ML19330B891
| ML19330B891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/21/1980 |
| From: | Pappas H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Wright G ILLINOIS, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008070151 | |
| Download: ML19330B891 (2) | |
Text
'o UNITED STATES
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799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN. lLLINOIS 60137 o
JUL 21 080 Mitate of Illinois Elepartment of Public Health ATTN:
Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Street Springfield, IL 62761 Centlemen:
The enclosed IE Supplement I to Bulletin No. 80-17 titled " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR" was sent to the following licensees on July 21, 1980:
ACTION Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Consumers Power C'empany Big Rock Point (50-155)
Dairyland Power Company LACBWR (50-409)
Iowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
INFORMATION Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)
Commonwealth Edison Cornpany La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341) 8008070 #N
o JUL 21 1960 -
State of Illinois Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)
A Northern Indiana Public Service Company L
Bailly (50-367) 5 Sincerely,
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4$6 tLJ f/AA Helen Pappas, Chief Administrative Branch
Enclosure:
IE Supplement 1 to Bulletin No. 80-17 cc w/ encl:
Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b Local PDR NSIC TIC i
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SSINS No.:- 6820 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 8006190027 NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tWISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
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July 18,1980 f
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-c Supplement No. 1 FAILURE OF 76 0F 185 CONTROL RODS TO FULLY INSERT DURING A S Description of Circumstances:
Please refer to IE Bulletin 80-17, issued July 3,1980, for complete details of the initiating event.
Although we are essentially confident that the event was caused by water in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) system, we do not yet have a complete explanation The best estimate is that some type of blockage as to why the water was present.
existed in the vent and/or drainage system for the SDV, precluding adequate To ensure that the SDV is empty, Browns Ferry (BF-3) has installed drainage.
instrumentation to continuously monitor the water level in the scram discharge Such instrumentation is being considered by other plants.
volume.
Since issuance of IE Bulletin 80-17, additional information has been identified.
Specifically:
At Browns Ferry a discrepancy was found between the "as-built" scram a)
An unused one-inch discharge system and the "as-designed" system.
(1") instrument line was found uncapped on the four-inch (4") drain header on the west side (the side whose rods scrammed) scram discharge It is believed that this line volume vent system of Unit No. 3.
improved the venting, and therefore the drain time for that system.
It has been determined that the vent systems on some scram discharge
(
b) volumes interconnect with vent headers that are also common with and are cor.nected to other systems.
The interconnected " vent" systems may contain water drained or being drained from those other systems.
This water could potentially affect performance of the SDV. Also, both the vent and drain systems for the scram discharge system may contain long lengths of relatively small bore piping.
Designs specify a very gradual slope, such that small errors in the "as-installed" piping could result in degraded performance (for example, due to loop seals).
Concerns have been expressed within the NRC Staff regarding potential c) delays that may occur before start of injection of boron into the BWR system from the Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) when this manual operator action is required. The potential delays could be caused by w
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July is,1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-17 Page 2 of 3 e
Supplement No. 1 unavailability of the SLCS key which is required to initiat t'his system, and/or administrative delays which require supervisory approval before the SLCS can be manually initiated by the control room licensed operator.
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fn view of the above items, the following actions in addition to those specified in IE Bulletin 80-17 are to be taken by BWR licensees.
Actions to be Taken by BWR Licensees Upon Receipt and to be Reported A.
Within 20 Days -f the Date of This Letter:
Provide to the NRC Regional Office an analysis of the adequacy of 1) the "as-built" SDV system and associated vent and drain systems, including any identified design deficiencies.
Include copies of verified "as-built" isometric drawings of the SDV and detailed descriptions of the remainder of the system, verified to be correct, as part of this analysis.
Revise and implement Operating Procedures as necessary to provide 2) clear guidance to the licensed operator in the control room regarding when he should initiate the SLCS without obtaining prior supervisory approval.
Provide a description of the implemented procedural requirements.
Assure that procedures exist and are implemented for specifying 3) remedial action to be taken if water is found in the SDV system at times when it should be free of water.
Provide a description
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of the implemented procedural requirements.
Revise and implement administrative procedures as necessary to ensure j
4) that the SLCS key shall be readily available to the licensed operator in the control room.
Provide a description of the implemented pro-cedural requirements.
Continue daily monitoring of water levels in all scram discharge 5) volumes until continuous monitoring system (s) (discussed in B.1 below) is (are) installed and operational (this requirement supersedes the requirements of Item 5 of IE Bulletin 80-17 which required daily surveillance for only 6 days).
Actions to be Taken by BWR Licensees and Completed by September 1, 1980:
B.
1)
Install a system to continuously monitor water levels in all scram discharge volumes.
Continuous recording and alarm features must be included in the design.
Consideration should be given to use of diverse level sensors in this (these) system (s). The. design installed should represent the design with the highest level of reliability compatible with completion of installation by September 1, 10 D.
Provide a written description of the system design to the NRC Aegional Office.
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"i IE Bulletin No. 80-17 July 18,1980 Page 3 of 3 Supplement No. 1 If installation by September 1, 1980 is not possible, by August 15, 0:,
1980, submit to the NRC Regional Office:
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1)
Documentation in detail why the installation cannot be
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completed by 9/1/80.
2)
A commitment to a firm schedule for installation.
3)
A commitment to equipment changes and/or surveillance requirements in addition to those now in effect that will provide adequate assurance of SDV operability in the interim until installation is completed.
Perform a study of potential designs for improving the venting system 2) for the scram discharge volumes and submit a description to NRC by Improvements such as providing a redundant, September 1, 1980.
independent vent for each significant volume in the system or locally installing vacuum breakers close to each such volume should be con-sidered (some plants already include a design which vents locally to atmosphere).
Include an estin! ate of the time that would be required to accomplish these modifications in your report to be submitted to the NRC Regional Office. We have been told that meetings have already been scheduled by GE to discuss their proposals in this area with licensees.
Additional requirements are under consideration and will be the subject of further communication from NRC.
Licensees of all operating BWRs shall submit the information requested within -
the specified allowable times. This information is requested under the provis-ions of 10 CFR 50.54 (f).
Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time periods specified above, written statements of the above information signed under oath or affirmation.
Reports shall be. submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, NRC. Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington DC 20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0071); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
r-Enclosure IE Bulletin No. 80-17 July 18,1980 Supplement No. 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS hulletin Subject Date Issued Iss@dTo Jo.
5 80-17 Failure Of Control Rods To 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor Insert During A Scram At A facilities hciding OLs BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 Facilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All nuclear facilities With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL 80-13 Cracking In Core Spray 5/12/80 All BWR's with an OL Spargers 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System 5/9/80 Each PWR with an OL Operability 80-11 Masonry Wall Design 5/8/80 All power. vetor facilities with an OL, except Trojan 80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All power reactor Nonradioactive System and facilities with an Resulting Potential for OL or CP Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 All power reactor Deficiencies operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All power reactors with Liner Penetration Welds a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980 j