ML19329D639

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Model Change Revision to BAW-10104A, B&W ECCS Evaluation Model
ML19329D639
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River 
Issue date: 01/27/1977
From: Rodgers J
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To: Stolz J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8003160264
Download: ML19329D639 (11)
v • d • e


Text

.

n y;n, }@p ' r

g(N o

~-

?,; G g.g.?,

,J

,q:7 -

y_

f,, af'.,..

. 9r z

.m w y

Florida

!4 o.o.....eP wer C!,

p H

~

W A

January 27, 1977

[#

+

a dWW, Mr. John Stolz MS2 91977% ;.

Branch Chief S u.s.usam %*

Light Water Branch I Division of Project Management CQuy D.

U.3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

//

Washington, D.C.

20555

SUBJECT:

Florida Power Corporation Crystal River Unit #3 Docket 50-302 On January 21, 1977 members of your technical review staff met with representatives of B&W and yourself to finalize a model change revision to B&W Topical BAW-10104A "B&W's ECCS Evaluation Model."

Agreed upon revision wa accomplished and forwarded to your Mr. S.A. Varga (copy to you) for acceptance on January 24, 1977.

Per your request this morning, we are herewith sending you this notice that the above referenced submittal applies directly to Crystal River Unit 3 Docket 50-302.

Enclosed are 40 copies properly certified for your use and distribution.

This change will be incorporated in B&W Topical Report - BAW-10104A, Revision 1, by B&W and will be referenced by Florida Power Corporation in the next Amendment to the Crystal River Unit #3 FSAR.

It is our understanding that the attaued submittal has been reviewed and accepted by your staff in making the determination that Crystal River Unit 3 i.; in compliance with Section I. c.4.e of 10CFR50, Appendix K (Refer your letter 20, December 1976).

Verv truly yo m,

J.. Rodgers Assistant Vice President JTR/hw 1CO 800310003 \\

I General Office 3201 Tnirtyaourth street soutn. P O Box 14042, St Petersburg. Pct ca 33733 813 - 866-5151

~

'IN WITNESS WHERE0F, the applicant has caused its name to be hereunto signed by J.T. Rodgers, Assistant Vice President, and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed by Betty M. Clayton, Assistant Secretary, thereunto duly authorized the 27th' day of January,1977.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION By J.T. R6dgers v

Assistant Vice President ATTEST Betty M. Claytdh Assistant Secretary

.(CORPORATESEAL)

.l Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27th day of January, 1977.

./ i,. u c

~

Notary Public My Connission Expires:

Notary Public State of Florida at Large Ev_ Commission Expires July 9, 1978

(

m#

t.

\\,

es as ses wasm

=aatsen va mm i

I t

e

    • I'* *., i r;*

WJ (g,g

&._.*.*J.

a f>

Yt sr s a )

i j

s e 4,6 e a m.rtn il:T wa

    • '?,... II CO[

.m } 14e es t j

4 I

cro' e

s.~ o A

e l

.: = O l 9.1 <

T

- = +

.(

  • vast

,b i

pee

  • ase gs ts.LeL Q

,lJ* Y,$#"

'13 '

M IkEis, lli:nr ' !!vdis i

A I

',:r.

l;n<.

i l ".::3.

I Jb i

y

."J,'.". *ET'.".Il'.

a

-.'**

  • sn]

f

.7

+

e

'ga==

p;;

<V, >

.t

..,)

_Ii4_ __ g s-.9 k

  • i g,q:.

I ee. =

g

-- - ' m i a sez.

3

,, j M7'

.- u

_m

..7-.

,_4 g

i e*

+

sj p2

... i

- h 2,

n l

/

n rir. e*v

,_gg aft tas #

1-l4 l

Js C w1*F*

M e wse 3 &

I

'A Mu^:

Sg l.j oga Q r.,

i

~c~,

"ibe g

.,1 4

...\\

$ h l

t

'is

~

l

\\

O

1 I

.aT16:

1 t

ssc....~.......

= =. c.a.."." e.^.,.$* ",c. *.

s a

)

m.

.s....

w.. - -

Y@

m m....

e

?p 4 ; r.;...-* b

&.. a 4

1.'l-a-

..l.n.1.-.l r_..

]

j e

s.

I. n.N+A.

.a f

......u g.y 1

qi

.,.g

- } F'Wm..

.w e,

,/.

, *=~ s*~~* ~

f,%e,-""-~J.

's t..

"y :=,

~t633 _.

5, ".

C M J.2

. $,4_ f..;....

mm w.

.-~. -

  • [

i w

.ye* p

+i.' **t. ;*.* *a*

gi sa

.t D D

, p * *

e 4

2D

>s i..

s lN i.d ge".

Q g -} a) a

=;:,

y~=

e-4

, }.

.,.c e, a..

p 5 $P{,

I

.'D L'

Nd I

b

?

'"'%l)G E s..,

l _J

%5,.'ill1.,

e;g<~.e T

L

, Q,.".'4 &-

v

...l y

  • ~ ~ - ' - -
  • c.g 4.a.1 9

h a t y-l 6L 4

X,.

6 e.,. s.u.su Y-3 4,

6 1.

pJ 1

g

-t,_yu t

we,

,v --.. 4 ar; 4

m

u. 4 e

'er' cmg #7e-;/e m., p,.

,1 &

.n

..>~

a f,.,:-.

y w-4!,

6 0

e.~. o'*

6 g,

i.y,, Q 3-e e 9 Jr.:n.*4:- *.*

n 2 3 4 - yt vi T P N.e;

-j

..-w a s.

gf.

r i ~.4 x.c..;.-)

j

$.nf an i)*::r.='m

~

f.Q.

tu?.X nr p 31 se

". ~ '.

L.m B '

~*

c.~,~1t

.*-i,..

m-".,c v, ;:.- a...,

y.

~.

..,,,.u.

n='

..'i-rr a. -.

6, 6,.:

n,"

.c.,

t.

yE.ET &

p;

.-- - - -[

s:

^:.*

eis.. b

.e -

a s.

a a

e...m....

_i_:n w

. tu..

.,c 3.. ;

ra

\\

y.n og:

e.* 3 'M,.)

r,. h ta.=. *e I.

S

)

i-.. -

h Q s[

t f

I

~.

4 j

om m.

- --<1 c ;p 5-J. -

U g(,w T. y, j___w,...

+

.a s uno

(..,1

'. 91 t

~

' 'i g"'**",

~,.,..

g

....m., gh. L.v~,,..,"ll r* ~~: I'

.3 a-z

'. s n.,

l....

l r-e

- :. w.-

e...

.a C=-) ;;. Q e.

DECAY HEAT REMOi'AL SYSTEM CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 L,0..,.

FICURE 9-o M M. 36 12 2173)

..~..*-:-

( Dvi G.H O. F D -302-6 41) i 1

I t

4 m

g gg g.ug..u,gW-O 9-9me$

-d MO -W*W-G 9

l I.

- ~

(-

4 Mb b

N I

1 1

mm

.~

49 6f.'94 Vg nit

. ~. M 9%M&h y

84 4f 1

l 2-L._

r-C _*d r g * (d j wW T sea

gitst a

f>4-G~~r

....i S

w 29 =.sv 7

  • m'h.

3 C.s '

i a

l 3RA i

C30 a * **t.,

_p._

l ira.a t

= = = r

\\

m., f 4 :;,,

2:::=>~

[

t} s i} ew ys

? "J.

  • 11'. '

'l r '

's %.

i 8

i-1 B.= =..:.

.n*._Wa.

og r

)

W-

  • 1, a

M.

6 r

1

=

6*5 i

6

)

.t p

}

ll 3F'"

+-

'i l

m.

"". -. i hay 4 t

  • I

.a I

l

'M g y,

i C

~.

g. s i

i,.

eg. *'s.4

} M.)*

f 3.j a

.. s m a 3. i, r.Ut

\\l h

g

>]I l

[,.*~* I 1

i

'.. ~....

ir i

}

J p

i

~

c @. ~

r4 i i

...... c i

)l}

} ",,.y i

I w~

Je t dE "-T bM f

e.

tla, "t_*._**L

,g

, )

f

=,.. -,.

v-.y

]

. w..

l f

l

./

o4

,m... -,

.e-e,,--- - - -. - - -, -,,,

m

.m e-_r,,.,,-,-,.,,,ee,,-,

.--,,,--,r-_n,e

+-a--,,--w-----m--

on. m e.

w..a. e,,e. m.

...e..,m.e...

.s.

y

.c..

g, 5.o;..

l..f;%: Ol

~....

%q r

r

-*'4"'^*

y3 At' 3..

,,".;e....-.... J..

t

= = = '

e a

,ns w-M,...,'...f, 'l N,. 4,...c I

~

f

.,, Qy 3-,

5 M * * >._ '... '. "g'"

^

/ / 2.

< u.sp

'W'.Y. ~'

-i t,.

ajw h

R g@ *,g.

J..

U R ~1

~.,,~.(.'

,v. sh,

- * = = = =

t

+ -.

3 W

2.s..,

' 5, c,o

  • 3J ",
f. %

t)

, _,{,

h

.I

~

,-n l

3a a u -

.t h c,3 t-e79 i

1

)

)

e

'w'r*., s**y. o;!,Q

, ( }

};$'

-, y 3,...

o M

t :.,.r) p J2_ %"g ;'s.,MW

}....

g Q

6

-D t

re y s,. !,l, up @Hp

>*1.**.

t

,w.

b = =.d,_s

  • k s

,KI$[R

.1 p, 'h d.i i

~c*.w.,-

s._

.N

.m~

l

%t::.a )

r I.i

_.s I'

v,.

t,

' ' '. - ~ ~-~.._....

,3 4 _.

e

y' t

av m

ml r

w M

l'

$ 611) p

.' g y

e rr 9 i

1 1/e11 ( o...

b".,,

w a.

L g

_ mA u :: #(-

~

v

,d g

t'rhu i%.g

't e( he.

6.s e

l

/

2'."..'X...J.*.;!."

19

/

.g

.e md Q fSh %

> +

p.y.?(r;g,t, ]a:

g.s e.,. t m.

p.2 n.-

2

c iren r c;,w y

' A)..m.....e Q

.. R ie ':,

(<G.i., g-,

e '.

- twm...>

1

=..',. ' i rrm...

U 6

Nr c.

-- n.

7. 2...

7

,,, ha -. -.

l, c.w....~y x ?

{

Md L c.

=_+

y &t 3-

.c.. 3) 1 c7 4

n p

J

  • DT

[.

eEtTJ[ [; A Q--),.

o

,,. ;)

$s,p w:2 wy

~~-,.

w

=

t~

Q;)

t, ;@

vu t

A

?

W o.

c' c6D]l

'.s

?

~,-.

"' A c.= a s

.T-a-

" E =,* 'D.. s 5 -

I m

t.,)

1 > <e-L..

i r,,,

g.

c,...

3...

a_~ o

.~

..g

'--w-.

2.~'= '" ** ' '"

{

< e..s. #

n g: *Eb J,

..,,,,;,, rT&.-

e =.'.d.,.. J M>l.

3 s,

11 J

h!

l u av 1 -. --

l

. _..aA- + =

"O C=) ; '.7, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM m

CRYSTAL RIVER UtHT 3 FIGU P.E 9-6 E m..

L..~au (AM. 36 12 2173)

.= ew J.-

(DW G.NO. F D-30 2-6.f li

~ ^ ' ~

    • ~~~~#'

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ' ' * * ** '*'

~ o w e,e

- ~ +

w

't no. w a w =

, n.m

'Y'"~

wev

1 t

emma og.s ven we gess

.s ag te. sa gets l

l

  • ~%l g-Il 32*_.*.

g'w g*

i

,,y

< ve st du s

e d

1

{m]sw j

',,gh,,:

w

e..y.e M eJ,'

'e

+

'L,'..&.. I-Gr.

qts i

s l

Lm i

?

e l

am t

"=*"2 n

g J ~_D l2.p i

. g.,. t Pease gag

s. es,* -

can r

, ga..

.jy; e

^ 3

^ -.e IHfaTO !! Eri

!kEEh o

o e

's?d *

'JY '

i ed, i

j"N

-=r.

_4,__,_

1 9

i M

.,{'

z' r

r. n.

s r

I'l i

q..

t

=n q,

3 I

~

g

---3 4

(s._ 9

. sc.

N' '

,g s O Q

.. m n.

  1. -]

r~

r-

,y.

.., l h

I.b N

)

m.
  • a

.j

,e v..w

r. r ' ~

\\

M-l *<

  • c::*i, o,

m,.,

i

~I

.n n.

I ii e

4 nr..w !

d_ '

w a" ' '

m.

~

d N{dh

)

m

,i El i.

n l

e t *

\\

i

./

.._J

.e01E......,..........

t

..e..,.m.........,

h

.d.

~ ; tim...~

l

.I i?

r d

.... M, ;,

p

_s c.n~ -

p_.....

i,

h. J

.j

....-.1:_~,/-

f., s

. J...m*

1 v..

....,.+4 l

. +..

,w

-41

.23 v,>n. :...:. : ~/.n....as.=-

TJ

. i,-

m.. i

+m 4

l mf%w 5

N'e,ff-M.

M.s = r.=-

r.ev,.~...:.

rr..- - -

pe

, g.rg p

9 ( l' P C'*.

,~kbM 9o, 0 k

' S*D

?

g jp;-.w r$b n '; l:

i a

y i

j%

-w +no I

was t.-4&. ;..t.:...

1.y.,<

T w "~,,,.,l,3..- wrmL,_ 4 <p-

-e f

-o-.c

,y r

i i Eid

, e;,.

g E. !.8 -

d. _ _, _,

..'.w,

~-

  1. e

~ *45

'6**

p t,

,i e

-,Y b

  • w'

'. ~R'fD t

.mM

'.,[n,7..*

5>

t 4y.

uy.,,

...-..-. g... ),

m

+v b*** *Le

~:. =..1.:.-

g.

....... ~

(**'g( __h e *.'

4 y, a e n. 3,, >

l

(=-$$* %..M '

-i,*j

,s.di'*e,

i s..tf r) i

,.ib.

(fp

-- y

-..c-1 g.g v...

tr se

_x t ~'m l

})W ~aa*.*.t'.';.

LV,7*.' M %

f**d'-

b

'.;m++ ** --

e -

I

.g7f'**

~

h=ylc e.

,w

.i e r g..

j 3,

1

.n w,-.

  • e, b-6 s ';

yma).t I

i m,

y.,,

.e.,,,1 w,; ---

,1ang,Y ^ ".O.m...

.t:iv':-

,T...'*I

)

s

/ -..

g ce3 s

e

--, ITQ[]

o~

-s.;

{**.,0 tD C.)

e y

f y

c.iz GTE

- --<! cs c.r

-i-D Y j.,g_

cH0 j'.:'!2 g,

1gg

<.1

%f'I W.

(D '

i

._g.e. ao..

e.,,9-L

'~ -' ~~

_Q,l7,,,,,,

M dD

..,,u.

r F;r>--

-d, I, 2 +-D a

c

.\\..' ? e. lY

\\

LW

,s 1 -..-

', 6' LG

,2

_ - - - ge,_

V-*D*

,f,,'

l tt.e4 g.

w DECAY HE AT RCMOVAL SYSTEM i

C!!YSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 FIGURE 9-4 i.,..,.

. lb.o...-~. (A M. 36 12-2173)

L g

( D w G J40. F D -30 2-.4 41)

.. ~ -

Item 3 Single Failure Analsis.

A single failure evaluation of the ECCS should be provided by the applicant (or licensee) for his specific plant design, as required by Appendix K to 10 CFR 50, Section I.D.1 In performing this evaluation, the effects of a single failure or operator error that causes any

-manually controlled, electrically-operated valve to move to a position that could adversely affect the ECCS mus t Ebe considered.

Therefore, if this consideration has not been specifically reported in the past, the applicants upcoming submittal must address this consideration.

In-clude a list of all of the ECCS valves that are currently required by the plant Technical Specifications to have power disconnected, and any proposed plant modifications and changes to the Technical Specifications that might be required in order to protect against any loss of safety function caused by this type of failure.

A copy of Branch Technical Position EICSB 18 from the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Standard Review Plan is attached to provide you with guidance.

The single failure evaluation should include the potential for passive failures of fluid systems during long term cooling following a LOCA as well as single failures of active components.

For PWR plants, the single failure analysis is to consider the potential boron concentration problem as an integral part of long-term cooling.

Response to Item 3.

The ECCS, as documented in Section 6.1.1 of the FSAR, was designed with separate and independent flow paths, re-dundancy in active components with separate E.S. power supplies to redundant components, and separate instru-mentation channels for actuation of the system.

The ECCS design was investigated as indicated in Figure 1.

A single operator error that causes any remote manually controlled, electrically operated valve to move to a position that adversely affects ECCS is no worse than a single active component failure.

No single active failure or operator error as defined cbove was found that negates the adequacy of the ECCS.

An evaluation of the potential for passive failures of fluid systems during long term cooling following a LOCA

-indicated that the occurrence of such a failure in the discharge side of the flush water booster pumps (DOP-2A and.DOP-23) would result in bearing failure of the sea water pumps (RWP-1, 2A, 2B, 3A and_3B).

This would in

ITEM 3 - PAGE 2.

. turn result in the loss of cooling capability to both the nuclear service closed cycle cooling system and the decay heat closed cycle cooling system.

However, the occurrence of a passive failure in the discharge line of booster pumps D0P-2A S 2B is not considered credible for the following reasons:

1.

Initial design has been upgraded to a B 31.1 Essential Service Seismic Class I system.

2. The line in question is a 1 1/2 inch low energy line (i.e.

100'F and 80 psig operating temperature and pressure, respectively).

Hence, there is no evident source for rupture (failure).

3. The valves and piping of this Seismic Class I system have a considerably conservative pressure-temperature rating of 275 psig @ 100 F.

In addition, the internal piping design pressure per code calculations @ 100 F far exceeds the conservative pressure-temperature ratings of 275 psig @ 100*F.

4.

Finally, the system in question is Jocated within a Seismic Class I structure (Auxiliary Building),

thus precluding any possibilities of damage due to non-seismic structure and/or component failure relative to a potential earthquake disturbance.

The request was also made to identify all ECCS valves i

that are currently required by the plant Technical Specifications.to have power disconnected.

The only such valves on Crystal River Unit No. 3 are CFV-5(F) and CFV-6(F) in FSAR Section 15.3.3, Part A.2(C).

This does

~

not in any way violate NRC branch technical position EICSB 18.

Dual indication of valve position is available even with power disconnected to these valves, in accordance with Section B.4 of the referenced NRC branch technical position.

Open, close, and intermediate positions of these valves are indicated from an independent power supply, and a redundant and diverse indication is pro-vided via an' alarm on the main control board which will sound if CFV-5(F) or CFV-6(F) are not fully open when reactor coolant system pressure is above */00 psi.

Section B.3 of EICSB 18 does not apply since these are not " active" valves, i.e. they are not required to change position during safety operational sequences.

The' single failure analysis'considering the potential boron concentration problem as an integral part of long term cooling is addressed in our response to Item 2 Potential Boron Precipitation.

~

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER - #3 PASSIVE ACTIVE FAILURE

  • FAILURE OR SINGLE OPERATOR FAILURE **

ERROR ***

OR ECCS FAILURE

  • - Only in Fluid Systems during long term cooling following a LOCA cc.As defined in 10CFR50, Appendix K, FIGURE 1 Section I. D. 1 LOGIC DIAGRAM FOR ECCS cC* - Limited to remote manually controlled, SINGLE FAILURE ANALiSIS electrically-operated valves (motor operated or solenoid valve operated)

Item 4.

Submerged Valves.

The applicant should review the. specific equipment arrangement within his plant to determine if any valve motors within containment will become submerged follow-ing a LOCA.

The review should include all valve motors that may.become submerged, not only those in the safety

. injection system.

Valves in other systems may be needed to limit boric acid concentration in the reactor vessel during long term cooling or may be required for con-tainment isolation.

The applicant (or licensee) is to provide the following information,_for each plant:

(1)

Whether or not any valve motors will be submerged following a LOCA in the plant being reviewed.

(2)

If any valve motors.will be flooded in their plant, the applicant (or licensee) is to:

(a). Identify the valves that will be submerged.

-(b)

Evaluate the potential consequences of flooding of the valves for both the short erm and long term ECCS functions and containment isolation.

The long term should consider the potential problem of excessive concentrations of boric acid in.PWR's.

(c)

Propose.a interim solution while necessary modifications are being designed and implemented.

(currently operating plants only).

(d)

Propose design changes to solve the potential-flooding problem.

Response to Item 4.

A total of six (6) valve motors would be submerged following a LOCA, none of which would effect (increase or limit) boric-acid concentration in the reactor vessel or' preclude containment isolation.

The following list identifies the valves, valve number, size, function, and provides the results of the evaluation relative to short term, long term ECCS functions and containment

~

. isolation.

e 9.

w

(Valve Functional Explanation Relative to No Effect on No, Size Descrintion Short, Long Term ECCS Function'& Cont.-Iso.

Deminc~ alized a)

Not an Emergency Safeguard or containment isolation valve.

LWV-164 1^ inch r

1 inch line Water Supply to the Reactor Coolant b) Valve normally closed.

Drain, Tank c)

No inleakage or outleakage following a LOCA.

J CAV-1F-1 inch Pressurizer.

a)

Normally closed valve 3/8" Line

. Steam Space Sampling b)

Receives an E.S. Confirmatory closed signal (E.S.A. Bus)

Isolation Valve c) Redundant to an outside containment isolation valve CAV-2F I

(E.S.B. Bus) normally closed solinoid operated requiring manual hold to open with automatic closure upon release.

u d)

No inleakage or outicakage following a LOCA.

CAV-3F 1 inch Pressurizer Water a) Normally closed valve 3/8" Line Space Sampling Isolation Valve b)

Receives an E.S. Confirmatory closed signal (E.S.A Bus) c)

Redundant to an outside containment isolation valve CAV-2F (E.S.B. Bus) normally closed solinoid operated re-quiring manual hold to open with automatic closure upon release.

d)

No inleakage or outleakage following,a LOCA.

CAV-4F 1 inch Steam Gen. 3A a)

Normally closed valve 3/8" Line Shell Side Sampling b) Receives an E.S. Con' fir:aatory closed signal (E.S.A. Bus)

Isolation Valve c)

Redundant to an outside containment isolation valve CAV-6F (E.S.B. Bus) normally closed solinoid operated requiring manual hold to open with automatic closure upon release.

d)

No.t a reactor coolant system boundary valve.

4-s.

+

4 n.

, Valve'

' Functional Explanation Relative' to No Effeet on

' Wo.

Size Description Short, Long Term ECCS Function & Cont.' Iso.

.e)

Secondary. Steam and water Sample isolation valve.

f) w-No inleakage or outleskage following a LOCA.

t J;AV-5F -

.1 inch' Steam Gen. 3B a)_ Normally closed valve

-3/8" Line Shell-Side '

Sampling b) Receives an E.S. ' Confirmatory closed. signal' (E.S. A.' Bus)

Isolation Valve

.c)

Redundant to an outside containment _ isolation valve CAV-7F

') '

(E.S.B. Bus) normally closed solinaid ' operated requiring manual hold to open with automatic closure upon release.

d)~

Not a reactor coolant system boundary valve.

e)

Sccondary Steam and water Sample isolation valve.

f)

No inicakage or outleakage following a LOCA.

.CAV-126 1 inch Reactor Coolant a)

Normally closed Valve

~

3/8" Line Letdown Sampling Isolation Valve b)

Receives an E.S. Confinnatory closed signal (E.S. A. Bus) c)

Redundant to an outside containment isolation valve CAV-2F (E.S.B. Bus) normally closed solinoid operated requiring manual hold to open with automatic closure upon release.

4 d)

No inleakage or outicakage follouing a LOCA.

1

.M..

t v

+

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML19329D639&oldid=4753650"