ML19330B951
| ML19330B951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1980 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008070268 | |
| Download: ML19330B951 (2) | |
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6 UNITED STATES S'
'7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b
E REGION ill 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN. ILLINOIS 60137
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'JUL 2 21980.
Docket No. 50-373 Docket No. 50-374 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:
The enclosed Supplement No. 2 to IE Bulletin No. 80-17 is forwarded to yon for information. No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Q,aO )\\ c
- ~
[/ James G. Kepp}_r Director
Enclosure:
Supplement No. 2 to IE Bulletin No. 80-17 cc w/ encl:
Mr. D. L. Peoples, Director Director, NRR/DPM of Nuclear Licensing Director, NRR/ DOR Mr. L. J. Burke, Site PDR Project Superintendent Local PDR Mr. T. E. Quaka, Quality NSIC Assurance Supervisor TIC Mr. R. H. Holyoak, Station Mr. Dean Hansell, Office of Superintendent Assistant Attorney General Central Files 1
8088070 2 M
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SSINS No.:
6820 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 8006190032 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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O 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
- $M WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 ow July 22, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-17 Supplement No. 2 FAILURES REVEALED BY TESTING SU'ISEQUENT TO FAILURE OF CONTROL RODS TO INSERT DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR Description of Circumstances
At about 3:35 a.m. on July 19, 1980, a manual scram test was initiated at Dresden Unit No. 3.
This test was initiated in accordance with the require-ments of IE Bulletin No. 80-17.
The scram itself was accomplished (i.e.,
control rods inserted).
Following the scram, the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) was monitored by UT in accordance with Item #3 of IE Bulletin No. 80-17.
The UT check followed the normal draining of the SDV at a time when personnel conducting the test believed the SDV to be empty.
However, the UT check revealed the scram discharge west header bank to be 80% filled with water 3
(i.e., apparently the drain was not successful).
Upon investigation, it appeared that the SDV vent system did not function due to a stuck ball check valve (i.e., a ball check valve functioning as a vacuum breaker). This ball check valve is installed in a tee connection downstream of the vent valve in a one-inch vent header which terminates in the reactor building equipment drain tank (RBEDT). The ball check valve provides a vent path to.the reactor building atmosphere in the event the vent header does not.
The vent header itself provides a path to other interconnections and extends into the RBEDT under the~ surface of water normally contained there.
Additional information has also resulted from scram testing at other BWRs as fcllows:
1.
At Duane Arnold, the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV) drain valve was found installed so that pressure in the SDIV tended to unseat the drain valve disk. This resulted in leakage out of the SDIV during the scram.
This was corrected by reversing and reinstalling the valve.
The scram tests were performed on July 12 and 13 and the drain valve was corrected before return to power operations on July 17, 1980.
2.
At the Millstone Unit 1, the scram tests were performed successfully on July 11 through 14.
The function of the 10-second delay on scram reset (per Item #2.(j) of IE Bulletin No. 80-17) was tested separately from the scram tests.
Review of the separate test results by plant personnel established that the scram reset delay feature was not functioning in the scram circuits due to a wiring error on the circuit boards.
This was corrected.
IE Bulletin No. 80-17 July 22, 1980 Page 2 of 2 Supplement No. 2 3.
At Browns Ferry Unit No. 1, a test scram involving two rods was performed on July 19, 1980. The test showed normal response of level switches in the SDIV. When proceeding to drain the SDIV, however, the SDV did not empty as required and expected.- A vacuum in the SDV apparently existed which kept the system from draining.
Subsequently, the vacuum was cleared by operator actions and the volume drained properly. Tests are continuing toward determination of the cause and to measure the vacuum.
4.
At Nine Mile Point Unit No. 1, one rod failed to scram during the manual scram test on July 14, 1980. This was due to a failure of the scram pilot valve for that rod.
In view of the above-described events, the following actions in addition to those specified in IE Bulletin No. 80-17, including Supplement No.1, are to be taken by BWR licensees.
1.
Each BWR licensee with a SDV vent system that depends on any component other than the vent valve alone for proper venting must provide an alter-nate vent path continuously open to building atmosphere on the side of the vent valve piping away from the SDV.
This alternate vent path must '
3 be positive in its function at all times (i.e., a vent must be effective regardless of component operability other than the vent valve).
Plants have made corrections by providing a vent through a standpipe open to building atmosphere.
This was done at Bruins Ferry Unit No. 3 and is being done at Dresden Units 2 and 3.
It is noted that due consideration to radiological aspects should be included.
An alternate vent path must be provided within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> following the telephone notification on July 19, 1980 in order to continue or commence operations.
2.
Report in writing within 5 days of the date of this Bulletin Supplement the confirmation of your action in response to the above.
Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.
More information on the details of the Dresden and Browns Ferry events and modifications can be obtained by contacting the Dresden and/or Browns Ferry operating supervision.
In addition, we understand that a General Electric Company task force is available for consultation at (408)dc.'-3188.
i For all boiling water power reactor facilities with a constructio.. permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is res' ired.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval 'as given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic prob ems.
I
> r IE Bulletin No. 80-17 (Supplement No. 2)
Enclosure July 22,1980
~
RECENTLY ISSUED
'IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To
-No.
~
Supplement i Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 Facilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All nuclear facilit.i'es With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL 80-13 Cracking In Core Spray 5/12/80 All BWR's with an Spargers
~
OL 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System.
5/9/80 Each PWR with an OL Operability 80-11 Masonry Wall Design 5/8/80 All power reactor facilities with an OL, except Trojan 80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All power reactor Nonradioactive System and facilities with an Resulting Potential for OL or CP Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 All power reactor Deficiencies operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All power reactors with Liner Penetration Welds a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980 i
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