ML19332C422

Requests Approval for Immediate Implementation of Expanded Personnel Security Investigative Coverage for L Security Clearance

ML19332C422
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/07/1989
From:	Norry P NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML19332C415	List: ML19332C414 ML19332C422 ML19332C433 ML19332C443 ML19332C735 ML19332C738 ML19332C745
References
FRN-54FR38863, RULE-PR-11, RULE-PR-25, RULE-PR-95 AD28-1-2, NUDOCS 8911280107
Download: ML19332C422 (4)

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April 7, 1989 k-j e,,,e 2

MEMORANDUM F04:

Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Opera.tions FROM:.

Patricia G. Norry, Director Office of. Administration

SUBJECT:

CREDIT CHECKS - EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE During a program review meeting in your office on March 13, 1989, we discussed 1

conducting credit checks during personnel security (1) to add c credit check to investigations. The 1

discussion was related to two pending propcsals:.

the initial security-clearance investigation coverage for "L" cleared employees, contractors,- and licensees, and (2) to do credit checks as part of

.our new program for reinvestigation of "L" cleared personnel.

A credit check has long been an essential element in Full Field background investigations that serve as the basis for an NRC "Q" security clearance and "U" SNM access authorization under 10 CFR Part 11.

Since 1983, a credit check j

-has also been a part of the."Q" reinvestigation scope.

In October 1987, OPM added several significant-financial questions to its SF-86, " Questionnaire For Sensitive Positions" which the NRC currently uses.

OPM added these questions in order to identify security related concerns and possible exploitable

'i weaknesses in a person's background.

'The credit checks we have'done in the past have provided the Division of Security with important and relevant information used in determining an applicant's overall eligibility for an NRC clearance.

In our judgment,

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.we have been able'to obtain a higher degree of assurance that an individual it reliable, trustworthy, and does not have any significant financial probleans which may cause the individual to be susceptible to pressures, blackmail' or coercion to act contrary to the national interest.

In our actual case experience we have found that an individual's financial difficulty may be an indicator' or. result of other more serious ~ problems e.g., drug abuse, i

alechol abuse or dishonesty.

Based on the GA0 program review period (1933-1983). we had over 100 cases that

' contained significant derogatory information, 30 of which involve:! credtt infor-mation.- In all cases the credit report data were confirmed to be essentially 1

correct. Also during this same period, 23 of approximately 1300 reinvestigations /

upgrades involved derogatory information, 9 of which were credit related. Again, the_ credit data were confirnied as correct.

By way of background, SEC goes through a number of steps and looks at many factors when reviewing and evaluating an individual's credit check report.

First, SEC compares any reported bad debts, e.g., delinquent or charged off accounts, bankruptcy, etc., listed in the report against the individual's SF-86, which requires the individual to list any loans or financial obligations t

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L which are 90 days or more delinquent and any bankrsp;cies, t6x liens or legal judgments. SEC reviews any past due accounts, for r,xample, to determine L

L (1) how long it has been past due; (2) the total drot which is past due; (3) the total debt owed; (4) any judgments or. claims filer' against the debtor; and (5)

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any bankruptcy action.

We also evaluate the appiscant's efforts, if known from the report to satisfy any debts. On balance, this evaluation provides SEC

. with an appreciation of the nature and seriousness of an individual's financial difficulties, as refiacted by the credit report; For example, an individual may have been 30-120 days past due on several small accounts 1 or P "crs ago, e

but has made timely payments since then.

If the background inv M ion ft otherwise favorable, SEC would not question the-individual's #

t stability. Another individual may have been reported to be L

due on several accounts for a lengthy period of time up to

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.a known effort to repay.the debts.

In this case, SEC wou " c svm of the information we had received and determine throut informal interview (1) the current status of the accou"

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filed; -(3) the individual's repayment intentions; (4)

'~.ag delinquent;(5)theindividual'sincomewhenthedebt.

A current status; (6) any other bad debts not listed on art:

cy

,other pertinent information. Contact with the indivic.

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the information contained in_the report.

If the financia. conL.

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.v resolved, or the individual can show that he/she desires to clear up their debt and it is apparent that he/she has made an effort to do so, the security concern regarding-the individual's financial stability will be mitigated.

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Based on-our experience in evaluating credit bureau reports (since 1975 for L

Full Field Investigations and since 1983 for Periodic Reinvestigations), we have found they are, on balance, reliable indicators of an individual's l

financial responsibility and susceptibility to pressures or coercion.

In the few instances where the credit report contained some isolated erroneous data, L

the individual has had the opportunity to correct his/her credit record / rating.

A number of agencies, including DOE, GA0}ture, and OPN, use the cre GSA, Department of Interior (Bureau of Indian Affairs), Department of Agricu part of the basis for employment and/or security clearance determinations.

Additionally, OPM reports that of the investigations they conduct for other government agencies including NRC, approximately 255 contain adverse financial information. Our own experience-reflects a 12% rate for NRC investigations.

We believe that adding a credit check makes sense for three reasons. First, it will provide us with greater assurance that an individual requiring an "L" or "R" is reliable, trustworthy and doet, not have any significant financial problems which may make him/her eubject to pressures, blackmail or coercion to act contrary to the nationa' inw u.

Secondly, the investigat: <:. m for w NRC "L" and "R" will achieve greater comparability with the s op "r 00 6 '

and Secret clearances.

DOE has found the credit &ck e ~ C u W f ir, making clearance eligibility determir:ations. Finally, cne up, w.a NRC investigative scope would be more

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-3 April 7, 1989' consistenti sith the investigative coverage proposed in the NUMARC guidelines for licensee personnel with unescorted access to protected and vital areas of nuc1 car power plants. By adding the credit check to the "L" investi scope, NRC employees, other than inspectors (e.g., project managers)gative

, who require unescorted access could be certified to the licensee as complying with a program essentially equivalent to the proposed NUMARC guidelines.

We do not recommend applying this new credit check requirement retroactively for those who currently have "L" or "R" clearances. However the planned reinvestigation program for "L" cleared individuals (recommen,ded in the GA0 report) would include a credit check.

We estimate that the additional annual costs to NRC associated with this personnel would be approximatelyinvestigative upgrade for NRC app $26,000.

licants, contractors and other non-licensee Investigative costs associated with processing clearances for licensee personnel are charged to the licensee. We estimate that the overall additional annual costs to the licenree. community as a whole would total approximately $13,770.

Based on OGC legal advice, implementing this change in the investigative scope for the "R" SNM -access authorization and the "L" security clearance granted to licensees would require a rulemaking to amend 10 CFR Parts 11 and 25.

A negligible effect is predicted on the general public since this rulemaking activity applies only to those licensees and others who need to use, process, store, transport, or deliver to a carrier for transport formula quantities of special nuclear material (as defined in 10 CFR Part 73) or enerate, receive, safeguard, and store National Security Information or Restr cted Data (as defined in 10 CFR Part 25). Approximately 31 NRC licensee and other license related interests would be affected under.the prcvisions of 10 CFR Parts 11 and/or 25.

However, 20 of these licensee or other interests have only a limited number of active clearances,Le.g., one or two each, relating to Safeguards activities. We do not anticipate that these interests would be significantly affected. Staff resources required for processing these rule

, changes through final publication are estimated at 240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br />. Since SEC has the necessary expertise in this area, we recoseend that SEC be designated to initiate the required rulemaking. RES and HMSS concur in this recommendation.

ADM plans to publish a proposed rule for public coment in the Federal Register by August, 1989.

Consistent with your authority, we request you (1) approve the imediate implementation of this-investigative coverage change for "L" security clearance

' investigations required for NRC applicants, contractors, and other non-license related personnel and for "L" security clearance reinvestigations for NRC employees; (2) sign the enclosed bulletin to implement the "L" reinvestigation

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A,iril 7. 1989' program which also includes a credit check; and (3) have SEC initiate rulemaking j

to amend 10 CFR Parts -11 and 25. in orde* to 1&iplement the same investigative scope change:for "R" and "L" licensee ap)1icants and to revise the current fee

. schedule to recover the full cost'of eae.) initial credit. check'

,w W __ 8!Y Patricia G. Norry, Direct Office of Administration

Enclosure:

As stated jbApprov'e Disapprove

[g el gg,.i Victor 5tello, Jrg // Z

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. Dated:

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MEMORANDUM-FOR:

Chairman Zech APR 2 81999 g

m Connissioner Roberts Connissioner Carr.

Connissioner Rogers 3

L, Connissioner Curtiss FRON:

Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

CREDIT CHECKS - EXPANDED PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE-As a follow-up to the General Accounting Office report cntitled "NRC't Security Clearance Program Can be Strengthened," and the subsequent Synar Connittee hearing _beld March 15, 1989, I have (1) approved adding a credit check, effective innediately, to the scope-'of the initial personnel security investigation' required for an "L" clearance for NRC applicants, contractors, l

and other non-licensee personnel;-(2) signed the enclosed bulletin implementing

, the. reinvestigation program for "L" cleared employees whMh will also contain a

' credit check; and'(3) authorized the Office of Administration to initiate rulemaking to amer.d 10 CFR Parts 11 and 25. in order v.9 implement the same

initial investigative scope change for "R" and "L" licensee applicants and to revise the current fee schedule under the authority of 31 USC 59701196 Stat.

1051torecovertheadditionalcostaggg.g credit check.

ViT W %fE9 d Jr.

Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

As stated cc:

SECY GPA OGC

Contact:

James J. Dunleavy, PSB X27343 9

nasefr See previous concurrence 0FC

PERSEC*

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FGNorry

HLTh mpson, Jr tello, Jr:

DATE. :04/14/89

04/ /89

04/14/89

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REGULATORY AGENDA ENTRY m

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Title:

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Credit Checks '- Expanded Personnel Security Investigatit e Coverage L

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CFR Citation:

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10 CFR'Part 11;510 CFR Part 25 q

' Abstract:

The proposed rule would expand the present investigative.-scope for licensee "R": Special Nuclear Material Access Authorization and "L" security clearance c

ap?licants by adding a; credit check and would revise the corresponding fee sc1edule to recover.the additional cost of each credit check.

These amendments are necessary for the following reasons:

(1)to.obtain a higher degree < of assurance that licensee "R" and "L" applicants are reliable, trustworthy and'do not have any significant financial problems which may cause them to be susceptible to pressures, blackmail or coercion to act contrary to Lthe national. interest; (2) to achieve greater comparability with the investi-

_gation scope for DOE's "L" and Secret clearances; (3) to be consistent with the investigative coverage proposed in the NUMARC guidelines for licensee personnel with unescorted access *.o protected and vital areas of nuclear power plants;'and -(4) to recover the additional cost of each credit check.

This: rule will have a negligible effect on the-tJeneral public.

NRC resources-

-required for, processing this rule through final publication are estimated to be 240 staff hcurs.

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-Timetable:

Proposed Rule to be published for comments in the Federal Register by August 31, 1989.

Legal Authority:

42 USC 2165; 42 USC'2201; 42 USC 5841; 42 USC 2273; E.0.10865, E.O.12356 Effects on Small Business and Other Entities:

None LAgency

Contact:

Beth Bradshaw

-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- Office of Administration Washington, DC 20555 (301)492-4120

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