ML19329G164

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Provides Subcommittee on Energy & Water Development W/Info Re Reprogramming Actions for Approval.Includes Priorities & Status Items,Reprogramming analysis,near-term OL Tasks & FY80 Base Table.W/O Encl
ML19329G164
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1980
From: Ahearne J
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Bevill T
HOUSE OF REP., APPROPRIATIONS
Shared Package
ML19329G151 List:
References
NUDOCS 8007140062
Download: ML19329G164 (52)


Text

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g+f...,,o UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555

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June 25, 1980

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The Honorable Tom Bevill, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During NRC's FY 1981 budget presentations to Congress, we had indicated that NRC was in the process of completing an agency-wide assessment of the TMI-2 accident and was preparing the TMI-2 Action Plan to address the issues identified during this assessment.

Further, we indicated that implementation of the Action Plan would cause a redirection of the FY 1980 budget that was approved by Congress.

In some cases, the resources for the redirected efforts will necessitate reprogrammings that require prior Congressional approval under the Appropriations Committees' reprogramming procedures for NRC. The purpose of this letter is to request your approval

.of these reprogramming actions.

The preparation of the TMI Action Plan evolved through intensive staff review and interaction with the Commission. The Plan also incorporates comments from the ACRS. While the THI-2 Action Plan now reflects how the Commission currently plans to respond to the many recomuendations and issues surfaced by investigations of the TMI-2 accident, we expect that specific details regarding implementation of some tasks will change as we learn more during the implementation phase.. We will provide your Committee with copies of the complete Action Plan under separate cover. provides a listing of all the TMI-2 Action Plan tasks, the responsible offices, and initiation schedules that have been approved by the Commission. summarizes, by NRC program office and decision unit, the resources required in FY 1980 during the period April 1 through September 30, 1980, for implementation of the Action Plan.

It also shows the resources available that can be redirected within Congressional repro-gramming limitations, and those resources which require prior Congressional approval for reprogramming. As indicated in Enclosure 2, NRC will be able l

to accomplish most of the necessary redirection of FY 1980 resources without exceeding Congressional reprogramming limitations.

There are some excep-tions for a limited number of decision units in the NRR and I&E programs.

Since most of the reprogramming actions requiring Congressional approval are as a result of the implementation in the NRR program of those tasks referred l

to as Near Term Operating License conditions, brief explanations of these tasks are provided in Enclosure 3.-

800714d091.

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The Honorable Tom Bevill,

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Therefore, in accordance with Congressional reprogramming procedures, we are providing your Committee with proposed revisions to our base table (Enclosure 4) with accompanying explanations.

In order to implement the high priority efforts identified in the TMI Action Plan, we would appreciate your early consideration of these proposed reprogrammings.

Sincerely,

! ae.

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Jbhn,F. Ahearne Chainnan

Enclosures:

1 Priorities and Status of Items

~

In TMI-2 Action Plan 2.

TMI Action Plan Reprogramming Analysis 3.

Near Tenn Operating License Tasks 4.

FY 1980 Base Table cc'w/ enclosures:

Rep. John T. Myers l

e a,

s PRIORITIES AND STATUS OF ITEMS IN TMI-2 ACTION PLAN t

I s

f s

PRIORITIES AND STAlus Of IllMS IN IMI-2 ACIl0N PLAN Key to Symbols Decision Group:

A = ltems or criteria already approved by the Commission in the course of business apart from the Action Plan.

8 = Items for which the scope and criteria are suf ficiently well-defined in the plan that additional study is not required. Commission approval of the plan means, for these itses, leptementation in the manner described in the plan, consistent with a policy to solicit and consider pubilc comments on these and any other IMI related requirements developed in accord with the plan. Ihis policy may lapact the estimated implementation deadlines presently shown for these Decision Group 8 items in the plan and in Iable 1.

C = Itees which require further definition of scope, need, and criteria. Commission approval of the plan means, for these items, approval to commit the neces,ary staff resources, consistent with other resource priorities, to develop the information needed to bring the ites separately to the Commission for a decision on the schedules shown in the plan.

D = ltems that are related to, but not directly derived from, the IMI-2 accident and are more properly characterized as part of the agency's normal operating plan. Some Decision Group D flees are ongoing.

Decision Group D items are included in the plan for completeness but are to be scheduled and assigned resou Ces along with the other Anreal fuRClions of the agency in its routine operating plan-and budgetary process. Licensee implementation details for Decision Group D items are not included in this Action Plan.

Priority Group:

I = Should be initiated in f V80 or FY81 and accomplished as scheduled in the Action Plan; in general, received more than 170 points in the Action Plan priority systes (see Appendix 8).

2 = Schedule, if possible, but initiation can be deferred for up to one year in view of relative priority or other work already initiated; in general, received between 110 and 190 points (see Appendix B).

3 = lnitiation can be deferred for up to two years; in general received less than 110 points (see Appendix B).

(no priorities assigned to Decision Group D items) e.

C 6

'. f i'

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PRIORillES AND STAIUS of IIENS IN INI-2 ACIl0N PLAN Decision Priority Lead Initiate Action Action Iten Group Group Office W80 FV81 fYB2 Comments I.

Operational Safety I.A Operating Personne1 1.A.I Operating Personnel and Staffing 1.

Shift Technical Advisor A

I MR X

2.

Shif t Supervisor Admin. Duties A

I MRR M

3.

Shiit Manning A

I iiRR X

4.

Iong-term upgrading D

50 M

l.A.2 1 raining and Qualifications of Operating Personnel 1.

Immediate Upgrading of Operator and A

1 NitR M

Senior Operator Training and Qualifications 2.

Iraining and Qualifications of Opera-B 2

MR X

tions Personnel 3.

Administration of Iraining Programs Audits - B 2

NRR X

Instructors -

X A

4.

NRR Participation in Inspector B

3 IE X

1 raining 5.

Plant Drills Short-ters - B 1 NRR X

)

long-ters - D M

6.

long-term upgrading of training C

I 50 X

and Qualifications.

PRIORITIES (contisused)

Decision Priority lead initiate Action Action llee Group Group Office fi80 FYtl FYS2 Comments 7.

Accreditation of Training C

2 NRR X

Institutions 1.A.3 Licensing and Requalification of Operating Personnel I.

Revise Scope and Criteria for A

2 MR X

Licensing Exams 2.

Operator Licensing Program C

3 MR X

Changes 3.

Requirements for Operator 0

50 X

Fitness 4.

ticensing of Additional Operations C

2 MR X

Personnel 5.

Establish Statement of D

MR X

Understanding with INPO and 00E I.A.4 Simulator Use and Development 1.

Initial $leulator Improvement B

1 MR M

2.

long-Tere training Slaulator 8

2 50 I

Upgrade 3.

Feasibility Study of Procurement of D

2L5 K

MC fraining Sleulator 4.

Feasibility Study of MC Engineering D

RES X

Computer e

-(.

  • PRIORIllES (continued)

Decision Priority Lead initiate Action Action ites Greg Grog Office Fia0 ryal rya 2 Comments I.B.I knagement for Operations I.

Organization and k nagement C

1 MS I

long-Tere leprovements 2.

Evaluation of Organization A

I IE X

and " - ;-- nt leprovements of NIOL AppIIcants 3.

Loss of Safety function C

2 50 M

5 tarted fy?9 I.B.2 Inspection of operating Reactors I.

Revise IE Inspection Program D

IE M

ongoing 2.

Resident inspector at Operating A

I IE M

Onguing Reactors 3.

Regional Evaluations D

IE X

Ongoing 4.

Overview of Licensee Performance 0

IE M

I.C Operating Prccedures 1.

Short-Tere Accident Analysis and A

I MR M

Procedures Revision 2.

Shift and Rellet turnover Procedures-A I

MR M

3.

Shsit Supervisor Responsibilities A

I MR M

t.

Control Room Access A

I NRR M

b.

Procedures for feesack of Operating A

I MR M

Emperience.

PRIORITIES (continued)

Decist'on Priority lead Initiate Action Action Ites Group Group Office.

FY80 FYet FY82 Comments 6.

Procedures for Verification of Correct 8 2

NRR X

Performance of Operating Activities 7.

M555 Vendot Review of Procedures A

I NRR X

8.

Pilot E nitoring of Selected Emergency A 2

MR X

Frocedures for NIOL Applicants 9.

Long-Term Program Plan for upgrading C

1 NRR X

of Procedures I.D Control Room Design I.

Control Room Design Reviews NIOL - A I

NRR X

o Remainder - B 2.

Plant Safety Parameter Display Console B I

NRR X

3.

Safety Systee Status Monitoring C

2 NRR X

4.

Control Room Design Standard B

i 50 X

5.

Improved Control Room Instrumentation A 2

RES X

Research 6.

Iechnology Iransfer Conference A

3 RES X

Complete I.E Analysis and Dissemination of Operating Lxperience 1.

Of fice for Analysis and A

I Af00 X

5 tarted FY79 Evaluation of Operational Data 2.

Program Office operational Data A

I

[D0 M

ongoing Activities 4_

~

PRIORITIES (continued)

Decision Priority Lead Initiate Action Action Ites Group Group Office TV60 ryst rye 2 Comments 3.

Operational Safety Data Analysis A

1 RES X

Ongoing 4.

Coordination of Licensee. Industry.

R I

AE00 X

and Regulatory Programs 5.

Nuclear Plant Reliability Data 0

50 M

Ongoing System 6.

Reporting Requirements C

1 AE00 I

Ongoing 7.

Foreign Sources B

2 IP M

8.

Human Error Rate Analysis A

2 RES X

Ongoing I.F Quality Assurance 1.

Expand QA list 8

2 50 M

2.

Develop Nore Detailed Criteria 0

50 X

I.G Preoperational and Low-Power Testing 1.

Training Requirements A

2 NRR X

2.

Scope of Test Program 8

2 NRR X

II.

Siting and Design II.A Siting 1.

Siting Policy Reformulation C

2 NRR X

2.

Site Evaluation of Existing Facilities C

.2 NRR X.

o'. -~

PRIORITIE! $:entlaued)

Decision Priority lead Initiate Action _

Action Ites Group Group Office FY80 FY81 FY82 Comments 11.8 Consideration of Degraded or Malted Cores in Safr*y Review 1.

Reactor Coolant System Vents A

2 NRR X

5 tarted FY79 2.

Plant Shlalding to Provide Access to A

2 NRR X

5 tarted FY79 Vital Areas and Protect Safety Equipment for Post-accident Operation 3.

Post-accident Sampling A

2 NRR X

5 tarted FY79 4.

Training for Mitigating Core Damage A

I NRR M

5.

Research on Phenomena Associated with A 2

RES X

Ongoing Core Degradation and fuel Melting 6.

Risk Reduction for Operating A

I NRR X

Reactors at Sites with High Population Densities 7.

Analysis of Hydrogen Control C

1 NRL M

8.

Rulemaking Proceeding A

2 50 M

II.C Reliability Engineering and Risk Assessment 1.

Interim A 6.obility A

I RES X

Six plant study Evaluation Program (IREP) delayed to 5/81 2.

Continuation of IREP C

2 RES X

3.

Systems Interaction A

1 NRR X

4.

Reliability Engineering 8

2 NRR X.

"..~

PRIORillES (continued)

Decision Priority lead Initiate Action Action Ites Group Group Office FY80 FYet FY82 Comments 18.0 Reactor Coolant System Relief and Safety Valves I.

Iesting Requirements A

I MR X

2.

Research o: Relief and Safety Valve A

3 RES X

Iest Requirements 3.

Relief and Safety Valve Position A

I MR X

Complete Indication ll.E Systes Design II.E.1 Auxiliary feedwater Systee I.

Auxiliary feedwater System A

I MR X

5tretch completion

[ valuation to FYB2 2.

Auxiliary fee &ater System Automatic A

I MR X

Infllation and flow Indication 3.

Update Standard Review Plan and 0

MR X

Develop Regulatory Guide ll.L.2 toergency Core Cooling System 1.

Reliance on ECCS 8

2 MR X

2.

Research on Small Rreak LOCAs A

I RES X

5 tarted iY19 and Anomalous Iransients 3.

Uncertainties in Performance C

2 MR X

Predictions

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PRIORillES (continued)

Decision Priority lea:1 Initiate Action Action ites Group Group Office FY80 FY81 fY82 Comments

11. [. 3 Decay Heat Removal I.

Reliability of Power Syylles for A

I NRR M

5 tarted fY79 Natural Circulation 2.

Systems Reliability 8

I NRR X

3.

Coordinated Study of Shutdown C

2 NRR X

lleat Removal Requirements 4.

Alternate Concepts Researcle D

RES X

Started fY79 5.

Negulatory Guide D

$D X

Ongoing II.E.4 Con' w eer.6 Design 1.

Dediraf d S.estrations A

1 NRR X

5 tarted FY79 2.

Isolat r '.9

- ;.Allity A

I KCR X

5 tarted FY79 3.

Integrity Check 8

2 NRR M

4.

Pw.r'n2 A

h NRR X

II.L.h resign S.:nsitivity of B&W Reactors 1.

Design Evaluation A

2 NRR X

2.

B&W Reactor Transient Response A

2 NRR X

Ongoing lask Force II.L.6 In Situ lesting of Valves 1.

Iest Adequacy Study D

NRR X.

PRIORIIIES (continued)

Decision Priority Lead Initiate Action Action item i

Group Group Office FY80 FY81 FY82

  • Comments II.T Instramentation and Controls 1.

Additional Accident Monitoring A

1 NRR X

Started fY79 Instramentation 2.

Identification of and Recovery from A

I NRR X

Started FY79 Conditions Leading to Inadequate Core Cooling 3.

Instrumentation for Monitoring Accident 8 2

50 X

Started FY79 Conditions (Reg. Guide 1.97) 4.

Study of Control and Protection D

3 NRR X

Action Design Requirements S.

Safety Classification of Electrical B

2 SD X

Equipment II.G Electrical Power 1.

Power Supplies for Pressurizer Relief A

1 NRR X

Started FYJ9 Valves, Block Valves, and level Indications II.li IMI-2 Cleanup and Examination I.

Maintain Safety of IMI-2 and Minfalze Environmental Impact A

1 NRR X

2.

Obtain lechnical Data on the Condi*

tions Inside the IMI-2 Containment Structure A

2 RES X

3.

Evaluate and feedback Information Obtained from IMI A

2 NPR X

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i PRIORITIES (continued) i l

Decision Priority lead

__ Initiate Action Action item Group Group Office FY80 FY81 FY82 Comments ll.J.3 Management for Design end Construction 1.

Organizatio. and Staffing to Oversee Design and Construction C

1 NRR X

2.

Issue Regulatory Guide C

3 50 M

II.J.4 Revise Deficiency Reporting C

1 IE X

Requirements II.K Measures to Mitigate Small-Break LOCAs and loss of feedwater Accidents 1.

IE Bulletins A

I NRR X

2.

Commission Orders on B&W Plants A

I NRR X

Started FY19 3.

Final Recommendations of B&O 8

i NRR X

Stretch out imple-lask Force mentation to FY82 Ill. Imergency Preparations and Radiation Ef fects li t. A. I improve Licensee Emergency Preparedness - Short-tern 1.

Lipgrade Emergency Preparedness A

I NRR X

2.

Upgrade Licensee Emergency Support facilities A

I NRR M

Complete 3.

Maintain Supplies of thyroid Blocking Agent (Potassium lodide)

C 3

NRR X.

. ~, -

PRIORITIES (continued)

Decision Priority lead Initiate Action Action Ites Group Group Office FY80 FY81 TV82 Comments III.A.2 Improving Licensee Emergency Preparedness - Long-term 1.

Amend to CfR 50 and 10 CfR 50 Appendix E C

3 50 X

5 tarted FY79 2.

Development of Guidance and Criteria C

3 NRR X

III.A.3 Improving NRC Emergency Preparedness 1.

NHC Role in Responding to Nuclear Emergencies A

I EDO X

2.

Improve Operations Centers 8

2 IE X

3.

Communications Telephones-A 2

IE X

Backup-C 2

IE 4.

Nuclear Data Link C

3 IE X

Ongoing 2

5.

Training, Drills, and lests D

IE X

Ongoing 6.

Interaction of NHC with Other Agencies C 2

100 X

111.8 Emer0ency Prepasednes of State and local Governments 1.

Iransfer of Responsibilities to ffMA A

1

[00 X

2.

Implementation of NRC's and FINA's A

I EDO X

Responsibilities 111.0 Public Information I.

llave Information Available for the News Media and the Public C

3 OPA X.

PRIORiflES (continued)

Decision Priority Lead Initiate Action Action Iten Group Group Office FY80 FY81 FYB2 Comments

)

2.

The Office of Public Affairs will Develop A ency Policy and Provide 0

Training for Interfacing with the News Media and Other Interested C

3 OPA X

Parties Ill.D.I Radiation Source Control 1.

Primary Coolant Sources Outside the NIOL - A 2

NRR X

Containment Structure Criteria - C 2

NRR 2.

Radioactive Gas Management 8

3 NRR X

/

3.

Ventilation System and Radiolodine 8

2 NRR X

Adsorber Criteria 4.

Radwaste System Design features to C

3 NRR X

Aid in Accident Recovery and Decontamination Ill.D.2 Public Radiation Protection Improvement 1.

Radiological Monitoring of Ef fluents 8

2 NRR X

2.

Radiolodine, Carbon-14, and Tritium 8

3 NRR X

Pathway Dose Analysis 3.

Liquid Pathway Radiological Control C

3 NRR X

4.

Offsite Dose N asurements NIOL - A 3

IE X

Research will initiate e

Remainder - C RES work in lY80 5.

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual B

3 NRR X

6.

Independent Radiological Measurements 0

IE X s

PRIORITIES (continued)

Decision Priority Lead Initiate Action Action Ites Group Group Office IV80 FY81 FY82 Comments Ill.D.3 Worker Radiation Protection leprovements 1.

Radiation Protection Plans e

2 NRR X

2.

Health Physics leprovements D

50

.X Osp ing 3.

Inplant Radiation Nonitoring Short-3 NRR V

ters - A Long-ters - 8. D 4.

Control Room Habitability NIOL - A 2

NRR X

long ters - C 2

NRR 5.

Radiation Worker Exposure Data Base D

SD X

Ongoing IV.

Practices and Procedures IV.A Strengthen Enforcement Process 1.

Seek Legislative Authority A

2 DGC X

2.

Revise [nforcement Policy D

2 IE X

IV.B Issuance of Instructions and Information to Licensees IV.B.1 Revise Practices for Issuance of D

2 NRR X

Instructions and Information to Licensees IV.C lxtend lessons learned to licensed Activities Other Ihan Power Reactors 4,

S

PRIORIllES (continued)

Decision Priority lead Initiate Action Action item Group Group Office fi$0 FY81 FY82 Comments IV.C.1 Extended lessons Learned from INI to C

3 NHSS X

Ollier NRC Programs IV.D NRC Staff Iraining IV.0.1 NRC Staff Training C

2 ADN X

IV.E Safety Decision-Making 1.

Expand Research on Quantification D

3 RES -

X of Safety Decision-Making 2.

Plan ;or Early Resolution of Safety C

2 NRR X

issues 3.

Plan for Resolving Issues at C

3 50 X

Construction Permit Stage 4.

Resolve Generic issues by Rulemaking C

2 SD X

b.

Assess Currently Operating Reactors C

2 NRR X

IV.f Financial Disincentives to Safety 1.

Increased IE Scrutiny of Power A

3 IE X

Ascension Test Program 2.

Evaluate line Impacts of financial C

3 NRR X

Disincentives to the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants IV.G Improve Safety Rulemaking Procedures I.

Develop a Public A enda for D

3 ADN X

d Rulemaking.

4 PRIDRITIES (continued)

Decision Priority Lead Initiate Action Action item Group Group Office FWl0 Fral rya 2 Comments 2.

Periodic and Systematic D

3 ELD M

Reevaluation of Existing Rules 3.

Improve Rulemaking Procedures D

3 ELD X

4.

Study Alternatives for Improved D

3 E10 M

Rulemaking Process IV.H NRC Participation in the Radiation Policy A

3.

50 X

Council V.

NNC Policy, Drganization, and Management 1.

Develop NRC Policy Statement on Safety NA NA Comm.

Io be determined 2.

Study Elimination of Nonsafety NA NA Comm.

10 be determined Responsibilities 3.

Strengthen Role of ACRS NA NA Comm.

To be determined 4.

Study Need for Additional NA NA Comm.

Io be determined Advisory Committees 5.

Improve Public and Intervenor NA NA Comm.

To be determined Participation in llearing Process 6.

Study Construction-During-NA NA Comm.

Io be determined Adjudication Rules l

1.

Study Need for INI-Related NA NA Comm.

Io be determined

{

Legislation 8.

Stialy the Need to Establish an NA NA Comm.

10 be determined Independent Nuclear Safety Board 9.

Study the Reform of the Licensing NA NA Comm.

Io be determined P ocess l.

~

PRIORITIES (continued)

Dect,lon Priority Lead Initiate Action Action item Group Group Office fiBOfY81 FY82 Comments 10.

Study NRC lop knagement Structure

.o.

NA Comm.

To be determined and Process 11.

Reexamine Organization and W.

NA Comm.

To be determined functions of MRC Offices 12.

Revise Delegations of Authority NA NA Comm.

Io be determiswd to Staff 13.

Clarify and Strengthen the Respective NA NA Comm.

To be determined Roles of Chairman. Commission, and LDO 14.

Authority to Delegate Emergency NA NA Comm.

Io be determined Response functions to a Single Commissionar 15.

Achieve Single location - Long-ters-NA NA Comm.

Io be determined 16.

Achieve Single location - Interim NA NA Comm.

Io be determined o

17.

Neexamine Commission Role in NA NA Comm.

To be deteralewd Adjudication

e l

S 9

e TMI ACTION PLAN REPROGRAMMING ANALYSIS E'2 8

5 m

N

.s THI Acticn Plan R:pr:graisning Analysis Sunnary FY 1980 01ffer:ncos

. t 011ars in Thousands - Program Support Only) 0

OffIca:

Nuclear Reactor Regulation FY 1980 4/1-9/30/80 Difference

.Congresslonal THE Action Candidate Requirements Reprogramming Plan Requiremeats Give Up less Candidates Thresholds

  • Decision Unit SY SY SY Operating Reactors......

(48) 822

(-)

50 (48) 772.

No Casework................

(14) 350 (24) 261

(-10) 89 Yes _1_/

Technical Projects......

(19) 1,170 (52) 1,531

(-33)

-361 (2) 500

(-2)

-500 Yes 2_/

Advanced Reactors.......

(-)

No

(-3)

(3)_

Standards Assistance....

(-)

TOTAL,................

(81) 2,342 (al) 2,342 (0) 0 I

"Yes" indicates prior Congressional approval is required to implement reprogranaing in FY 1980.

1/ Congressional funding level established for Casework and for Technical Projects combined $12.16SK.

Y/ Congressional fundf rig level established for Advanced Reactors $1,31SK, includes a $500K Congressional add-on for itTGR.

THI Action Plan Reprcgrausaing Analysis

~-

Sunuuary FY 1980 Differences (Dollars in Thousands - Program Support Unly)

Office:

Standards Development FY 1980 4/1-9/30/80 Difference Congressional THI Action Candidate Requirements Reprogramming Plan Requirements Give Up Less Candidates Ti.resholds*

Decision Unit SY SY SY -

4

(-)

No (4.4)

Power Facility Standards (4.4)

Operation and Utilization

(-)

No (1.3)

(1.3)

Standards.............

(-)

(5.7)

T O TAl..................

(5.7)

"Yes" indjcates prior Congressional approval is required to implement reprogramniing in FY 19,80.

b

THI Action Plan Reprogransning Analysis Simunary FY 1980 Differcnces (DollarsinThousands-ProgramSupportOnly)

Office:

lospection and Enforcesent FY 1980 4/1-9/30/80 Difference Congressional THI Action Candidate Requirements Reprogransuing Plan Requirements Give Up Less Candidates Thresholds

  • Decision Unit SY 5

SY 5

SY

(-)

No (2.9)

Heactor Construction....

(2.9)

(16.1) 100

(-)

-100 No (16.1)

Reactor Operations

.e (0.1)

(-)

No vendor and Contractor...

(0.1) fuel Facilities and

(-)

l (1.1)

Materials Safety......

(1.1) l Yes 1/

i Hanagement Direction and

(-)

100 h

Support...............

(0.7) 100 (0.7)

(-)

No

(-)

Safeguards..............

(-)

Special Techical

(-)

No Training..............

(-)

(-)

TOTM..................

(20.9) 100 (20.9) 100

(-)

l "Yes" indicates prior Congressional approval is required to implement reprogranvain9 in FY 1980.

1/ Congressional funding level established for fuel Facilities and Materials Safety and for Mana9ement Direction and Support conbined $1,935K.

~

THI Actica Plan Reprogranning Analysis Stanmary FY 1980 Differences

~.-

(Dollars in Thousands - Program Support only) l Office:

Nuclear Regulatory Research l

FY 1980 Difference Congressional THI Action Candidate Requirements Reprogramming Plan Requirements Give up Less Candidates Thresholds

  • Decision Unit SY SY SY Systems Engineering.....

(-)

4,200

(-)

4,200

(-)

No LOFT....................

(-)

40,300

(-)

40,300

(-)

No Code ~Devel oimient........

(-)

800

(-)

800

(-)

No fuel Dehavior...........

(-)

200

(-)

200

(-)

No fast Breeder Reactor....

(-)

2,780

(-)

2,780

(-)

No Risk Assessment.........

(-)

400

(-)

400

(-)

No Improved Reactor Safety.

(-)

550

(-)

550

(-)

No TOTAL.................

(-)

49,230

(-)

49,230

(-)

l

'Yes" indicates prior Congressional approval is required to implement reprogramming in FY 1980.

0 0

Q 4

g 6

5 NEAR TERM OPERATING LICENSE TASKS i

l l

9

9 8

6 e

e FUEL-LOADING AND LOW-POWER TESTING LICENSE REQUIREMENTS l

l

I. A.1.1 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR A technical advisor to the shift supervisor shall be present on all shifts and available to the Control Room within 10 minutes.

Although minimum training requirements have not been specified, shift technical advisors should enhance the accident assessment function at the plant.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.A.1.2 SHIFT SUPERVISOR ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES Review the administrative duties of the shift supervisor and delegate functions that detract from or are subordinate to the management responsibility for assuring safe operation of the plant to other personnel not on duty in the control room.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.A.1.3 SHIFT MANNING The minimum shift crew for a unit shall include three operators, plus an additional three operators when the unit is operating.

Shift staffing may be l

adjusted at multi-unit stations to allow credit for operators holding licenses on more than one unit.

In each control room, including common control rooms for multiple units, there shall be at all times a licensed reactor operator for each reactor leaded with fuel and a senior reactor operator licensed for each reactor that is operating.

There shall also be onsite at all times, an additional relief operator licensed for each reactor, a licensed senior reactor operator who is designated as shift supervisor, and any other licensed senior reactor operators required so that their total number is at least one more than the number'of control rooms from which a reactor is being operated. --

Administrative procedures shall be established to limit maximum work hours of all personnel performing a safety-related function to no more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of continuous duty with at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> between work periods, no more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7 day period, and no more than 14 consecutive days of work without at least 2 consecutive days off.

These requirements shall be met before fuel loading.

(Detailed guidance to licensees is expected to be issued in May 1980).

I.A.3.1 REVISE SCOPE AND CRITERIA FOR LICENSING EXAMINATIONS All reactor operator license applicants shall take a written examination with a new category dealing with the principles of heat transfer and fluid mechanics, a time limit of nine hours, and a passing grade of 80 percent overall and 70 percent in each category.

All senior reactor operator license applicants shall take the reactor operator examination, an operating test, and a senior reactor operator written examination with a new category dealing with the theory of fluids and thermodynamics, a time limit of seven hours, and a passing grade of 80 percent overall and 70 percent in each category.

These requirements shall be met oefore fuel loading.*

I. B.1. 2 EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS OF NEAR-TERM OPERATING LICENSE APPLICANTS t

The licensee organization shall comply with the findings and requirements generated in an interoffice NRC review of licensee organization and management.

The review will be based on an NRC document entitled Draft Criteria for Utility Management and Technical Competence.

The first draft of this da'aent was "In the case of Sequoyah, North Anna 2, Salem and McGuire, the oper aco 3 2re not required to take the new written examination, but were required t r4. ct 4 new l

passing grade requirement.

However, any license applicants who must be. reexaminec are being required to take the new examination.

The

'cer na operators and senior operators for all other new operating licenses will e required to take the new examination.

dated February 25, 1980, but the document is changing with use and experience in ongoing reviews.

These draft criteria address the organization, resources, training, and qualifications of plant staff, and management (both onsite and 1

offsite) for routine operations and the resources and activities (both onsite and offsite) for accident conditions.

i Establish a group that is independent of the plant staff but is assigned on '

site to perforu independent reviews of plant operational activities and a capability for evaluation of operating experiences at nuclear power plants.

Organizational changes are to be implemented on a schedule to be determined prior to fuel loading.

I. C.1 SHORT-TERM ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PROCEDURE REVISION Analyze small-break LOCAs over a range of break sizes, locations and condi-tions (including some specified multiple equipment failures) and inadequate core cooling due to both low reactor coolant system inventory and the loss of natural circulation to determine the important phenomena involved and expected instrument indications.

Based on these analyses, revise as necessary emergency procedures and training.

These requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.C.2 SHIFT RELIEF AND TURNOVER PROCEDURES Revise plant procedures for shift relief and turnover to require signed check-lists and logs to assure that the operating staff (including auxiliary operators and maintenance personnel) possess adequate knowledge of critical plant parameter status, system status, availablility and alignment.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.C.3 SHIFT SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES Issue a corporate management directive that clearly establishes the command duties of the shift supervisor and emphasizes the primary management responsi-bility for safe operation of the plant.

Revise plant procedures to clearly define the duties, responsibilities and authority of the shift supervisor and the control room operators.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.C.4 CONTROL ROOM ACCESS Revise plant procedures to limit access to the control room to those individuals responsible for the direct operation of the plant, technical advisors, speci-fied NRC personnel, and to establish a clear line of authority, responsibility, and succession in the control room.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.C.5 PROCEDURES FOR FEEDBACK 0F OPERATING EXPERIENCE TO PLANT STAFF Review and revise, as necessary, procedures to assure that operating experiences are fed back to operators and other personnel.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

I.C.7 NSSS VENDOR REVIEW OF PROCEDURES Obtain nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor review of low power testing procedures to further verify their adequacy.

1 -

This requirement must be met before fuel loading.

I. D.1 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN Perform a preliminary asressment of the control room to identify significant human factors deficiencies and instrumentation problems and establish a,

schedule approved by the NRC for correcting deficiencies.

This requirement must be met before fuel loading.

I.G.1 TRAINING DURING LOW-POWER TESTING Define and commit to a special low power testing program approved by NRC to be conducted at power levels no greater than 5 percent for the purposes of providing meaningful technical information beyond that obtained in the normal startup test program and to provide supplemental training.

This requirement shall be met before fuel leading.

II.B.4 TRAINING FOR MITIGATING CORE DAMAGE Develop a training program to instruct all operating personnel in the use of installed systems, including systems that are not engineered safety features, and instrumentation to monitor and control accidents in which the core may be severely damaged.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

~

II.D.1 RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE TEST REQUIREMENTS Describe a test program and schedule for tasting to qualify reactor coolant system relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions for design basis transients and accidents.

I This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

II.O.3 RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE POSTION INDICATION Install positive indication in the control room of relief and safety valve position derived from a reliable valve position detection device or a reliable indication of flow in the valve discharge pipe.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

II.E.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER INITIATION AND INDICATION Install a control grade system for automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system that meets the single-failure criterion, is testable, and is powered from the emergency buses, and control grade indication of auxiliary feedwater flow to each steen generator that is powered from emergency buses.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

II.E.4.1 CONTAINMENT-DEDICATED PENETRATIONS Provide a design of the containment isolation system for external recombiners or purge systems for postaccident combustible gas control, if used, that is dedicated to that service only and meets the single-failure criterion.

Review and revise, if necessary, the procedures for use of combustible gas control system following an accident resulting in a degraded core and release of radioactivity into the containment.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

A

II.F.1 ADDITIONAL ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Provide procedures for estimating noble gas, radiciodine, and particulate release rates if the existing affluent instrumentation goes off the scale.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

II.F.2 INADEQUATE CORE COOLING INSTRUMENTS Develop procedures to be used by operators to recognize inadequate core cooling with currently inftalled instrumentation in PWRS.

Install a primary coolant saturation meter.

Provide a description of any additional instruments or controls needed to supplement installed equipment to provide unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling, procedures for use of this equipment, analyses used to develop these procedures, and a schedule for installing this equipment.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

II.G EMERGENCY POWER FOR PRESSURIZER EQUIPMENT Motive and control components of the power-operated relief valves and associated block valves and the pressurizar level indication shall be capable of being supplied from the offsite power source or from the emergency power buses when offsite power is not available.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

II.K.1 IE BULLETINS ON MEASURES TO MITIGATE SMALL-SREAK LOCAs AND LOSS OF FEEDWATER ACCIDENTS C.1. 5" Review all valve positions, positioning requirements, positive controls and related test and maintenance procedures to assure proper ESF functioning.

C.1.10 Review and modify, as required, procedures for removing safety-related systems from service (and restoring to service) to assure operability status is known.

C.1.17 For Westinghouse-designed reactors, trip the pressurizer low-level coincident signal bistables, so that safety injection would be initiated when the pressurizer low pressure setpoint is reached regardless of the pressurizer level.

C.1. 20 For B&W-designed reactors, provide procedures and training to operators for prompt manual reactor trip for loss of feedwater, turbine trip, main steamline isolation valve closure, loss of offsite power, loss of steam generator leveT, and low pressurizer level.

C.1. 21 For B&W-designed reactors, provide automatic safety grade anticipa-tory reactor trip for loss of feedwater, turbine trip or significant decrease in steam generator level.

C.1.22 For boiling water reactors, describe the automatic and manual actions necessary for proper functioning of the auxiliary heat removal

  • Table C-1 of the Action Plan lists all the requirements given in IE Bulletins.

systems that are used when the main feedwater system is not operable.

C.1. 23 For boiling water reactors, describe all uses and types of reactor vessel level indication for both autcmatic and manual initiation of safety systems.

Describe other instrumentation that might give the operator tha, same information on plant status.

These requirements shall be met before fuel loading.

II.K.3 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF B&O TASK FORCE

  • C.3.9.**

For Westinghouse-designed reactors, modify the pressure integral derivative controller, if installed on the PORV, to eliminate spurious openings of the PORV.

C.3.10.

For Westinghouse-designed reactors, if the anticipatory reactor trip upon turbine trip is to be modified to be bypassed at power levels less than 50 parcant, rather than below 10 percent as in current designs, demonstrate that the probability of a small-break LOCA i

resulting from'a stuck-open PORV is not significantly changed by this modification.

1

  • The B&O recommendations were not specifically delineated as to fuel-loading or full power requirements prior to the review of Sequoyah, North Anna 2, and l

Salem 2.

The NRR staff is presently confirming compliance with these four l

f tems for these plants.

l

    • Table C.3 of the Action Plan lists the requirements derived from final recommendations of the B&O Task Force.

l ls t

C.3.11.

Demonstrate that the PORV installed in the plant has a failure rate i

that is not significantly less than the valves for which there is an operating history.

C.3.12.. For Westinghouse-designed reactors, confirm that tr.; e is an anti-cipatory reactor trip on turbine trip.

These requirements shall be met before fuel loading.

s III.A.1.1 UPGRADE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Comply with Appendix E, " Emergency Facilities," to 10 CFR Part 50, Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Energency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants," and for the offsite plans, meet essential elements of NUREG-75/111 or have a favorable finding from FEMA.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

III. A.1.2 UPGRADE EMERGENCY SUPPORT FACILITIES Establishaninterimonsitetechnibalsupportcenterseparatefrom,butclose to, the control room for engineering and management support of reactor opera-tions during an accident.

The center shall be large enough for the necessary utility personnel and five NRC personnel, have direct display or callup of plant parameters, and dedicated communications with the control room, the emergency operations center, and the NRC.

Provide a description of the permanent technical support center.

Establish an onsite operational support center, separate from but with communica-tions to the control room for use by operations support personnel during an accident.

Designate a near-site emergency operations facility with communications with the plant to provide evaluation of radiation releases and coordination of all onsite and offsite activities during an accident.

sm

These requirements shall be met before fuel loading.

III.D.3.3 INPLANT RADIATION MONITORING Provide the equipment, training and procedures necessary to accurately determine the presence of airborne radioiodine in areas within the plant where plant personnel may be present during an accident.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

~ ~

6

-l FULL-POWER LICENSE REQUIREMENTS e

G

+

I. C. 7 NSSS VENDOR REVIEW OF PROCEDURES Obtain NSSS vendor review of power-ascension test and emergency procedures to l

further verify their adequacy.

This requirement must be met before issuance of a full power license.

I.C.8 PILOT MONITORING OF SELECTED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR NEAR-TERM OPERATING LICENSE APPLICANTS Correct emergency procedures, as necessary, based on the NRC audit of selected plant emergency operating precedures (e.g., small-break LOCA, loss of feedwater, restart of engineered safety features following a loss of ac power, steam-line break, or steam generator tube rupture).

This action will be completed prior to issuance of a full power license.

I.G.1 TRAINING DURING LOW-POWER TESTING Supplement operator training by completing the special low power test program.

Tests may be observed by other shifts or repeated on other shifts to provide training to the operators.

This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full powe.- license.

II.B.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS Provide (1) a description of the design of reacter coolant system and reactor vessel head high point vents that are remotely operable from the control room; (2) analyses of loss-of-coolant accidents initiated by a break in the vent

)

4 pipe; and (3) analyses demonstrating that direct venting of noncondensable gases with perhaps high hydrogen concentration limits dose not result in violation of combustible gas concentration limits in containment.

  • This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

II.B.2 PLANT SHIELDING Provids (1) 2 radiation and shielding design review that identifies the location of vit41 kreas and equipment in which personnel occupancy may be unduly limited or safety equipment may be unduly degraded by radiation during operations following an accident resulting in a degraded core, and (2) a description of the types of corrective actions needed to assure adequate access to vital areas and protection of safety equipment.

i This requirement must be met befort issuance of a full power licenza.

II.B.3 POSTACCIDENT SAMPLING Provide (1) a design and operational review of the capability to promptly obtain and perform radioisotopic end chemical analyses of reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples under degraded core accident conditions without excessive exposure, (2) a description of the types of corrective actions needed to provide this capability, and (3) procedures for obtaining and analyzing thest samp1 s with the existing Jguipment.

e This requirement must be met before issuance of a full power license.

II. S. 4 TRAINING FOR MITIGATING CORD DAMAGE Complete the training of all operating personnel in the use of installed systems to monitor and control accidents in which the core may be severely damaged.

i

[

.g.

i

.j This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

II.E.1.1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM RELIABILITY EVALUATION (1)

Provide a simplified auxiliary feedwater system reliability analysis that uses event-tree and fault-tree logic techniques to determine the potential for AFWS failure following a main feedwater transient, with particular emphasis on potential failures resulting from human errors, common causes, single point vulnerability, and test and maintenance outage.

(2)

Provide an evaluation of the AFWS using the acceptance criteria of Standard Review Plan Section 10.4.9.

(3)

Describe the design basis accident and transients and corresponding acceptance criteria for the AFWS.

(4)

Based on the analyses performed modify the AFWS, as necessary.

These requirements shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

II.E.3.1 EMERGENCY POWER FOR PRESSURIZER HEATERS Install the capability to supply fros' emergency power buses a sufficient number of pressurizar heaters and associated controls to est'ablish and main-tain natural circulation in hot standby conditions.

The requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

~

II.E.4.2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DEPENDABILITY l

Provide (1) containment isolation on diverse signals, such as containment i

pressure or ECCS actuation, (2) automatic isolation of nonessential systems (including the bases for specifying the nonessential systems), (3) no automatic reopening of containment isolation valves when the isolation signal is reset.

l l

This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full-power license.

II.K.2 Commission Orders on Babcock & Wilcox Plants.

C.2.2 Procedures in training to initiate and control auxiliary feedwater water independent of Integrated control System.

C.2.9*

For B&W-designed reactors, provide a failure mode and effects analysis of the Integrated Control System.

C.2.10 For B&W-designed reactors, install safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip for loss of feedwater and turbine trip.

C.2.13 For B&W-designed reactors, confirm by a detailed analysis of thermal-mechanical conditions in the reactor vessel during recovery from a small-break LOCA, with an extended loss of all feedwater requiring the use of the high-pressure injection system, that vessel integrity is not jeopardized.

C.2.14 For B&W-dewigned reactors, demonstrate that the power-operated.

relief valves on the pressurizer will open in less than five percent of all anticipated overpressure transients using revised setpoints and anticipatory trips for the range of plant conditions which might occur during a fuel cycle.

C.2.15 For B&W-designed reactors, analyze the effects of slug flow on once-through steam generator tubes after primary system voiding.

C.2.16 For B&W-designed reactors, evaluate the effect of reactor coolant pump damage and leakage following a small-break LOCA concurrent with a loss of offsite power that results in the loss of seal cooling.

Table C.2 of the Action Plan lists all of the requirements of the Commission Orders.

l l

L

These requirements shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

II.K.3 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF B&O TASK FORCE C.3.3 Any failure of a PORY or safety valve to close shocid be reported to t

the NRC promptly.

All challenges to the PORVs or safety valvss i

should be documented in the annual report.

This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

III.A.1.1 UPGRADE EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS Provide an emergency response plan in substantial compliance with NUREG-0654,

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (which may be modified after May 13, 1980 based on public comments) except that only a description of and completion schedule for the means for providing prompt notification to the population (App. 3), the staffing for emergencies in addition to that already required (Table B.1), and an upgraded meteorological program (App. 2) need be provided.

NRC will give substar.tial weight to FEMA findings on offsite plans in judging the adequacy against NUREG-0654.

Perform an emergency response exercise to test the integrated capability and a major portion lof the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations.

This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

III.0.1.1 PRIMARY COOLANT SOURCES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as-low-as practical levels, measure actual leak rates and establish a pregram to maintain leakage at as-low-as practical levels and monitor leak ratas.

"TaDie C.3 of the Action Plan lists all of the recommendations of the B&D Task Force.

-S-

This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license.

III.D.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY Identify and evaluate potential hazards in the vicinity of the site as described in SRP Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3, confirm that operators in the control room are adequately protectea from these hazards and the release of radioactive gases as described in SRP Section 6.4, and, if necessary, provide the schedule for modifications to achieve compliance with SRP Section 6.4.

This requirement shall be met by issuance of a full power license.

e

-s -

9 q

d 0

O ue e

e NRC ACTIONS O

'. '. e I. 8. 2. 2 REACTOR INSPECTOR AT OPERATING REACTORS A NRC resident inspector will be assigned to each site.

This action will be completed before fuel loading.

I. O.1 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW NRC review of applicant's preliminary assessment of the control room design to determine whether the assessment is adequate and identify at.y necessary cor-rections and approve the schedule for correction of the deficiencies.

This action will be compieced prior to fuel loading.

j II.8.7 ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN CONTROL Reach a decision on the immediata requirements, if any, for hydrcgen control in small containments and apply, as appropriate, to new OLs pending completion of the degraded core rulemaking in II.B.8 of the Action Plan.

This action is to be completed before issuance of a full-power license.

II.B.8 DEGRADED CORE - RL'LEMAKING Issue an advance notice of rulemaking on requirements for design and other j

features for accidents involving severely damaged cores.

i This actior, is to be completed before issuance of a full power license.

III. A.3.1 ROLE OF NRC IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 1

More explicitly define the role of the NRC in emergency situations involving NRC licenses. _

5,

,. e i

This action was completed in a meeting between the staff and the Commission on February 6, 1980.

i III.A.3.3 COMMUNICATIONS Install direct dedicated telephone lines between each plant and the NRC Operations Center.

This action is to be completed prior to fuel loading.

III.B.2 IMPLEMENT *. TION OF NRC AND FEMA RESPONSIBILITIES The applicant emergeacy plans shall meet the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50 and, the positions in Regulatory Guide 1.101 (Mar. 1977).

Offsite plans shall meet the essential planning elements in NUREG-75/111 and Supplement 1 thereto or receive a favorable finding by FEMA.

This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.

III.D.2.4 0FFSITE DOSE MEASUREMENTS The NRC will place approximately 50 thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) around the site in coordination with the applicant and State environmental monitoring program.

This action will be completed pr: r to issuance of a full power license.

IV.F.1 POWER-ASCENSION TEST IE will monitor the power-ascension test program to confirm that safety is not compromised because of the expanded startup test program and economic costs of the delay in commercial operation.

This action will be taken during the startup and power-ascension test program.

l

.t FY 1980 BASE TABLE

f. / ' '

PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FY 1980 BASE TABLE (Dollars in Thousands) i Proposed Programmatic Program Previous Base

  • Change Revised Base Nuclear Reactor Regulation Casework: and Technical Projects.

14,565

-272.2_/

14,293 Safeguards.....................

Advanced Reactors..............

1,315

-500 3/

815 All Other 1/...................

39,290

+772 T/

40,062 Subtotal............ r.......

55,170 55,170 Standards Development Safeguard Standards............

2,307 2,307 All Other 1]...................

11,095 11,095 Subtotal.....................

13,402 13,402 Inspection and Enforcement Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety, Management Direction and Su p po rt........................

1,935

+100 5/

2,035 Safeguards.....................

1,000 1,000 All Other 1/,..................

37,849

-100 6/

37,749 Subtotal.....................

40,784 40,784 Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Waste Management...............

8,706 8,706 Safeguards.....................

1,800 1,800 All Other 1/...................

17,779 17,779 Subtatal.....................

28,285 28,285 Nuclear Regulatory Research Light Water Reactors...........

116,945 116,945 Fast Breeder Reactor...........

13,700 13,700 Advanced Converter.............

1,700 1,700 Site, Waste, Enviroraent, Risk, and Fuel Cycle.................

25,876 25,876 Safeguards.....................

4,000 4,000 Improved Reactor Safety........

1,000 1,000 Equipment......................

7,737 7,737 All Other 1/...................

8,930 8,930 Subtotal.....................

179,888 179,888 Program Technical Support 1/.....

15,100 15,100 Program Directica and Administration 1/................

33,316 33,316 Total New Obligational Authority.

365,945 365,945 Unobligated Balance Carryover....

3,022 3,022

.0TAL 08LIGATIONAL AVAILABILITY..

368,967

$ 368,967 Reference FY 1980 Base Table as of March 31, 1980, provided to Congress on April 9, 1980.

1)

Includes the following items which received a specific change by Congress, but not applied to specific programs:

Administrative Support 35,273 35,273 Travel 7,500 7,500 l

..,. [..'

... )

o..

Footnotes - continued The following explanatory footnotes are augmented by the data contained in Enclosures 1 and 3 of this letter:

2/ Represents the net effect of implementing the TMI Action Plan tasks that:come under the two Decision Units constituting this reprogramming control line through internal redirection of resources.

The reduction of $272,000 represents the deferral or reducing of lower priority non-TMI related efforts.

Primarily these include:

the deferral of work on generic issues that are not TMI related issues or " Unresolved Safety Issues"; the reduction of some of the planned improvements to the Standard Review Plan; and the reduction of some generic studies to develop NRC licensing positions that are not specifically case-related.

3/ This reduction of $500,000 represent:: resources for Congressional initiative to review an HTGR preapplication that was anticipated to be tendered in FY 1980.

The current NRC caseload forecast does not anticipate this review to be tendered until 2/82.

Therefore, these resources will not be required for the preapplication review, and are available to be applied to higher priority TMI Action Plan issues.

4/ Represents the net effect of implementing the TMI Action Plar, tasks that come under the Operating Reactors Decision Unit that is within this reprogramming control line through internal redirection of resources.

The increase of $772,000 along with the internal redirection of $822,000 provides for implementing those TMI Action Plan tasks identified in of this letter as fuel-loading, low-pcwer testing and full-power license requirements for all Operating Reactors.

5/ The increase of $100,000 will be added to previously internally redirected

~~

resources of $285,000 under the Management Direction and Support Decision j

Unit that is within this reprogramming control line.

These funds together with $400,000 to be made available from the NRC's FY 1980 Supplemental will provide for a feasibility study of the nuclear data link system (TMI Action Plan Task III. A.3.4.), as part of upgrading of NRC's Operations Center at Headquarters.

6/ The decrease of $100,000 represents the deferral of a lower priority contractual effort to assist I&E in detennining what the physical inspection priorities should be for operating pressurized water reactors.

This work would have been done under the Reactor Operations Decision Unit within this reprogramming control line.

v n,

-