ML19330B936
| ML19330B936 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Martin T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008070239 | |
| Download: ML19330B936 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
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831 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 July 22, 1980 D:cket Nos. 50-354 50-355 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN.
Mr. T. J. Martin Vice President Engineering and Construction 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
The enclosed Supplement No. 2 to IE Bulletin No. 80-17, " Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR," is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, WPf.
k Bpyce H. Grier irector
Enclosures:
1.
Supplement No. 2 to IE Bulletin No. 80-17 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins CONTACT:
D. L. Caphton (215-337-5266) i cc w/encls:
E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance, Engineering and Construction Department 8008070
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ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No.: 6820 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 8006190032 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 m-July 22, 1980 o
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IE Bulletin No. 80-17 Supplement No. 2 Page 1 of 2 FAILURE OF 76 0F 185 CONTROL RODS TO FULLY INSERT DURING A SCRAM AT A BWR Description of Circumstances:
At about 3:35 a.m. on July 19, 1980, a manual scram test was initiated at Dresden Unit No. 3.
This test was initiated in accordance with the require-ments of IE Bulletin No. 80-17.
The scram itself was accomplished (i.e.,
control rods inserted).
Following the scram, the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) was monitored by UT in accordance with Item #3 of IE Bulletin No. 80-17.
The UT check followed the normal draining of the SDV at a time when personnel conducting the test believed the SDV to be empty.
However, the UT check revealed the scram discharge west header bank to be 80% filled with water (i.e., apparently the drain was not successful).
Upon investigation, it appeared that the SDV vent system did not function due to a stuck ball check valve (i.e., a ball check valve functioning as a vacuum breaker).
This ball check valva is installed in a tee connection downstream of the vent valve in a one-inch vent header which terminates in the reactor building equipment drain tank (RBEDT).
The ball check valve provides a vent path to the reactor building atmosphere in the event the vent header does not.
The vent header itself provides a path to other interconnections and extends into the RBEDT under the. surface of water normally contained there.
Additional information has also resulted from scram testing at other BWRs as 1
follows:
1.
At Duane Arnold, the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume (SDIV) drain valve was found installed so that pressure in the SDIV tended to unseat the drain valve disk.
This resulted in leakage out of the SDIV during the scram.
This was corrected by reversing and reinstalling the valve.
The scram tests were performed on July 12 and 13 and the drain valve was corrected before return to power operations on July 17, 1980.
2.
At the Millstone Unit 1, the scram tests were performed successfully on July 11 through 14.
The function of the 30-second delay on scram reset (per Item #2.(j) of IE Bulletin No. 80-17) was tested separately from the scram tests.
Review of the separate test results by plant personnel established that the scram reset delay feature was not functioning in the scram circuits due to a wiring error on the circuit boards.
This was corrected.
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4 IE Bulletin No. 80-17 July 22, 1980 Supplement No. 2 Page 2 of 2 3.
At Browns Ferry Unit No. 3
- test scram involving two rods was performed on July 19, 1980.
The test showed normal response of level switches in the SDIV. When proceeding to urain the SDIV, however, the SDV did not empty as required and em icted.
A vacuum in the SDV apparently existed which kept the syste 4 draining.
Subsequently, the vacuum was cleared by operator actions and the volume drained properly.
Tests are continuing toward determination of the cause and to measure the vacuum.
4.
At Nine Mile Point Unit No. 1, one rod failed to scram during the manual scram test on July 14, 1980.
This was due to a failure of the scram pilot valve for that rod.
In view of the above-described events, the following actions in addition to those specified in IE Bulletin No. 80-17, including Supplement No.1, are to be taken by BWR licensees.
1.
Each BWR licensee with a SDV vent system that depends on any component other than the vent valve alone for proper venting must provide an alter-nate vent path continuously open to building atmosphere on the side of the vent valve piping away from the SDV.
This alternate vent path must be positive in its function at all times (i.e., a vent must be effective regardless of component operability other than the vent valve).
Plants have made corrections by providing a vent through a standpipe open to building atmosphere.
This was done at Browns Ferry Unit No. 3 and is being done at Dresden Units 2 and 3.
It is noted that due consideration to radiological aspects should be included.
An alte'rnate vent path must be provided within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> following the telephone notification on July 19, 1980 in order to continue or commence operations.
2.
Report in writing within 5 days of the date of this Bulletin Supplement the confirmation of your action in response to the above.
Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.
More information on the details of the Dresden and Browns Ferry events and modifications can be obtained by contacting the Dresden and/or Browns Ferry operating supervision.
In addition, we understand that a General Electric Company task force is available for consultation at (408)925-3188.
For all boiling water power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin is for information only and no written response is required.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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IE Bulletin No. 80-17 (Supplement No. 2)
-July 22, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All holders of a BWR to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram OL or CP at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All holders of a BWR to Insert During a Scram OL or CP at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All holders of a power Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 reactor OL or CP and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15
?ossible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All holders of a power With Loss Of Off-Site Power reactor OL and fuel cycle licensees connected to the Emergency Notification System 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All holders of a BWR OL Discharge Volume Capability 80'-13 Cracking In Core Spray 5/12/80 All holders of a BWR OL Spargers 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System 5/9/80 All holders of a PWR OL Operability 80-11 Masonry Wall Design 5/8/80 All holders of a power reactor OL, except Trojan l
80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All holders of a power Nonradioactive System and reactor OL or CP Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 All holders of a power Deficiencies reactor OL or CP 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All holders of a power Liner Penetration Welds reactor CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980 i
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