ML19331C326
| ML19331C326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Pasternak R POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008140560 | |
| Download: ML19331C326 (1) | |
Text
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o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
y REGION 1 0,
631 PARK AVENUE
,o',4 KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 July 31, 1980 Docket No. 50-333 Power Authority of the State of New York James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ATTN:
Mr. R. J. Pasternak Resident Manager P. O. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-20 which requires action by you with respect to your nuclear power facility (ies).
In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report (s) required by the Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.
Should you have any questions regarding the Bulletin or actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, q
B y e H. Grier Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Bulletin No. 80-20 with Enclosure 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins CONTACT:
E. G. Greenman (215-337-5267) cc w/encls:
George T. Berry, President and Chief Operating Officer i
l J. P. Bayne, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Generation l
A. Klausmann, Director, Quality Assurance l
M. C. Cosgrove, Site Quality Assurance Engineer J. F. Davis, Chairman, Safety Review Committee C. M. Pratt, Assistant General Counsel G. M. Wilverding, Manager-Nuclear Licensing s008140560 Q
ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS Nc.: 6320 UNITED STATES Accession Nc.:
NUCLEAR REGULATCRY CCtNISSICN E006190023 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEv.EF WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 July 31,1980 IE Bulletin No. S0-20 Page 1 cf 2 FAILURES OF WESTINGHOUSE TYPE W-2 SPRING RETURN TO NEUTRAL CONTROL SWITCHES Sy letter dated June 13, 1980, Cececnwealth Edison Ccecany subsitted Licensee Event Report Nc. LER 50-295/S0-24 to the NRC describing a salfunction of a Westinghouse Type W-2 centrol switch at the Zicn Generating Statica, Unit 1.
The salfunctioning switch is a tnree positicn spring return to neutral switch.
Although the switch was in its proper neutral position when it salfunctioned, its neutral contacts failed to close prcperly therety preventing the autosatic start of 1A Service Water Pup.
Subsecuent tests cenducted on the aalfunctiening switch revealed that centact closure was intermittent with the switch in the neutral (cr " Auto Start")
position.
Other tests concucted en identical switches frca spares and fres Unit 2 equipment disclosed two additional switches with a tencency for inter-mittent centact closure.
A review cf this satter by Westinghcuse led to tne issuance of N5D Technical Eulletin No. N50-T3-SG-S to tne utility cwners of all Vestinghouse cperating plants.
The recc:mendatiens centained in the Westingncese technical bulletin include: (i) testing the neutral positica contacts of the subject W-2 switches for centinuity, and (ii) rewiring of the indicating light circuit to perzit the early detection of a neutral centact failure as snewn in Figure 1.
Depending en how the incicating light circuit is wired, less cf continuity thru the neutral position contact of a V-2 switch could re.sain undetectec until the equipzent asscciated with the switch wre called upcn to operate.
Since such a failure would be equivalent to by passing the systes associated with the switen, consideration should be given to rewiring the switches used in safety-related a::plications as shewn in Figure 1.
Such rewiring would provide an acceptable ceans for cetecting centact failure, provided the indicat.ing light is in the control recs and readily visible by the cperater.
If the indicating lignt is not se located, censideration snculd be given to annunciating the neutral position centact failures at the centrol rcen to alert the operator of the incperabis status of a safety-related systen.
In addition, censideration should be given to adding recundant contacts to the W-2 switches er to replacing the W-2 switches with cthers havirg a 2:cre posi-tive contact wiping action.
IE Bulletin No. 80-20 July 31, 1980 Page 2 of 2 ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES AN HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS:
1.
Determine whether Westinghouse Type W-2 control switches with spring return to neutral position are used in safety related applications at your facility.
If so, identify the safety-related systems using these switches and the total number of switches so used.
If no such switches are used in your facility, you should indicate that this is the case and ignore the remaining questions.
2.
Licensees of operating plants using Type W-2 spring return to neutral control switches in safety related applications shall perform continuity tests on all such switches.
These tests shall be performed with the switch operator in the neutral position and completed within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin.
In addition, this continuity test shall be repeated at least every thirty-one (31) days after the initial test and after each manipulation of the switch from its neutral position.
These continuity tests may be discontinued subsequent to implementing the longer term corrective measures described below.
3.
Licensees of operating plants and holders of construction permits shall describe the longer term corrective measures planned and the date by which such measures Will be implemented by actual installation or by design change, as appropriate.
As a minimum, the longer term corrective measures should include rewiring the indicating light as shown in Figure 1 provided the light is readily visible to the control room operator.
If not, failures of the ntutral position contacts should be annunicated in the control room.
A report addressing the above matters, including the number of failures detected during the first series of tests and the safety-related systems involved, shall be submitted to the director of the appropriate NRC regional office within forty-five (45) days of the date of this bulletin.
A copy of the report shall be forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Enclosure:
Figure 1
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Enclosure to IE Bulletin No. 80-20 EXISTING INDICATING LIGHT CIRCUIT (TYPICAL)
NEUTRAL SWITCH CONTACT INDICATING LIGHT W/
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FROPOSED REWIRING OF INDICATING LIGHT CIRCt:IT (TYPICAL)
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FIGURE 1 REWIF.ING Of INDIC ATIh3 LIGHT CIRCUIT OF J-2 SWITCHES l
As 'p.ECow" ENDED BY WESTINGw"USE TECHNICAL BUL'..ET N NSt-TE-8>9
IE Bulletin No. 80-20 July 31, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 Facilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "D" Outout Codes 80-15 Possibic Loss Of Hotline 3/18/80 All nuclear facilities With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL 80-13 Cracking In Core Spray 5/12/80 All BWR's with an Spargers OL 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System 5/9/80 Each PWR with an OL Operability
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