF, this function may have been initiated at the 150.)
(4) Establish and maintain a primary communications link i
with the TSC.
(5) Comunicate with NRC Site Team.
Guidance for staffing of the E0F is specified in Table 2 of Supplement 1 to llVREG-0737 and the licensee's staffing is listed in the site emergency plans or implementing pro-cedures.
Personnel should not be prepositioned before comencement of the exercise.
The personnel perfoming key functions should be knowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities.
(b) 'Offsite Dose Assessment.
If a release is anticipated or is ia progress, the licensee should correctly assess and integrato information from the reactor system's status and trents, radiological monitoring. Source-ters assumptions.
and meteorological infomation to define the magnitude and location of the offsite impact.
If a release is anticipated or in progress, the licensee should deploy an initial environmental sempling team (s) to appropriate locations to intercept the plume, direct the team (s) regarding geographical movement (e.g., remain at a predesignated loca.
tion, go to the approximate center, begin a traverse from location to location), and direct the team (s) regarding measurements or samples to be taken (e.g., gross b, air, water, vegetation, milk TLDs).
The results of monitoring should be used to redefine the source tem and projected doses appropriate.
The licensee should be able to promptly and correctly project the direction and maximum dose within the plume EPZ and the distance to which the EPA's PAGs are projected to be exceeded.
Licensee staff responsible for 1
protective action recomendations should also communicate with the reactor systems' st6tus personnel to comprehend plant status and trends and anticipate radiological con-sequences of the progression of events. The licensee should obtain the necessary current and forecasted meteorological ini'omation from onsite systems and appropriate offsite sources (e.g., supplemental systems, the National Weather Service).
The licensee should assure that assessments are updated as tangible changes in plant status, release, or meteorological conditions become evident, are forecasted, or are refined from confirmatory measurements.
Current approved procedures should be used for dose assessment and personnel should know how to use them.
A backup dose assessment system should be available if the primary system fails.
The staff should be trained in using the alternate system.
(c) Protective Action Decisionmakin0.
As appropriate, the licensee should assess the status of the reactor core, systems and containment to recomend offsite protective actions without waiting for a dose assessment.
(Before activation of the EOF, this function may have been initiated l
82301 Issue Date: 08/21/89 -
e st the TSC.) The licensee should promptly recomend offsite protective actions that are consistent with those in the approved or. site emergency plan.
Guidance on protective n;asures can be found in Appendix 1 of NUREG- 0654.
The licensee should consider, to the extent time pemits, the following items in deciding upon appropriate pro',tective actions:
- 1) current reactor and plant status prognosis of accident expected duration of release evacuation time estimates 5
local sheltering efficiencies 6
current and projected weather conditions
.7 local geography
- 8) time of day (d) Netification.
The licensee e,hould set up and maintain a comunica tions channel to offsite authorities, including the NkC, and (if not already accomplisNd by TSC or control room persorenel), promptly infom offsite offici6ls, includ-ing NRC, of:
(1) emergency conditions (2) emergency classification
- 3) radioactivity release status
- 4) potentially affected population
- 5) projected population doses
- 6) recomended protective actions
- 7) any changes in these conditions (e) Implementation of Protective Actions.
The licensee should cor.fim and periodically assess the habitability of the EOF.
If the EOF has to be tvacuated, its functions should be transferred to alternate facilities without disruption of offsite interaction, comand and control, dose projections, or protective action decisionmaking.
The licensee should confim that offsite authorities are aware of the licensee's recomendations for protective actions. The licensee should detemine from the offsite authorities what, if any, protec-tive actions are being taken and chould infom management and NRC of these actions.
The licensee should always be l
aware or informed of the status of offsite protective t-actions.
(f) Interaction with Offsite Officials. The offsite representa-tives at the EDF and the site should be briefed upon arrival and kept infortned of changing conditions without interfering l-Offsite moni, oring and sampling t
with the onsite response.
I results should be coordinated with offsite officials.
(g) The plant procedures used should be current, readily available and approved.
EOF personnel should comunicate l
I frequently with each other and with other centers (especially with corporate headquarters and with offsite 82301-
- II -
Issue Date: 08/21/89
authorities). Congestion and noise levels should be kept to J
a minimum.
All primary cornunications systems should func-tion properly and if they do not, backup systems should be available.
Proper functions should be transferred to the EOF in a timely manner when that facility becomes opera-tional.
All concerned parties should be notified of such a j
transfer. Bound or other pemanent-type logs should be kept j
ano all important data, calculations, notificatioris, and decisions should be recorded thronologically.
. Relief personnel should be properly and adequately briefed.
The
~
EOF should be properly equipped to perfom its functions.
Job aids such as status boards, should be accurate and i
should be kept up to date.
At the request of personnel in the 150, the control room, or elsewhere, outside resources should be obtained in a timely manner.
4.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
(a) The OSC should be quickly staffed, activated, and fully functional.
Operations at the OSC should be supervised by licensee officials predesignated in the emergency plan and procedures.
The licensee's personnel assigned to the OSC should be identified in the Emergency Plan and/or the implementing procedures.
The manager-in-charge should be
~
knowledgeable of his or her duties and responsibilities.
Reliable voice comunication should be established with the c.
control room, the TSC, and the EOF. Habitability of the OSC should be confirmed and periodically assessed and, if need be, its functions should be transferred to a habitable area.
For conditions requiring iodine protecticn, personnel should promptly implement appropriate iodine-protective measures (use appropriate respiratory protection or take Kl).
Guidance on staffing is presented in Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
Congestion and noise 1e'els should be kept to a minimum.
(b) v All primary comunications systems to the TSC, the EOF and the repair teams should function properly and if they do not, backup systems should be available.
Relief personnel should be properly and adequately briefed.
Periodically, the OSC staff should be briefed on plant and radiological conditions.
The OSC should be properly equipped to perforn its functions.
Teams dispatched from the OSC should be I
briefed, tracked, and debriefed upon return to the OSC.
l Comunication with the teams should be maintained.
Personnel who will perform specific tasks as requested by management, the TSC, or the control room should be assigned j
in a timely manner and should be given clear instructions.
i A pre-implementation planning meeting involving operations, maintenance, and health physics should be held to reduce I
exposure by means of appropriate tool se' lections, routes of travel, development of temporary procedures, etc.
(These L
actions may be perforined in the TSC or the control room.)
[
Exposure and exposure limits of personnel should be s
considered in planning actions.
(These actions may be performed in the TSC or the control room.)
1 Issue Date: 08/21/89 82301
L.
Corporate Comand Center (CCC) 1 (a)
If called for in the emergency plan or procedures, the Corporate Comand Center should be activated and prepared to perfom its functions in a timely manner.
Reliable. voice comunications should be esteb11shed with the site (pri-i marily the EOF). Licensee officials should be prede'signated in the emergency plan or related procedures to manage j
operations.
The senior manager should be knowledgNble of his or her duties and responsibilities and able to perfom his or her functions, i
(b) When called upon for assistance, the CCC should provide timely support in such areas as Government liaison.
logistics, and finance.
Congestion and noise levels should
.be kept to a minimum. The CCC should be properly equipped to perform its functions.
6, Offsite Monitoring l
(a) Licensee staff capable of performing offsite surveys should be prepared to implement their functions in a timely manner.
I Monitoring teams should be dispatched in a timely manner.
Personnel should not be prepositioned before comencen,ent of the exercise.
(b) Team members should be able to demonstrate proficient use of protective measures equipment such as respiratory protection. Teams should be able to quickly locate sampling and monitoring locations (for example, predetemined sample sites).
Team members should exhibit proficiency in collecting, bagging, and marking samples, and in reading monitoring results in accordance with procedures (e.g., open and closed G.M. window readings).
Team members should keep track of their individual exposures.
Teams should be adequately briefed on radiation conditions, their mission, and plant conditions before they are dispatched and should be kept informed of changing conditions in the field.
Vehicles should be available and readily accessible to transport the teams and should be capable of functioning under adverse weather conditions.
Calibrated instru-mentation and equipment should be available for monitoring and for taking samples.
Instrumentation to detect radio-iodine at levels as low as 10-7 ett/cc under field conditions should be available.
Teams should be equipped with an adequate communications system (e.g.,
a radio that pemits unimpeded transmission and reception of data and instructions over the entire plume emergency planning 2nne (EPZ)). Monitoring results should be promptly and correctly reported to the TSC and/or the EOF.
7.
Corrective Action or Rescue Teams.
Team actions should be initiated and perfomed promptly following the decision to conduct the operation. Before entry, the team should consult and g
coordinate with the control room, and should be briefed on potential hazards.
The team should be provided with adequate protective equipment such as self-contained breathing apparctus B2301 Issue Date: 08/21/89
I (SCBA) with sufficient stay times, and monitoring equipment with sufficient range (e.g., up to 1000 R/ hour). Team exposure, moni-tred constantly should not exceed guidelines or preestablished vavves.
Communication with the team should be maintained by the control room, the TSC, or the OSC.
The team personnel should be qualified by training or experience to perfom the specified job in a high radiation environment, and they should be trained in the use of the appropriate protective equipment.
Team pe'esonnel should be able to demonstrate proficiency in the use.of pro-tective equipment.
8.
Security and Accountability (a) Access control should be maintained at the site and should not interfere with the response to an emergency (e.g.,
, response of offsite assistance should not be hindered).
Security practices or procedures should not impede move-ment and access of site operating and response personnel to plant areat during an emergency situation (e.g., computer-controlled doors to vital areas fail in the open position I
upon loss of electrical power, essential personnel have keyt to locked doors or can easily obtain leyr., anti-passback features do not hinder reentry).
Any practice or procedure l
to allow easy access during emergencies must be compatible
(
with the licensee's Physical Security and Contingency Plans I
developed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73 and 10 CFR 73, Appendix C.
Access control should be maintained at the control room, the OSC, the TSC, and the EOF.
Security personnel exposure should be monitored and appropriate protective actions should be taken.
(b) All onsite personnel should be accounted for and the names of missing individuals should be achieved within about 30 u
minutes of the declaration of a Site Area Emergency or a l
l General Emergency.
A search-and-rescue operation should be initiated promptly for missing people. All onsite personnel should be continuously accounted for during the emergency response.
9.
Emergency News Center (Joint lufomation Center)
(a) Infonnation should be disseminated to the media / press in an accurate and timely manner. News releases should be properly coordinated with the NRC and other offsite officials. Media personnel should be prohibited from interfering with the emergency response.
Corrected or supplemental infonnation should be promptly released in the event of error or misin-formation in news stories (e.g., rumor control).
Informa-tion given to the public should be prepared to the technical l
1evel that the public can understand.
News should be updated periodically whether or not the ' status has changed.
i (b) Adequate numbers of telephones should be available for press use.
Personnel giving the briefings should be technically k'
qualified and able to answer media questions accurately and 4
l quickly.
Issue Date: 08/21/89 82301
t
- 10. Emercency Medical Services (a) Preparation and implementation of First Aid, Medical Trans.
portation, and Hospital Assistance.
For a life-threatening injury, first aid should be given and victims transported before decontamination.
Generally, the victim shquid be decontaninated before first aid and hospital care are,given.
Pe rst,nnel, vehicles, and equipment possibly contaminated should be contro11eo.
Hospital personnel should be briefed and trained in radiation protection and contamination control.
(b) Comunicaticns should be maintained between the emergency vehicle and the hospital. All transmissions to the hospital from the emergency vehicle should be preceded oy an an.
.nouncement such as *This is a drill."
A qut.lified radio-logical control technician should accompany the injured person to the hospital.
Hospital personnel should be adequately briefed by the radiological control technician on the extent of the injury and on contamin6 tion levels.
11, post-Accident Sampling Team.
When the licensee conducts post-accident analysis of the primary coolant and containment atmosphere, appropriate exposure limits for the in-plant team operations should be maintained.
The team should be qualified and capable to take and analyze coolant and containment atmosphere samples under emergency conditions.
The team should be able to proficiently implement the post-accident sampling procedure, wear, or simulate the wearing of, the appropriate pro-tective equipment (e.g.,
SCBA), and follow the appropriate radiation protection procedures. Appropriate tools should be used, and samples should be properly transported.
Samples should be analyzed using the appropriate precautions to prevent personnel exposure and contamination of the lab.
Samples should be analyzed for the following:
noble gases, todine, cesium, nonvolatile isotopes, hydrogen, chlorides, and boron.
The results from these analyses should be available in the TSC within about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of taking the samples.
- 12. Critique.
At the end of the exercise, each facility should hold a critique with the controllers and players while the details are fresh.
This preliminary critique should be followed by a forinal critique that evaluates the overall performance of the exercise and the interaction of facility representatives and players with one another.
During the critique, the evaluators should provide an unbiased and candid evaluation of the exercise, identifying the areas of strength as well as weakness and areas needing improvement. Corrective actions should be defined and scheduled.
l R2301 Issue Date: D8/21/89
'82301 04 RESOURCES The estimated direct onsite tirne to complete this inspection is provided l
below:
l Inspectinn Type Staff Hours Per Site Regional Team Leader 28 Resident inspector 12 Headquarttrs Observer
- 14 Thus for planning purposes, the total estimated direct onsite inspection time to complete this inspection is 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />.
- The inspection effort expended by headquarters observers is separate from regional budget allocations.
Because they are available to observe only one half of the exercises conducted, an overall average of their time was estimated.
82301-05 REFERENCES ANSI /Ah5 3.11981, " Selection, Qualification, and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants' (supersedes ANSI N18.1-1977-77).
EPA-520/1-75-001,
- Manual of Protective Action Guides and Frotective Actions for Nuclear incidents," Revision 1. June 1980.
NUREG-0396, ' Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants,' December 1978.
' Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,' Revision 1. November 1980.
NUREG-0696, ' Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," February 1901.
h0 REG-0731, ' Guidelines for Utility Management Structure and Technical
~
Resources." September 1980.
l NUREG-0737, ' Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980; supplement 1 (Generic Letter 82-33), December 17, 1982.
1 Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light-Water, Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an l
Accident," Revision 3. November 1980.
t Re9ulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2. " Emergency Planning and Preparedness for l
Nuclear Power Reactors ' October 1981.
END
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issue Date: 08/21/89
- 16 82301
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