ML19326D618
| ML19326D618 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry, Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1980 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Parris H TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007020761 | |
| Download: ML19326D618 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
g
,e EEGION il 101 MARIETTA ST N.W.. SulTE 3100 o
ATLANTA, G EORGIA 303o3 JUN 161960 In Reply Refer To:
RII:JP0 50-259 50-260 50-296
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Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN:
H. G. Parris Manager of Power 500A Chestnut Street Tower II Chattanooga, TN 37401 atlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-15 which requires action by you wkh regard to your power reactor facility (ies) and/or fuel facility (ies) with an operating license.
In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/ impact of each Bulletin on licensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpower expended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report (s) required by the Bulletin.
Please estimate separately the manpower associated with corrective actions necessary following identification of problems through the Bulletin.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, b.
dLwtL O ames P. O'Reilly D' rector
Enclosures:
1.
List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins cc w/encls:
H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Superintendent R. E. Rogers, Project Engineer H. N. Culver, Chief, Nuclear Safety Review Staff G. G. Stack, Project Manager J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent J. F. Cox, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Section M. J. Burzynski, Project Engineer 18007020 7 [ /
Er e
b' UNITED STATES SSINS No.: 6820 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Accessions No.-
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 8005050072 WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 June 18, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-15 POSSIBLE LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (ENS) WITH LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER In the past year, there have been two occurrences where a loss of off-site power has resulted in a loss of communications between a power reactor facility and the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). The most recent occurrence was at Indian Point Unit 2 on June 3, 1980.
The earlier event occurred at the Davis Besse facility on October 15, 1979 and resulted in the issuance of IE Circular 80-09.
The installation of the ENS requires a station package which operates on 110 VAC.
In some cases, the station package is located at the local telephone company which supplies the required power for normal operation and emer'ency power for operation during abnormal occurrences, but in many cases, the package is located at the site and is served by on-site power.
In some cases where the station package is served by on-site power, the station package has not been backed up by emergency power.
NRC data indicates that the station packages for each facility are powered in the manner described in the two enclosures.
Actions to be taken by all licensees:
1.
Within 10 days of the date of this Bulletin, verify by direct inspection, in conjunction with the appropriate telephone company representative, that the ENS at your facility is powered in the manner described in the two enclosures.
2.
Those facilities which have station packages requiring on-site power, but which are not connected to a safeguards instrumentation bus which is backed up by batteries and an inverter or equally reliable power supply, shall make necessary modifications and provide such a connection.
3.
All facilities are to develop and conduct a test, within 60 days of the issuance of this Bulletin, to verify that all extensions of the ENS located at your facility (ies) would remain fully operable from the facility (ies) to the NRC Operations Center in the event of a loss of offsite power to your facility (ies).
This is not intended
{
to mean that an actual loss of offsite power be executed.
L
o IE Bulletin No. 80-15 June 18, 1980 Page 2 of 2 4.
If it is determined that a station package requiring on-site power is'not connected to a safeguards instrumentation bus backed up by automatic transfer to batteries and an inverter or an equally reliable power supply, notify the NRC Operations Center via the ENS within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after such determination.
5.
Prepare and issue an administrative procedure or directive which requires notification to the NRC Operations Center by commercial telephone or relayed message within one hour of the time that one or more extensions of the ENS located at your facility (ies) is subsequently found to be inoperable for any reason.
6.
Provide a written report, within 75 days of the issuance of this Bulletin, describing the result of the reviews required by items 1 and 2 above, the results of the testing required by item 3 and the procedures required by item 5.
This information is requested under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f).
Accordingly, you are requested to provide within the time periods specified in item 6 above, written statements of the above information, signed under oath or affirmation.
Reports shall be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy forwarded to the Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
20555-.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072): clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Enclosures:
1.
Facilities With " Hotline" Powered By Local Telephone Company 2.
Facilities With " Hotline" Using On-Site Power
o Facilities With " Hotline" Powered By Local Telephone Company Region I B&W Leechburg/ Apollo Beaver. Valley 1 Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 Fitzpatrick Ginna Indian Point 2 Indian Point 3 Millstone 1 & 2 NFS-West Valley Nine Mile Point 1 Three Mile Island I & 2 TI-Attleboro Westinghouse Cheswick Region II Hatch I & 2 NFS-Erwin Region III Cook 1 & 2 Dresden 1, 2 & 3 Duane Arnold Kerr McGee Cresent La Crosse Monticello' Palisades Point Beach I & 2 Quad Cities 1 & 2 Region V Exxon Richland General Atomics LaJolla Rockwell Canoga Park San Onofre Trojan i
f a
Facilities With " Hotline" Using On-Site Power Region I Haddam Neck Maine Yankee Oyster Creek Peach Bottom 2 & 3 Pilgrim 1 Salem 1 & 2 UNC-Montville UNC-Wood River Junction Vermont Yankee Yankee Rowe Region II B&W LRC-Lynchburg B&W Navy-Lynchburg Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 Brunswick 1 & 2 Crystal River Farley 1 North Anna 1 & 2 Oconee 1, 2 & 3 Robinson 2 Sequoyah 1 St. Lucie 1 Surry 1 & 2 Turkey Point 3 & 4 i
Region III i
Big Rock Point Davis-Besse Kewaunee Prairie Island I & 2 Zion 1 & 2 Region IV Arkansas Nuclear One, 1&2 Cooper a
Fort Calhoun Fort St. Vrain 1
Region V Diablo Canyon Rancho Seco l'
L. :
i k
IE Bulletin No. 80-15 Enclosure June 18, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subj ect Date Issued Issued To No.
80-15 Possible Loss of Emergency 6/18/80 All nuclear power and Notification System (ENS) fuel facilities holding With Loss of Offsite Power OLs 80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWR's with an Discharge Volume Capability OL 80-13 Cracking In Core Spray 5/12/80 All BWR's with an Spargers OL 80-12 Decay Heat Removal System 5/9/80 Each PWR with an OL Operability 80-11 Masonry Wall Design 5/8/80 All power reactor facilities with an OL, except Trojan 80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All power reactor Nonradioactive System and facilities with an Resulting Potential for OL or CP Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 All power reactor Deficiencies operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All power reactors with Liner Penetration Welds a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980 80-07 BWR Jet Pump Assembly 4/4/80 All GE BWR-3 and Failure BWR-4 facilities with an OL 79-03A Longitudinal Weld Defects 4/4/80 All power reactor In ASME SA-312 Type 304 facilities with an Stainless Steel Pipe OL or CP 80-06 Engineered Safety Feature 3/13/80 All power reactor (ESF) Reset Controls facilities with an OL 80-05 Vacuum Condition Resulting 3/10/80 All PWR power reacter In Damage To Chemical Volume facilities holding Control System (CVCS) Holdup OLs and to those with Tanks a CP L