ML19326C384

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 2 to License DPR-51

ML19326C384
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	05/21/1974
From:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML19326C376	List: ML19326C375 ML19326C379 ML19326C381 ML19326C382 ML19326C384
References
NUDOCS 8004220924
Download: ML19326C384 (4)

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1-letters detei Jcnuary 17, 1973 cr4 1 arch Of, 19 7 5, Ar kc.ts c a r. I-ove r anc

1. i t h t Connary recc.:sted charpes tc the lechnical 1.pecificctions errenied to Fccility Operat ine license :o. LFT-51 for tiw Arkentas Neelcar tre -

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The proposed chan: es involved both Apperdix A and Appenci; E Techtical Speci t icot ions.

Cnly those charrea relst.d to Armendi:: A hchnic:1 Specificatiers are discussed in this resort sr4 irvulve:

1.

Oo'.e irm th e $ pe r c en t xv e r reve r t r i p for e t i en f re.m

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act in tat r:t tve to - :torat te cent rol.

2.

reletine the Cere Fisociee T rk (CFT) instrur.entation frm-frecificctiec 3.3.5 f or v a tttenmice previsionc.

3.

recrearine tbe arcrat icral pter id aler.ce envelope te be ce ret it le ',ith t he rcerir um allovable setpcirts fer the receter t ret ect ian sys t er.

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ricrrin tLe testit.r re cu t rere n t e for ths. ' w s y Pe..t i s.-crol S v-t e. ( n K )'isclstien selves.

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L.iarity:ne c e serrlint. cot on e,.y s i s tre rivency reeuire: eats by the c4 ition of fh, tnotes to Table 4.1-3.

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,Ca m ir'.U o.t<*ctine re cu i re~e r t s for the e.errerey e.C r,rearrel h0LCh:dCet SetIS.

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TISCUSSION

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Durine our review of the proposed changes, we determined that additional chances to related technical specifications were necessory to irrple: rent and clarify the proposed changes.

These aJditional changes were discussed

.:.::.y vith and' agreed to by the ANO-1 staff cenbers and involve:

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Redefining the reactor coolant system activity limits for total specific activity and cddicg a limit for radiciodine activity.

Eri 2.

Fevriting Specifications 3.3.5, 3.3.6 and 3.3.7 to cor'bine all

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conditions for component ocintenance of stated systees into one specification and establishing specifications to define actions

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to be taken if limiting conditions for operation of stated systers cennot be vet.

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3.

reducins; the seconcary coolant sy st er.: licit for radiciodine cetivity.

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4.

Adding setpoints for I+PS isoletion valve closure and LES

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relief velve orening.

5.

Changing einieu= sampling rnd analysis frequency cnd tests to be perforced on reactor coolant and secondary coolant relating to activity limits.

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/dding a test for dissolved gases on reacter ecolent. consistent uith Specification 3.1.9.1.

7.

Teleting test s for Sr-09, Er-90, tritica and gross ciphc activity on reactor coolcnt end for pross betc-par.a activity en secondcry coolant.

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Chcoginp ana tysis require: ert s in the footnotes to 7eble 4.1-3 for cctivity determicatione.

9.

Chenning the testing recuire-ents en the persocnel hatch cnd

-e ergency hatch outer door seals to neet Appendix J, 10CH Part 50.

The firct chcnre proposed by the licensee vecely incorporr.tes into the "rechnical Specifications c riodification preciously reviewed end approved by the cc nission in a letter dated Fet rucry 12, 1975.

Frerosed chenres

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2 and 3 are: correct ions to the specificctions-and bases necessary to elirtincte discrepancier.

Cbcore 4 is necester'. to tervit testin of the iPFS irolttion valves-at cppropriate presserer.

Chance 5 i.a recuired te omet>

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clarity the intent of'sanpling requirerents and reasurenents.

Changes 6 cod 7 would increase the surveillance require =ents by changing the acceptance testing ~for the' personnel hatch and emergency hatch door

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seals and battery charpers.

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Cur evaluation of the changen proposed by the licensee and added by the

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E 1.2 staf f which were agreed to by the licensee is as follows:

r.:: xg (1) Table'2.3 Our review of'the reactor protectice system (KPS) l rddifieatidn as given in the sefety evaluation appended to our letter

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dated February 12, 1975, for the shutdown bypass circuitry codification

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concluded that the r:odificction did not effect any other safety related 7

system, sctisfied the recuirements of IEC Std 279-1c71 and enhenced

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"E safety by replacine an administrative control function with an cuto-catic control function.

This chance to the technical specification

[.ll7 reflects' completion of this approved IGS rodificcticn cod is acceptable.

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(2)

Se. c t i.on. 3.1. 4.,.. ' Fe s c. t o. r Co.ola.n, t. S. ys t em. A. c. t. ivit y - We r.erforred a reanalysis of the postulated double-ended rupture of c steam penerator tube u::ing current entlyt ical -odels and ceteorological parareters es discucced in the bases to the new specifications.

This anclysis unc perforced to determine the acceptable specific activity limite for rr.diciodine in both the recctor coolant cycten and secondary

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coolant systee.

'th e r,pecific act ivity limits tor the recctor coolant have been defined in tern s of rass (ptcrs) rather thon volu=e E

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(orilliliter) as previously used to eliminate possible error in defininn B

tereperature and pressure associated with the senrele volume.

Tae half-g.g.

life limitalien valve ws deleted from the sncification since this

,.x parameter does not change the possible exposure frer cloud passage of a riven rrdioirotopic mixture. Uowever, the c inirum tire for decay enroute fren the source to the necrest site boundary for the assumed reteorologiccl conditions chould tie considered during the sceple rr snelysis end ic discussed later.

A reouirerent has been added to the kx rpecificatior. unicb specifies the actions te be taken if the snecific f

cetivity limits are exceeded.

Such recuire=ents vere not previously

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!~l included in the specit icat ion. The specific setivity lieit for radio-iodine was not previously defined for the reactor coolart.

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limits nre defined for stecdy state recetor cenditions cr:d do not 11 h

reflect tossible spikint conditions associated with transient recctor conditions.

Such conditions are c'onsidered' Icter for surveillcr.ca En

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requirc ents.

The niniritin rotio deterrined between the radiciodine h==

erecific activity for the reactor coolcnt cnd the secondary coolant wc::: conservatively assessed on.the basis of the raximun allowable

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leckere trite ~ of _1 spe be t ween' the - prinary c.ud :ecendary systens cr.d e*ncn *

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..as the half-life of I-131 for equilibrium conditions.

The actual

==. 226 rat io of radioiodine specific activity in the reactor coolant to the secondary coolant would be expected to be significantly greater than the calculated value of 20 to 1.

(3)

Specifications 3.3.5, 3.3.6 and 3.3.7 - The changes delete the CFT pressire 'and"12vei' instru5entat' ion from the list of systems E

for which provisions have been made for maintenance.

The restric-tions on this system are delineated in Specification 3.3.3(D).'

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Exceptions to Specification 3.3.6 conditions given in Specification

..h 3.3.7 rtovide adequate relief for performing necessary maintenance ~

functions on both the CFT and Borated Water Storage Tanks (bWST) instrument chcnnels.

Therefore, deletion of the CFT pressure

~77 and level instrumentation from the maintenance aspect of Specification

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3.3.5 does not affect the safety of the syctem or reactor operations j((

ard therefore is acceptable.

Continued reactor operation for 9

ceven days with inoperable inst runent channels in the CET and L.

EWST systems as given in Specification 3.3.7 is consistent with I.:I except;ons pernit ted for instrument channels in similar systens N

rnd there ore is acceptoble.

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Specificction 3.5.1.7 - This added specification delineates the cppropriate L5hS" iso' lation valve closure setpoints on the suction line to assure proper operation of the DHRS when required and the EliPS relief valve setting necessary to protect the system against overprescure.

Proper settings for these valves would be verified during the testing and calibration required by Table 4.1-1.

(5) _Ficure ro. 3.5.2 The chcoge in the permissive operatine region for power ir. balance reduces the allowable operation to be coa.petible with the protective system maximua allowable setpoints.

~4 The change to this figure does not change the allowable reactor operation since the reactor had to be operated within the more restrictive linits established for the reactor protective syster.

The charre is acceptable.

(6)

Sec t, ion 3.10, " Secondary System Act ivi t y' - he have reanalyzed the steam generctor tube rupture as previously analyzed in the Eases to Stecification 3.1.4.1 and cs analyzed in the Bases for the change to Specification 3.1.4.1 to deternine reactor and secondary coolant activity linit, e loss oi lond incident as previously analyzed in the Fares to this Specification to determine the secondary system N

netivity lieit and a steam line break accident outside containment.

t:cina the secondary coolant activity limit determined trem the stece generator tube rupture as presented in the bases for the reactor coelent system activity. Section 3.1.4, the thyroid doses g.; a w.4 L b

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