ML19332D254

Proposed Tech Specs Changes Granting Temporary Waiver of Compliance to Allow Restart

ML19332D254
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/16/1989
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19332C409	List: ML19332C408 ML19332D254
References
NUDOCS 8911300223
Download: ML19332D254 (7)

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Page;3.7/4~.7-34 1 Delete: Reactor head spray valves M0-1001-60 and H0-1001-63 .l

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~ Page -.'3. 7 / 4.7-39 -

1 P_lpe Pene. tilt 10D1- .

X-17 Reactor vessel head spray i Delete:

X-36 Control Rod D' rive Return u

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-QUAD-CITIES. l

-OPR-29 i TABLE 3.7-1 (Cont'd)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Valve Number Number of Maxinum-for i Power-Operated Operating Normal- Action oi Isolation- -Valve- Units Valves Time Operating Group-Identification 1 and 2 Inboard Outboard (sec) Position InitiatiI; Signal

' 1 2 Reactor

" shutdown  !

cooling

-supply MD-1001-47~ 1

2. Reactor 140 C SC shutdown cooling i suppg, M0-1001-50 1 140 C- SC

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Pressure Suppression '

E 2 Drywell purge-i valve A0-1601-21 1

<10 C SC

.2 Vent valve A0-1601-22 1 710 C SC 2 ~ Drywell vent valve A0-1601-23 1 -

<10 C SC 2 ~ Vent to reactor

' building -

exhaust systes' A0-1601-24 1 110 C SC 2 Nitrogen <

purge A0-1601-55 1 110 0 GC l 2 Torus purge i

valve A0-1601-56 1 <10 0 GC

2. Makeup valve MD-1601-57 1 715

- 0 GC

'2- Torus askeup '

valve A0-1601-58 1 115 C SC l 3.7/4.7-34 Amendment No.'114

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TA8LE 3.7-2 1 bs in y PRIMARY:CONTAINMENTlLEAKAGE TEST PENETRATIONS I iDouble-Gasketed Seals'-

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X-1  : Equipment hatch J

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Personnel air _ lock h-4-61. .

! Control. rod drive hatch i'

-X-35A through G: - TIP drives '

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.. <Drywell. head access-hatch

-J j- LX-200A & 8' < Suppression chamber access' hatch 1

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1 through 8' Drywell: head shear. lug g ,, ,

L(inspection. hatch)> ) 1 j- y Pipe Pene'tratio' ns ~

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-X-8 X-7A through D.: Main steam't Main steamline' drain l

. .X-9AL& 8-- :Feedwater

X.10 .-Reactor core isolation cooling -

X-11 -High pressure coolant injection

.X l Residual heat removal s

%i 'X-13A & BL Residual heat removal a

X - Reactor. coolant cleanup P .X-16A'~& 8. > Core spray

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.X-23 & 24 o iReactor building closed cooling water -

.X-25426 Orywe111 ventilation .. .

X-;;. 0;;.tre,1.77,4 dr M 7;t;rr.

1X-47  : Standby liquid control' .

, Electrical Penettstions- '

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-X-1008; C; E, F, &'G-X-101A, 8'& O'  !

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X-103! - i

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3.7/4.7-39 Amendment No. 114 L

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' Current Technical Specifications 3.7.D 2 requires that all Isolation Valves contained in Table 3.7-1 be operable during reactor power operation.

Table 3.7-1 contains a description and associated requirements for operating position and operating time for reactor head spray valves HO-1001-60 and H0-1001-63. In addition. Table 3.7-2 describes the Primary Containment 1.eakage L..  : Test Penetrations which includes penetrations for the reactor vessel head t

~ spray and CRD return lines.

The proposed Technical Specification deletes the reference to the reactor vessel head spray and CRD return lines from Table 3.7-1 and 3.7-2 as a l

' result-of-the removal of these lines.

The modifications to the reactor vessel head spray and CRD return lines:were performed as part of the Station's Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking ~ mitigation program, as put forth in the response to Generic l.etter 88-01. The piping was determined to be unnecessary and susceptible to IGSCC.

The head spray system provided a means to augment reactor cooldown

-and reduction of pressure following a shutdown. The head-spray system is part i of the Residual Heat Removal system and allows water to be diverted to a spray J nozzle in the steam dome of the vessel. The-operation of the head spray '

system during reactor shutdown is optional. The system is not used to mitigate accidents or.during normal reactor operation, j The CRD return line was previously removed from service to prevent thermal stresses on the reactor vessel due to temperature differential caused ~

by the return of cooler CRD water. The CRD return line provided a return flowpath'to the reactor vessel following CRD movement. The current return flowpath.is reverse flow through the exhaust header and return to the vessel through the CRD seals. Since the return line was capped, the piping was not utilized during any mode of operation.

As a result of the removal of the llead Spray piping, valves H0-1001-60 and HO-1001-63 were eliminated. These valves provided for containment isola-tions and were normally closed. -The valves received a close signal during a Group II initiation signal (low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, or high drywell radiation levels). The remaining plping (reactor side) is blind flanged which provides for-isolation of the pressure boundary. The blind

, flange provides the same or greater level of reactor pressure boundary as the removed isolation valve. j 1

The removal of the CRD return line and head spray piping resulted in the closure of two drywell penetrations which were listed on Table 3-7.2. l This Table delineates the penetrations which require Type C local leak rate testing. The integrity of the penetration closure will continue to be tested ,

during containment integrated leak rate test. The closure of the penetrations l eliminate possible leakage path from containment. The penetration cap was designed to be consistent with containtment design pressures and temperature, f

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AUMMif.KL5 BbS1S FOR NO SlGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMIEM10B

,As discussed in the Description of the Proposed Amendment Request, the proposed change revises the current Technical Specification listing for the primary containment isolation valves and primary containment leakage-test penetration.

The changes have been reviewed by Commonwealth Edison. Based on this review, Commonwealth Edison does not believe the changes present a Significant Hazards Consideration. The basis-for the determination is documented below.

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that the changes does not involve a,significant hazards consideration. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(c):

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase In the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated. 4 I

The probability of a pipe. leak and/or break due to intergranular stress j corrosion cracking (IGSCC) is reduced by the removal of the Head Spray and l Control Rod Drive return lines. The removal of the Head Spray line reduces l the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) due to the elimina- i tion of a vessel leakage path. The hydrostatic test of the vessel, performed each cycle, will assure the integrity of the installed blind flange. j i

The probability of an accident is not affected by the closure of the penetrations. The consequences of an accident is reduced since the closed penetrations will not be available as a possible Primary Containment leakage path. The leak tightness of the penetrations will be verified by l the integrated leak rate test (ILRT). The penetration cap is designed to withstand containment design pressures and temperatures.

Finally, since neither the CRD return line nor.the Head Spray system are utilized to mitigate any accident scenarlo, the elimination of the Head Spray system and the CRD return line does not increase the probability or

. consequences of any accident previously evaluated. .j i

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2. The proposed change will not create the possibility of a new or different I kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

2 No new interfaces with safety-related equipment, systems or structures or  :

any new systems subject to failure or malfunction have been introduced.  !

1he proposed change does not introduce any new operational modes. The j

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_ Head Spray system and CRD Return Line were not used for accident mitiga-tion, normal operation or shutdown (use-of Head Spray during.a shutdown is optional). Consequently, the removal will not result on the use of other systems in new or unanalyzed methods. No new or different kinds or accidents from any previously evaluated is therefore created.

3. .The proposed _ change does.not involve a significant reduction in the' margin of safety.

The margin of. safety is unchanged as a result of the removal of three possible pathways for leakage. The possibility of failure due to IGSCC in

'the removed piping systems is eliminated as is the possibility of. leakage through the Head Spray-Containment Isolation Valves. The current configuration of the blind flange (reactor side) and pipe cap (RHR side) provides for an adequate isolation of the piping. Reactor vessel hydrostatic ~ testing will ensure integrity of the current configuration.

Closing'the penetrations in the drywell also reduces the possibility of Primary Containment leakage' through these paths. Penetration closure integrity is vertfled using ILRT.

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