ML19329D700
| ML19329D700 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1977 |
| From: | Stewart W FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19329D697 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003160318 | |
| Download: ML19329D700 (3) | |
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'LCENSE EVENT LCEN3EE 7
LCENSE MUMrET)
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25 26 30 31 32 7 89 14 15 CATECCAY firl 50us CE COCAET NUMUE A EVENT DATE REPOAT oaf t
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$9 60 61 68 69 74 75 EVENT DESCRIPTIONto introduction of NaCll into the RCS as reported in LER-77-17, B6W evaluati Ql Subsequent 7 89 Ql of this event indicated the possibility of an unreviewed safety question as defined by
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@l 10 CFR50.59(b) in that the unterminated injectica of the MaOH tank centents into the l 7 89 0S l RCS could result in core criticality with all rods inserted. Redundancy N/A.
This Administrative and physical controls to crecludel 7 u9 05 l event has not occurred to'this date.
7 89 m
svStEu caust ccv e ENT CovecsE%t (LER 77,52)
CCCE CCCE CCupCNEr T CCCE S@ PLE4 MAnuFACTUPEA VCLATON g l Cl Bl jB l l Xl Xl Xl.] :q Xl lAl lZlZlZlZl l Nl 7 09 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCR:Pi!CN h
oe l The possibility of =oderator dilution by the unterminated injection of the entire 7 89 l
contents of the NaOH tank into the Reactor Coolant while in the decay heat re:Coval 7 eG l
i c]Cle.
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F ACrl1 Y VETHOO CF i
STATUS
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'. O 11 44 45 FERSONNEL EXPCSURES NuveEA TYPE CESCAri;CN
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NA 7 89 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJUFnES NuvaE A DEsca.pf cs kO!O!O!
l NA 14 7 89 11 12 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES pEl l NA 7 89 LOSS OR OAM AGE TO FAC!UTY TYPE CESC A Df CN 7 0D 10 PU2UCtTY NA 7 89 AOCIT:ONAL FACTCAS
@l this occurrence have been provided.
? O9 gl See attached Supplementary Information 7 89 WC P. Stewart
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NAME:
P140ME:
! 8003140.1/ 7
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
'l. 'Rsport No.:
50-302/77-52 2.
Facility:
Crystal PJiver Unit #3 7
3.
~ Report'Date:
2b June' 1977 4.
Occurrence Date 14 June 1977
'5.
Identification of occurrence:
Possible unreviewed safety question as defined by 10 CFR50.59(b) concerning unterminated sodium hydroxide dilution of Reactor Coolant System.
6.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence: -
NA as event has not occurred to this date.
7.
Description of Occurrence:
As reported en 1 March 1977 (LER '77-l'7) approximately 600 gallens of NaOH was introducted into the Recctor Coolant System via the Decay Heat Re-moval System.
Subsequent to this event, an evaluation by Babcock and b'ilcox, concerning the unterminated injection of the entire contents of the sodium hydroxide tank into the Reactor Coolant System, reveals that the possibility of this occurrence may censtitute an unreviewed safety question.
The results cf this evaluation indicate that a situation could exist where an unterminated moderator dilutien accidcat could occur that is not bounded by the CR-3 FSAR Chapter 14 analysis.
8.
Designation of Apparent Cause:
The injection of the entire NaOH tank centents into the RCS as described in the E5'a' evaluation eculd cause the core to go critical.
9.
Analysis of Occurrence:
Should this event ever cecur, there is the possibility of the Reactor going critical with all rods incerted.
10.
Corrective Action:
Precluding an ' occurrence of this nature includes the following administratively
-imposed safeguards:
A. - Closing manual isolation. valves in the NaOH supply lines and " racking out" the breakers to the motor operated isolation valves in the NaCH supply lines before starting a DH pump.
B.
Verifying manual isolatica valves are closed before testing the motor operated valves in the NaCH supply lines.
.C.
Only~ testing the motor operated valves at a refueling interval.
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Supplsmentary Informati.
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- Page 2 Co rre ctive Ac. tion ' (Cont' d)
Florida Power Corporation is presently evaluating the, chemical additive system for CR #3 to determine what permanent modifications are required as a result of climinating tiie sodium thiosulfate from the system.
'Ihis evalua-tion is being performed in accordance with Condition 2.C(4) of Anundment No. I to the CR #3 Operating License and will be submitted to the Comntission for review and approval on or before September 3,1977.
It is.our intent to in-clude this unreviewed safety question as part of our overall evaluation of the-Chemical Additive System.
Appropriate revisions to the CR #3 FSAR vill be submitt'ed to the Commission following the completion of our evaluation.
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